SECRETARY OR GENERAL?

THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S DIPLOMATIC

INTERVENTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL

CONFLICTS

A DISSERTATION

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
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I certify that I have read the dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation focuses on the diplomatic role of the United Nations Secretary-General in international conflicts, and examines the following question: does the Secretary-General live up to his mandate of serving the collective interests of all U.N. member-states without bias and as called for in Articles 99 and 100 of the U.N. Charter? Specifically, are his intervention patterns determined more by P-5 parochial interests or by U.N. Charter dictates? Also, just how autonomous are the Secretary-General's interventions? Granted that he sometimes intervenes on his own initiative, do his autonomous interventions largely occur in peripheral conflicts that do not elicit P-5 interests, or do they also occur in conflicts that affect parochial P-5 interests? I utilize both quantitative and qualitative research methods to answer these questions.

At the core of my quantitative research was an original data collection effort that brought together information on every public Secretary-General diplomatic intervention in civil wars, militarized inter-state disputes, and international crises since 1945, along with information on whether the intervention was approved by the U.N. Security Council. I was able to create a set of variables indicating whether and to what extent the Secretary-General intervened in a conflict, and also whether or not he intervened based on a mandate from the Security Council. The empirical analysis centered around a series of regression models designed to search for evidence of autonomy in (a) the Secretary-General's responsiveness to indicators of conflict severity and (b) actions undertaken by the Secretary-General without Security Council authorization- specifically, whether such actions were constrained by variables that capture parochial P-5 interests. The ultimate goal of the regression analyses was to ascertain which set of variables, realist or institutionalist, best account for the Secretary-General's patterns of intervention, and to what degree the Secretary-General resorts to autonomous mechanisms of intervention whenever Security Council authorization is not granted.

Results from the quantitative analysis show that for both inter-state conflicts and civil wars, indicators of conflict severity are significantly better predictors of the Secretary-General's public intervention behavior than are measures of parochial P-5 interests. I also find strong evidence of autonomy in the civil war and inter-state conflict data: Secretaries-General were more likely to make autonomous diplomatic interventions during instances of P-5 animosity/deadlock than during instances of relative P-5 unanimity; additionally, the autonomous interventions were less beholden to parochial P-5 interests when compared to Security Council approved interventions. This set of findings lends some credence to the principal-agent theory prediction that an agent is more likely to assert autonomy whenever multiple principals are in deadlock. The findings also indicate that the Office of the Secretary-General does, to a significant extent, live up to its U.N. Charter obligations, and may not be the P-5 lackey that a lot of its critics label it to be.

The qualitative phase of my research consisted of two parts: first I accessed anecdotal archival information primarily from the declassified papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations- all Secretaries-General with the exception of Kurt Waldheim, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and current office holder Ban Ki-Moon have declassified their papers. These previously unavailable papers contain documents such as the Secretary-General's private communications with world leaders, press conference transcripts, speeches and lectures outside of U.N. Headquarters, as well as internal U.N. inter-office memos. I then conducted extensive in-person interviews with various senior staffers in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and the Department of Political Affairs at the United Nations Secretariat. This qualitative research helped confirm as well as contextualize the outlined quantitative findings.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to begin by thanking the handful of individuals without whom this dissertation would not have been possible. First and foremost, I would like to thank the members of my doctoral committee:

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Aside from my doctoral committee, there are other individuals in the Stanford Political Science Department who I would like to thank for their moral support- first of all the following faculty members: Phillip Lipscy, Josiah Ober, Mike Tomz, Jim Fearon, Josh Cohen, Debra Satz, Larry Diamond, Stephen Krasner, Beatrize Magaloni, and Karen Jusko. I would also like to thank the staff members in the Political Science Main Office: Jackie Sargent, Chandelle Arambula, Hana Meckler, Judy Low, Eliana Vasquez, Stephanie Burbank, and Jennifer Radley.

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

1.1: Introductory Remarks

The thesis focuses on the diplomatic role of the United Nations Secretary-General, and examines the intensity as well as autonomy of his interventions in international conflicts. The primary question being studied is the following: to what extent does the U.N. Secretary-General live up to his mandate of serving the collective interests of all U.N. member-states without bias and as called for in Articles 99 and 100 of the U.N. Charter? Specifically, are his intervention patterns determined more by P-5 parochial interests (as realist would expect), or by U.N. Charter dictates (as institutionalists would expect)? Also, just how autonomous are the Secretary-General's interventions? Granted that he sometimes intervenes in conflicts on his own initiative, under what circumstances does he assert such autonomy? Do his autonomous interventions largely occur in peripheral conflicts that do not elicit P-5 interest (as realists would expect), or do they also occur in conflicts that affect parochial P-5 interests (as institutionalists would expect)?

The Secretary-General's conflict diplomacy role has evolved to become the most important aspect of his job. Loosely referred to as his "good offices", this role is defined as one that "involves steps taken publicly and in private, drawing upon the Secretary-General's independence, impartiality and integrity, to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading."[1] In recent years, U.N. member-states

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[1] This definition is paraphrased from the Secretary-General's website. "Good Offices" is the definition provided on the U.N. Secretary-General's website. This term has its roots in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. Articles 2 and 3 of both Conventions stipulate that conflicting states have recourse, in as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers. See Thomas M. Franck, "The Secretary-General's Role in Conflict Resolution: Past, Present and Pure Conjecture," *European Journal of International Law* 6, no. 1 (January 01, 1995): 2. The most salient examples of the Secretary-General's good offices interventions include successful mediation endeavors in Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Central America, and also interstate conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war.

have enhanced the Secretary-General's legal and practical framework for intervening in international conflicts through, inter alia, the 1998 creation of a Deputy Secretary-General position to handle the administrative aspects of the Secretariat while granting the Secretary-General more space for diplomatic interventions, and the 2008 creation of a Mediation Support Unit at the U.N. Secretariat.[2]

What is rather unclear however is the nature and extent of the Secretary-General's autonomy from the member-states, in particular the P-5 states. The U.N. Charter is ambiguous on this question: on the one hand, it states that the Secretary-General shall be appointed by and answer to the member-states.[3] On the other hand, the Charter also places a lot of emphasis on the Secretary-General's autonomy and impartiality by asserting in its Article 100 that "the Secretary-General should not seek or receive instructions from any government or outside authority, and governments must undertake to respect the exclusively international character of his responsibilities."[4] This ambiguity has led to a continuous tension[5] that accompanies the Secretary-General's diplomatic interventions: he would face enormous challenges if he did not

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[2] The Department of Political Affairs was formed after a 1992 meeting of Security Council members at the level of Heads of State and Government (the first ever meeting of its kind); the meeting formally advocated greater use of the Secretary-General's good offices. Another example of the expanding role of the SG was General Assembly Resolution 43/51 passed in 1988, which affirmed U.N. member states' support for the Secretary-General's "Good Offices" initiatives (paragraph 20).

[3] As a matter of fact, it is the P-5 states that effectively appoint/fire the Secretary-General; the General Assembly usually rubber-stamps P-5 decisions on Secretary-General appointments. Chapter XV of the U.N. Charter states: "The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council...and shall be the Chief Administrative Officer of the organization. He shall act in that capacity and perform "such other functions as are entrusted" to him or her by the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and other United Nations organs."

[4] Direct quote from Article 100 of the U.N. Charter—see United Nations Secretariat, "Charter of the United Nations," http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (accessed June 5, 2012). The U.N. Charter also empowers the Secretary-General to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security"(Article 99) - hinting at his independent judgment and action. These guidelines both define the powers of the Secretary-General's Office and grant it considerable scope for action.

[5] The term "continuous tension" is actually used on the official website of the Secretary-General to describe the complexity of his having to balance his advocacy of U.N. Charter with the fact that those principles may sometimes clash with the parochial interests of some member-states- see United Nations Department of Public Information, "The Role of the Secretary-General," http://www.un.org/sg/sg_role.shtml (accessed May 3, 2014).

take into careful account the concerns of (especially the powerful) member-states; at the same time, he must also uphold the moral and legal authority of the United Nations Charter, even at the risk, from time to time, of challenging or disagreeing with those same member-states.[6]

The thesis singles out the P-5 from the rest of the member-states because they are the most powerful countries at the United Nations: they are the only countries that have veto powers and therefore have the ultimate say on the U.N. Security Council's agenda as well as the Secretary-General's appointment/re-appointment; additionally, they are among the U.N.'s largest financial and logistical contributors, accounting for much of the oversight on the organization's work. The national interest of individual P-5 states may sometimes be (and often is) at odds with that of other P-5 states, as well as with the collective interests of all U.N. member-states.[7] So how does the Secretary-General navigate the difficult course of reconciling these sets of interests? This is a question that remains largely unanswered, and the thesis sets out to fill this knowledge vacuum, along the way using principal-agent delegation theory as a theoretical basis.

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[6] See Ibid. for more on the Secretary-General's job description. On Article 99 of the U.N. Charter mentioned in the preceding footnote, this Article in particular is considered the fundamental legal basis of the Secretary-General's political role. Although its explicit invocation has been extremely rare, what has happened instead has been a tendency among Secretaries General to develop a parallel practice based on the "spirit" of this provision. Articles 98 and 99 basically refer to several executive functions and powers of the Secretary-General. The political influence of these functions and powers may vary considerably according to different factors such as the state of world affairs, the personality of the Secretary-General, the interpretation of the article prevailing at the time, and others- for more on this particular line of thought, see Jorge E. Vinuales, *Can the UN Secretary-General Say "no": Revisiting the "Peking Formula"* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 2006).

[7] Chapter 1 of the U.N. Charter, entitled *Purposes and Principles*, describes the most important function of the U.N. organization as follows: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace..." and also "to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends..." See United Nations Secretariat, *Charter of the United Nations.*

The thesis specifically focuses on the Secretary-General's public diplomatic interventions in militarized interstate disputes, international crises, and civil wars; it is not examining his public interventions in thematic and/or other transnational realms of international politics (such as international health, economic development, and humanitarian issues). The thesis is also not examining the Secretary-General's public interventions in crises emanating from internal U.N. bureaucratic politics (e.g. 1950s-1960s Security Council debacles triggered by contentious U.N. membership candidacies at the height of the Cold War). Thus, the thesis is not at all an exhaustive study of the full breadth and scope of the Secretary-General's public diplomacy; rather, it is a limited analysis focusing only on his interventions in international conflicts and crises.

1.2: Preview of Main Findings

The thesis main findings are as follows:

Results from the quantitative analysis show that indicators of conflict severity in both inter-state conflicts and civil wars are significantly better predictors of the Secretary-General's intervention behavior than measures of parochial P-5 interests. In other words, U.N. Charter dictates outperform P-5 parochial interest when it comes to explaining the Secretary-General's public intervention patterns.

I also find strong evidence of autonomy in both the civil war and inter-state conflict data: Secretaries-General were more likely to make autonomous diplomatic interventions during instances/periods of P-5 deadlock than during instances/periods of relative P-5 unanimity; additionally, the autonomous interventions were less beholden to parochial P-5 interests when compared to Security Council approved interventions. Part of the main drive for these results is evidently the "Hammarskjöld effect"- the pattern of behavior inaugurated by Dag Hammarskjöld whereby the Secretary-General made high profile diplomatic intervention without approval from,

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and often against the expressed opposition of one or more P-5 states. Collectively, this set of findings lends some credence to the principal-agent theory prediction that an agent is more likely to assert autonomy whenever multiple principals are in deadlock. The findings also indicate that contrary to realist expectations, the Secretary-General's Office may not be a lackey of the P-5.

The validity of these quantitative results was buttressed by the qualitative portion of the research project. Archival U.N. information as well as extensive in-person interviews with senior staffers at the United Nations Secretariat in New York, revealed an aspect of autonomy that is very difficult to capture in quantitative models: instances where the Secretary-General receives an intervention mandate from the Security Council, but then goes on to either stretch or outright disregard the scope of that mandate. In other words, the quantitative results provide strong evidence of autonomy even though my coding only captures formal autonomy as opposed to the de facto autonomy that the Secretary-General may exert in cases of formal authorization; ultimately <u>understating</u> the true extent of the autonomy. Aside from this utility, the qualitative research also helped contextualize the theoretical underpinnings as well as quantitative findings in this dissertation.

1.3: Thesis Roadmap

The roadmap of the thesis is as follows: I begin by highlighting the theoretical and empirical significance of the thesis, as well as providing a synthetic literature review. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background to the project, in particular, the use of principal-agent theory, an exposition of the dynamics and complexities at play whenever states delegate to IOs, and ultimately the construction of our main hypotheses. Chapter 3 profiles the Office of the Secretary-General from a historical and methodological perspective. Chapter 4 showcases statistical as well as qualitative evidence (covering the 1946-2000s) on the question of the Secretary-General's broader intervention patterns in both inter-state conflicts and civil wars. Chapter 5

repeats this procedure for the question of the Secretary-General's autonomy, again complete with a qualitative evidence section.

Chapter 6, the case studies chapter, focuses on three main case studies designed to showcase the importance of the Secretary-General's conflict diplomacy: the U.S.-China Crisis of 1954-1955, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the Lebanon Hostages Crisis of the late 1980s/early 1990s. These case studies have been selected based on the following criteria: 1) they all impinged on the strong parochial interest of a P-5 state; 2) the Secretary-General intervened without a mandate from the Security Council; and 3) the diplomatic intervention was ultimately successful and publicly lauded by the crisis actors, including the P-5 state in question. Chapter 7 summarizes the main contributions of the dissertation, highlights its policy implications, and makes recommendations for future researchers on this topic. The appendices list the Secretary-General's intervention cases in international crises and civil wars.

1.4: Theoretical and Empirical Significance of the Thesis

The thesis makes at least four original contributions to the field of international relations:

A rigorous quantitative study of the U.N. Secretary-General's interventions in international conflicts has important ramifications for the ongoing debate between realists and institutionalists on the significance and autonomy of international organizations (IOs). If the scope of the Secretary-General's diplomatic interventions in international conflicts and crises is determined more by P-5 geo-strategic interests and less by the resulting levels of violence, human suffering, and threat to international peace and security, then this would support the contention made by some realist scholars that institutions such as the U.N. (and by implication, the Office of the Secretary-General) are mere vehicles for the advancement of the parochial interests of

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their most powerful member-states.[8] Conversely, evidence that the Secretary-General's intervention patterns do in fact reflect the norms, rules, and principles articulated in the U.N. Charter would support the institutionalist claim that IOs such as the U.N. enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from the parochial interests of their most powerful member-states.[9]

Of particular note is the fact that this study takes the unprecedented step of comparing and contrasting two intra-U.N. sets of institutions as far as the politics behind the Secretary-General's diplomatic interventions are concerned. Unlike previous quantitative studies on the extent of P-5 influence on U.N. conflict interventions such as Gilligan & Stedman[10] and Beardsley & Schmidt,[11] this thesis goes beyond the question of "where and when" the interventions occur, as outlined in the previous paragraph, and takes the additional step of differentiating "autonomous" from "P-5 sanctioned" interventions in its search for a better answer to the autonomy question. In this way, the thesis sheds more light on whether his Office can truly be portrayed as an "autonomous broker" whose actions are reflective of the U.N.'s organizational mandate of acting as an impartial global peacemaker.

Practically, this study will be of use to policy makers and scholars who seek a greater understanding of the role of the U.N. Secretary-General. Despite the obvious

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[8] This sentence is a paraphrase from the text of Kyle Beardsley and Holger Schmidt, "Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (March, 2012): 33-49. See also John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter, 1994): 5-49, and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer, 2000): 5-41 for expositions of this view.

[9] Among others, see Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (Autumn, 1999): 699-732; Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power : Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 270, and Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (Summer, 1995): 39-51.

[10] Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, "Where do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003): 37-54.
[11] Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002*, 33-49.

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importance of the Office on the global stage, empirical knowledge about the determinants of the Secretary-General's intervention efforts remains underdeveloped. Recent quantitative work on U.N. interventions has largely focused on the realm of the U.N. Security Council's work, especially peacekeeping. A deeper understanding of the determinants of the Secretary-General's intervention patterns could serve as a methodological precondition for developing accurate assessments of the effectiveness of his, and by implication of overall U.N. conflict management activities.[12] Analyses that fail to account for the process by which third parties select what conflicts to intervene in are likely to produce biased estimates of the efficacy of the resulting intervention efforts.[13]

Further (empirically speaking), little is known about the U.N. Secretary-General's proclivity for impartiality when it comes to his choices (and in this instance, especially the autonomous choices) of which conflicts to intervene in. Recent studies have shown that impartiality and bias play an important role in determining the success of third-party conflict management efforts.[14] While the U.N. Secretary-General, as the world's foremost international diplomat, is often assumed to act with a high degree of impartiality, this assumption has remained largely untested, and what little systematic evidence there is raises serious questions about its accuracy.[15] This thesis sets out to settle those questions.

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[12] For more on this particular point, see Ibid. This sentence is paraphrased from that paper.

[13] See again Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002*, 33-49.

[14] Among others, see Katja Favretto, "Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias," *The American Political Science Review* 103, no. 2 (May, 2009): 248-263; Andrew Kydd, "Which Side are You on? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4 (Oct., 2003): 597-611; Andrew H. Kydd, "When can Mediators Build Trust?" *The American Political Science Review* 100, no. 3 (Aug., 2006): 449-462; Robert W. Rauchhaus, "Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management," *World Politics* 58, no. 2 (Jan., 2006): 207-241; Burcu Savun, "Information, Bias, and Mediation Success," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (Mar., 2008): 25-47.

[15] See Michelle Benson and Nil S. Satan, "Choosing Sides: U.N. Resolutions and Non-Neutrality," in *International Conflict Mediation : New Approaches and Findings*, eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner, Vol. 3 (London ;New York: Routledge, 2009), 135-156.

1.5: Synthetic Literature Review

Over the last two decades, there has been a proliferation of literature on United Nations interventions in international conflicts. This is partly because IR scholars have become increasingly sensitive to the fact that any valid analysis of the effectiveness of third-party conflict management efforts necessitates a thorough understanding of the conditions under which intervention occurs.[16] As Fortna,[17] Gilligan & Sergenti,[18] and others have shown, failing to account for the non-random assignment of UN intervention efforts to conflicts is likely to produce biased inferences about the effectiveness of these efforts. The most rigorously studied aspect (in terms of quantitative analysis) of U.N. interventions thus far has been in the realm of peacekeeping. Analyses of other types of U.N. interventions such as the Secretary-General's "good offices" have been almost entirely qualitative in nature.

The work that is most similar to this project in terms of scope and methodology is by Beardsley and Schmidt[19] who examined the determinants of U.N. involvement in international crises, broadly speaking, and compared "organizational mission" and "P-5 parochial interests" explanatory models. Their findings indicated that measures of crisis severity are better predictors of U.N. intervention behavior than measures of P-5 interests. Beardsley and Schmidt built on previous work by Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel[20] who set out to determine the long term effects of U.N. interventions (without differentiating P-5 from organizational interests) and examined the incidence of

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[16] see Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002*, 33-49.

[17] Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (Jun., 2004): 269-292; Virginia Page Fortna, "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects," *World Politics* 56, no. 4 (Jul., 2004): 481-519; Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? : Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), 214.

[18] Michael J. Gilligan and Ernest J. Sergenti, "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? using Matching to Improve Causal Inference," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 2 (2008): 89-122.

[19] Kyle Beardsley and Holger Schmidt. "Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002." *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (March, 2012): 33-49.

[20] Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider and Paul R. Hensel, "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict," *International Organization* 50, no. 4 (Autumn, 1996): 683-700

recurring conflict between state dyads following a crisis. Overall, Diehl et al. argued that U.N. intervention has proved ineffective in inhibiting, delaying, or lessening the severity of future conflicts, and that the U.N. needs alternative long-term strategies.

This dissertation however differentiates itself from Beardsley and Schmidt (as well as Diehl et al.) in four ways: first, both Beardsley/Schmidt and Diehl et al. use an ordinal dependent variable created by the International Crisis Behavior Project for the widely-used ICB dataset; their dependent variable focuses heavily on the work of the U.N. Security Council including peacekeeping and peace enforcement. My dependent variable on the other hand is a product of an original data collection effort, focuses exclusively on the Secretary-General's diplomatic work, and codes elements of U.N. conflict intervention that the International Crisis Behavior project did not capture, e.g. SRSG interventions.

Second, unlike Beardsley and Schmidt, I go beyond just measuring the responsiveness of a broad U.N. intervention dependent variable to "organizational mission" and "P-5 interest" variables, and instead go a step further to code a second dependent variable that differentiates autonomous interventions (specifying varying degrees of autonomy) from interventions authorized by the Security Council. I place my comparison of these two sets of intra-U.N. institutions at the core of my research project. Third, and as an extension of the second point, my testing of the autonomy dependent variable is more rigorous: I develop and test hypotheses that predict opposite effects for the same independent variables, thereby pitting traditional principal-agent theory against realist expectations.

Fourth, I use a broader universe of cases: whereas both Beardsley/Schmidt and Diehl et al. use a curtailed 270-observation version of the ICB international crisis data, I use my original data to create a 1470-observation dataset based on the Correlates of War dyadic MID data; I also use the ICB data, revised and updated with my original data, but only as a robustness check. I also test my dependent variables in a third dataset

that focuses exclusively on civil wars and is based on the Sambanis and Doyle civil war data. Thus, unlike Beardsley/Schmidt and Diehl et al., my universe of cases captures all realms of international conflict: militarized inter-state disputes, international crises, and civil wars, and makes a claim at providing a better and more robust answer to the question of U.N. autonomy.

The Beardsley/Schmidt and Diehl et al. pieces aside, the following is the most notable literature on the work of the U.N. in international conflict:

On peacekeeping operations, several recent studies have examined the conditions under which the U.N. is most likely to deploy peacekeeping missions.[21] Collectively, these studies indicate (1) that the U.N. tends to intervene in the most difficult and violent cases; (2) that the U.N. is less likely to send peacekeepers into conflicts that directly involve P-5 members or other powerful states; and (3) that U.N. peacekeeping is biased in favor of certain regions of the world, in particular Europe and the Western Hemisphere.[22] Although these studies have contributed to a greater understanding of how peacekeeping intervention choices are made, they suffer from two major limitations.

First, the peacekeeping literature has focused almost exclusively on intra-state conflicts. An important exception is Page-Fortna's work[23] on the determinants of

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[21] Among others, see Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 424; Fortna, *Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects*, 481-519; Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War*, 269-292; Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? : Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War*, 214; Gilligan and Sergenti, *Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? using Matching to Improve Causal Inference*, 89-122; and Mark J. Mullenbach, "Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 3 (Sep., 2005): 529-555.

[22] See Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002*, 33-49.

[23] Fortna, *Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects*, 481-519.

inter-state peacekeeping. DeRouen,[24] although primarily interested in analyzing the outcome of UN intervention efforts, also offers some analysis of the conditions under which the UN is more likely to involve itself in international crises. The main point here is that while the emphasis on intra-state conflicts is understandable in light of the prevalence of internal conflicts after the cold war, direct inter-state conflicts still occur, e.g. Ethiopia vs. Eritrea 1999, and also indirect ones in the form of proxy civil wars, e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo. Equally important, many intrastate conflicts have a significant interstate dimension, e.g. Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the recent Russo-Georgian war over South Ossetia.

Second, it has overlooked other important intervention strategies that are available to the U.N., such as the diplomatic role of the Secretary-General. Indeed, recent research has reaffirmed the belief that peacekeeping and enforcement missions are not the only forms of intervention that can make an effective contribution to conflict management. For instance, a number of studies have shown that third party mediation can have tangible effects on conflict resolution. De Rouen,[25] for example, shows that after accounting for selection effects, low-level tactics such as mediation and calls for action significantly contribute to conflict abatement.[26] Wilkenfeld et al.[27] successfully demonstrated that mediated crises are characterized by compromise among crisis actors are more likely to end in agreements, and show a tendency toward long-term tension reduction.[28] Other studies that have argued for mediation as an efficacious peacemaking tool include William Dixon, Regan & Stam, Barbara Walter, Beardsley et al., Wilkenfeld et al., Regan & Aydin, Frazier & Dixon, Robert Rauchhaus, and Isak Svensson.[29]

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[24] Karl Derouen Jr, "The Role of the UN in International Crisis Termination, 1945-1994," *Defence and Peace Economics* 14, no. 4 (08/01; 2014/04, 2003): 251-260.

[25] Ibid.

[26] See also Jacob Bercovitch and Scott Sigmund Gartner, *International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings*, Vol. 3 (London ;New York: Routledge, 2009), 311.

[27] Jonathan Wilkenfeld and others, "Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and Experimental Perspectives," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 3 (Jun., 2003): 279-301.

[28] See Ibid.

[29] William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 1 (Mar., 1994): 14-32; William J. Dixon, "Third-Party Techniques for

There is however no unanimity in international relations literature about the effectiveness of mediation- some studies have questioned its efficacy as a conflict resolution strategy. For example, Gartner & Bercovitch[30] found that mediation attempts in international conflicts do poorly when compared to negotiation attempts. Similarly, Smith & Stam[31] argued that, absent the manipulation of conflict costs and benefits, mediators have little potential to affect the resolution process. Other authors have also cast doubt on the ability of the mediation strategy to guarantee log-term peace after cessation of hostilities. For example, Werner[32] successfully argued that, *inter alia*, mediation has no impact on the duration of peace after war. Similarly, Werner & Yuen[33] found that cease-fires after third-party pressure to end war are much shorter lived than uninterrupted conflict bargaining. Such disagreements notwithstanding, the ubiquitous literature on mediation demonstrates that concentrating U.N. intervention analysis on peacekeeping missions alone is not only limiting from a substantive point of view, but also problematic in methodological terms, because it leads to a loss of valuable information about variation in the amount

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Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement," *International Organization* 50, no. 4 (Autumn, 1996): 653-681; Patrick M. Regan and Allan C. Stam, "In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (Jun., 2000): 239-260; Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace : The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 200; Kyle Beardsley, "Politics by Means Other than War: Understanding International Mediation" (Ph.D., University of California, San Diego); Jonathan Wilkenfeld and others, eds., *Mediating International Crises* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 235; Patrick M. Regan and Aysegul Aydin, "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 5 (Oct., 2006): 736-756; Derrick V. Frazier and William J. Dixon, "Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000," *International Interactions* 32, no. 4 (12/01; 2014/04, 2006): 385-408; Rauchhaus, *Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management*, 207-241; Isak Svensson, "Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (Mar., 2007): 177-194.

[30] Scott Sigmund Gartner and Jacob Bercovitch, "Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (Dec., 2006): 819-840.

[31] Alastair Smith and Allan Stam, "Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003): 115-135.

[32] Suzanne Werner, "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms," *American Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 3 (Jul., 1999): 912-934.

[33] Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, "Making and Keeping Peace," *International Organization* 59, no. 2 (Spring, 2005): 261-292.

of effort that the U.N. devotes to cases where its activities fall short of the deployment of a mission into the field.[34]

In the realm of peacemaking, Fortna[35] uses cooperation theory to assess ceasefire agreements and the durability of peace during inter-state conflicts.[36] She examines 48 ceasefire agreements in international wars ending between 1946 and 1997 and concludes that peacekeepers, demilitarized zones, third party guarantees, joint commissions for dispute resolution, and specificity in the peace agreements are all effective tools for peacemaking.[37] Eriksson and Wallensteen[38] credit aggressive post-Cold War U.N. peacemaking efforts for being partially responsible for the decline in interstate conflicts since 1991. However this quantitative peacemaking literature has not been specific enough in terms of addressing and assessing the U.N. Secretary-General's interventions.

The few studies assessing the diplomatic role of the U.N. Secretary-General have been largely prescriptive (as opposed to analytical), and have approached the subject from legal and policy angles with little if any quantitative analysis. A notable exception is Kent J. Kille,[39] who quantified the personalities of the different Secretaries-General from Trygve Lie to Kofi Annan and drew from political psychology to model their political influence and output, but did not systematically base her analyses on international conflicts as I am doing. I discuss her arguments in the institutionalist section of Chapter 2, but unlike her, I am not treating personality as a quantifiable variable. The next few paragraphs highlight the most significant qualitative works on the role of the U.N. Secretary-General.

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[34] See Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002*, 33-49.

[35] Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time : Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 243.

[36] The aim of Virginia Page Fortna's study was to counter prevailing realist assertions that states and international organizations cannot institute measures to overcome the obstacles to peace.

[37] Virginia Page Fortna, "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace After Civil and Interstate Wars," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003): 97.

[38] Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict, 1989-2003," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 5 (Sep., 2004): 625-636.

[39] Kent J. Kille, *From Manager to Visionary* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 308.

Vinuales[40] argues that the quantity of Secretary-General's diplomatic interventions has increased cumulatively in part due to increased and constant demand from member-states whereas, in contrast, U.N. involvement in military matters (specifically, U.N. peacekeeping) has been characterized by a "boom-bust" pattern. This study dwells mostly on the legal aspects of the Secretary-General's Good Offices, and does not delve into any analysis of actual historical intervention patterns, nor does it systematically analyze case studies.

Franck[41] opines that the extent to which the Secretary-General's peacemaking role will grow is largely dependent on two variables: personal variables (his/her ability to exude independence, influence, and outreach), and institutional variables (his/her ability to use the full potential of the U.N. and its related family of organizations and agencies to carry out his conflict resolution missions). Franck asserts that the Secretary-General needs to have at his disposal a sufficient trust fund to enable him to embark on credible mediation missions at his own initiative, and also a small, all-volunteer multinational force under his command that could be deployed for at least six months with the consent of the conflicting parties.[42]

Cockayne and Malone[43] offer a different perspective from Franck and argue that the most important variable for ensuring the effectiveness of the Secretary-General is active cooperation with and support from the P-5 states (and especially the United States when it comes to the post-1990 unipolar setting in which the P-5 states have tended to converge towards unanimity on the Security Council). They further argue that the Secretary-General needs to balance global geopolitical realities (the

[40] Vinuales, *Can the UN Secretary-General Say "no": Revisiting the "Peking Formula"*

[41] Franck, *The Secretary-General's Role in Conflict Resolution: Past, Present and Pure Conjecture*, 360-387.

[42] Ibid., 386. According to Edward C. Luck, "The Secretary-General in a Unipolar World," in *Secretary Or General? : The U.N. Secretary-General in World Politics*, ed. Simon Chesterman (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 218, this proposal, when made by Boutros-Boutros Ghali, drew the ire of the U.S. Government.

[43] James Cockayne and David M. Malone, "Relations with the Security Council," in *Secretary Or General? : The U.N. Secretary-General in World Politics*, ed. Simon Chesterman (Cambridge ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 69-85.

indispensable power and influence of the P-5 states) with the need to avoid being seen as just an instrument of the great powers, in which case his independent authority would lose legitimacy in the eyes of the non-P-5 states.[44] This leaves open the empirical question of this thesis.

Luck[45] studies the often tense relationship between post-Cold War Secretaries-General and the United States. He contrasts what he sees as America's "custodial attitude" vis-à-vis the U.N. and also "exceptionalism" vis-à-vis the rest of the world, with post-Cold War Secretaries-General' attempts to steer the U.N. towards an independent and more democratic path. Luck argues that one of the ways to minimize these tensions is for future Secretaries-General to limit the scope of their activities to just the essential capacities of the United Nations itself.[46] He notes that post-Cold War Secretaries-General have thus far tended to "take on too much" by "combining the taxing jobs of global norm entrepreneur, moral arbiter of the world's states and peoples, and public balancer of the competing agendas of disparate member-states", with the end result of achieving too little in terms of putting either the U.N. or the Office of the Secretary-General itself on a sustainable and viable footing.[47]

These studies aside, there is currently a dearth of literature in terms of a rigorous quantitative analysis of the Secretary-General's interventions in international conflicts, and the thesis sets out to fill this void.

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[44] Ibid., 69
[45] Luck, *The Secretary-General in a Unipolar World*, 202-231.
[46] Ibid., 231
[47] Ibid., 231

CHAPTER 2: Theory

2.1: Why the U.N.?

The first question we need to resolve at the onset is what exactly the United States and the other victorious World War II great powers sought to gain when they founded the United Nations, especially given their divergent[48] sets of parochial national interests. From an intuitive viewpoint, it would make a lot of sense for countries to cooperate and interact via regional mechanisms: regional groupings of states tend to share common geographical, security, economic, and other concerns, and interact with each other by necessity; this makes it easier for them to resolve their coordination dilemma. However when it comes to the entire global family of 200+ states and territories spread over six continents, with their varying degrees of economic, military, and other forms of power, and sometimes with little if anything in common with each other, delegation to a global organization is not as simple to justify. The key to answering this question lies in understanding the concept of collective state interests.

After the devastation of World War II, itself a result of the failed 19th century international cooperation and inter-war League of Nations experiments, the victorious great powers decided to create an international institution whose main purpose would be to deter future would-be aggressor states and forestall the outbreak of World War III. The main thrust of the new organization was that its Security Council, with the five victorious great powers at its helm, would have legally binding oversight in all matters of global peace and security, and would reserve the right to use coercion if necessary to ensure global stability. President Franklin Roosevelt and the other founding leaders articulated this collective interest vision in the preamble to the U.N. Charter, which implicitly cited the historical failure of the pre-World War II international institutions/arrangements:

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[48] I am referring to the fact that the USA and the USSR each wanted to shape the world based on their ideological outlook. There is also the fact that the U.S. was a strong opponent of British and French imperialism, as evidenced by the U.S.-authored Atlantic Charter of August 1941.

> We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind...and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained...have resolved to combine our efforts to ... maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace...[49]

Ultimately then, the utility of the United Nations lies in the fact that it has become what James Traub called a "parliament of states"[50] where the member-states, headed by the victorious World War II powers, interact on a continuous basis and sustain a normative structure for policing the international system and dissuading rogue state behavior. It is precisely when one understands the concept of collective interests that the idea of the United Nations begins to make sense, and states including the powerful P-5 become amenable to the idea of delegating some power to the United Nations and its Secretary-General.

Though somewhat moribund during the Cold War era, the concept of collective security was resuscitated after the Cold War when the great powers were no longer fighting for global ideological influence, and were therefore less susceptible to support extreme actions by rogue states out of broader geopolitical concerns. This convergence was exemplified during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, when in a rare show of multilateralism, the United States invoked the U.N. Charter and galvanized an international coalition through the U.N. Security Council to drive Saddam Hussein's troops out of Kuwait. President George H.W. Bush was able to galvanize a broad anti-Iraqi military coalition through the U.N. Security Council because the other P-5 powers had some similar parochial interests to the U.S.: they were major importers of Middle-Eastern oil and had a strategic interest in making sure that the Persian Gulf remained stable. Alexander Thompson[51] argued that whenever state actions are endorsed by an IO such as the U.N., the result is the transmission of

[49] United Nations Department of Public Information, "Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations," http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml (accessed February 14, 2012).
[50] James Traub coined this phrase in his book James.
[51] Alexander Thompson, *Channels of Power : The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009), 261.

politically crucial information to the world community (both to leaders and to their publics), and ultimately greater international support for the military action of the magnitude that the first President Bush was able to attain.

Crises involving rogue non-state actors, especially terrorist groups, also fit into the collective interest category. Terrorist groups do not fit into the rubric of nation-states and are therefore harder to contain using the traditional tools of diplomatic coercion. Virtually all of the great powers have opposed international terrorism (in part because they have all been affected by it, e.g. Russia in Chechnya, U.K. in Ireland, and the U.S.A. in Lebanon in the early 1980s and on/after September 11th 2001). The U.N. Secretary-General has been able to extend his good offices to resolve hostage crises affecting citizens of P-5 countries, often at the behest of the P-5 themselves. The success of former Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and his Middle East negotiator Giandomenico Picco in securing the release of the U.S. hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon in the late 1980s and early 1990s is a classic example in this regard- this case study is one of the three we will cover in detail in Chapter 6. The terrorism theme also extends to failed states that have the potential to become or actually become havens for terrorist groups- places such as Afghanistan after the rise of the Taliban, Somalia from the mid-1990s onwards, and Mali in 2012.

The global weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation agenda (although not an "international crisis" per se) is yet another example of a collective security interest. The rationale is simple- U.N. member-states do not view it as in their interest to live in a world where weapons of mass destruction fall in the hands of irresponsible actors such as rogue states and non-state actors who may inadvertently or deliberately use such weapons. The current impasse between the U.N.'s atomic agency and Iran is a good example- the P-5 reached a significant level of agreement in terms of imposing sanctions on Iran for its nuclear activities, some reservations from Russia and China notwithstanding. Historically speaking, nonproliferation of weapons of mass

destruction is an area in which Secretaries-General have successfully[52] galvanized international consensus (with the support of the P-5 who happen to be the five recognized nuclear powers[53]) and helped establish international legal instruments[54] that govern the production and use of such weapons.

From a strictly parochial national interest perspective (aside from globalist idealism of the U.N. Charter), both weak and powerful states derive a lot of benefit from the U.N.:

Weak states have little to no influence in the great power dominated international system, and are therefore very likely to favor the delegation of some power to the United Nations where the "one country one vote" system of the General Assembly grants them clout they would otherwise not have. In their study of international institutions, Parks & Tierney[55] expound on this rationale by demonstrating how some international agencies such as the UNDP and the Montréal Protocol Fund enable weaker states to realize their aid allocation preferences more fully than they do under the weighted voting systems of the World Bank and the IMF.

For the great powers, nuclear power status and Security Council veto privilege are a few of the many benefits they derive from the collectivist architecture of the United

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[52] Nuclear non-proliferation was said to be one of the signature achievements of Dag Hammarskjöld's tenure- see Peter B. Heller,
the United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1961, ed. George J. Lankevich, Vol. 2 (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 110.
Aside from the threat of nuclear Armageddon which gave rise to the NPT, the victorious powers also reached consensus in the realms of economics and humanitarianism, among others, leading to the establishment of a new global trading regime (GATT) to avoid a repeat of the devastation brought about by the protectionism of the interwar years, and also a Genocide Convention (1948) to avoid a repeat of the holocaust. See Judith Goldstein, *Legalization and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 319., for a rigorous treatment of global regimes beyond just the security focus of this dissertation. Over time, the United Nations has become the legal repository and guarantor for global, security and humanitarian regimes such as the Genocide Convention, and the Chemical and Biological Weapons conventions.
[53] In recent times, the nuclear club has expanded to include potential flashpoints such as India and Pakistan.
[54] Examples would include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical/Biological Weapons Conventions.
[55] Bradley Parks and Michael J. Tierney, "Outsourcing the Allocation and Delivery of Environmental Aid- Conference Paper." (Chicago, Illinois, September 1-4, 2004).

Nations. Just as important is the fact that by providing peace and security <u>as a global public good</u>, the United Nations relieves them of the burden of having to intervene in places or conflicts that they otherwise do not want to. Here the rationale is three-fold:

First, a conflict or crisis may constitute a genuine threat to international peace and security but occur in a peripheral part of the world where the great powers do not have any parochial strategic interests. In such instances, the great powers may be unwilling to intervene unilaterally, but still be force to contend with the domestic political dilemma[56] whereby devastating media images compel domestic interest groups (humanitarian and isolationist alike) to lobby for or against military intervention, as was the case in Darfur, Libya and Syria in the 2000s. While national casualties from a military intervention could be politically costly for an incumbent Head of State, non-intervention could also be viewed as a moral and legal abandonment of global humanitarian norms. This is where delegation to the U.N. becomes useful- it can be used to placate both the humanitarian and isolationist domestic interest groups. By delegating such interventions and turning them into a U.N. sponsored global public good, the great powers realize the added benefit of pushing some intractable issues on to the U.N. and using it as a scapegoat if and when its efforts do not succeed.

Second, and perhaps more intuitively, the P-5 states do not have the ability to expend their own (financial and logistical) resources on resolving each and every major international conflict or crisis even if they wanted to. This is especially true for parts of the world where such crises are chronic and intractable such as the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. The U.S. State Department, U.K. Foreign/Commonwealth Office, and equivalent institutions, while often times effective at advancing their home countries' agendas and national interest, are not designed or intended to mediate or resolve every conflict in the world. For argument's sake, even if the P-5 were able to assign themselves the role of global conflict

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[56] Mark S. Copelovitch, *The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy : Banks, Bonds, and Bailouts* (Cambridge, UK;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 51, - domestic political dilemma point borrowed from this IMF analysis but applies to the U.N. Secretariat as well.

mediators, they would very likely run into serious problems because of the ideological and neocolonial stigmas often attached to them, which would deny them the aura of impartiality and even-handedness that conflicting parties are usually more willing to attach to an IO such as the United Nations.

Third, it is in the interest of the great powers to ensure that hitherto peripheral conflicts do not spiral out of control and ultimately spill over into or destabilize regions that they consider to be strategically important. A case in point is the rise of Somali piracy in the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, which is costing the P-5 states, at the very least, hundreds of millions of dollars a year in ransom payments, and jeopardizing a trade route that is very vital for their international trade transactions. Back in the early 1990s, Somalia's strategic importance may not have been as apparent when the United States and the other great powers virtually abandoned the country and left it to its own devices as a failed state. It was only after those failed state conditions gave rise to the (hitherto unforeseen) threat of piracy that the P-5 have re-engaged Somalia and re-invigorated their support for U.N. diplomatic involvement in Somalia.

From a theoretical viewpoint, regime and constructivist theorists[57] accept the neo-realist premise that states are the primary actors in the international system, but go further to claim that non-state actors and inter-governmental organizations such as the U.N. can indeed matter a lot. Regime theorists such as Krasner[58] make the case for how international regimes[59] can help bring about cooperation under anarchy and how

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[57] One could also draw from neo-liberalists such as John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russet, "The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (1997): 267-294, who have drawn on Kantian peace literature to explain how regime type and economic interdependence can reduce the likelihood of interstate war- this an expansion of earlier "democratic peace" works such as Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (Sep., 1993): 624-638.

[58] Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 372.
[59] Krasner defines regimes as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations." See Ibid.

conflict need not be the primary norm in international relations; instead, cooperation could be fostered in areas such as collective security. Constructivists such as Wendt[60] have written about how collective state identity sometimes leads to the clustering of states into collective security arrangements and also how states' historical experiences and lessons learned from war could make them develop norms and value systems that emphasize pacifist foreign policies. From the institutionalist perspective then, the Office of the Secretary-General is an entity that could play a pivotal role in the maintenance of international peace and security, and whose potential should not be ruled out.

Purely security interests aside, there are additional reasons why the United Nations serves the collective interests of all member states, including (1) gains derived from the specialization and expert knowledge possessed by IOs; (2) the presence of policy externalities affecting many states; (3) dilemmas of collective decision-making that can be resolved by granting agenda-setting power to IOs; (4) resolving disputes between principals.[61] These theoretical reasons have been well established in the literature[62] on state delegation to IOs and apply to the United Nations in varying degrees; I will not cover them here. The one reason worth commenting more about is gains from specialization: these are likely to be greatest when the task to be performed by the IO is frequent, repetitive, and requires specific expertise or know-how; international diplomacy, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building are examples of tasks that benefit from the institutional memory and pooled resources of a specialized organization like the United Nations.

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[60] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992): 391-425.

[61] Darren G. Hawkins and others, "Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory," in *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, eds. Darren G. Hawkins and others (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3-38.

[62] Interestingly, Ibid. claim to find considerable overlap between the reasons why principals delegate to domestic agents and why states delegate to IOs. They also claim to find considerable similarity in the mechanisms that domestic principals use to control the agents and those used by states to control IOs. They do stress however that there are also some important differences. Since domestic delegation is a subject that has been studied extensively in international relations, the main point they make is that their research leads them to believe that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at the international level.

The following delegation chart summarizes the point I made about why delegation to the United Nations made more sense than other cooperation models such as unilateralism and pre-World War I international cooperation. Under unilateralism, there is little if any adjustment of policy and the international system is closest to the anarchic set-up that neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz envisioned. Under international cooperation, as symbolized by the pre-World War I era, states typically use a variety of mechanisms, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, ranging from informal agreements to gentlemen's agreements[63] to legally binding formal treaties, but these were ineffective as evidenced by the 1919 decision to found the League of Nations. The United Nations served as a more refined version of what the League of Nations set out to do- refined because it had coercive not just legal mechanisms for safeguarding international peace and security:

Figure 1: International Delegation Decision Tree

~Cooperate

Cooperate

1
Unilateralism

~Delegate

Delegate

2
International
Cooperation

3
Delegation
to IO

64

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[63] Gentlemen's agreements can be legally binding, which is why I am distinguishing them from just informal agreements.

[64] Darren G. Hawkins and others, Ibid. 11, use this decision tree to make sense of international delegation to IOs.

The Secretary-General himself fits into this equation by serving as the personification of the U.N. normative structure, and, more importantly, as a mediator, arbitrator, and/or face-saving mechanism. While delegation of authority in this instance allows U.N. member-states to benefit from the expertise and abilities of the Secretary-General and his talented team of international civil servants, such delegation can also be hazardous. The hazards arise from the fact that delegation entails a <u>transfer of power</u>- the member-states delegate a portion of their authority in international politics, and the Secretary-General may sometimes, if not often, act in ways that are inimical to their parochial national interests.

In analyzing the Secretary General's interactions with member-states, the thesis essentially examines a *strategic* interaction. I use the term *strategic* because the U.N. member-states delegate some authority to the Secretary-General who in turn, under Articles 99 and 100 of the U.N. Charter, is granted some considerable latitude and independence in executing his role as Head of the U.N. Secretariat[65]. These two Articles empower the Secretary-General to serve as more than just a conduit for the member-states and instead to have the ability to sometimes undertake independent decisions and actions that may challenge their interests. While the member-states, on the one hand, may have specific reasons, expectations, and even monitoring mechanisms while delegating to the Secretary-General, the latter, on the other hand, is also granted enough latitude and potential (formally at least) to assert his own interests and objectives, making this a strategic as opposed to just a simple dominance and submission interaction.

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[65] The U.N. Secretariat is one the six principal organs of the United Nations. The other five organs are the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice. Aside from these six organs, there are also 15 UN Agencies and other UN Programs and Bodies. See Chapter Three for the text of Articles 99 and 100.

2.2: PA Theory

2.2.1: Principal-Agent Framework

The act of delegation from member states to the United Nations as described above engages the principal-agent framework, which defines delegation as a conditional grant of authority from a *principal* to an *agent* that empowers the agent to act on the principal's behalf. This grant of authority is limited in time or scope and must be revocable by the principal.[66] The principal-agent framework also assumes that the preferences of principals and agents are important determinants of outcomes in their relationship- as will be explained in greater detail later in this chapter. In delegating, principals often design institutions in a way that enables them to control possible opportunism by agents.[67] Relations between the principals and agents are always governed by a contract, even in instances where the contract is only implicit (never formally acknowledged) or informal (based on an original agreement). The key takeaway here is that in order to be a principal, under the terms of the contract, an actor has to both grant authority and have the power to rescind it. The U.N. Charter serves as the formal contractual document between the member-states and the Secretary-General, spelling out exactly what the latter's role should be (see section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3 for a detailed legal discussion of the U.N. Charter).

Two key principal-agent (framework) terms that apply to our study are *discretion* and *autonomy*. Discretion refers to a grant of authority that specifies the principal's goals but not the specific actions the agent must take to accomplish those objectives (e.g. the aforementioned Article 99 of the U.N. Charter).[68] Autonomy on the other hand refers

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[66] Darren Hawkins and others, Ibid., 7

[67] This will be explained in greater detail in the coming section on control mechanisms that principals such as the P-5 use to rein in potentially slack-prone agents.

[68] Darren G. Hawkins and others, eds., *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (Cambridge, UK ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 235, provide an empirical example: Hans Blix and his team of U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion: the inspectors enjoyed substantial *discretion* in terms of determining which weapons sites to inspect, but

to the range of independent actions and maneuver available to the agent (after the principal has established some specific screening, monitoring, and other mechanisms intended to constrain the agent's behavior). Actions available to the U.N. Secretary-General under this <u>discretion-based delegation</u> framework could include the autonomous high profile interventions that we will analyze in Chapter 5. In other words, where discretion grants the agent some leeway the principal deems necessary for the agent to accomplish the delegated task, autonomy is the actual range of independent action available to the agent: greater discretion often allows agents greater autonomy, but not always.

Delegation to agents carries with it an inherent risk for member states: the possibility that the agent (in our case the U.N. Secretary General) may receive conditional grants of authority from the principal, but does not always do what the principal wants or approves of. The likelihood of this occurring increases in cases of discretion-based delegation (such as the U.N.); we will refer to this risk as the "principal-agent problem." Some key terminology associated with the principal-agent problem includes *agency slack*, which is generally defined as independent action by an agent that is undesired by the principal. We will come across historical evidence of agency slack when we discuss the "Hammarskjöld effect" as well as "informal autonomy" as epitomized by Boutros-Ghali in the qualitative section of Chapter 5.

There are two forms of agency slack: *slippage*, when an agent shifts policy away from its principal's preferred outcome and towards its own preferences, and *shirking*, when an agent minimizes the effort it exerts on its principal's behalf, or fails to enact policies that are ordered or desired by the principal (e.g. foot-dragging).[69] However shirking is less of a concern in this context- we will mostly encounter instances of

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ultimately enjoyed little *autonomy* due to constant pressure from the United States and other members of the Security Council to produce specific results.

[69] Hawkins and others, *Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory*, 8, except for the foot-dragging portion of the sentence. In terms of the Secretary-General's interventions in international conflicts, we will mostly encounter the *slippage* form of agency slack.

agency slack. Williamson[70] describes agents as capable of being opportunistic and called them *"self-interest seeking with guile"*- a statement that has now become a classic in PA theory.[71] A historical example of slippage in the U.N. Secretary-General's context would be systematic agenda-setting and assertions of autonomy (under Article 99 of the Charter) on issues that are inimical to P-5 interests, e.g. the push for decolonization in the 1950s-1970s.[72]

Thus, the principal-agent problem presents U.N. member-states with a major dilemma: on the one hand, discretion-based delegation implies that the agent exists to primarily advance the IO's mission; on the other hand, the agent may turn out to be imperfect (a perfect agent would be one that always does exactly what the principals desire). In other words, states may be comfortable with delegating some power to an agent, but will grow uncomfortable once the agent uses his or her discretion to do things that the principals do not like. For the U.N. principals, the presence of slack does not in itself imply a failure of delegation or imply that delegation is not the best course of action available to states, as noted by Erica Gould;[73] rather it means individual principals may be comfortable with agency slack as long as their own parochial interests are not adversely affected- we will come across instances of some P-5 states doing exactly this in Chapter 5. In other words, for the member states, the (perceived or real) independence of the IO may sometimes yield credibility for the delegation process itself. This may be precisely the reason why the P-5 inserted the aforementioned Articles 99 and 100 into the U.N. Charter.

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[70] Oliver E. Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism : Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting* (New York: Free Press ;London, 1985), 450.

[71] Hawkins and others, *Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory*, 24.

[72] Principal-agent theory also talks a lot about the role of third-parties who vigorously pursue their interests and may attempt to influence the principals to instruct agents to act in certain ways. Alternatively, the third-parties may bypass the principals and try to influence the agents directly. This project will not place a lot of emphasis on third-parties due to the direct and unique nature of the relationship between the U.N. Secretary-General and U.N. member-states.

[73] Erica R. Gould, "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality," *International Organization* 57, no. 3 (Summer, 2003): 551-586.

2.2.2: Multiple-Principal Problem

For a multiple-principal set-up such as the United Nations then, individual member-states may support or oppose agency slack depending on the issue-specific alignment of their parochial interests. American Politics scholars have argued (based in part on empirical findings from their analyses of the U.S. Government as a multiple principal) that whenever multiple principals are in conflict over the terms of the delegation, the agent may exhibit behavior that is inconsistent with the preferences of one or more of the principals considered in isolation.[74] Their logic is that the agent is more likely to "shirk" whenever the principals are in disagreement.[75] As a consequence, principals often try to control the behavior of the agents, but do so with only limited success and at some cost to themselves especially when they are in deadlock. PA theory essentially predicts that an agent will engage in slack when significant preference heterogeneity exists among the principals, and will exploit disagreement to advance its own preferences.[76]

Hawkins & Jacoby[77] (2006) invoke an interesting analogy to complement Williamson's description of agents- that of the *Man with No Name*, made famous by Clint Eastwood in *A Fistful of Dollars*, where he is hired by each of two warring families to help in their fight against each other. The *Man with No Name* essentially plays the principals off against one another, hides the way his own preferences diverge

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[74] Mona M. Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, "Who Delegates? Alternative Models of Principals in Development Aid," in *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, eds. Darren G. Hawkins and others (Cambridge, UK ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 42.

[75] Ibid. Lyne and Tierney conducted a quantitative analysis of the US government's decision to unilaterally delegate the administration of foreign aid for social policy through a trust fund at the Inter-American Development Bank and later cancelled that arrangement and replaced it with one in which the delegation went to a domestic administrator, the Inter-American foundation. They argue that although the deliberate shift from an international to a domestic agent suggests that the United States was unhappy with the results of its initial delegation to an IO, the subsequent performance of the Inter-American foundation revealed that it was not a demonstrably more faithful agent.

[76] D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, *The Logic of Delegation : Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 26-27.; Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," *International Organization* 57, no. 2 (Spring, 2003): 249.

[77] Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby, "How Agents Matter," in *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, eds. Darren G. Hawkins and others (Cambridge, UK ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 199-228.

from those of his principals, and waits for moments of maximum principal vulnerability to clarify contract terms... he then embraces all the autonomy granted by the principals, and then uses his power to take more for himself.[78] In enhancing this profile of agents, Hawkins & Jacoby make further and more direct claims about the conduct of agents by pointing to strategies that agents may use to try to circumvent the principals' controls and enhance their own autonomy- such as re-interpreting rules and increasing permeability to third parties. An example here would be that of the first Secretary-General Trygve Lie who in 1950 attempted to enhance his autonomy by releasing a controversial document called the "20 Year Programme"[79] which, among other things proposed an independent U.N. military force at his command- an idea that was ultimately shot down by the P-5 powers.

2.2.3: Resolving the Principal-Agent Problem

So given the dynamics of the principal-agent problem as outlined, how do members-states go about confronting this challenge whenever they delegate to an IO? The following are the strategies that member-states tend to employ:

Screening and Selection

A primary mechanism of control that states may use vis-à-vis IOs is *screening and selection procedures* for the IO personnel. The key dynamic here is that states may use screening and selection procedures to identify and appoint IO agents whose preferences align with their own, and who would be inclined to act as the states themselves would in implementing policy. In instances of discretion-based delegation such as that of the U.N. Secretary-General, the veto-wielding P-5 states may set out to nominate a candidate for Secretary-General who is viewed as sympathetic to their parochial national interests. Their calculation would be that after assuming Office,

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[78] Ibid., 201.
[79] Norwegian Mission to the U.N., "Trygve Lie's Seven Years for Peace: A Bio," http://www.norway-un.org/PageFiles/415227/TrygveLie20yearplanGA.pdf (accessed May 7, 2014).

such a candidate would be less likely to translate his discretionary powers into "undue" extensions of his autonomy, something that would force the P-5 to employ more costly monitoring mechanisms just to minimize slack. For example, the U.S. vetoed the candidacy of Tanzanian diplomat Salim Ahmed-Salim 15 times during the 1980 election because he was seen as "socialist-leaning",[80] and also vetoed the re-election of Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1996 because his tenure of office was viewed as inimical to U.S. interests.

Monitoring

A second control mechanism that states may use is *ex post monitoring and reporting requirements*, typically specified in the delegation contract and designed to reveal information about the IO's actions. The most important distinction in this regard is between "police patrols", which refer to direct monitoring of agents by principals to identify any malfeasance, and "fire alarms", which rely on affected parties outside the agency relationship to bring evidence of slack to the attention of the principals as noted by McCubbins & Schwartz[81]. In the case of the U.N. Secretary-General, both "fire-alarms" and "police patrol" apply under different circumstances. In certain instances where the Secretary-General takes a public stance during an international crisis, the P-5 states have been known to apply the "police patrols" monitoring strategy by closely analyzing the his words and actions to make sure that their national interests are not being threatened.[82]

A good example of the "police patrol" dynamic occurred during Trygve Lie's intervention in the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis, the first time that any Secretary-General

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[80] Colin Keating, "Selecting the World's Diplomat," in *Secretary Or General? : The U.N. Secretary-General in World Politics*, ed. Simon Chesterman (Cambridge ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 53.

[81] Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms," *American Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 1 (Feb., 1984): 165-179.

[82] Such direct monitoring has often times included unethical strategies such as phone tapping, collection of personal biometric information, and other spying activities by P-5 states on the Office of the Secretary General- for example see: Robert Booth and Julian Borger, "U.S. Diplomats Spied on U.N. Leadership," http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-spying-un (accessed March 12, 2012).

had ever intervened in a crisis. In only the third month of his tenure as Secretary-General, Lie took the unprecedented step of issuing a controversial memorandum (addressed to the President of the Security Council who in turn had an interpreter read it aloud to the Council) in which he expressed a legal opinion supporting the view of the Soviet Union, France, and Poland and opposing a point of view held by a majority of Security Council member-states including the United States and Great Britain. The United States and the Republic of China (which was then holding the Chinese seat as the PRC was not yet a member) expressed opposition to Lie's initiative. U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes was quoted as opining that Lie had "exceeded his powers" by issuing the memo[83]; Security Council President Quo Tai-Chi of the Republic of China quoted Article 97 of the U.N. Charter and its description of the Secretary-General as the Chief Administrative Officer of the Organization[84] - an implied challenge to Lie's attempt at autonomy.

A good example of the "fire alarm" dynamic occurred during the Congo Crisis of 1960 when the Soviet Union, acting on feedback from its allies in the Congolese conflict accused Hammarskjöld of "favoring the Western colonialists"[85] during his intervention in that crisis, and commenced a series of "increasingly abusive attacks on his policies and conduct"[86], ultimately demanding his resignation. Fire alarms were more likely to occur in Cold War proxy conflicts such as the 1960 Congo Crisis where the superpowers had strong parochial interests at stake and closely monitored the Secretary-General's involvement for fear that he would jeopardize their ideological as well as national interest. Hammarskjöld found himself in the middle of a Cold War zero sum game in the Congo; his seemingly neutralist initiatives were viewed

[83] Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Trygve Lie, 1946-1953*, Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 40.
[84] Ibid., 41.
[85] Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960-1961*, Vol. 5 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 9. For a detailed analysis of why exactly the Soviets and some African states protested Hammarskjöld's mode of intervention, as well as the mistakes the U.N. may have made in the Congo operation, see Richard I. Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1961), 289-293.
[86] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960-1961*, 9.

negatively by whichever side felt its interests were being threatened. He was ultimately caught in a "damned if you do and damned if you don't position"[87].

Sanctions

A third mechanism is that of *sanctions* that the principals may use to punish agents for undesired behavior. In the case of the U.N., such sanctions have over the years included, inter alia, fluctuations in financial and other logistical contributions to the organization. The U.S. for example has occasionally withheld financial contributions to the United Nations as a strategy for exacting change in the behavior of the organization[88]. The Soviet Union on its part famously boycotted the first Secretary-General Trygve Lie (including a boycott of his social cocktails) after his autonomous interventions in the 1950 Korean War, a dynamic that led to Lie's forced resignation upon becoming a lame-duck and paralyzed Secretary-General.

Ultimately then, the severity of the principal-agent problem depends on the ability of principals to implement these three main mechanisms of control. The next section details the realist perspective on delegation, which basically asserts that the U.N. Secretary-General is more likely to be a perfect agent based on the ability of the P-5 to effectively apply these mechanisms. The section after that will detail the institutionalist argument, which asserts that the principal-agent problem is more severe than the realists would expect because these control mechanisms do not work perfectly in the U.N. context.

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[87] This is a phrase used by Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, 306, to describe Hammarskjöld's impossible position.
[88] Republican Administrations in the U.S. government have been especially prone to use this strategy, as recently as 2011. See Susan Corwell, "Republicans Threaten to Withhold U.N. Funding," http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/25/us-un-usa-idUSTRE70O64J20110125 (accessed June 13, 2011).

2.3: P-A Problem in the International System

2.3.1: The Realist Perspective

Parochial Interests Matter More

The main thrust of the realist perspective is that collective interests (as outlined in the previous section) do not matter as much in international relations because the primary determinant of states' actions in the international system is their parochial interests. Parochial interests are those promoted by states for purely their national interest. For example, in the realm of national security, almost[89] every state maintains a national army, police force, and intelligence agencies as a means of guaranteeing internal stability and protection from external threats. Similarly, all states promote their economic interests/security by establishing domestic institutions such as central banks, and also signing mutually-beneficial trade and other economic agreements with other countries. These interests are the pre-eminent drivers of state behavior, and the actions of organizations such as the U.N. can be expected to be more reflective of states' pursuit of these interests (especially the powerful member-states) and not of the ideals outlined in their Charter.

Realist international relations literature assumes two fundamental features about the international system: the existence of self-interested state[90] actors, and also the existence of an *anarchic international system* with no supranational authority to enforce agreements and regulate disputes, as articulated by Kenneth Waltz.[91] For classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau, human nature and its desire for self-interest in terms of power pushes individuals (and by implication states) to behave in a

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[89] I use the term "almost" in recognition of the fact that some "states" such as the Vatican in Rome may not actually maintain a national army and intelligence apparatus.

[90] States as the unit of analysis, rather than sub-state actors, have been the hallmark of international relations theory.

[91] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1979); Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1985), 688.

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manner that prioritizes self-interest over morality or ideology. For neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz, the primary emphasis shifts from human nature to the anarchic structure of the international system (anarchy in terms of the absence of a global government or supreme authority) in which states are the only units that matter.

In the realist[92] world-view then, non-state actors such as individuals, local NGOs, and international organizations such as the United Nations are relegated to the status of being driven by state actors. The U.N. Charter ideals are undermined by an anarchic international system (with its finite resources) in which states are unsure about each other's intentions, and in which states behave rationally by looking out primarily for their own survival. Offense-defense balance realists such as Jervis[93] highlight the role of misperception arising from imperfect information, and assert that conflict may occur even when states do not desire it due to the *security dilemma*.[94] By implication, the U.N. is, at the end of the day, just a "club" where self-interested states meet to deliberate and cooperate as long as such cooperation enhances their own national interests. It is by no means a "supranational authority" capable of consistently implementing lofty concepts such as "collective security" and "P-5 consensus." Instead, national interest trumps multilateralism.

Realist scholars such as Phyllis Bennis[95] and David N. Gibbs[96] have posited that the P-5, and especially the United States, can instrumentalize the U.N. almost at will and use

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[92] I will not go into the detail of the different strands of realism, e.g. defensive realists like Waltz, who famously argued that among states, "the state of nature is a state of war" and war may occur, for example, when states balance to contain the ambitions of a potential hegemon. Another school of realist thought is the offensive realists like John Mearsheimer, who went a step further and asserts that states are doomed to fight wars because the anarchic (and self-help) international system encourages them to engage in military expansion and pursue hegemony in order to maximize their chances of survival.

[93] Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (Jan., 1978): 167-214.

[94] The security dilemma arises when one state's action to increase its own security decreases other states' security, and the dilemma is exacerbated when defensive and offensive capabilities are hard to distinguish. For example, China increasing its military budget for purely defensive purposes may inadvertently pose a threat to the U.S. and others who will perceive the same action as an offensive act.

[95] Phyllis Bennis, *Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN*, Rev & updat ed. (New York: Olive Branch Press, 2000), 341.

it to advance a neo-colonial agenda. Other scholars have added that the likelihood and extent of U.N. involvement in a conflict is a function of the stakes that P-5 members have in a conflict.[97] This view essentially portrays the U.N. as nothing but a front for the advancement of the parochial interests of the P-5 states and implies that the U.N. is unlikely to commit significant resources to conflicts that do not directly impinge on the military or economic interests of P-5 members.[98]

For other realists, the great powers may even choose to occasionally ignore[99] and bypass the U.N. altogether if their national interest considerations compel them to do so. Erik Voeten[100] pointed to select circumstances where the P-5 states may choose to work outside the Security Council (even though its voting rules are weighted in their favor) either unilaterally or with an ally in order to enable themselves to reach agreements that would be vetoed in the absence of the outside option. This makes a lot of sense given that powerful states are sometimes able to realize their goals through their own influence and capabilities independent of international organizations, and sometimes do execute this outside option when it suits their preferences, as was noted by Lloyd Gruber. Examples of this dynamic include the Bush Administration's decision to "go it alone" and create a "coalition of the willing" in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, or the massive bilateral economic aid programs that countries like the United States have in place with a select number of strategically allied states (bypassing the IMF and the World Bank).

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[96] David N. Gibbs, "Is Peacekeeping a New Form of Imperialism?" *International Peacekeeping* 4, no. 1 (03/01; 2014/05, 1997): 122-128.

[97] See, for example, Chantal De Jonge Oudraat, "The United Nations and Internal Conflict," in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown, Vol. 10 (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 518-519.

[98] See Kyle Beardsley and Holger Schmidt, "Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (March, 2012): 33-49, for an interesting discussion.

[99] Realists would for example point to the Bush Administration's decision to "go it alone" and create a "coalition of the willing" in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

[100] Erik Voeten, "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action," *The American Political Science Review* 95, no. 4 (Dec., 2001): 845-858.

Great power parochial interests tend to be global and far reaching in nature; this makes them more likely to sometimes conflict with the collective interest of the United Nations. Britain and France, for example, retain important relationships with their former colonies through the British Commonwealth, the Central/West African Franc Zone, and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) as a means of projecting their global clout and continuing relevance in the post-colonial world. The United States maintains important military alliances with countries such as Japan, South Korea, and its NATO allies, as well as important economic links with the major oil producing countries of the Middle-East, to the extent that it has deployed its military assets all over the world in order to protect those interests, and along the way assumed the role of global public good (security) provider. Russia and China, for their part, are currently broadening their economic interests in emerging markets such as Africa[101], Latin America, and Eastern Europe.

The outbreak of conflict in any of these settings, with the different sets of P-5 interests at play, means that whatever the conflict-specific U.N. Charter ramifications, the realists expect the P-5 to view the dynamics primarily from a parochial interest perspective. For example, individual P-5 states had very strong parochial interests in the Korean War of the early 1950s, the Vietnam War in the 1960s -70s, the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956, and the French colonial independence wars in North Africa, such that an outcome other than what they planned or envisioned would have been unacceptable. As such, they were less likely to support U.N. intervention in case it ran counter to their interests. After the Cold War, this dynamic has continued to manifest itself as Russia and China especially have consistently blocked U.N. collective action in trouble spots such as Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Syria, because of parochial economic and geostrategic interests.

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[101] As of 2012, China has surpassed the United States and the E.U. to become Africa's largest trading partner. Annual trade exchanges are now at $200B annually, and projected to reach $400-500B by 2020, by that point equaling China-U.S. annual trade flows. There is already a debate among scholars as to whether China will become a neo-colonial power in Africa, and whether a Cold-War type conflict with the continent's traditional western powers is inevitable as both blocs race to secure their supply of the continent's natural resources.

The P-5 also occasionally have strong parochial interests in favoring a specific outcome to third-party conflicts. During the Cold War years, this trend manifested itself in the "proxy wars" of the developing world which pitted the superpowers against each other indirectly, both in intra and inter- state conflict situations, e.g. the civil war in Angola which pitted Soviet-backed Cuba against U.S. backed apartheid South Africa in the late 1970s-1980s. In all these crises, the P-5 states have tended to view the Secretary-General as a useful agent only if and when he uses his bully pulpit to advance their point of view and parochial interests.

A less common manifestation of parochial interests that would compel the P-5 to block collective action is the incidence of conflicts or crises along their geographic borders or in their administrative territories, e.g. Tibet for China, and Northern Ireland for the U.K. There has not been any U.N. diplomatic intervention in these crises because the P-5 have considered them to be internal matters, and preferred to handle them unilaterally. Today, even with the advent of the "Responsibility to Protect" or "R2P" concept, the P-5 (especially Russia and China) have still, to a considerable degree, impeded collective U.N. Security Council action in places such as Syria not only because they have strategic interests at stake, but also because, as many believe, they are eager to avoid setting a legal precedent that could eventually be used against them.

Thus, while it is plausible that the member-states want a strong and autonomous U.N. and share some strong beliefs in the ideals of the U.N. Charter, it is equally true that they will also endeavor to keep that strength and autonomy on a leash for the sake of protecting their parochial interests. The ultimate interplay between P-5 parochial and U.N. collective interests boils down to the following: first, P-5 support for the Secretary-General's intervention/autonomy is less likely in instances where strong P-5 parochial interests are at stake. Second, such support is more likely if the P-5 parochial interest is weak, and especially if this is coupled with strong collective U.N. interests.

For realists, the principal-agent problem as outlined in the previous section is quite easy for the P-5 to resolve because of their ability to effectively implement the three aforementioned control mechanisms: selection, monitoring, and sanctioning, and that is the focus on the next subsection.

P-A Problem Easy for P-5 to Resolve

Institutional Design- P-5 Veto

Following from our discussion, the next question is why the realists assert that the principal-agent problem is quite easy for the P-5 to resolve, and specifically why the P-5 are adept at implementing selection, monitoring, and sanctioning mechanisms. The answer to this question lies in the realist interpretation of the U.N.'s institutional design as well as the financial/resource clout of the P-5.

First, on institutional design, the Security Council veto privilege enables the P-5 to a lot of leverage over the Secretary General, more so than other U.N. member-states. As was alluded to in the selection subsection, the Security Council veto provision grants any of the P-5 states the authority to unilaterally block the appointment or re-appointment of the U.N. Secretary-General. They are able to do so without any accountability to the rest of the U.N. member states[102] due in part to the informal and secretive nature of the Secretary-General selection process.[103] Such secrecy makes it easy for each P-5 country to ensure that they choose a candidate who they perceive as

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[102] In 1997 for example, the United States vetoed the re-appointment of Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt for a second term of office because of his perceived anti-American bias, in spite of an otherwise unanimous Security Council vote (14 out of 15) for his re-election. The U.N. Charter's Article 97 states that the General Assembly should appoint Secretaries General "based upon the recommendation of the Security Council", however it is an accepted fact that in reality the Security Council and especially the permanent five members always determine the successful candidate for the job.

[103] The Security Council's discussions and voting on this issue are held in private, with the voting itself characterized by informal and anonymous "straw polls." Published information on which way individual Security Council members vote, or which P-5 country vetoed a specific candidacy, is largely based on insider leaks.

best suited to serving their parochial national interests.[104] The veto also enables any of the P-5 to unilaterally frustrate or derail any initiative that requires the approval or support (logistical or otherwise) of the U.N. Security Council. In this way, the realists would assert that the P-5, more so than other U.N. member states, are perfectly placed to select/screen, monitor, as well as sanction the Secretary-General based on their parochial interests.

PA theorists make sense of the veto structure's utility to the P-5 by asserting that powerful states are more likely to delegate to an IO if that IO's institutional rules reflect the power distribution of states in the international system (i.e. if great powers have more say). Some scholars such as Broz & Hawes[105] have studied the IMF and pointed to it as exemplifying an IO that the United States and other great powers are often very willing to work through/with precisely because its weighted decision rules make it more responsive to their (parochial) needs and concerns. The P-5 unilateral veto mechanism places the Security Council squarely in the IMF category.

Loosely tied to the concentrated authority structure is a geographical dynamic: the U.N. Secretariat is headquartered in New York and is home to both the Security Council and the Office of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General spends a majority of his time at his Office in New York and as such it is easy for the P-5 to monitor him on a daily basis. Besides, the P-5 states have made sure that their own nationals occupy the most influential posts on the Secretary-General's executive cabinet. Their oath of loyalty to the U.N. as international civil servants may in fact not always preclude such top officials from sometimes exerting the influence and leverage of their home government, especially if they come from a P-5 state.

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[104] The rest of the United Nations member states have not been happy with this procedure and in 1997 passed General Assembly Resolution 51/241 which called for a more transparent appointment process, however to date no action has been taken to address this issue.

[105] J. Lawrence Broz and Michael B. Hawes, "U.S. Domestic Politics and International Monetary Fund Policy," in *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, eds. Darren G. Hawkins and others (Cambridge, UK ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 41-76.

The P-5's financial/resource clout, on the other hand, is such that they are world's most powerful countries militarily: they are the five recognized nuclear powers, plus they collectively account for almost two thirds of global military spending. The P-5 states also rank among the world's foremost economic powers, collectively accounting for 44% of global nominal GDP and 42% of global GDP PPP respectively.[106] This clout is reflected at the United Nations: the P-5 rank among the largest military and financial donors to the United Nations Secretariat's operations, collectively providing 35% of the Secretariat's overall budget, as well as much of the technical know-how and logistical capacities for the U.N.'s field operations.[107] This makes them well placed to apply *sanctions* (by withholding economic and military support) if and when they want to keep the Secretary-General in check.

Closely aligned with the P-5 resources point is the fact that broadly speaking, the Secretary-General does not have a lot of discretionary funds at his disposal – as of 2013, these are speculated to be limited to perhaps a few tens of millions of dollars at the most. Member-state financial contributions to the organization are all voluntary, and it is a well-known fact that member-states rarely contribute to initiatives outside the regular budget unless those initiatives directly serve their parochial national interest. Thus, whenever the little discretionary funds he has run out, the Secretary-General has always needed "specific (regular budget) fiscal authorization from the General Assembly (whose budget still relies heavily on P-5 contributions) or by a special funding arrangement approved by the contributing member states" - and this dynamic has necessarily put his office on a "short leash."[108] It is difficult to speculate just how serious the problem of financing is in the 2014 context; what is not in doubt

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[106] World Bank, "GDP Ranking," http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table (accessed 7 May, 2014).

[107] See Figure 4. It is also worth noting that post-Cold War especially, every Secretary-General has operated under a fundamental premise that as the world's sole superpower, the United States is an indispensable member of the United Nations whose support is crucial for the very survival of the organization, and to a lesser extent the other P-5 powers as well.

[108] Frederic L. Kirgis Jr. and others, "United Nations Mediation of Regional Crises," *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)* 80 (APRIL 9-12, 1986): 139.

is that the Cold War era Secretaries-General were emphatic[109] in pointing out their financial limitations. Ban Ki-Moon, who took Office in 2007, has also highlighted this limitation in three[110] separate landmark reports on U.N. mediation. As a consequence, there is an argument to be made that agency slack in terms of the Secretary-General undertaking autonomous initiatives, even if theoretically possible, would only be plausible for short duration interventions and not necessarily for protracted conflicts where the mediation requires enormous financial resources. The realists would thus point to P-5 resource/financial power as an attribute that enables effective sanctioning by the P-5.

Alan James[111] summarized the P-5 economic/resource clout more poignantly by asserting that the United Nations is "fundamentally nothing more than an association of sovereign member-states which dances, for better or ill, to the tunes that the member-states as its paymasters compose."[112] The member-states, and especially the powerful countries, "did not join the U.N. out of respect for the "U.N. idea" or with a view to creating a stronger organization through the transfer of some of their competencies to it", but rather, they are in the United Nations for what they can get out of it.[113]

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[109] For example, see U. Thant, *View from the UN*, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), 33 and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 1st ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 500-501, for emphatic descriptions of the fiscal limitations in the Secretary-General's diplomacy.

[110] See Ki-Moon Ban, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities* (New York: United Nations Secretariat,[2009]), http://peacemaker.un.org/resources/key-un-documents; Ki-Moon Ban, *Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results, Report of the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations Secretariat,[2011]), http://peacemaker.un.org/resources/key-un-documents; Ki-Moon Ban, *Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution- Report of the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations Secretariat,[2012]), http://peacemaker.un.org/resources/key-un-documents.

[111] Alan James, "The Secretary-General as an Independent Political Actor," in *The Challenging Role of the U.N. Secretary General : Making "the most Impossible Job in the World" Possible*, eds. Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 23-39.

[112] Ibid., 24

[113] Ibid., 24.

Thus far we have addressed P-5 control over the Secretary-General's actions based on their conflict or crisis specific parochial interests. However this section highlights instances of P-5 opposition to agency slack based largely on principle - some P-5 states opposed the Secretary-General's autonomy even in instances where their parochial interests were either affected in a limited fashion or not affected at all. In such instances, the P-5 explicitly adopted the view that the Secretary-General has no business asserting his autonomy in matters that should otherwise be addressed by the P-5 themselves, and were effectively applying the "police patrol" monitoring strategy identified in Section 2.2.3.

A good example of the largely principle-based P-5 opposition occurred in 1959 when the Soviet Union expressed public opposition to Dag Hammarskjöld's autonomous diplomatic intervention in Laos in 1959 - during a meeting of the General Assembly Fifth Committee that took place soon after Hammarskjöld's intervention. The USSR Permanent Representative said the following:

> The status and functions of the Secretary-General were defined in Article 97 of the Charter...The Secretary-General should not become involved in any political controversy among member states in order to avoid partisanship... By sending a subcommittee to Laos and providing it with staff and funds, the Secretary-General... clearly exceeded his duty; such action would have been warranted only in virtue of a decision of the Security Council, and none had been taken...The Secretary-General's visit...coincided with a tense internal political struggle; with the consideration of the situation by the Security Council.... In making a political visit of that nature without the requisite authorization from the Security Council, the Secretary-General has exceeded his competence.[114]

Interestingly, Dag Hammarskjöld replied by making a classic institutional counter-argument to the Soviet permanent representative comment:

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[114] Vratislav Pechota, "The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace," in *Dispute Settlement through the United Nations*, ed. K. Venkata Raman (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1977), 614-615.

To deny the Secretary-General the right to such personal fact-finding was, in fact, to erase Article 99 from the Charter. The USSR representative appeared to consider... that the Secretary-General should forget the responsibilities and needs which flowed from Article 99, and that he should serve only as a Chief Administrator of the Secretariat, technically assisting a vast conference machinery. That implied that the United Nations should be reduced to the role of a framework for public multilateral negotiations and robbed of its possibilities of action to preserve peace.[115]

This pattern repeated itself during the tenure of later Secretaries-General. For U Thant, the Soviet Union opposed his independent initiatives on at least three separate occasions during the Yemen Civil War of 1962,[116] the Spain-Equatorial Guinea crisis[117] of 1969, and also the Bahrain[118] Crisis of April 1970. All of these examples showcase the dedicate line that the Secretary-General has to walk in balancing out institutionalist and realist concerns, even in instances where strong parochial P-5 interests are not at stake such as Yemen and Equatorial Guinea. If anything, these examples serve to showcase the realist backlash that might follow any high-profile autonomous intervention irrespective of P-5 interest alignment.

SG as a Perfect Agent

Ultimately, the ability of the P-5 to make the Secretary-General a perfect agent depends on their ability to implement the control mechanisms we have discussed, and for realists, the U.N. is an institution where such a feat is quite easy for the P-5 to achieve. The realists would argue then that the behavior of the agent (Secretary-General) where P-5 interests are concerned is a function of his expectation that he will

[115] Ibid., 615

[116] Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: U Thant, 1961-1964*, Vol. 6 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 17.

[117] See United Nations Secretariat, *Official Records of the Security Council, 24th Year, Supplement for January, February, and March 1969* (New York: United Nations Secretariat,[1969]).

[118] See United Nations Secretariat, *Official Records of the U.N. Security Council, 25th Year, Supplement for April, may, and June 1970, Document S/9738* (New York: United Nations Secretariat,[1970]); United Nations Secretariat, *Official Records of the U.N. Security Council, 25th Year, Supplement for April, may, and June 1970, Document S/9738*; U. Thant, "The Role of the Secretary-General," *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, October 1971, 1970, 179.

be sanctioned by the P-5 principals if he is seen as engaging in slack. In this instance, slack shall refer to the Secretary-General pitting himself against one or more P-5 states by, for example, making public condemnations or displays of autonomy in conflicts where P-5 parochial interests are directly affected. The P-5 prefer to minimize the dangers associated with the delegation of authority, keep the Secretary-General in check, and do not want to see him intervene independently in conflicts that directly impinge on their parochial individual interests.

Some empirical studies of U.N. peacekeeping interventions have actually come up with findings that support this line of thinking. Fortna[119], for instance, showed that peacekeeping missions (both U.N. and non-U.N.) are unlikely to be sent to conflicts that occur within or near the borders of P-5 members. She explains this pattern by suggesting that major powers tend to be extremely sensitive to encroachments on their sovereignty and/or immediate spheres of influence and therefore will typically prefer to not have the U.N. involved in such instances.

Intuitively, there are at least two reasons the realist expectation may make sense. First, the Secretary-General would not want to intervene, let al.one exert autonomy, in instances of P-5 deadlock because doing so would effectively set him up for failure given that he would face attempts by individual P-5 states protecting their parochial interests to frustrate his efforts (see Dag Hammarskjöld's France-Tunisia anecdote in Chapter 5 qualitative section). Second, he would want to avoid alienating himself from the P-5 states because there are many instances where his intervention needs effective Security Council follow-up action, e.g. deployment of post-conflict peacekeeping troops.[120] Given the high likelihood of his needing Security Council support to guarantee the long term success of his interventions, it is plausible to argue (as the realists do) the Secretary-General is less likely to intervene, let al.one assert autonomy in the midst of a conflict or crisis, unless there is an alignment of P-5

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[119] Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? : Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), 214.
[120] For example, Hammarskjöld's diplomatic intervention into the 1956 Suez crisis was followed up by a United Nations Peacekeeping force approved by the U.N. Security Council.

interests and broad consensus exists in support of his involvement. These dynamics make it more likely that the Secretary-General's intervention behavior will be akin to that of a perfect agent whenever P-5 interests are a play.

Consequently, for the realist hypotheses, I posit that what really matters in predicting whether and how P-5 interests affect the Secretary-General's intervention behavior is the alignment of P-5 interests. The realists would expect the likelihood of the Secretary-General's interventions to be low, for example, in situations that directly pit P-5 members against each other or against non-P-5 states. In both hypothetical situations, there are greater incentives for P-5 states to block or frustrate the Secretary-General's actions, and to try and keep him out of their immediate or internal affairs. The Secretary-General in turn would intuitively internalize these dynamics and proceed with caution whenever P-5 conflicts break out.

In addition, I hypothesize that the overall political climate among P-5 states is likely to affect how they perceive the desirability of the Secretary-General's involvement when it comes to P-5 vs. P-5 or P-5 vs. non P-5 conflicts: when relations between P-5 states are highly adversarial, e.g. Cold War era, the realist expectation would be for the P-5 to prefer to manage such conflicts either unilaterally or with the assistance of organizations that they dominate (such as the OAS in the case of the United States or the Warsaw Pact in the case of the former Soviet Union). When relations are more cooperative, e.g. immediate aftermath of the Cold War, P-5 states would, along the realist line of thought, be more likely to view the Secretary-General's involvement as comparatively more desirable, since they can hope to receive support for their actions in exchange for relatively small concessions to the preferences and views of other P-5 members.[121]

Since acting with the U.N.'s support considerably increases the perceived legitimacy of P-5 policies as well as the chances for obtaining domestic and international

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[121] See Voeten, *Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action*, 845-858 for a game-theoretic demonstration of this point.

support,[122] the realists would expect the P-5 states to welcome the idea of the Secretary-General's interventions in those instances where the expected concessions required in order to obtain legitimacy and U.N. support for their actions "are not too onerous."[123]

The next section examines the institutionalist expectations of the Secretary-General's intervention behavior.

2.3.2: The Institutionalist Perspective

Control is rarely perfect

The main thrust of the institutionalist perspective, on the other hand, is that principals' control of agents is rarely perfect because selection, monitoring, and sanctioning never work perfectly in the real world, least of all at the United Nations. Much as parochial P-5 interests are important enough to not be discounted, they are nevertheless not the primary determinant of the Secretary-General's intervention behavior. This is due to factors such as strong individual personalities (which cannot be anticipated during the selection process), the international civil service culture enshrined in the aforementioned Article 100 of the U.N. Charter, and the unique nature of the U.N. principal that makes slack more likely than the realists would expect. For the institutionalists, U.N. Charter dictates and not parochial P-5 interests are the primary determinant of the Secretary-General's intervention behavior. The next few sections outline the institutionalist case in detail.

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[122] On these points, see (as specified in bibliography) Hurd (2005, 2007); Tharoor (2003); and Thompson (2006) who stresses the signaling value of channeling coercive actions through the U.N.
[123] See Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002,* 33-49 for an interesting insight-last part of sentence paraphrased from that paper.

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Notable U.N. scholars[124] have argued that slack at the U.N. can arise from strong personalities that are hard to anticipate during the selection process and that as a consequence, any analysis of the Office of the U.N. Secretary-General must go beyond institutional variables to the actual person serving in the office. Their argument is that ultimately, the post of Secretary-General is occupied by human beings whose conduct and behavior while in office may be heavily influenced by variables such as national origin, cultural background, IQ, personal charm, and ideology, to name a few, more so than just the parochial interests of the P-5. A project such as ours would therefore be incomplete in the eyes of institutionalist unless it took into account the personality variable. The underlying point here is that some individual Secretaries-General can be more likely than others to engage in slack, and more difficult to monitor and control because of their personal traits. This point is all the more relevant to the U.N. because as we established in Section 2.2.1, delegation to the Secretary-General is discretion-based as opposed to rules based, and this technicality creates space for strong personalities to shine when circumstances are right.

Institutionalist scholars[125] have decried the dearth of literature that carefully examines the differences in leadership styles among the Secretary-General, and bemoaned the fact that this oversight occurs due to the tendency among U.N. analysts to focus upon contextual limitations (such as parochial P-5 interests) at the expense of the leadership capabilities of office-holders. Their point is that essentially, the few studies that touch upon the personal characteristics of Secretaries-General often do so as a secondary consideration[126] relative to contextual, periodic, or environmental factors, and that as

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[124] See Leon Gordenker, *The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace*, Vol. 4 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 320; Inis L. Claude, "Reflections on the Role of the U.N. Secretary-General," in *The Challenging Role of the U.N. Secretary General : Making "the most Impossible Job in the World" Possible*, eds. Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 255; Kent J. Kille, *From Manager to Visionary* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 10.

[125] For a list of these scholars, see Ibid., 10

[126] See also Leon Gordenker, "The U.N. Secretary-Generalship: Limits, Potentials, and Leadership," in *The Challenging Role of the U.N. Secretary General : Making "the most Impossible Job in the World" Possible*, eds. Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 261-282.

such, these studies fail to provide a more "nuanced picture"[127] of the Office of the Secretary-General. Terry Moe[128] and Hawkins & Jacoby[129] have argued that agents' "exogenous traits" are likely to matter even more than any carefully designed institutional, selection, and monitoring mechanisms that principals use to control adverse agent characteristics. The rationale here is that agents, by virtue of their "exogenous traits" (such as personality), are perfectly capable of asserting independence even after taking into account the principals' control mechanisms.

U.N. scholars such as Kent Kille[130] have criticized even those literatures[131] that touch on personality differences of suffering from the "super Secretary-General syndrome", i.e. the tendency to essentially treat every Secretary-General as a constant in terms of output or impact on international affairs.[132] She asserts that while this set of literatures acknowledges individual differences between Secretaries-General, these scholars fail to show or even argue as to whether such differences may in fact set the different office-holders apart in terms of conduct and performance while in office. Kille's main point then is for studies such as this project to avoid the pitfall of treating all Secretaries-General as a constant, and instead strive to produce some fine-tuned analyses that assess the possibility of individual differences when it comes to intervention behavior. I therefore use these critiques as a point of departure in testing for the assumed effect of a Secretary-General's individual-level variables in the quantitative tests in Chapter 5. I choose to call this assumed effect as the "Hammarskjöld effect" because Dag Hammarskjöld, perhaps more than any of the Secretaries-General, exemplified the extent to which an individual personality can

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[127] Kille, *From Manager to Visionary*, 9.

[128] Terry M. Moe, "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 6, Special Issue: [Papers from the Organization of Political Institutions Conference, April 1990] (1990): 213-253.

[129] Hawkins and Jacoby, *How Agents Matter*, 199-228.

[130] Kille, *From Manager to Visionary*, 308.

[131] In her critique on that page, Kille singles out the following scholars, among others: (Murthy 1995, 186; Bourloyannis,1990, 645, 668; and Rikhye, *Critical Elements in Determining the Suitability of Conflict Settlement Efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General*, 72-73.

[132] Kille, *From Manager to Visionary*, 9.

transform the Office of the Secretary-General in terms of asserting autonomy in spite of P-5 misgivings (see Chapter 5 qualitative section).

This project therefore follows the trend of scholars such as Kille in going beyond previous oversimplifications of IOs such as those from Mutume[133] and Oatley & Yackee[134] who portrayed IOs as just guileless tools of the great powers or as primarily just sets of rules with minimal capability to develop as independent and logical actors.[135] Instead, I avoid such extremities at the onset and employ a theoretical framework that accounts for the Secretary-General's role as a rational actor (as pointed out in Section 2.1) who is capable of acting autonomously in ways whose outcomes may or may not adhere to any a priori oversimplifications.

As personality is something that is difficult if not impossible to quantify, I do not go as far as what Kille and other scholars have tried to do in terms of drawing from political psychology to quantify the personalities of the Secretaries-General. Instead, for the quantitative tests in Chapter 5, I create a control variable denoting the tenures of the seven Secretaries-General from Trygve Lie to Kofi Annan (Kofi Annan finished his 10-year term in 2006) to see if there were any marked differences in intervention behavior.

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[133] Gumisai Mutume, "Criticism of the IMF Gets Louder," http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/louder.htm (accessed February 15, 2010).

[134] Thomas Oatley and Jason Yackee, "Political Determinants of IMF Balance of Payments Lending: The Curse of Carabosse? Unpublished Manuscript" University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2000), http://www.unc.edu/~toatley/imf.pdf (accessed February 15 2010).

[135] See also Beth A. Simmons and Lisa Martin, "International Organizations and Institutions," in *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Beth A. Simmons (London ;Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2002), 192-194.

Institutionalists[136] also posit that the international civil service culture that is enshrined in Article 100 of the U.N. Charter increases the likelihood of slack, as well as provides a loophole for imperfect monitoring and control of the Secretary-General's Office. The main thrust of this argument is that international civil servants, as opposed to appointees seconded from national governments,[137] have bureaucratic incentives to advance the mission of the international organization because their job security and prospects for advancement within the organization depend on criteria associated with the IO and not with member-states.[138] Such internally generated evaluations, as well as any "international civil servant" organizational cultures that may develop, could in turn increase the inward focus of staff members and produce independent interests that may conflict with their principals' preferences.[139]

An IO staff that is composed of international civil servants, especially highly-specialized types like U.N. diplomats, is also more likely to develop distinct preferences that sometimes contradict those of the principals. Theorists such as March and Olsen[140] have argued that international civil servants are very likely to be experts in their particular field, and therefore more likely to use their professional roles as a prism through which they perceive view their IO's mandate. Such independence is again more likely occur in the context of discretion-based delegation (as defined in

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[136] See for example Cortell and Peterson, *Dutiful Agents, Rogue Actors, Or both? Staffing, Voting Rules, and Slack in the WTO and WHO*, 255-280.

[137] This makes intuitive sense- national governments are more likely to have an easy time screening seconded officials from their own ranks than they would screening independently appointed international civil servants.

[138] See again Ibid.

[139] Ibid., 260. This however does not necessarily mean that a staff seconded from a national government is incapable of developing independent preferences over time; as officials' tenure in an IO lengthens and their prospects for future employment outside their home government increases, it is plausible that even seconded staff may develop preferences independent of the member states.

[140] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organization* 52, no. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Autumn, 1998): 943-969.

Section 2.2.1) where strong personalities can promote the independence norm across the IO.

Institutionalists provide a counter-argument to the realist dynamic we saw in the institutional design/P-5 veto section about how the principals solidify their control of the U.N. Secretary-General by making sure to staff his cabinet with their nationals (usually their own political nominees). While it is true that senior appointees from the P-5 states serve the purpose of projecting P-5 clout and influence in the organization, it is also true that all U.N. officials, from the Under-Secretary-General level to the most junior of officers, serve at the pleasure of the Secretary-General in much the same way that government ministers in any country serve at the pleasure of the Head of Government. Indeed, the U.N. Secretary-General has been known to fire[141] top U.N. officials who are P-5 nationals whenever he deems this appropriate.

U.N. officials are explicitly barred from taking instructions from their own or any other government- this honor code is spelled out clearly in the U.N.'s Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service document and also applies equally to staffers who are on secondment[142] from national governments. Any breach of this code results in instant dismissal from the organization, and in that sense, the U.N. bureaucratic structure can be rightly labeled as an "international" civil service as per Article 100.

Institutionalists would also provide a counter-argument to the realist assertions[143] on the effectiveness of resource and funding leverage as a control mechanism. While it is true that the United Nations is organization whose very survival and operation

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[141] Heidi Vogt, "Peter Galbraith: Top U.S. Official Fired by U.N. in Afghanistan," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/30/peter-galbraith-top-us-of_n_304441.html (accessed May 26, 2014).

[142] For more on this, see paragraph 8 of the U.N.'s international civil service Code of Conduct: International Civil Service Commission, "Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service," http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/general/standardsE.pdf (accessed May 3, 2014).

[143] See for example Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (2001): 487-515.

depends on voluntary financial contributions and memberships of its member-states, especially the P-5, it is also true that the collective interests mentioned at the onset of this chapter compel the P-5 to continue using the U.N. from a self-interest perspective, irrespective of the extent of SG slack. A good example to illustrate this point could be the events of 2003: when the U.S. decided to bypass the Security Council and unilaterally invade Iraq, a lot of analysts saw the move as a serious threat to the U.N.'s continued legitimacy and very survival, especially after Kofi Annan was also widely criticized in Washington D.C. for labelling the U.S. invasion "illegal."[144]

However a few months after the Iraq invasion, after it became clear that the U.S. would have a difficult time managing the nation-building process unilaterally, the Bush administration returned to the Security Council and asked for the dispatchment of an SRSG in the form of the U.N.'s most reputable mediator, Sergio Vieira de Mello, to help mediate the Iraq conflict as well as lend an air of international legitimacy to the controversial U.S. provisional administration.[145] Thus, the P-5 states have a parochial interest in continuing to fund and use the U.N., and as a result, SG slack does not constitute an existential threat to the organization because it is not very likely to trigger a P-5 boycott or abandonment of the organization, at least not to the extent that realists would expect. As such, the Secretary-General is more likely to be inclined to develop independent preferences when warranted than to conform to member states' preferences when his own judgment tells him otherwise.

Unique Nature of the U.N. Principal

The institutionalist view also posits that P-5 control over the Secretary-General's actions is harder than the realists would expect because of the unique nature of the U.N. principal which is two-fold in nature: first the Security Council where, as we

[144] BBC News, "Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm (accessed May 26, 2014).
[145] Richard C. Holbrooke, "U.N. Serving U.S. Interests with Too Little Help," http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2003-08-21/news/0308200555_1_east-timor-mello-sergio-vieira (accessed May 26, 2014).

noted in Section 2.3.1, the P-5 enjoy unilateral veto powers, and the General Assembly where all 193 member states (the P-5 included) enjoy a one country one vote privilege. PA theorists[146] have generally used the term "complex principal" to define this type of arrangement where multiple states delegate to the same agent. They further classify the Security Council arrangement as a "multiple principal" set up because the P-5 enjoy unilateral selection, monitoring and sanctioning powers, and the General Assembly arrangement as a "collective principal" scenario because of the one country one vote rule.

The institutionalist argument is that preference heterogeneity among the principals, whether among the P-5 within the Security Council, or between the Security Council and the General Assembly (much like the U.S. executive vs. legislature in the latter scenario), creates room for agency slack in much the same way that PA theorists made reference to Clint Eastwood's character in *The Man With No Name*. Lyne, Nielson & Tierney[147] argued that analyses of PA relationships need to employ models that accurately reflect the structure of the principal in a specific empirical setting, and warned that failure to do so may result in PA models that provide false or misleading results.[148] It is precisely in this spirit that we separate out the nature and preferences of the two sets of U.N. principals.

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[146] Kiewiet and McCubbins, *The Logic of Delegation : Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*, 286; Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins and Barry R. Weingast, "A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 3 (Aug., 1989): 588-611; Thomas H. Hammond and Jack H. Knott, "Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making," *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 12, no. 1 (Apr., 1996): 119-166.
[147] Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, *Who Delegates? Alternative Models of Principals in Development Aid*, 41-76.
[148] PA scholars employ complex mathematical and econometric models to explain principal-agent relationships; however this project will only survey the literature in brief and not go deep into the mathematics part of it.

The unilateral nature of the veto privilege as outlined in Section 2.3.1 places the P-5 in a position whereby they effectively enact separate and distinct contractual arrangements with the Secretary-General. This section will not repeat what was already explained in Section 2.3.1, except to emphasize that the P-5 fit the profile of multiple principals because the veto grants to each of them a unilateral say over the selection, monitoring, and sanctioning of the Secretary-General's Office. Thus, when it comes to building our hypotheses, we will consider the P-5 as multiple principals and then, as a separate category, the General Assembly (backed by the U.N. Charter) as a collective principal. In other words, it makes a lot of sense to separate out the P-5 multiple principal from the General Assembly collective principal and view them in much the same way as PA theorists view the U.S. President and Congress as separate principals delegating to the same agent such as the CIA, FBI, or USAID. The diagram below makes sense of this assertion, and clarifies our focus on the P-5 as multiple principals and the GA as a collective principal:

Figure 2: Single vs. Multiple Principals

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[149] Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, *Who Delegates? Alternative Models of Principals in Development Aid*, 45.

Collective Principal: Why the GA also Matters

The institutionalist argument posits that the General Assembly should not easily be discounted as a non-entity in matters of international security even though, unlike the Security Council, its resolutions are symbolic in nature. Instead, the General Assembly is also a force to reckon with because its membership constitutes all 193 U.N. member states, some of whom, like the P-5, also carry significant financial and resource clout in the organization. More importantly, the General Assembly has at times during the U.N.'s history served as a counter-balance to the Security Council during instances of the latter's inaction or deadlock, and almost always against the wishes of at least one P-5 state.

The strongest evidence of why the General Assembly should be considered a force to reckon with comes in the form of General Assembly resolution[150] 377 (V) of 3 November 1950, which affirmed that in cases of P-5 inaction or deadlock on matters affecting international peace and security, the General Assembly has the right to assume the Security Council's responsibilities either during sessions or via an emergency special session. The spirit and letter of this provision was developed in 1950 during the acrimonious Korean War debate in the Security Council, but used for the first time in 1956 when U.K. and French vetoes prevented collective Security Council action during the Suez Crisis. The exact text of the Uniting for Peace Resolution reads in part as follows:

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[150] United Nations Secretariat, "*General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), 3 November 1950,*" http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/landmark/pdf/ares377e.pdf (accessed May 26, 2014).

The General Assembly,

...Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto...

Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States... does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security...

Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security...

Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.[151]

Since 1956, the General Assembly has used the Uniting for Peace provision 11 times to intervene in crises where the P-5 was either unable or unwilling to.[152] The spirit and letter of this resolution, plus its subsequent application in select international crises, solidifies the point I made earlier about the need to view the Security Council and General Assembly in the same "balance of power" terms that PA theorists view the U.S. Congress and the Executive when they delegate power to the same agents such as the CIA, FBI, or USAID.

The more crucial point however is that again, preference heterogeneity between the Security Council and the General Assembly creates room for agency slack in the Clint Eastwood fashion- indeed, some of the cases in our quantitative analyses such as the 1956 Suez Crisis involved the Secretary-General asserting and even enhancing autonomy from the Security Council but based on a General Assembly Uniting for

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[151] Ibid.
[152] Security Council Report Organization, "Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace: An Abridged History," http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Security_Council_Deadlocks_and_Uniting_for_Peace.pdf (accessed May 26, 2014).

Peace Resolution (in other words, with the support of the majority of U.N. member states). Thus, consistent with Beardsley & Schmidt[153] and also Gilligan & Stedman[154], I hypothesize that both "P-5" and "U.N. Charter" interests feature prominently in shaping the U.N. Secretary-General's intervention behavior. While serving P-5 interests is no doubt important, the Secretary-General also needs and indeed dwells on the support of the other 188 member-states in order to remain relevant.

This brings us to the second institutionalist justification for the importance of the GA principal: the fact that the General Assembly membership includes select member-states whose financial and resource clout rivals that of the P-5. The P-5 actually account for only about 35% of the U.N. budget, with the next five biggest financial contributors (Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Canada) accounting for the next ~30%, and the rest of the U.N. member-states the remaining 35%. As the chart on page 62 shows, Japan and Germany rank among the top 5 financial contributors, whereas Russia, a P-5 state, is not in the top 10. Furthermore, when it comes to troop contributions for U.N. peacekeeping operations, China is the only P-5 state that makes the top 20 list. In terms of financial contributions to peacekeeping missions, only the United States makes contributions that are not matched by a non-P-5 country (see the two peacekeeping charts on page 45).

The institutionalist rationale is therefore quite simple: if the Secretary-General's intervention activities consistently produced outcomes that benefited P-5 members at the expense of the interests of the other 188 member-states, the latter would see little reason to support the U.N. financially and politically, let al.one retain their membership of the Organization. This makes a lot of sense when one considers the fact that although they do not hold Security Council veto powers, the 188 non-P-5 states collectively (and individually in some cases) make some significant

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[153] Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002*, 33-49.
[154] Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, "Where do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003): 37-54.

contributions without which the U.N. could never function. The non-P-5 states also have *sanctioning* capabilities vis-à-vis the Secretary-General in terms of their ability to withhold much-needed support from the U.N. at will.

It therefore makes a lot of sense to think of the rest of the U.N. member-states (backed by the U.N. Charter) as principals as well. The key takeaway however is that these dynamics imply occasional preference heterogeneity between the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the possibility of slack as per the aforementioned *Man with no Name* dynamic.

Figure 3: Annual Contributions to U.N. Budget (2014)

Top 12 U.N. Regular Budget Contributors

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[155] United Nations Secretariat, "Assessment of Member States' Advances to the Working Capital Fund for the Biennium 2014-2015 and Contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget for 2014," http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=ST/ADM/SER.B/889 (accessed May 5, 2014).

Figure 4: Troop and Financial Contributions to U.N. (as of 2014)

Top 20 Contributors of Uniformed Personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations
As of 31 March 2014

Top 20 Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Budget
2013-2015

[156] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Background Note: United Nations Peacekeeping," https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf (accessed May 3, 2014).

Last but not least, when it comes to appointing a new Secretary-General or renewing the contract of a current Secretary-General, the U.N. rules require the votes of a clear majority (at least 9) of the 15-member Security Council. The same applies to voting rules for other important U.N. agenda items such as authorization and replenishment of U.N. peacekeeping missions. As a result then, if the Secretary-General were to consistently pursue policies and interventions that were blatantly designed to promote parochial P-5 interests while showing little regard for the U.N.'s organizational mission and the interests of the other member-states, he would find it very difficult to sustain his legitimacy or that of the Organization. Just as we established in the case of the P-5 then, the institutional design of the U.N. places the non-P-5 states in a position to also invoke control mechanisms such as *screening and selection procedures* and also *sanctioning* to keep the Secretary-General in check in terms of his adhering to U.N. Charter dictates. Given that maintenance of international peace and security is at the core of the U.N.'s organizational mandate, institutionalists would expect the Secretary-General's intervention decisions to be reflective of this mandate.

From the institutionalist viewpoint then, the Secretary-General would perceive any mismatch between his actions and U.N. Charter dictates as having the real potential to undermine the legitimacy of his Office. The institutionalists would not go as far as branding the Secretary General as a rogue actor bent on subverting the authority and control of the member-states. Instead they would characterize him as a rational actor who prioritizes the objectives of the Organization, even if that means publicly disagreeing with the powerful P-5 from time to time.

It is however important to emphasize that the non-P-5 states also have parochial interests, but it is harder for them to act unilaterally due to their weaker clout on the world stage (at least militarily speaking, and also because they lack the veto), such that their influence is likely to be greatest on matters of collective U.N. interest.

Three Implications for SG Autonomy

The dynamics we have discussed (strong personalities, international civil service, unique nature of the U.N. principal, also discretion-based delegation) collectively imply three main things in as far as the Secretary-General's autonomy from the P-5 and his propensity to uphold the U.N. Charter's ideals above all else:

Collective Interest Can Overwhelm the P-5

First, there are times when the collective interest of the U.N. member-states overwhelms the parochial interest of any P-5 state; this in turn creates room for the Secretary-General to act autonomously with the support of a majority of member states and in spite of public opposition from one or more P-5 states. Such majority member-state support is more likely in but not limited to instances of Uniting for Peace General Assembly action in which the Secretary-General's autonomous initiatives have received broad member-state support in spite of opposition from one or more P-5 states. A majority of member-states have also on occasion provided informal support for the Secretary-General's autonomy in spite of opposition from one or more P-5 states, as will be showcased in Chapter 6 when we study the U.S.-China 1954-55 Crisis in detail.

The collective interest can also overwhelm the P-5 in crises that threaten global nuclear war and destruction, instances of global terrorism, or crises involving non-aligned rogue regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein in Gulf War 1. I am careful to use the term "non-aligned" because there are exceptions such as North Korea in which a P-5 state may advance its parochial interests by curtailing its support for collective U.N. action- China has a parochial national interest in ensuring the survival of the communist North Korean regime because a) it would not want millions of refugees flooding its borders in the event of a state collapse, and b) it would not want to see a

U.S.-allied unified Korea playing host to U.S. military personnel and installations right along its border.

Collective interest can also prevail during crises that occur in strategically peripheral regions, but generate a significant enough level of humanitarian fallout to elicit a collective desire on the part of the P-5 as well as the collective U.N. membership to contain the crisis and avoid negative externalities. These are crises that the P-5 would otherwise view as politically "distasteful" (i.e. outside the realm of their national interest and not worth any domestic political votes), and are happy to delegate to the U.N. and have the Secretary-General provide mediation as a global public good. In this instance it is less a case of the collective interest overwhelming the P-5 but rather the collective interest proving convenient to the P-5.

Split Security Council Breeds Autonomy

Second, a split Security Council can create scope for the Secretary-General to act autonomously with the support of at least one P-5 state, as was the case in in U.S.-China 1955 hostage crisis which we will cover in Chapter 6.

As was established early on in the Chapter, PA theorists argue that a divergence of preferences among multiple principals will create more room for agency slack.[157] At the very least, conflict among the principals allows the agents to pursue their independent preferences much more than if they had been accountable to a single principal or multiple principals that have similar preferences.[158] In the repeated studies of the U.S. Congress and Executive, the evidence has tended to suggest that when the U.S. Congress and the Executive differ in their policy preferences, and their agent essentially receives different or contradictory marching orders from them, the

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[157] See Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, *A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion*, 588-611.; Hammond and Knott, *Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making*, 119-166.

[158] Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, *Who Delegates? Alternative Models of Principals in Development Aid*, 50.

agent exercises slack and pursues independent preferences, becoming less accountable than if there were a single principal or multiple principals with similar preferences, and subsequently complaints about the agent arise.[159]

A point of emphasis on this second dynamic: realists and institutionalists have diametrically opposite expectations for instances of a split Security Council, e.g. "P-5 vs. P-5", or "P-5 vs. Other" crises. For realists, the Secretary-General is more likely to stay out of such crises for fear of sanctioning by an aggrieved P-5 state, given the high likelihood that his judgment may not be in concert with the parochial interests of the P-5 state in question. For institutionalists however, a split Security Council creates room for autonomous action based on the reasons outlined in this section, and in line with the *Man with No Name* dynamic from PA theory.

Discretion-Based Delegation Breeds Ingenuity

Third, the nature of delegation at the U.N. (discretion based as opposed to rules based) makes it possible for the Secretary-General to devise ingenious ways of staging political interventions in a less controversial way than would the case if the intervention was overtly political. This has occurred in cases such as the 1971 Birth of Bangladesh Crisis, in which the P-5 were deadlocked, plus both India and Pakistan characterized as an internal crisis not warranting U.N. involvement. Another example is the early 2000s North Korean nuclear crisis in which the U.S., China, and other concerned actors preferred to negotiate directly with North Korea via the "six party talks" mechanism. I provide the following two anecdotes from both instances:

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[159] Ibid., 50.

This section briefly highlights a unique type of high profile SG intervention that has occurred in instances of Article 2 barriers (prohibition of U.N. interference in internal affairs of member states- see civil war independent variables section of Chapter 3 for a detailed exposition) and also instances of P-5 deadlock. The evidence from this anecdotal study suggests that these co-called "humanitarian" interventions can constitute a disguised form of slack in that the Secretary-General engages in activities that would otherwise not be tolerated by the P-5:

1971 Birth of Bangladesh

The 1971 Bangladesh crisis arose from compounded political differences between East Pakistan and the central Pakistani government. The breakdown of peaceful discussions in March 1971 led to a flare-up of violence that resulted, ultimately, in the flight of up to 10 million refugees from East Pakistan into the adjacent states of India, thereby rekindling old India-Pakistan hostilities. The problem was exacerbated by the "extraordinary apathy" of the U.N. Security Council, which was due to the fact that neither India nor Pakistan wanted action by the United Nations (they each considered the dispute an internal matter) and also because some[160] P-5 states took sides in the conflict, and as a result, none of the permanent members of the Council, or any member-state for that matter, would support a call for a Security Council meeting.[161]

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[160] The Soviet Union backed its ally India, whereas the United States and the People's Republic of China, which became a P-5 member by the breakout of the India-Pakistan War in December 1971, both supported Pakistan. See Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: U Thant, 1968-1971*, Vol. 8 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 9.

[161] Thant, *View from the UN*, 422. U Thant writes that the Security Council was immobilized; the P-5 did not agree much, to the extent that they did not even discuss the problem privately, at least initially. By the time the Security Council finally met on December 3, 1971, the People's Republic of China had just assumed the Chinese seat in the U.N. and on the Security Council, and immediately clashed with

Given the P-5 deadlock, and in spite of the unfolding humanitarian tragedy, Secretary-General U Thant decided to not invoke Article 99 to compel the Council to meet over this crisis because, in his words, he would have been "accused of having invoked Article 99 on a "false" premise, my utility as a prospective mediator would have been seriously jeopardized".[162]   Instead, he initially limited his involvement to the humanitarian sphere by dispatching a humanitarian SRSG in May 1971 the form of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadruddin Khan, to coordinate the assistance of the various United Nations agencies assisting the millions of refugees in India; Khan's appointment was only accepted by Pakistan six weeks into the crisis.[163]

Privately however, U Thant initiated a political intervention as early as July 1971 when he distributed a confidential memorandum (on July 20) to the Security Council, warning that the conflict "could all too easily expand, erupting the entire subcontinent in fratricidal strife", and that "the United Nations must now attempt to mitigate the tragedy."[164] He then took things a step further when, barely a month later, he decided to publicize his secret memorandum and, in doing so, to make "an implied invocation of Article 99."[165]

In addition, U Thant initiated a two-fold private diplomatic initiative that first involved his dispatching a secret letter to His Excellency Tunku Abdul Rahman, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia and a man respected[166] in both India and Pakistan, to

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the Soviet Union over whether or not to invite representatives of secessionist Bangladesh to address the Council, to the extent that a Soviet resolution on the crisis failed to pass.

[162] Ibid., 423.

[163] Cordier and Harrelson, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: U Thant, 1968-1971*, 555.

[164] Thant, *View from the UN*, 423.

[165] Ibid., 423

[166] Tunku was a friend of the late Jawaharlal Nehru as well as of Pakistani President Yahya Khan; a devout Moslem, Tunku was at that time also the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. Tunku and I agreed that if and when he contacted President Khan, he would not disclose that I had approached him; since he had previously been approached by many Moslem organizations,

mediate the dispute. Second, he sent a pair of identical confidential messages to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan under his personal seal[167] on October 20, 1971, in which he veered away from his public domain humanitarian focus, and instead delved into the politics of the matter. He wrote in part:

> ...this situation could all too easily give rise to the hostilities which could not only be disastrous to the two countries principally concerned, but might also constitute a major threat to the wider peace. In this potentially very dangerous situation, I feel that it is my duty as Secretary-General to do all that I can to assist the governments immediately concerned in avoiding a development which might lead to disaster. I wish Your Excellency to know, therefore, that my good offices are entirely at your disposal if you believe that they could be helpful at any time. Naturally the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP (the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan set up in 1949) will continue to do his utmost to assist in maintaining the peace in the area of his responsibility.[168]

During this period, U Thant also commented publicly, via his spokesperson, on the trial of the separatist Awami League, Sheik Mujibur Rahman, who had been captured in March 1971 in Dhaka by Pakistani troops and whose fate remained unknown for many months, but whose participation in any peace process was thought to be indispensable. The Pakistani government later announced on August 20 1971 that Rahman would stand trial for "waging war against Pakistan." In reaction to these events, U Thant sent a personal letter[169] under his personal seal to the Pakistani president, as well as made the following carefully crafted public statement via his spokesperson:

> The Secretary-General feels that it is an extremely sensitive and delicate matter which falls within the competence of the judicial system of member state - in this case, Pakistan. It is also a matter of extraordinary interest and concern in many quarters, from a humanitarian as well as from a political point of view. The Secretary-General has received and is still receiving almost every day expressions of serious concern from representatives of governments about the situation in East Pakistan and there is a general feeling that the restoration of peace and normalcy in the region is remote unless some kind of accommodation is reached. The Secretary-General shares the

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including the Islamic Conference, we believed that this would provide him with sufficient grounds for undertaking the mission. See Ibid., 424.

[167] Ibid., 425.

[168] Cordier and Harrelson, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: U Thant, 1968-1971*, 569-570.

[169] Thant, *View from the UN*, 425.

feelings of many representatives that any developments concerning the fate of Sheik
Mujibur Rahman will inevitably have repercussions outside the borders of Pakistan.[170]

Meanwhile the Security Council remained passive[171] until 3 December 1971, when
full-scale warfare broke out between India and Pakistan both along the India-East
Pakistan border and along the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir- only then did the
Council finally meet to discuss the crisis. However any Security Council initiatives
were blocked by Soviet vetoes, to the extent that the issue was transferred to the
General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. The General Assembly on
its part adopted a cease-fire appeal on December 7 which was unfortunately ignored-
the fighting came to an end 10 days later under the auspices of other mediators.

The Bangladesh anecdote showcases the options available to a Secretary-General
during instances of P-5 deadlock and Article 2 constraints. The humanitarian SRSG
strategy can be put to good effect in terms of establishing an acceptable public face of
intervention while at the same time masking a more controversial political
involvement that would otherwise not be accepted by the P-5 and other member states.

2003 North Korea: "Also kept an eye on the nuclear issue"

The protracted North Korean nuclear crisis provides yet another interesting example of
the dedicate balance that the Secretary-General faces between humanitarian and
political issues. The 2003 North Korean nuclear crisis was triggered by North Korea's
decision to withdraw completely from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The

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[170] Cordier and Harrelson, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: U Thant, 1968-1971*, 566-567.
[171] U Thant writes that "there was not even the shadow of a consensus among council members as to whether the dispute involved India and Pakistan, or West Pakistan and East Pakistan, or India, Pakistan, and "Bangla Desh."- See Thant, *View from the UN*, 423.

United States and other major powers decided to negotiate directly with North Korea via the Six-party Talks (2003-2009), with the six participating states being South Korea, the United States, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and North Korea itself. There was no direct United Nations involvement in the political negotiations; rather, Kofi Annan, at least publicly speaking, restricted his involvement to the humanitarian sphere by dispatching a Humanitarian SRSG (Personal Envoy), Maurice F. Strong of Canada, to focus on North Korea's humanitarian needs especially in light of the family of the late 1990s whose effects were still being felt in 2003.[172] In private however, Kofi Annan had a very detailed political intervention strategy that he kept out of the public domain, and for good reason because it may have clashed with the Six arty talks that the great powers preferred.

However during a series of press conferences related to North Korea between January and July, Kofi Annan began to provide some hints to the effect that his "humanitarian" SRSG was in reality a political operative tasked with finding ways to resolve the nuclear issue as well. The following is a series of exchanges between Kofi Annan and reporters at U.N. Headquarters from January to July 2003, in chronological order, as to the mandate of Maurice F. Strong in North Korea:

January 14th 2003 Press Conference:

Reporter Question: I wonder if you regard North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons as a grave threat to international peace and security and whether or not you favor bringing that issue of the Security Council.[173]

Kofi Annan Response: It is grave, and I have issued a statement... I myself have sent an Envoy to discuss the humanitarian situation in North Korea, given the new situation and the possible negative impact of the population... He will focus mainly on the humanitarian issues, but, of course, he is also available and prepared to listen to any other issues they may want to discuss with him.[174]

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[172] Jean E. Krasno, ed., *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan : U.N. Secretary-General, 2002-2003*, Vol. 3 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), 2272.
[173] Ibid., 2272
[174] Ibid., 2272

July 16th 2003 Press Conference:

Reporter Question: The North Korean ambassador told the Security Council President that the situation in the Korean Peninsula is deteriorating. How concerned are you with the situation in North Korea and the Korean Peninsula as a whole?[175]

Kofi Annan Response: I have been concerned about the North Korean situation quite some time. As you know I have an Envoy, Maurice Strong, who has been going in and out, focusing immediately on the humanitarian situation. But we have also kept an eye on the nuclear issue... I would urge the parties to really engage and find a peaceful way out of this conflict.[176]

What these press conference transcripts show is essentially a repeat of the dynamic we saw in the Bangladesh 1971 case- the Secretary-General appointing a "humanitarian" SRSG whose real purpose is to camouflage an autonomous and unsolicited SG political intervention that would be controversial at best and offensive otherwise to the United States and at worst be objectionable to the United States, North Korea, and other concerned parties that have strong parochial interests in the North Korean nuclear issue. This line of reasoning is borne out by the declassified papers of Kofi Annan, which revealed for the first time his "preventive initiative" vis-à-vis the North Korean nuclear crisis.

A declassified report/briefing prepared by the U.N. Secretariat Department of Political Affairs reveals the primarily political objectives of the initiative- it mentions the humanitarian aspect only as a secondary concern.[177] More revealing is the fact that the

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[175] Ibid., 2483

[176] Ibid., 2483

[177] Jean E. Krasno, ed., *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan : U.N. Secretary-General, 2004-2005*, Vol. 4 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), 2769. The document is entitled "Preventive Initiative by the Secretary-General in Relation to the Korean Peninsula and Session of Experts on Korean Peninsula- the opening of the document describes aims of the initiative as follows: "to support and organize international efforts aimed at defusing tensions in the Korean Peninsula, preventing the situation there from escalating into an armed conflict, contribute to the multilateral diplomatic process of resolving the nuclear controversy and achieving a comprehensive, peaceful settlement of the long-standing threat to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula. This is designed to encompass helping to meet DPRK's humanitarian and long-term economic development needs, notably in the area of energy, which will be essential components of such a settlement."

document lists five "expected results"[178] of the Secretary-General's preventive initiative, all of them could do with political as opposed to humanitarian outcomes, and in this way, confirming to us that the "humanitarian" mission of Kofi Annan's SRSG to North Korea was in fact one with political objectives as far as the U.N. Secretariat is internal policymaking machine was concerned. As was the case in Bangladesh, the public face of the Secretary-General's mission was primary humanitarian because he simply wanted to give the Security Council as well as the six party talks some breathing space by not injecting the likely controversial idea of himself as a mediator. The "humanitarian SRSG" strategy has been used in a number of other conflicts by different Secretary-Generals, and the Bangladesh and North Korean examples demonstrate how it can sometimes be used as a tool to reconcile realist and institutionalist sensitivities, and perhaps as a tool to mask activities that the great powers would otherwise not approve of.

2.4: Hypotheses

To sum up the detailed discussion, I present the 2x2 table as well as additional table specific to the competing explanations for conflicts that directly involve the P-5 as a way of summarizing our discussion. I then outline the realist and institutionalist sets of hypotheses.

For the 2x2 table, our main dynamic of interest is Scenario A: what can we expect the SG to do in crises where the strong impetus to intervene (based on clear threats to international peace and security) is tempered by the fact that one or more P-5 states have a strong parochial interest in that crisis? Can we expect him to intervene or not? I outline the opposite realist and institutionalist expectations based on our discussion in this chapter.

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[178] Ibid., 2770.

Table 2 places more emphasis on the opposite predictions from our two competing theories when it comes to parochial interests more so than the convergent P-5 interests), and what we can expect to test in our later quantitative models.

Table 1: Constructing Realist and Institutionalist Hypotheses

U.N. Charter Interests

	Strong	**Weak**
Strong (Parochial P-5 Interests)	Scenario A • Realists: SG intervention and/or autonomy highly unlikely due to fear of P-5 sanctions. • Institutionalists: SG intervention and/or autonomy very likely due to strong Charter impetus even if "P-5 vs. P-5" or "P-5 vs. Other."	Scenario B • Realists: SG intervention and/or autonomy highly unlikely due to strong parochial P-5 interests buoyed by weak Charter interest. • Institutionalists: SG intervention and/or autonomy not as likely unless SG feels strongly, e.g. Lebanon Hostages humanitarian imperative
Weak	Scenario C • Realists: SG intervention may occur due to low P-5 parochial interest and perhaps humanitarian impulse; however P-5 will oppose autonomy (to forestall slack precedent). • Institutionalists: SG intervention and/or autonomy very likely due to strong Charter interest.	Scenario D • Realists: SG intervention likely because "no-one cares", but P-5 will oppose autonomy in principle (to forestall slack precedent). • Institutionalists: SG intervention and/or autonomy may occur because "no-one cares" and only if SG has time and resources.

Table 2: Predictions on P-5 Deadlock/SG Action

P-5 Interests	Realist	Institutionalist
Parochial P-5 Interests	No mandate, no intervention	No mandate, intervention and autonomy likely
Convergent P-5 Interest	Intervention with mandate	Will Intervene, some autonomy possible

Again, the focus in our hypotheses as well as later quantitative models is the interplay between the realist and institutionalist predictions when it comes to parochial P-5 interests, and the fact that they make two sets of completely opposite predictions. Strong parochial P-5 interests are represented in Scenarios A and B in our 2x2 table.

Convergent P-5 interests are represented in Scenarios C and D e.g. conflicts that trigger humanitarian disasters, or involve least developed countries that are of little strategic value to the great powers. Both realists and institutionalists would predict an intervention for this scenario, but still differ on autonomy: realists would expect the Secretary-General to intervene if and when he has a mandate from the P-5 (please refer back to Section 2.3.1 on the realist perspective and especially the section on the P-5's propensity for monitoring the Secretary-General's activities).

The hypotheses are laid out over the next two pages:

2.4.1: Realist Hypotheses

Research Question 1: Where Does the Secretary-General Go?

R1: The U.N. Secretary-General's intervention behavior is more likely to be influenced by the parochial interests of the P-5 (whether temporal or conflict-specific) than by the dictates of the U.N. Charter. He is less likely to intervene in conflicts that elicit strong P-5 parochial interests, and more likely to intervene in conflicts where P-5 interests converge or are very weak. He is especially unlikely to intervene in "P-5 vs. P-5", "P-5 vs. Other", or conflicts bordering P-5 states because such conflicts elicit strong parochial -5 interests, trigger Security Council deadlock, and increase the likelihood of P-5 sanctions.

R2: The intensity of the Secretary-General's interventions is likely to be driven more by the configuration of P-5 interests than by U.N. Charter dictates. High profile interventions are less likely in conflicts that elicit strong P-5 parochial interests due to the SG's fear of P-5 sanctions. Such interventions are more likely in conflicts where P-5 interests converge or are very weak.

Research Question 2: Is the Secretary-General Autonomous?

R3: The Secretary-General is unlikely to initiate autonomous diplomatic interventions, even in instances where P-5 interests converge, because he will want to minimize the likelihood of sanctions and other acts of antagonism from the P-5 principals.

R4: The Secretary-General is especially unlikely to assert autonomy in "P-5 vs. P-5", "P-5 vs. Other", or conflicts bordering P-5 states because such conflicts elicit strong parochial -5 interests, trigger Security Council deadlock, and increase the likelihood of P-5 sanctions.

2.4.2: Institutionalist Hypotheses

Research Question 1: Where Does the Secretary-General Go?

I1: The U.N. Secretary-General's intervention behavior is more likely to be influenced by the dictates of the U.N. Charter than by the parochial interests of the P-5, and he is as likely to intervene in conflicts that elicit strong P-5 parochial interests as he is in conflicts where P-5 interests converge.

I2: The intensity of the Secretary-General's interventions is likely to be driven more by the dictates of the U.N. Charter than by the configuration of P-5 interests. High profile interventions are more likely in conflicts that threaten international peace and security, irrespective of whether or not they elicit strong parochial P-5 interests (e.g. "P-5 vs. P-5" conflicts, "P-5 vs. Other" conflicts, or conflicts bordering P-5 states).

Research Question 2: Is the Secretary-General Autonomous?

I3: The Secretary-General is likely to initiate autonomous diplomatic interventions (interventions without the approval of the P-5) irrespective of whether or not there is P-5 unanimity because his actions are primarily guided by U.N. Charter dictates.

I4: The Secretary-General is especially likely to assert autonomy in "P-5 vs. P-5", "P-5 vs. Other", or conflicts bordering P-5 states because a P-5 split on the Security Council, or a split between the Security Council and the General Assembly, creates space for him to assert autonomy, in line with PA theory.

Chapter 3: Understanding the SG's Space in Conflict Diplomacy

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3.1: Introductory Remarks

This chapter profiles the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General from a historical and methodological perspective. I start off by briefly revisiting its historical antecedents, followed by an outline of the powers granted to the Secretary-General in the U.N. Charter. I then discuss how the East-West Cold War divide, and also the massive influx of new member-states from the mid-1950s onwards (dynamics that were not necessarily foreseen in 1944 by the framers of the Charter at San Francisco) led to complexities when it came to translating the powers of the Office into real world politics. Thereafter, I provide a detailed description of the research design for this project, from the data collection process to variables of interest. I also provide some bivariate and time-series analyses.

3.2: Historical Profile of the Office

3.2.1: Legal Background

The diplomatic role of the U.N. Secretary-General is embedded in a legal tradition that dates back to the 1791 Concert of Europe, a loose agreement by major European powers to act in concert on matters of common interest. In spite of its failure to prevent European wars and its eventual disintegration after 1870, the Concert of Europe left behind a set of ideas[179] and methods regarding preventive diplomacy that would make their way into the Covenant of the League of Nations, and later the United Nations Charter. The notion of preventive diplomacy (using good offices or mediation) was first explicitly recorded at the Hague peace conferences of 1899 and 1907. These conferences set out to devise measures for avoiding war through the use

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[179] Perhaps the most pertinent of these ideas was Protocol 23 of the 1856 Declaration of Paris which contained the following provision: "the plenipotentiaries do not hesitate to express in the name of their governments the desire that states... should, before appealing to arms, have recourse, so far as circumstances and allow, to the good offices of a friendly power. The plenipotentiaries hope that governments not represented in the Congress will unite in the sentiment which has inspired the desire recorded in the protocol." See *B. G. Ramcharan, Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 266.*

of international law and the promotion of peaceful methods for settling disputes, among other strategies.[180]

3.2.2: League of Nations Precedent

In order to better understand the role of the U.N. Secretary-General, it is important to examine the precedent established by the League of Nations, and particularly how that organization's Covenant defined the role of a Secretary-General.

Articles 11 and 15 provide the only references in the Covenant of the League of Nations as to what the role of its Secretary-General would be. A close examination of these two Articles reveals two things:

First, according to Article 11, the League of Nations Secretary-General could intervene in an international dispute or crisis only if requested to do so by one or more League of Nations member-states. He had no inherent powers to decide for himself which conflicts and crises could be brought before the League of Nations Council, let al.one which ones constituted a threat to international peace and security. Rather, whenever a conflict or crisis arose, he was mandated to serve as (essentially) a conduit between concerned state parties and the decision-making bodies of the League of Nations.[181] The actual text of Article 11 read as follows:

> Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall

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[180] Ibid., 13. In particular, Article 2 of the Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes saw the contracting Powers agree to have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers before resorting to arms. Article 3 gave those nations not involved in the dispute the right to offer good offices during hostilities- the exercise of this right was not to be considered an unfriendly act. Similar clauses were later inserted into the Covenant of the League of Nations.

[181] Examples of this mechanism in action include the 1921 dispute between Sweden and Finland over the question of the Aaland Islands. There was one exception in which the League of Nations Secretary-General Eric Drummond, on his own initiative, brought a border dispute between Panama and Costa Rica to the attention of the League of Nations Council without a request from either or any country. This instance was an outlier.

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on the request of any member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.[182]

Second, Article 15 of the Covenant decreed that the Secretary-General was subordinate to the Council of the League of Nations and was not an autonomous entity within the League's structure. Modalities on how exactly conflicts and crises would be mediated or settled were decided upon by the League of Nations Council alone. The League's Covenant did not grant the League of Nations Secretary-General any independence or discretion to come up with his own independent initiatives or innovations for resolving conflicts and crises. In essence, his role was more akin to that of a Secretary than a General. The text of Article 15 read as follows:

> If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof...For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.[183]

However as we will see in the case of the United Nations, the victorious World War II allies decided to grant the Office of the Secretary-General more discretion and political autonomy than its League of Nations predecessor.

Aside from this legal basis, some scholars such as Ramcharan[184] and Newman[185] have argued that the administrative (rather than political) face of the League of Nations Secretary-General was reinforced by the demeanor and personalities of the individuals that served in the Office. One figure that is mentioned frequently in this regard is the first Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond, who served from the time of the League's

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[182] League of Nations, "The Covenant of the League of Nations," http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp (accessed May 3, 2012).
[183] Ibid.
[184] Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 266.
[185] Edward Newman, *The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era : A Global Peace and Security Mandate?* (Houndmills: Macmillan ;New York, 1998), 239.

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founding in 1919 to the start of its downward spiral[186] in the early 1930s. Drummond had been a British career civil servant with a background in the Foreign Office. During his time as Secretary-General, he deliberately de-emphasized the political potential of his position by skillfully avoiding concession demands from a host of pressure groups at the League's Geneva Secretariat.[187] Instead, he placed greater emphasis on the administrative side of his duties, and also the "Silences of the Covenant"- a phrase that referred to the image of the League of Nations Secretariat as an efficient and truly international civil service bureaucracy.[188]

Sir Eric Drummond also preferred a style of caution and anonymity that, according to many League of Nations scholars, earned him the respect and trust of the League of Nations member-states. His annual reports on the work of the League of Nations organization were typically characterized by clarity and factual detail, and never included personal political judgments.[189] Some scholars have branded him as the epic form of the passive, administrative, and bureaucratic model of his Office.[190] Again, simply put, he was, to many, the personification of a Secretary as opposed to a General.

Drummond's personal style of work, viewed retrospectively after the collapse of the League of Nations and the catastrophe of World War II, would prompt President Roosevelt and the other founders of the United Nations to envision a new type of Secretary-General whose role would transcend just administrative duties and take on a more political tone.

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[186] Drummond retired as the League of Nations Secretary-General in 1933. I use the term "downward spiral" because the early 1930s was the period when the European fascist powers and militarist Japan commenced their expansionist and imperialist projects that the League proved powerless to stop. Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933 in light of the League of Nations condemnation of the invasion of Manchuria- and there was no action on the part of the League and/or the major western powers against this act of defiance. What followed shortly thereafter was Mussolini's invasion of Manchuria and the beginning of the end for the League of Nations.
[187] Anthony Gaglione, *The United Nations Under Trygve Lie, 1945-1953*, ed. George J. Lankevich, Vol. 1 (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 44.
[188] Ibid., 44.
[189] Ibid., 44.
[190] See Newman, *The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era : A Global Peace and Security Mandate?*, 239.

3.2.3: Establishing the Office

In the final days of World War II, the framers of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco inserted a number of Articles that granted some autonomy and political independence to the Secretary-General of the new organization.

The parts of the Charter that relate directly to the Secretary-General are Article 7 and Articles 97 to 101 inclusive. Additionally, U.N. Secretaries-General have also derived some authority from Article 33 which focuses on the central role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes that may endanger international peace and security.[191] I shall briefly go through these Articles in the next few paragraphs:

Article 7 states that the U.N. Secretariat is a principal organ of the United Nations. It reads as follows:

> 1.   There are established as principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice and a Secretariat.
> 2.   Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.[192]

Some U.N. scholars such as Newman[193] have asserted that by virtue of the fact the Secretary-General is the Chief Executive Officer and Head of the U.N. Secretariat, this Article implies equality between his Office and the other principal organs of the United Nations such as the Security Council and General Assembly, and invalidates the subordinate role that the League of Nations Secretary-General played vis-à-vis the Council of the League of Nations.

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[191] Ibid., 19.
[192] United Nations Secretariat, *Charter of the United Nations*.
[193] Newman, *The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era : A Global Peace and Security Mandate?*, 239.

I will go through Articles 98, 99, 33, and 100 in that order. Article 97 relates to the appointment process for the Secretary-General and this will be examined in a separate section later on in this chapter:

Article 98 basically tasks the Secretary-General to perform functions that are in trusted to him by the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the other principal organs, and also to make an annual report on the work of the Organization. It reads as follows:

> The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.[194]

The term "entrusted to him by other organs" may at first glance seem to counter the assertion made by Newman and others that the Secretary-General is equal in stature to the other principal organs, however it is important to recall that the Charter is very clear about his autonomy and independence, and that "entrusted" in this case carries more of a coordination than a subordination type of relationship between the Secretary-General and the principal organs. Based on the experience of the Office, the exact nature of the tasks delegated to the Secretary-General by the Security Council and the General-Assembly has ranged from routine requests for reports to the most sensitive delegations of responsibility[195].

One thing that needs clarification here is the fact that the term "coordination" as opposed to "subordination" does not negate the fact that Article 98 serves as a monitoring mechanism for the member-states (the principals) to use on the Secretary-General (the agent). This clause would be similar to those in the U.S. Constitution that require the U.S. President to make an annual State of the Union report to the Congress and the nation, and also to undertake tasks that are delegated to him by the

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[194] United Nations Secretariat, *Charter of the United Nations*

[195] Newman, *The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era : A Global Peace and Security Mandate?*, 20. "Sensitive" delegation could include asking the Secretary-General to intervene in a dire international crisis.

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Congress or the Constitution. Those tasks on the part of the U.S. President do not necessarily make him a subordinate entity relative to the Congress and Judiciary, but rather serve as a 'checks and balances" mechanism. I make a similar argument regarding Article 98.

A notable ramification of this Article 98 delegation clause has been the transformation of the Secretaries-Generalship from the periphery to the heart of decision-making. A classic example in this regard was the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt during the 1956 Suez crisis- "the first U.N. peacekeeping operation to be directed from the outset by the Secretary-General rather than under the umbrella of a special *ad hoc* political commission composed of U.N. member states specially designated for the job by a U.N. political organ."[196]

Yet another notable ramification of Article 98, specifically the part that requires him to make an annual report on the work of the Organization, has been to transform the Secretary-General's Office into an agenda-setter and norm-promoter. It is interesting to note that although little political importance was attached to this particular provision at San Francisco, the *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization* has become a vital tool for advancing the Secretary-General's image as the principal spokesman for the international community.

For example, the first U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie used the annual reports to express personal attitudes and opinions[197], and also to offer recommendations on

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[196] Newman, *The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era : A Global Peace and Security Mandate?*, 20.

[197] Lie's opinions were not limited to just thematic political issues, but also touched on specific conflicts and crises, and, in some instances, included some generic (as opposed to conflict-specific) criticisms of P-5 behavior. For example, in his first annual report to the General Assembly, the equivalent of the U.S. president's State of the Union address, Trygve Lie chided U.N. member states for not doing enough to "capture the imagination and harness the enthusiasm of the peoples of the world" on behalf of the United Nations. He asserted that the United Nations was "no stronger than the collective will of the nations that support it." Lie made such statements at many of his public appearances and, in contrast to the League of Nations Secretary-General, Lie quickly became the advocate of a U.N. that could be an independent political and moral force in the world. For more on this, see Gaglione, *The United Nations Under Trygve Lie, 1945-1953*, 45. Memorable post-Trygve Lie annual reports of the Secretary-General

important political matters. This is a remarkable contrast to the League of Nations where annual reports were predictably little more than a factual account of the work of the Organization.[198] There has indeed been some consensus among many U.N. scholars that the Annual Report of the Secretary-General can be regarded as a tool of influence in terms of placing issues on the U.N.'s (and by implication the international community's) agenda and legitimizing ideas or forming norms in the long term.[199]

Article 99 which I cited in the introduction chapter instantly differentiated the United Nations Secretary-General from his League of Nations predecessor by granting him a broader range of political powers than would be available to a mere Chief Administrative Officer of a multilateral organization. It was both far-reaching and vague; the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations submitted a report in 1945 which elaborated on the Article 99 follows:

> The Secretary-General may have an important role to play as a mediator and as an informal advisor of many governments, and will undoubtedly be called upon from time to time, in the exercise of his administrative duties, to take decisions which may justly be called political. Under Article 99 of the Charter, moreover, he has been given a quite special right which goes beyond any power previously accorded to the head of an international organization, viz., to bring to the attention of the Security Council **any matter** (not merely any dispute or situation) which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. It is impossible to foresee how this Article will be applied; but the responsibility it confers upon the Secretary-General will require the exercise of the highest qualities of political judgment, tact, and integrity.[200]

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have included Dag Hammarskjöld's 1960/61 treatise which outlined his conception of the choices which the Organization faced, and Pérez de Cuéllar's first report from 1981 which outlined the crisis of multilateralism, the need to overhaul various aspects of the U.N., and also emphasized the need for a greater preventive role for the Secretary-General...this report was seen at the time as a watershed for the Office after the cautious approach of the Kurt Waldheim years in the 1970s- see Newman, *The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era : A Global Peace and Security Mandate?*, 21 for more on this.
[198] Newman, *The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era : A Global Peace and Security Mandate?*, 21.
[199] Ibid., 21. 1980s Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar once opined that the annual report could also be a means of initiating debate among member states and within the international community in general.
[200] Thant, *View from the UN*, 30.

This is supposedly the only official guidance available the Secretary-General on the implications of Article 99, which, according to records, was adopted with very little debate in San Francisco.[201]

Article 99 has a number of notable ramifications:

First, it complements the earlier argument made by Newman on how the U.N. Charter makes the Office Secretary-General a principal organ with equal stature to the Security Council and the General Assembly.[202] This complementarity argument is borne out by the fact that Article 11 (paragraph 3) of the U.N. Charter tasks the General Assembly with an identical task to the Secretary-General's in Article 99- to "bring to the attention of the Security Council those situations that are deemed to be a danger to international peace and security."

Second, by granting him the right to bring to the Council any matter which in his opinion constituted a threat to international peace and security, Article 99 supplies the Secretary-General with a springboard for dramatic appeals to world public opinion comparable to that provided for the General Assembly[203], and enhances his stature in the aforementioned realms of agenda-setting and norm-entrepreneurship. Although the Secretary-General does not have the policymaking powers (these are the preserve of the P-5 and other Security Council member states who create policies by voting on and adopting binding resolutions), the right to invoke Article 99 grants the Secretary-General a powerful tool for bully pulpit diplomacy and the potential to be a norm entrepreneur that could shame rogue states into submission.

Third, Article 99 grants the Secretary-General the discretion to undertake diplomatic and political initiative of his own- although this point is best understood and validated when one concurrently invokes Article 33 of the Charter. Article 33 asks U.N.

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[201] Ibid., 30

[203] Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 17.

member states to work to mitigate crises through recourse to peaceful diplomatic means, usually at the behest of the U.N. Security Council. It reads:

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.[204]

Although this Article does not specifically mention the Office of the Secretary-General, the different Secretaries-General have invoked it to justify their independent political or diplomatic initiatives (as opposed to waiting for the Security Council to ask them to do so). For example, the third Secretary-General of the U.N., U Thant, stated[205] in his memoirs that he had Article 33 in mind when he foresaw the need to exercise his good offices in the settlement of disputes or difficulties, even without specific authorization from the Security Council and/or the General Assembly (and notice the Clause No. 1 in Article 33 above captures the full length and breadth of activities fall under the "good offices" umbrella). Conversely, there have been cases in which member-states have approached Secretaries-General directly and asked them to make diplomatic interventions (based on Article 33 as well as the pro-active initiatives of some Secretaries-General)- as will be illustrated in the qualitative section of Chapter 5.

Thus, Articles 98, 99, and 33 considered together reaffirm the stature of the Secretary-General as an actor who reserves the right to undertake his own political initiatives, and who is able to point to the Charter as the guarantor of his discretionary, and if necessary autonomous, undertakings. Unlike the League of Nations Secretary-General, the U.N. Secretary-General could, for example, initiate his own inquiries and

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[204] United Nations Secretariat, *Charter of the United Nations*.
[205] Thant, *View from the UN*, 31.

fact-finding missions[206] without the authorization of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Secretaries-General have indeed claimed and exercised the right to autonomously engage in inquiries and fact-finding (specifically by visiting a country or countries to brief themselves first hand) as Dag Hammarskjöld did in 1959 during the Security Council's consideration of the situation in Laos.[207] Hammarskjöld declared that he had accepted an invitation to visit Laos in order to acquire the independent and full knowledge that would enable him to discharge his responsibilities (I briefly discussed other aspects of this trip in Section 2.9.1.4.2 of the Theory Chapter). In a similar event, in July 1961 while the Security Council was examining the situation in Tunisia, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld accepted an invitation from that country's government to visit for an exchange of views (see anecdote in Chapter 5 qualitative section)- a good example of the Article 99 and Article 33 combination explained earlier. Hammarskjöld laid out the rationale for the visit as follows:

> Quite apart from the fact that it is naturally the duty of the Secretary-General to put himself at the disposal of the Government of a Member State, if that Government considers a personal contact necessary, **my acceptance of the invitation falls within the framework of the rights and obligations of the Secretary-General, as Article 99 of the Charter authorizes him** to draw to the attention of the Security Council what, in his view, may represent a threat to international peace and security, and as it is obvious that the duties following from the Article cannot be fulfilled unless the Secretary-General, in case of need, is in a position to form a personal opinion about the relevant facts of the situation which may represent such a threat.[208]

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[206] For example, the Secretary-General's right to engage in fact-finding was invoked by Secretary-General Trygve Lie in 1946 during the Security Council's consideration of the situation in Greece. The United States had proposed the establishment of a commission of inquiry to ascertain the facts relating to skirmishes along the Greek northern frontier. Lie asserted that if the American proposal was not implemented, he would reserve his right to engage in fact-finding: "I hope that the council we understand that the Secretary-General must reserve his right to make such inquiries or investigations as he may think necessary in order to determine whether or not he should consider bringing any aspect of this matter to the attention of the Council under the provisions of the Charter." See Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 20 for more.

[207] Ibid., 21.

[208] Ibid., 21. The Ramcharan text points out that Hammarskjöld would later make an urgent appeal to the Security Council to take immediate action to ensure the cessation of force duties in Tunisia. In both the Laos and Tunisia cases, Hammarskjöld cited his rights and responsibilities under Article 99 without explicitly invoking that Article. The one instance in which Secretary-General Hammarskjöld explicitly invoked Article 99 was when the Congo crisis erupted in 1960, and he sent a letter to the Security Council president dated 13 July 1960 which read in part: "I want to inform you that I have to bring to

In many other situations where the Secretary-General himself was unable to make a fact-finding visit, he was able to dispatch a Special Representative/Special Envoy/Personal Envoy to the country in question with the responsibility of keeping the Secretary-General's Office informed of developments in a given crisis. Section 3.3.2 of this chapter will specifically examine the subject of Special Representatives.

Finally Article 100 complements and solidifies Articles 98 and 99 by codifying the sacrosanct nature of the Office where member-state interference is concerned. It reads as follows:

> 1.   In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.
> 2.   Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.[209]

Thus, Article 100 could be described as underpinning and guaranteeing the political basis of the Office of the Secretary-General as enshrined in Articles 98 and 99, and, indirectly, in Article 33. Indeed, the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, once observed that "Article 98, as well as 99, would be unthinkable without the compliment of Article 100 strictly observed both in letter and spirit."[210] The spirit of this clause was emphasized early on that San Francisco in 1945 in the report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations which stated: "The Secretary-General, more than anyone else, will stand for the U.N. as a whole. In the eyes of the world...he must embody the principles and ideals of the Charter."[211]

the attention of the Security Council a matter which, in my opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, I requested that you call an urgent meeting of the Security Council to hear it report of the Secretary-General on a demand for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo."

[209] United Nations Secretariat, Charter of the United Nations
[210] Newman, The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era : A Global Peace and Security Mandate?, 23.
[211] Ibid., 23

3.2.4: U.N. Charter vs. Realist Politics- Limitations to the SG's Role

The international political environment of the "hottest" years of the Cold War (1945-1962) had a profound effect on the U.N.'s internal dynamics, which in turn led to limitations for the Office of the Secretary-General, as well as opportunities that were unforeseen by those who drafted the U.N. Charter in 1945.[212]

The limitations emanated from the fact that the superpower Security Council deadlock created by the Cold War invalidated the premise of collective security that the framers of the U.N. Charter had in mind towards the end of World War II. This point is best illustrated when one revisits the records from the proceedings of the United Nations Preparatory Commission at San Francisco in 1945 which reveal that the original plan of action for the Security Council was for the collective leadership of the five permanent members of the Security Council, acting by the method of consensus.[213] However from the onset, the Security Council was unable to agree on common positions and effectively execute its responsibilities due to Cold War driven superpower inertia.

Most poignantly, the P-5 failed to create a Military Staff Committee[214] that was proposed in Article 47 of the Charter to enforce international peace and security.[215]

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[212] For more on this opportunities vs. limitations dynamic, see Nabil A. Elaraby , "The Office of the Secretary-General and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security," *Revue égyptienne De Droit International.*- 42 (1986): 1-42.

[213] Thant, *View from the UN*, 34.

[214] During the interwar period, there was general agreement among scholars of the League of Nations that the principal weakness in the Covenant of that organization was the omission of automatic sanctions against aggression. As such, in the lead up to the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, the framers of the U.N. Charter came up with Article 42 which empowered the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain and restore international peace and security." See Gaglione, *The United Nations Under Trygve Lie, 1945-1953*, 27.

[215] The Military Staff Committee was conceived by the framers of the U.N. Charter as a body to run the collective security interests of U.N. member-states and composed of military representatives from the P-5 states. This Committee was envisioned to play the role of advising and assisting the Security Council on all matters relating to the military scope and requirements of international peace and security as well as the to oversee an a designated U.N. military force. However due to P-5 differences on issues such as who would command of the force, where it would be stationed, what its size would be, led to the natural death of the concept and no standby armed force set aside to implement Security Council decisions. Interestingly, when the 1956 Suez crisis came about, the peace-keeping military

This proposed entity was to consist of the Military Chiefs of Staff from the P-5 states whose job would be to advise the Security Council in matters relating to its "military requirements" and also to assume command of U.N. military operations.[216] In 1945, the newly inaugurated Security Council lost no time in working to set up the Military Staff Committee, but it quickly became apparent that the Cold War was becoming an obstacle.[217] On the surface, talks broke down over technical differences, but in reality, Cold War suspicions destroyed any hope that the major powers could agree on a U.N. strike force.[218] This failure dealt a death blow to the concept of collective security envisioned by the founders of the United Nations.[219] Coupled with the overall escalating superpower tensions of the late 1940s and 1950s, this development did not bode well for the diplomatic role of the Secretary-General.

As Section 5.2.3 in Chapter 6 will show, the Secretary-General often times faced challenges whenever he tried to assert his independence and autonomy in conflicts that were viewed in Cold War terms by the superpowers and their allies (a majority of conflicts during the Cold War had an "East vs. West" dimension to them). Whereas the founders of the U.N. provided some space for a "middle road"[220] as far as the Secretary-General's conduct was concerned (he was to represent only the U.N. Charter and not the interests of any member state), in reality the superpowers equated "support for the U.N. Charter principles" with the satisfaction of their narrow political and ideological interests.

In particular, the zero sum[221] nature of the Cold War would made it very hard for any Secretary-General to remain free of criticism at the onset given that the Cold War was

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personnel for that mission were placed under the direction of the Secretary-General and not of the Security Council. See Gaglione, *The United Nations Under Trygve Lie, 1945-1953*, 28-29.

[216] Gaglione, *The United Nations Under Trygve Lie, 1945-1953*, 28.

[217] Ibid., 28

[218] Ibid., 28

[219] Ibid., 28

[220] This is the phrase that is appropriately used by Gaglione.

[221] By "zero sum" I am referring to the fact that for the Western powers, their Cold War objective was to contain if not annihilate communism. They definitely did not want to tolerate communism in any shape or form. The Soviet Union and its communist allies on the other hand also had their objective of

a political struggle between mutually exclusive views of justice as well as interests.[222] Neither the Soviet Union not the West recognized the United Nations as "representing a third way", but instead strove to align the U.N. Charter with their respective worldview[223] and strategic political interests. As such, it was almost impossible under the supercharged atmosphere of the Cold War for any Secretary-General to project and assume the role of U.N. Charter representative without risking the alienation of at least one bloc.

For instance, Anthony Gaglione[224] provides the example of the first Secretary-General Trygve Lie whose public "neutrality" during the 1946 Azerbaijan crisis (as noted in Chapter 2) and also during 1949 over the issue of Chinese representation of the United Nations saw him applauded by the Soviet Union for his "independence." However, just a year later in 1950, when the Korean crisis came up, Lie was ostracized in every sense of the word by the same Soviets, both politically and socially, because his interpretation of the Charter ran counter to their interests. In other words, a mere public intervention, not to mention autonomy in any situation involving a P-5 state or P-5 interests, meant that the Secretary-General was risking being perceived as engaging in slack because the P-5 state/s in question would dread the prospect of a Secretary-General advocating against their interests.

This development meant that when it came to P-5 conflicts (in particular), a U.N. Secretary-General had the option of practicing the Sir Eric Drummond (League of Nations) model of quiet efficiency, concentrating on his broad administrative duties and offering his good offices only when his neutrality remained assured.[225]   But again, owing to the zero sum nature of the Cold War rivalry, it is doubtful that any

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spreading communism around the world and defeating Western capital and "imperialism." There was no middle ground as far as the two sides were concerned, and this placed the Secretary-General in an impossible situation.
[222] Ibid., 123
[223] For example, the western worldview compelled the U.S. and its allies to advocate the pursuit of democracy, human rights, and free markets, whereas for the Soviets and the Chinese it was the promotion of communism and also the fight against western "imperialism."
[224] Ibid.
[225] See Ibid., 122

Secretary-General would have managed to convince the great powers to tolerate a posture of total neutrality.[226] Any intervention (especially in a P-5 vs. P-5 conflict) risked being perceived as slack because one or both sides would ultimately be displeased by the Secretary-General's words or judgments.

In summation then, the Office of the U.N. Secretary-General found itself impeded by the Cold War especially during the first few decades of the U.N.'s existence. Simply put, it would be hard if not impossible for any Secretary-General to cultivate a "third way" or "middle road" without displeasing one or more great powers and effectively being seen as engaging in slack.

3.2.5: How the Secretary-General's Role Expanded In Scope

Expansion opportunities for the Office of the Secretary-General arose from the fact that the end of the Second World War gave way to decolonization in Africa and Asia, and to a massive influx of newly independent member-states into the United Nations, especially from the late 1950s onwards. These new member-states began to change the character of the U.N. General Assembly from a chamber that was divided along East-West Cold War lines from 1945 to the mid-1950s to one in which new powerful caucuses and voting blocs (such as the African Group, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Group of 77) began to tilt the agenda of the U.N. towards the needs of the developing world, and also towards the dictates of the U.N. Charter.

Prior to this development (from 1945 to the mid-1950s), when the General Assembly's membership did not exceed 60 countries, there were more than 40 western-allied member-states who frequently supported the United States position on major issues.[227] As a case in point, during the Korean crisis of 1950-53, the United States and its General Assembly allies took it upon themselves to circumvent potential U.S.S.R.

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[226] Ibid., 122
[227] Thant, *View from the UN*, 34.

vetoes in the Security Council by adopting resolution 377(A), the so-called *Uniting for Peace Resolution*, which contained provisions for bypassing Security Council vetoes via the invocation of Emergency General Assembly meetings with legally binding powers.[228] Former Secretary-General U Thant recalls in his memoirs that back in 1952 when he was a member of the Burmese delegation to the seventh session of the General Assembly, the U.S. dominated General Assembly was like "a one-party system functioning in the assembly, and the political role of the Secretary-General was not considered to be of major importance."[229]

However all this changed after 1955 when the United States was no longer able to muster the required two thirds majority in the General Assembly to support its positions.[230] Many of the new member states chose the path of nonalignment when it came to superpower conflicts at the U.N., and thus a multiparty system and not a two-party system of international politics emerged in the United Nations General Assembly.[231] This in turn led to a situation where the Office of the Secretary-General increasingly grew in importance as a resource for channeling and solving the problems facing the United Nations. The political role of the Office was enhanced because the Secretaries-General tended to share a common philosophy with this non-aligned small and medium-state new majority: the preservation of the United Nations Charter and ideals.[232] These new member-states became increasingly vocal in their frequent agreement with the Secretary-General's interpretation of the Charter and of his other actions.[233]

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[228] The uniting for peace resolution was invoked a few more times after the Korea crisis as a means of dealing with major international crises such as Suez in 1956, Hungary in 1956, Lebanon in 1958, the Congo in 1960, and the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967.

[229] Ibid., 34-35

[230] Ibid., 34-35

[231] Ibid., 34-35

[232] Ibid., 35

[233] Ibid., 35 For example, U Thant provides the example in his memoirs of how in the late 1950s, a series of successive votes of confidence in Dag Hammarskjöld in the General Assembly served as an important barometer of the growing importance of the Secretary-General's performance of his political functions. U Thant also observes that the newly independent member-states increasingly showed an independent policy and a deep devotion to the U.N. as well as a strong faith in its principles.

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In summation, the U.N. member-states (formally at least) granted the Secretary-General's Office some unprecedented political powers and space for independent action. The Secretary General was empowered "to take initiatives as he saw fit in matters relating to international peace and security, no matter what the consequences to his Office or his personal prestige, and sometimes at the risk of disagreeing with some member states, if he sincerely believed that his initiative would mean the difference between peace and war."[234] Article 100 would guarantee the Secretary-General the freedom to act, without fear or favor, as an international civil servant in the service of world peace, again, at the risk of sometimes disagreeing with member states.[235] In reality however, complexities such as the superpower Cold War made it very hard to implement those lofty goals until the late 1950s when the shifting balance of power in the General Assembly from North to South began to open up new possibilities for the Office of the Secretary-General.

3.3: Nature of the Secretary-General's Diplomatic Interventions

3.3.1: Interventions Personally Undertaken by the Secretary-General Himself

Broadly speaking, the Secretary-General's public interventions can be classified into four categories, of which this project will be examining three: 1) private behind the scenes diplomacy (these are almost indistinguishable from his day to day responsibilities and very hard to code because data is near impossible to assemble; they are not part of the data analysis in this project), 2) restrained or "low level" public diplomacy that is limited to calls for action or statements of concern, 3) mediation activities, and lastly 4) activities that are largely executive in nature, e.g. fact-finding and observer missions, supervision of plebiscites, and administrative oversight of

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[234] Some of the words in this sentence are paraphrased from Ibid., 33

[235] U Thant opines, again on page 33, and I agree with him, that such independence does not imply any disrespect for the wishes or opinions of member governments, but rather that the Secretary-General's independence is an insurance for his ability to serve in full accordance with the U.N. Charter and the long-term interest in peace of all member states of the United Nations.

peacekeeping missions which are largely carried out by Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs).

The first category (private, behind the scenes diplomacy) consists of what scholars such as Pechota[236] have referred to as "the most rudimentary forms of diplomatic assistance, such as informal contacts and consultations with a view to exposing each side of the others attitudes and claims, and facilitating communications between them."[237] In layperson's terms, these are all activities that occur on a non-stop basis as part of the Secretary-General's daily entrée of job responsibilities. In one of the introductions to his annual reports, U Thant described this category as "a considerable part of the workload of the Secretary-General"... but one for which "very often there is no public knowledge at all of specific activities."[238]

Behind the scenes diplomacy is very hard to distinguish from the Secretary-General's day to day diplomatic functions. This is because as part of his job description, the Secretary-General and his senior staff maintain extensive contacts with member states through the member states' U.N. Ambassadors as well as through U.N. Resident Representatives in the capitals of some of those states. As part of such extensive contacts, whenever a crisis breaks out, the Secretary-General, at the very least, holds exploratory private conversations with his own staff as well as with representatives of the crisis actors that are geared toward stimulating requests for his involvement or to prepare the ground for his own initiatives depending on the circumstances of the crisis.[239]

Against this background, it is reasonable to assume that whenever a major crisis breaks out, there is some form of behind the scenes inquiry or exploratory action by

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[236] Pechota, *The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace*, 577-684.
[237] Ibid., 577
[238] See U. Thant, *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 16 June 1968 - 15 June 1969* (New York: United Nations Secretariat,[1969]).
[239] Pechota, *The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace*, 30.

the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. However much of this is never recorded in U.N. documents or even the declassified papers of the Secretaries-General, and as such is virtually impossible to code. I therefore note the existence of this category, but do not include it in my empirical investigation.

The second category (restrained diplomacy) consists of public but low profile/low-level/low intensity initiatives [240] that are neutral, and gesture-driven in nature. The Secretary-General may issue written or oral statements designed to express international concern for an escalating situation, urge humanitarian restraint, or encourage conflicting parties into seeking negotiated diplomatic solutions to international crises. He may also make public reference to mediation, conflict resolution or other proposals that he has offered to the crisis actors, however such public disclosures may not go as far as publicly condemning (and therefore alienating) any one side.

Based on findings from the data in Chapters 4 and 5, for the 1945-2007 period, restrained public diplomacy tended to occur in cases where the Security Council was deadlocked and the Secretary-General was still determined to be seen as doing something without going as far as initiating high-profile interventions. Examples include the Secretary-General's actions during the 1948 Berlin Airlift and the Vietnam War (U Thant, in his memoirs, has a whole Chapter on Vietnam whose first paragraph also tries to describe this type of intervention).

The third type of intervention is mediation[241] and conciliation- the Secretary-General serves as an agent who reconciles opposing claims and helps conflicting parties arrive

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[240] U.N. scholars such as Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel (1996) and also Beardsley and Schmidt (2012)- full citations in bibliography, have referred to this strategy as the "lowest level of U.N. involvement" in conflicts, largely consisting of mere gestures such as calls for actions and good offices (shuttle diplomacy).

[241] Mediation in the context of this paper refers to the process defined by Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson and Donnette L. Wille, "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1, Special Issue on International Mediation (Feb., 1991): 8: "*a process of conflict management where disputants seeks the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their*

at mutually agreeable terms of settlement, or to deal with specific negative externalities such as human suffering and refugee problems. Well known cases of the Secretary-General's mediation include the Cuban Missile Crisis (studied in detail in Chapter 6), the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, and the Palestinian question since 1948. Because mediation is often a long, complex, and drawn process, and one that takes place in multiple conflict theatres that the Secretary-General cannot visit at the same time, he tends to dispatch conflict-specific Special Representatives (SRSGs) who handle the minute details of the mediation. The forthcoming subsection on SRSGs describes the mediation function in detail.

The fourth type of activity consists of largely executive duties such as fact-finding missions, supervision of plebiscites, post-conflict observation missions, and other conflict-setting executive duties. The Secretary-General may undertake these duties on his own, or, more often than not, dispatch teams of experts to undertake these duties in his name. For example, Dag Hammarskjöld personally undertook fact-finding to Tunisia in 1958 and Laos in 1959. His successor U Thant dispatched an SRSG (Ralph Bunche) to Yemen in 1962 on a fact-finding mission that constituted the first phase of his extensive intervention in that country, and also dispatched Winspeare Guicciardi as his Personal Representative on a fact-finding mission to Bahrain in 1970.[242]

All that said, two of the four intervention categories (mediation/conciliation and executive duties) can be further subdivided into two sub-categories: those undertaken following a mandate from either the Security Council or the General Assembly, and those undertaken autonomously in the Secretary-General's own capacity, usually following Security Council deadlock. From a substantive viewpoint, autonomous and

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conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law." See the SRSG section for a detailed discussion on U.N. mediation.
[242] Data sourced from Manuel Fröhlich,
"the Role of SRSGs in Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding": Project Peacemaker SRSG Database 1946-2011
(Jena: University of Jena, Germany, 2012)

Security Council mandate interventions are very similar- in both cases, the Secretary-General exercises a lot of discretion in how the mediation or executive missions are actually implemented (as a matter of fact, the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions almost always contain explicit language granting the Secretary-General the wide discretion).

The main difference occurs in terms of symbolism and political ramifications: in the approved cases, the Secretary-General acts as a repository of delegated powers from the Security Council. The P-5 collectively decide via a Security Council resolution whether or not there should be U.N. involvement in a particular crisis, what that involvement should be, and ask the Secretary-General to report back to them regularly on his progress. Symbolically then, the Secretary-General becomes the de facto and de jure representative of the Security Council, even though the possibility remains that his subsequent actions might be undesirable to the P-5 (see the "informal autonomy" section of Chapter 5). The political ramification of such an arrangement is that the P-5 are comfortable with his assertion of discretionary powers because they are directed at conflicts where the P-5 agree that he should play a role.

On the other hand, autonomous interventions originate from the Secretary-General's own authority and initiative, usually as a result of P-5 deadlock, and often times in the face of explicit opposition from one or more P-5 states (as noted in Chapter 2). Symbolically, the Secretary-General is no longer just a "Secretary" to the Council, but rather his own agent asserting his discretionary powers out of his own accord. As for political ramifications, the autonomous interventions reflect slack due to the historical P-5 aversion to any autonomous initiatives by the Secretary-General, especially in conflicts where they would prefer that he not involved in at all. The Soviet Union for example tended to "resent any weakening of the pivotal position of the Security

Council and often opposed the delegation of power to the Secretary-General"[243] as we saw in Section 2.9.1.4.2 of Chapter 2.

It is also worth pointing out that once in a while, the Secretary-General may be asked by the Security Council to carry out tasks whose likelihood of success is in doubt, and which he himself may not have otherwise embarked on autonomously. For example, when Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, the Security Council experienced prolonged deadlock due to conflicting P-5 interests.[244] The Security Council ended up passing Resolution 384 requesting Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to dispatch a Special Representative (SRSG) to East Timor. The SRSG mission was not expected to succeed, but rather served as a face-saving effort on the part of the Council. Waldheim himself was reported to have been initially reluctant to involve himself in this quagmire (his memoirs cover the entire affair in just one sentence).[245]

An interesting comparison could be made between the 1975 East Timor crisis and the current civil war in Syria. In both instances, the Security Council failed to agree on collective military intervention, but agreed on a request to the Secretary-General to dispatch a Special Representative to the conflict area, even though it was apparent that the mediation effort would not produce any immediate results. The face-saving dynamic could arguably be characterized as stronger in the Syrian case where civilian fatalities and cross-border displacement have been catastrophic, and where public differences between the western allies and Russia are more public and pronounced, but the great powers nevertheless delegated a task to the Secretary-General arguably as a ploy to scapegoat him for the lack of progress in that intractable conflict.

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[243] Kjell Skjelsbæk, "The UN Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1, Special Issue on International Mediation (Feb., 1991): 107.

[244] The U.S. and its western allies opposed the Indonesian action, in part because they were worried about the possibility of East Timor becoming 'the Cuba of the Indian Ocean', whereas the People's Republic of China, by then a P-5 Security Council member, sympathized with Indonesia. See Ibid., 106.

[245] Ibid., 107

3.3.2: Deployment of Special Representatives (SRSGs)

This subsection provides a detailed account of the U.N. Secretary-General's use of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) as a diplomatic intervention mechanism in international conflicts. The roadmap is as follows: the first subsection provides a brief exposition of SRSGs and their role in international conflict. This is followed by a subsection on the SRSG selection process and the dynamics involved when dispatching them into the field. The third subsection describes the activities of SRSGs once they are deployed into conflict areas.

Defining a Conflict-Specific SRSG

A number of works[246] have described the SRSG institution as the most salient form of the Secretary-General's conflict diplomacy, one in which he appoints high profile individuals to represent his Office and person in conflict theatres. Such appointments constitute a stark contrast to other instances where he opts to undertake low-key and restrained conflict interventions[247]. Building on this foundation, conflict-specific SRSGs can be described surrogates for the Secretary-General who are dispatched to conflict theatres to not only serve as his "eyes and ears" on the ground, but also to represent his Office by way of doing what the Secretary-General would do to resolve the conflict "if he were personally present"[248].

The legal framework surrounding the use of SRSGs is as follows: SRSGs are appointed by the Secretary-General under Article 101 of the U.N. Charter which

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[246] Benjamin Rivlin, "The Changing International Political Climate and the Secretary-General," in *The Challenging Role of the U.N. Secretary General : Making "the most Impossible Job in the World" Possible*, eds. Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 84-92. Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 117-125.

[247] I am again referring to the SG's low profile/low-level/low intensity diplomacy which is passive, neutral, and gesture-driven in nature. It may involve just a public call for restraint, private offers of mediation, private proposals for resolving crises, etc. but will not go as far as public condemnation of any one side or the appointment of an SRSG.

[248] K. Venkata Raman, "A Study of the Procedural Concepts of United Nations Intermediary Assistance in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," in *Dispute Settlement through the United Nations*, ed. K. Venkata Raman (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1977), 667.

grants him authority to appoint people of his choosing in the U.N. Secretariat.[249] Their legal mandate once dispatched into the field is derived from three other U.N. Charter Articles: first and most importantly Articles 99 and 100, which grant the Secretary-General a considerable degree of political discretion and autonomy, respectively, and also Article 33, which invites disputants to seek recourse from international third party mediators and conciliators (and by implication paves the way for the Secretary-General's good offices). In undertaking their assignments, SRSGs enjoy the legal and diplomatic status of senior U.N. officials.

When it comes to international conflicts and crises, there are two kinds of SRSGs: first "Special Representatives/Envoys" who are usually appointed by the Secretary-General at the behest of the U.N. member-states via Security Council or General Assembly resolutions, and second 'Personal Representatives/Envoys" who are appointed by the Secretary-General on his own initiative. A key point to note here is that while a technical difference may between Personal Representatives and Special Representatives (Personal Representatives are autonomously appointed whereas Special Representatives are not), in practice there is very little distinction between the two in terms of their legal status and modus operandi— this will be explored further in the next section.

Historically speaking, the institution of SRSGs evolved with the founding of the United Nations, when the World War II victorious powers envisioned a strong mediation role for the United Nations and also for regional organizations (as explicitly stated in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter). This was a notable departure from the pre-World War II days when the global organization of the day, the League of Nations, had been relegated to essentially performing administrative and management tasks.

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[249] See Pechota, *The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace*, 665 and Donald J. Puchala, "The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives," in *The Challenging Role of the U.N. Secretary General : Making "the most Impossible Job in the World" Possible*, eds. Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 82.

However as history would have it, this new vision of the U.N. as a pre-eminent mediator was derailed by the Cold War superpower tensions, and rendered almost impossible when it came to applying U.N. diplomacy to great power conflicts; nevertheless, the idea of SRSGs gained traction when it came to peripheral conflicts where the member-states were either aloof or actually encouraged a role for the United Nations (e.g. Palestine crisis in 1947-48).

According to data made available by the SRSG Project at the University of Jena, the first ever conflict-specific SRSG appointments were made in 1947 when Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General, appointed Erik Colban of Norway as his SRSG for the India-Pakistan conflict, and also Victor Hoo of China as his SRSG for the Palestine conflict. In both instances, the appointments came after the conflict featured highly on the Security Council's agenda, and that body delegated specific tasks to the Secretary-General (in these instances, the Secretary-General was not a principal mediator but rather a "Secretary" to the Council tasked with implementing some of its decisions).

Trygve Lie's successor, Dag Hammarskjöld, expanded the institution of SRSGs by (first) routinely and simultaneously dispatching SRSGs on his own initiative without the formal (or in some cases without any) approval from the Security Council or General Assembly. Hammarskjöld argued forcefully for the autonomous deployment of SRSGs. His premise was that the Office of the Secretary-General could serve as a mediator of last resort especially when it came to instances of Security Council deadlock or instances where the disputant/s did not recognize the authority of the Security Council or General Assembly.[250]

This line of reasoning became the basis, for example, for Hammarskjöld's field trip to Peking China in 1954, the first such trip ever undertaken by a Secretary-General in an attempt to defuse an international crisis. During this trip (studies in detail in Chapter 6), Hammarskjöld publicly asserted that his right to autonomously mediate the crisis

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[250] Pechota, *The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace*, 665.

was "within the competence of a Secretary-General and in all respects in strict accordance with the Charter, provided it was exercised in order to assist in the achievement of the purposes of the Charter."[251] In retrospect, Hammarskjöld's strategy of dispatching a ring of SRSGs around the world simultaneously and often times autonomously cemented the role of SRSG interventions as a principal intervention strategy.

Selection Process for Conflict-Specific SRSGs

This section outlines the two most important considerations when it comes to the selection of SRSGs for international conflicts: first the prerogative for selecting specific personalities as SRSGs rests squarely with the Secretary-General and NOT with the P-5 (specifically) or the Security Council or General Assembly; second, the individual being appointed as SRSG needs to enjoy the confidence of both the Secretary-General personally and also of both the disputing parties.

As Chief Executive Officer of the U.N. Secretariat, the Secretary-General is the ultimate decision-maker when it comes to appointing SRSGs. His prerogative does not only apply to autonomous SRSG appointments, but also to Security Council and/or General-Assembly mandated appointments. U.N. Secretaries-General have time and again resisted overt attempts by the member-states to interfere with the appointment process, and have insisted on personally selecting the individuals who represent and serve them. The best that the P-5 and other member-states have done in terms of influencing the appointment process (especially in cases where they have a vested interest) has been to signal or outright state their disapproval of a specific candidate, in which case Secretaries-General have put forward alternative, broadly acceptable candidates.

Interestingly, there are no public job advertisements for SRSG positions, nor are there any application processes or public vetting procedures. For much of the U.N.'s

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[251] Ibid., 580

existence, the SRSG selection process was a purely political affair, with the Secretary-General handling the decision-making process as to who gets appointed as Personal Representative, or who gets nominated as a Special Representative in instances where the backing of the Security Council was deemed crucial. Since 2007, the process has become more technocratic with the formation of a U.N. Secretariat Senior Leadership Appointment Section, which now serves as a focal point for SRSG appointments, and employs standardized criteria to screen potential SRSG candidates and assist the Secretary-General with the decision-making process.

Personal Representatives and Special Representatives have the same type of relationship with the Secretary-General in terms of being appointed by him, reporting to him, and having their assignments terminated by him; both enjoy the same status in law and fact.[252] The one notable caveat is that when it comes to appointing Special Representatives, the Secretary-General seeks, at least informally, the consensus approval of his nominee by the Security Council.

When it comes to Personal Representatives however, the Secretary-General enjoys a greater degree of autonomy - in such instances, he notifies the Security Council ex-post of his appointment, and, where applicable, also seeks the prior consent of the nominee's home government if the nominee is a civil servant in the national administration and requires a leave of absence in order to assume the appointment.[253]

The motivation for any Secretary-General to insist on their prerogative to appoint SRSGs has both a legal and intuitive basis. Legally, as noted earlier, Article 101 of the Charter grants the Secretary-General the executive powers to make U.N. Secretariat staff appointments. Intuitively, any Secretary-General would want to appoint people they know and trust in order to maximize the likelihood that the SRSGs would safeguard their interests, and not be easily influenced and manipulated by third parties.

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[252] Ibid., 665
[253] Ibid., 666

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It is for precisely the issue of personal trust that Secretaries-General often times appoint SRSGs from among their own corps of U.N. Secretariat senior staff.

A good example of this dynamic occurred in August 1989 when Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar dispatched one of the senior staffers in his Office, Giandomenico Picco, as his Special Envoy to Tehran to convey a confidential and sensitive message to President Hashemi Rafsanjani on a (U.S.-backed) proposal to enlist Iranian help is resolving the Lebanon hostage crisis. In his memoir, Secretary-General de Cuéllar later noted: "while not imagining how large a role Picco would play in freeing the hostages, I knew he had the initiative, courage, and total discretion required for this work."[254]

Other examples of U.N. Secretariat senior officials-turned SRSGs include the American Nobel Peace Prize winner Ralph Bunche, who was dispatched by Secretary-General U Thant as his personal representative to Yemen (1963) and to the India-Pakistan conflict in 1965. Similarly, in 1995 Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Kofi Annan, then an Under-Secretary General for U.N. Peacekeeping, as his Special Envoy for the former Yugoslavia.

When it comes to the second indispensable prerequisite for an SRSG appointment (the consent of both the conflicting parties), Secretaries-General realize that a nominee who is not accepted by one or either conflicting side is a "dead on arrival" agent who will not make any headway whatsoever towards alleviating a conflict or crisis. As such, Secretaries-General routinely consult ex ante with the crisis actors to ascertain whether their nominee is agreeable. SRSG appointments are never publicly announced until the threshold of acceptance by the disputants is met. In this way, Secretaries-General buttress the credibility of the SRSGs in the eyes of the disputing parties.

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[254] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 105.

Secretaries-General have often times recruited their Special Representatives (more so than Personal Representatives) from outside of the U.N. system, and settled for eminent and accomplished international personalities whose expertise is desirable for the U.N. and more likely to be acceptable to both sides in a dispute. A very good example of a dispute where such acceptability sensibilities arise is the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, in which SRSGs appointed over the years have almost always and necessarily had to be outside personalities not affiliated with the U.N. Secretariat because of the sensitivities of the government of Israel about the United Nations and the perceived anti-Israel bias in the General Assembly.[255]

Perhaps as a result of the sensitivities that conflicting parties or states may have regarding the objectivity of an SRSG, a remarkably large number of SRSGs have been nationals of neutral and nonaligned countries such as Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries.[256] Nationality is often an important factor in determining a nominee's chances of getting an SRSG post, just as it is often an important factor for those running for the post of Secretary-General itself. Consensus candidates tend to come from countries that are considered uncontroversial, e.g. the Scandinavian countries.

In the post-Cold War era, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General has increasingly made such outside SRSG appointments in consultation with the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and other key U.N. Secretariat offices. Within the last decade, the Department of Political Affairs has started maintaining a list of "standby mediators" from outside the U.N. system, comprised of outside experts from each and every continent, who are deemed worthy of making acceptable SRSG-level mediators.[257]

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[255] Puchala, *The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives*, 83.
[256] Ibid., 83
[257] See a detailed description of U.N. standby mediators here: United Nations Department of Political Affairs, "Standby Team of Mediation Experts,"
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/standby_team (accessed May 3, 2014).

A broader point to retain in terms of the selection process is that as part of their drive to sustain the integrity of the SRSG mechanism, Secretaries-General have resisted formalizing, institutionalizing, or in any sense routinizing the appointments of SRSGs; instead, the appointments are considered ad hoc processes that are executed as frequently or rarely as resources allow, and as ambitiously or cautiously as the Secretary-General deems appropriate.[258] The Secretary-General reserves the right to extend or withdraw an SRSG mission as he deems appropriate in each specific circumstance. This is essentially an appointment process that is ad hoc, non-bureaucratic, and moves quite quickly.

As for other administrative dynamics, both Personal and Special Representatives' assignments are usually linked with a defined purpose (see next section) and made for an agreed period of time.[259] Both also report directly to the Secretary-General's Office throughout the duration of their assignment, and, along with the conflicting parties, provide some input into the form and nature of the Secretary-General's report and recommendations on their conflict to the Security Council. An SRSG's assignment comes to an end under any of the following scenarios: when his or her task is accomplished, when the tour of duty has expired and no agreement on an extension has been reached, when he or she resigns, or when he or she is removed by the Secretary-General upon being declared persona non grata[260] by one or both sides.

There is usually no direct (administrative) relationship between SRSGs and the Security Council; rather, SRSGs report to and represent the Secretary-General, and the latter's responsibility for the good offices process is absolute. How an SRSG operates once a field mission commences is thus out of the purview and control of the P-5 and

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[258] Puchala, *The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives*, 84.

[259] Pechota, *The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace*, 666.

[260] There have been instances where SRSGs have been declared persona non grata, e.g. in October 2006, the Sudanese military declared U.N. Special Envoy Jan Pronk persona non grata, accusing him of "waging war against the armed forces."- The general command accused Pronk of "openly intruding in the armed forces." See Associated Foreign Press, "Sudanese Army Eclares U.N.'s Pronk Persona Non Grata," *Sudan Tribune* October 20, 2006, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18241.

other U.N. member states. Any action taken by an SRSG is considered by the member-states to represent the will of the Secretary-General (although that said, Secretaries-General have sometimes been known to grant the SRSGs a lot of latitude in terms of autonomously deciding the best course of action once in the field).[261]

Given the lack of Security Council administrative oversight of SRSG work, the deployment of SRSGs can in itself constitute a source of friction between the Secretary-General and the member-states, especially the Security Council P-5. Tensions are not only likely in instances where the Secretary-General autonomously dispatches an SRSG, but also in instances where the P-5 or other member-states specifically request an SRSG. In the latter scenario, there is no guarantee that the content and outcome of an SRSG's delegated task will advance any underlying P-5 parochial interests, instead there is a real possibility that the SRSG may engage in slack (behavior that the P-5 would not engage in or desire if they themselves were conducting the task).

An SRSG appointment that is requested by the P-5 or other member states may thus not in itself constitute slack, but has the potential to create slack once the SRSG is dispatched into the field and assumes an autonomous and independent character. Ultimately, and perhaps unwittingly, the P-5 may (in asking for an SRSG) unleash a slack-prone agent whose mediation preferences and outcomes may run counter to their parochial preferences or interests.

That said, the Security Council has sometimes mandated the deployment of SRSGs into hopeless situations where their real but unspoken function was to bear the brunt of diplomatic failure and shield the Security Council's own inability to act decisively.[262]

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[261] Pechota, *The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace*, 667.

[262] Simon Chesterman and Thomas M. Franck, "Resolving the Contradictions of the Office," in *Secretary Or General? : The U.N. Secretary-General in World Politics*, ed. Simon Chesterman (Cambridge ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 80; Skjelsbæk, *The UN Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes*, 106-107.

As noted earlier, scholars such as the ones cited here point to examples like the 1974-75 SRSG mediation mission to East Timor which was dispatched by a reluctant Kurt Waldheim at the behest of the Security Council; others would arguably add to this category Ban Ki-Moon's unsuccessful 2012-2014 mediation effort in the Syrian civil war which saw, among other things, Kofi Annan resigning his SRSG post.

Job Description for Conflict-Specific SRSGs

Broadly speaking, SRSGs undertake three kinds of tasks in international conflicts and crises: mediation, fact-finding, and overseeing peacekeeping/peace building operations. -With the significant increase in multidimensional[263] U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world since the end of the Cold War, a large number of SRSG missions now combine all three tasks.

Mediation

Mediation-specific SRSG appointments are typically made for three main scenarios: first for protracted conflicts (such as the Middle East since 1947 and Cyprus since 1964, both of which have seen different personalities assume the role of SRSG at different points in time). Mediation SRSGs have also (secondly) been dispatched to short-duration militarized interstate disputes and international crises (e.g. Ghana-Togo border crisis in 1960 and the Dominican Republic crisis in 1966). Thirdly, mediation-SRSGs have been deployed to mediate hostage situations (e.g. Jose Rolz-Benett[264] during the 1967 detention in the Ivory Coast of the Guinean Foreign Minister and, as mentioned prior, Giandomenico Picco during the late 1980s-early 1990s Lebanon hostage crisis).[265]

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[263] See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "What is Peacekeeping?" http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml (accessed May 3, 2014) for a definition of multidimensional peacekeeping.

[264] Secretary-General U Thant discusses the appointment of SRSG Rolz-Benett: Thant, *View from the UN*, 55.

[265] In an article written for the Foreign Affairs magazine Picco described his role in Lebanon as "the U.N. negotiator with the hostage takers"- see Giandomenico Picco, "The U.N. and the use of Force: Leave the Secretary General Out of it," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1994): 14-18. This self-characterization is independently endorsed in George J. Lankevich,

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While common for inter-state disputes both during and after the Cold War, mediation SRSGs were notably less common for civil wars during the Cold War era. The few Cold War era civil war SRSG appointments were in fact mostly limited to specified humanitarian objectives, e.g. Biafra intra-state conflict in Nigeria in 1967-1970, or the early 1970s Bangladesh War as noted in Chapter 2. Secretaries-General were more constrained when it came to intervening to intra-state conflicts due to member-state backlash against U.N. involvement in domestic affairs (triggered largely by Cold War politics and the related invocation of Article 2 of the U.N. Charter which kept the domestic affairs of member-states out of the U.N.'s purview). Such backlash has notably eased since the end of the Cold War, and especially after the evolution of norms such as "the Responsibility to Protect" or "R2P."

The mediation tasks of the SRSGs largely consist of facilitative and formulative initiatives- as facilitative mediators, SRSGs "serve as a channel of communication among disputing parties"[266], whereas as formulative mediators, they make substantive contributions to the negotiation process, including developing and proposing new solutions to the disputants as a means of breaking an impasse[267].

In exceptional cases, SRSGs may also serve as manipulative mediators, that is, mediators who use their positions and leverage-"resources of power, influence, and persuasion" to manipulate the conflicting parties into agreement.[268] Manipulative mediation is more likely to happen in instances where the SRSG has a strong mandate (both legal and political) from the Security Council and other key stakeholders such as regional powers. An SRSG mediating a conflict such as the current one in Sudan could plausibly extract some concessions from the Khartoum government in return for

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the United Nations Under Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, 1982- 1991, ed. George J. Lankevich, Vol. 5 (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 122. Lankevich confirms that Picco was "the primary figure in all negotiations" surrounding the Lebanon hostage crisis. See detailed case study in Chapter 6.
[266] Wilkenfeld and others, *Mediating International Crises: Cross-National and Experimental Perspectives*, 283.
[267] Ibid.: 284. This is the widely acceptable definition of formulative mediation in the mediation literature.
[268] Ibid.

negotiating a loosening of Security Council sanctions or a Security Council deferral of the ICC arrest warrants targeted at the government leaders.

Experience has shown that SRSG mediation tends to consists of an eclectic mix of the different styles identified in the previous paragraph, especially the facilitative and formulative approaches. Successful SRSG mediation missions (by the U.N.'s own reckoning) have included Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq 1974 border crisis and Iran-Iraq 1980s war, Thailand-Cambodia in 1959, etc. Less successful missions have included the Middle-East conflict and Cyprus, both of which have had constant SRSG coverage since the early 1950s with less favorable outcomes.

Mediation SRSGs also serve a broader, normative purpose in conflict prevention that goes beyond their need to achieve immediate and tangible results. Scholars such as Puchala[269] argue that even in those instances where mediation does not produce immediate desired results, SRSGs help keep the process of mediation itself in motion and sustain an independent channel of communication that serves as an extra dimension that is beyond the control of the disputants. The rationale here is that by their very presence in the field as emissaries of the Secretary-General, mediation SRSGs serve as a constant reminder to the disputants about the possibilities for a negotiated peace and "keep the situation from getting worse" or from dangerously escalating.[270]

This normative[271] argument has carried more weight in recent years as evidenced by the post-Cold war increase in overall SRSG activity, much of it at the request of the U.N. member-states as the descriptive data section will show. It also helps us make sense of those situations where the Secretary-General or member-states insist on sending an SRSG to what seems like an otherwise intractable situation, e.g. the Middle East and Cyprus.

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[269] Puchala, *The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives*, 84-96.
[270] Puchala provides some interesting examples of this dynamic in his previously referenced work.
[271] Puchala also indicates that U.N. Secretariat officials interviewed for this project emphasized this normative point during his interviews with them in the summer of 1991.

As alluded to earlier, P-5 concerns about the likelihood of slack are likely in mediation SRSG missions, primarily because the SRSGs do not answer to the Security Council and as such there is little to no P-5 oversight. For mediation missions, history has shown that in some instances, SRSGs used the Secretary-General's legal right to discretion and independence to inject their own ideas and inventiveness into the mediation process. Notable examples include Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, who while mediating the Middle East crisis in 1971, wrote:

> ...each side unyieldingly insists that the other make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions to be included in a final peace agreement... I therefore feel that I should at this stage make clear my views on what I believe to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the principles of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967).[272]

This example shows how SRSG mediation missions constitute an often-times contentious and slack-prone (at least in terms of member-state perceptions of slack) strategy that the Secretary-General has at his disposal. That said the SRSG institution remains perhaps the best available institution to carry-out such missions because of the perceived impartiality and independence that is usually associated with the Office of the U.N. Secretary-General.

Fact-Finding

Fact-finding SRSG appointments were quite common both during and after the Cold War, and were as likely to be requested by the Security Council as they were to be autonomously initiated by the Secretary-General. The objective in such missions is for the SRSG to obtain first-hand information on developments in conflict areas with the goal of enhancing the effectiveness of the Security Council's or Secretary-General's response. The underlying rationale is for the SRSG to complement the flow of information coming from official government sources within state parties to conflicts, and to alleviate bias concerns that are usually associated with such sources.

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[272] Ibid., 466.

Notable examples conflicts that were assigned fact-finding SRSG missions include Laos in 1959, Oman in 1960 (the mission undertaken by the Swedish diplomat Herbert B. de Ribbing to investigate a conflict between the United Kingdom and several Arab states), and also Nicaragua and Namibia in the 1980s. During de Ribbing's 1960 Oman fact-finding mission, he described his (SRSG) objective as follows: "the primary task of the mission would be a fact-finding one. The mission will visit the area... and would report on such questions as the presence of foreign troops in Oman ... and on the existence of any 'rebel' forces actually in control of a particular area."[273]

Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding

SRSG appointments directly associated with United Nations peacekeeping missions have become very common over the last two decades, largely due to the drastic surge in the number of civil wars in places like Africa and the Balkans following the end of the Cold War (there were as many civil wars in the 11-year period between 1990 and 2001 as there were between 1945 and 1990- see Sambanis and Doyle dispute-level data). SRSGs serving in peacekeeping theaters have by necessity evolved into dynamic actors playing multiple roles: first and foremost as the Chief Executive Officers of the peacekeeping operations, then as mediators, fact-finders, conciliators, etc. in the peace processes that follow from the signing of peace agreements. They essentially combine all three functions to execute what the United Nations frequently refers to as the "peace-building" task in post-conflict settings.

The main rationale behind the dispatching of SRSGs into the peacekeeping arena is that the Secretary-General himself cannot personally and concurrently administer the myriad peacekeeping operations that take place around the world at any given point in time, given that his main sets of responsibilities are centered on the U.N. Secretariat in New York. The SRSGs serve the purpose of implementing the U.N. mandate as

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[273] Raman, *A Study of the Procedural Concepts of United Nations Intermediary Assistance in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*, 415-416.

handed down by the Security Council and serving as (essentially) the Secretary-General's Ambassadors Plenipotentiary in the peacekeeping missions.

Peacekeeping SRSGs also play the role of liaison between the Secretary-General and the host governments, and represent the face of the U.N. for the world media and the public at large.[274] On a few occasions, peacekeeping SRSGs have even been granted the mandate of serving as de facto Heads of State running entire countries/territories during post-conflict transitional periods, as was the case with the mission of Sergio Vieira de Mello in East Timor in the late 1990s, perhaps the most successful SRSG mission in terms of showcasing the dynamism the SRSG institution in general.

3.4: Research Design

3.4.1: The Data

This project involved the creation of three original datasets on the U.N. Secretary-General's public interventions in militarized inter-state disputes, international crises, and civil wars. The data were collected from multiple sources, as the United Nations does NOT maintain any historical records or database related to this topic.

Main Data Sources:

As a means to compiling data on the public interventions, my first step was to meticulously go through the annual *Yearbook of the United Nations Series* (1946-2007). This series has been the primary reference work on the U.N. since 1946, and also includes an annual *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization* which details many of the Secretary-General's public interventions.

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[274] Puchala, *The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives*, 92.

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The second and most important phase of the secondary research was accessing the previously classified or unavailable papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations (all Secretaries-General with the exception of Kurt Waldheim, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and current office holder Ban Ki-Moon have declassified their papers). The declassified papers were entrusted to academic editors who then published them as a series. Andrew W. Cordier, former Dean of the School of International Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University, edited a total of eight volumes of declassified papers covering the tenures of the first three Secretaries-General (1946-1971); his co-editors were Widler Foote and Max Harrelson.[275] Yale Professor Charles Hill edited three volumes worth of declassified papers from Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whereas Jean Krasno, another Yale professor, edited five volumes worth of Kofi Annan's declassified papers.[276] Much of the material in these papers was never included in official U.N. documentation, which tends to comprise of periodic and special reports as well as statements made to or on behalf of the principal organs of the United Nations.

Uniquely, these previously unavailable papers contain private communications between the Secretary-General and world leaders, the Secretary-General's official press statements, press conference transcripts, radio and television broadcasts, speeches and lectures outside of U.N. Headquarters, contributions to magazines and books, as well as internal U.N. Secretariat inter-departmental memos, all of which helped with anecdotal and contextual evidence to make sense of my quantitative findings. The quality of the anecdotal evidence from the public papers of the Secretaries-General is particularly high, and a worthy addition to the otherwise limited qualitative findings from official U.N. reports or from the memoirs of the Secretaries-General and their aides.

I also utilized the *International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB) crisis data series* which does a good job of outlining the nature of U.N. involvement in select international crises, as well as some U.N. Book Series such as *Partners for Peace*, and also the

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[275] See bibliography for full citations.
[276] Again, see bibliography for full citations.

writings/memoirs of the different Secretaries-General and their close confidants (such as Sir Brian Urquhart). The memoirs were especially helpful in informing me about autonomous Cold War era public interventions in conflicts that did not make the ICB population of cases and were not necessarily covered in the other documents I consulted.

For the SRSG interventions subset, I acquired data from Prof. Manuel Froehlich, Head of the SRSG Project at the *Friedrich-Schiller-Universität* in Germany, who has compiled a historical database of such appointments spanning the period 1945-2007. This database is arranged by conflict/year and distinguishes conflict-specific from thematic SRSG appointments.

Finally, I accessed U.N. Security Council documents (resolutions, annual reports, etc.) from the 1945-2002 period to help ascertain which of the public interventions were approved by the P-5 and which were not (and this is explained in greater detail later in the chapter). Collectively, these secondary sources enabled me to compile some comprehensive historical data on the nature, extent, and autonomy of the Secretary-General's public interventions.

Coding Caveat:

One important caveat to point out is that not all of the Secretary-General's diplomatic interventions are connected to a MID, ICB crisis, or civil war. For example, Kurt Waldheim's tenure of Office was characterized by diplomatic interventions aimed at securing the release of political prisoners within member-states. Waldheim was able, for instance, to convince the President of South Korea, Chun Doo-Hwan, to commute the death sentence on opposition leader (and future President) Kim Dae-Jung to life imprisonment; he was also able to persuade Fidel Castro to release a number of

individuals from custody for re-unification with their families in the United States.[277] Such human-rights themed domestic crises are not captured in our MID, ICB or civil war universe of cases. As such, this project only captures the Secretary-General's diplomatic interventions as they pertain to MIDs, ICB crises, and civil wars, not the totality of his diplomatic or political work.

Other political interventions not associated with MIDs, ICB crises, and civil wars involved U.N. bureaucratic politics. For example, the 1949 proposed seating of the People's Republic of China at the U.N. was a major (intra-U.N.) bureaucratic crisis that threatened the Organization's cohesion and focused the wrath of the U.S. and its western allies on Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General. Similarly, in 1950, when Lie announced his "Twenty-Year Peace Program", a controversial ten-point memorandum that included proposals for an independent U.N. military force and a modification of the P-5 veto provision, his efforts met with the disapproval of the P-5 powers. Other contentious intra-U.N. issues have included decolonization in the 1950s and 60s, arms control, disarmament, and peaceful uses of atomic energy.[278] The main point again is that the MID, ICB, and civil war data do not on their own constitute an exhaustive listing of all of the political crises that the Secretary-General has had to contend with, nevertheless, for our later quantitative tests, they represent the best available datasets.

Populations of Cases and Construction of Datasets

As alluded to in the previous subsection, I use three separate datasets to capture the universe of cases that we will need to examine the Secretary-General's interventions in inter-state and intra-state conflicts: the militarized inter-state dispute (MID) dataset

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[277] Kurt Waldheim, *In the Eye of the Storm : A Memoir*, 1 US ed. (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1986), 143.

[278] For instance, Dag Hammarskjöld's efforts in promoting international cooperation in the use of atomic power for peaceful purposes is probably the least known but potentially most important of his endeavors. See Heller,
the United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1961, 112. I also noticed that the 1980s protracted hostage crisis between the U.S.A. and Lebanon, in which Secretary-General De Cuéllar was substantively involved, is not coded in the ICB or MID data.

which was created by the Correlates of War Project, the ICB international crises dataset which was created by the International Crisis Behavior Project, and the Sambanis & Doyle civil war data. The justification for using these three both datasets is provided in the next two subsections.

<center>Inter-State Disputes</center>

For inter-state disputes, I draw my population of cases from two sources: the militarized inter-state dispute data from the Correlates of War project and international crisis data from the International Crisis Behavior Project at the University of Maryland.

The MID data collection is based on a conception that emphasizes the militarized aspect of inter-state conflict. The Correlates of War Project defines a militarized inter-state dispute as "a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force."[279] The MID dataset does a particularly effective job of capturing all militarized inter-state disputes, with casualties ranging from zero to the thousand battle-death-plus threshold that political scientists have set for full-scale inter-state war.

The MID data are particularly ideal for this project because they are organized in a manner that is amenable to the testing of dyadic theories of inter-state conflict such as the ones enumerated in the theory section (e.g. P-5 vs. P-5, P-5 vs. Other type conflicts). As a matter of fact, most of the political science empirical research on the dyadic processes that lead to the onset of armed conflict employs data from the MID dataset.

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[279] Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, no. 4 (Dec., 1984): 587; J. Joseph Hewitt, "Dyadic Processes and International Crises," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (Oct., 2003): 669-692.

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The Zeev Maoz modified dyadic version of the MID dataset is a good fit for this project because Maoz has done a particularly exhaustive job of generating valid MID dyads from previous (often error-prone) MID data versions.[280] Maoz has corrected previous errors in the coding of variables such as level of hostility, dates of disputes, and (distorted) dispute outcomes. I modify my version of the Maoz dataset to begin my analyses from 1945, the founding year of the U.N.

I conduct a second round of inter-state conflict analyses using the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB) international crises dyadic data 2003 version by J. Joseph Hewitt. The ICB dataset is broader in scope than the MIDs in terms of having (additional) non-military conceptions of inter-state conflict as outlined in the next two paragraphs. While there is no doubt as to the utility of the MID dataset, the major drawback with MIDs is that they have a limited conceptualization of inter-state conflict that places specific emphasis on military force at the expense of other plausible crisis dimensions.

There are essentially two main differences between the MID and the ICB data:

First, the ICB data has a largely non-military conception of international conflict that is centered on the perceptions of leading (nation-state) foreign-policy decision makers.[281] An ICB international crisis essentially has three necessary conditions: first "a threat to one or more basic values, second an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and third a heightened probability of involvement in military

[280] Zeev Maoz,
Dyadic MID Dataset , Vol. 2.0 (Davis: University of California, Davis, 2005).

[281] Hewitt, Dyadic Processes and International Crises, 671. "Leading foreign policy decision makers" in this context largely refers to the Head of State and Government level.

hostilities."[282] What this basically entails is that ICB international crises can emanate and evolve from just perceptions (as opposed to actual threats or use of military force). In contrast, perceptions do not play any role in defining MIDs, plus, most notably, some 20-25% of ICB crises were not MIDs.

Second, MIDs and ICB data differ in terms of their respective initiating events. By definition, an explicit threat, display, or use of force is a necessary condition for the initiation of a MID.[283] In contrast, international crises can evolve from actions other than the implied or actual use of force. Indeed, 25% of the foreign-policy crises in the ICB data were triggered by a political (and not a military) act. For example, the ICB dataset denotes a crisis trigger as "political act" when that trigger is an act of "subversion, alliance formation by adversaries, diplomatic sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, or violation of treaty."[284] The MID dataset, on the other hand, would not include these types of events, and would ultimately fail to capture a sizeable population of inter-state crises, hence the need for this study to incorporate the ICB data. By including ICB data in the study, we can also have greater confidence in the robustness of our MID findings.

The Hewitt ICB dyadic dataset itself contains information on 882 non-directed crisis dyads and spans the years 1918-2001. Hewitt defines a crisis dyad as a pair of states that satisfies each of the following three conditions: (1) both sides of the dyad are members of the inter-state system, (2) at least one of the states satisfies all three of the

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[282] An example of a "value" in this context would be democracy and free markets (a value defended by the U.S. and its allies during the Cold-War years, and communism, a value defended by the USSR during the same period.
[283] Gochman and Maoz, *Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights*, 587.
[284] Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 1064.

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aforementioned ICB necessary conditions for crisis involvement, and (3) at least one of the states has directed a hostile action against the other.[285]

Modifying MIDs/ICB and Creating Original Datasets:

For the data modification, my first step was to code "U.N. Charter" and "P-5" variables at the dyad level because a single MID/ICB crisis often contains multiple dyads (pairs of states). The Maoz dataset contains 1470 MIDS (as denoted by a unique dispute identifier for each MID) spread across 2949 dyads for the 1945-2001 timeline I am looking at. Upon accounting and coding for each dyad, I aggregated the 2949 dyad-level observations to the MID-level as my analyses were centered on the dispute rather than dyad level. The question I am exploring is whether the U.N. Secretary-General intervened at all in a MID, and how substantive his intervention was, irrespective of how many individual episodes (dyad-level entries) that MID may have had. Analysis at the MID (dispute) level is actually very convenient for this project given that U.N. data is very hard to get, and it would be virtually impossible to code the Secretary-General's interventions at the dyad level for those MIDs that have multiple dyads. The U.N. has scant if any historical records on its own peacemaking activities; its records do not rise to the level of detail that would be required to conduct analyses at the dyad level.

As for the ICB data, my primary goal is to arrive at a dataset that serves as an effective robustness-check to the MID findings. This objective is met by the fact that, first of all, the Hewitt dyadic version of the ICB data captures only those international crises that (like MIDs) have a true inter-state component to them, and omits intra-state crises. Second, the ICB data captures only the most salient of inter-state conflicts/crises as

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[285] J. Joseph Hewitt, *Dyadic-Level ICB Data Version 2.0* (Maryland: University of Maryland, 2003)

opposed to accounting for each and every known inter-state dispute, thereby ignoring the hundreds of low profile/low intensity conflicts that are recorded in the MID data, and ultimately serving as a litmus test for the broader applicability of the MID findings to inter-state conflicts in general. I specifically utilize the Beardsley and Schmidt 2012 version of the Hewitt ICB dyadic dataset which denotes only those crises that had a truly dyadic inter-state component to them, and also aggregates those dyadic-level observations to the dispute level (as I did with the MIDs), as well as omits crises related to major wars ("intra-war" crises). I then created ICB "U.N. Charter" and "P-5" variables using the same process as the MID modifications, setting 1946 (Azerbaijan Crisis) as the start/cut-off point, and ending up with 270 crises for the 1945-2002 period.

Civil Wars

For civil wars, I utilize the dataset by Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis which captures 124 events of civil war that started after 1944 and terminated before 1997, or were ongoing as of December 1999. Political scientists define civil wars as armed conflicts that satisfy the following criteria: the conflict caused more than 1,000 battle deaths; represented a challenge to the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; occurred within the recognized boundary of that state; involved the state as one of the principal combatants; and involved rebels who were able to mount an organized military opposition to the state and to inflict on it some significant casualties.[286]

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[286] This definition of civil war is nearly identical to the definition in Melvin Small, J. David Singer and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms : International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982), 373. However, unlike Singer and Small, the Sambanis and Doyle coding of civil wars does not require that the war cause 1000 deaths annually, but rather uses the 1000 deaths threshold for the entire war as long as the war caused 1000 deaths in any single year. That said most of the Sambanis and Doyle cases have in fact caused 1000 or more deaths annually. Sambanis and Doyle relaxed the 1000 annual deaths threshold in some cases because they felt that the overall amount of violence and the nature of that violence (i.e. a state fighting against organized rebel groups) and most of their own that criteria were satisfied.

Fortunately, unlike the MID and ICB datasets, the Sambanis and Doyle data comes coded at the dispute level, and there was no need to aggregate any dyad-level data. The straight-forward nature of this dataset makes it the ideal choice for conducting the same analyses we did for the MIDs and ICB data.

Civil Wars Article 2 Dilemma

A major conceptual challenge I faced with the civil war data was how to deal with Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits U.N. interventions in the internal affairs of member states, and was frequently invoked during the Cold War era by weak and strong member-states alike. The text of Article 2 allows for U.N. intervention only in instances of (P-5 Consensus) Security Council Chapter VII coercive measures, but does not include U.N. diplomacy among those exceptions:

> Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.[287]

Article 2 presented two main challenges: first, it compromises the viability of the Cold War independent variable as will be used in the inter-state data to denote parochial P-5 interests. Article 2 was largely invoked during the Cold War era and therefore presents us with a lurking variable problem. Second, it is not easy to code Article 2 as an independent variable in its own right because its implementation has been haphazard and political as opposed to systematic and judicious. Indeed, notwithstanding the post-Cold War revisionist trend within the U.N., and especially the development of the "Responsibility to Protect" norm, some countries continue to invoke Article 2 whenever it suits their national interest to reject U.N. mediation, e.g. Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe.

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[287] See United Nations Secretariat, *Charter of the United Nations*

As a solution to this two-fold challenge, I do not code the Cold War as a P-5 parochial interest variable, and exclude it from my main models altogether in our later quantitative tests. Instead, I code it as a robustness check variable that controls for not only Cold War era P-5 dynamics, but also any underlying Article 2 effects, given that the latter was largely invoked during that same time period. As a result, my main P-5 parochial interest independent variables for civil wars will not include any periodic measures, but rather more "direct" measures such as P-5 involvement in a civil war, colonial ties, or civil wars involving states that were contiguous to a P-5 state.

I avoid dropping the Cold War era cases altogether (as Gilligan and Stedman did in their 2003 peacekeeping study) because unlike peacekeeping, there was a substantial amount of SRSG interventions during that time period (for the 97 civil wars that occurred during the Cold War era, there were a total of 15 SRSG interventions, compared to 17 for the 27 civil wars that occurred between 1990 and 1999). In spite of the Article 2 constraint, the Secretary-General was still able to dispatch SRSGs during the Cold War, especially for those civil wars that generated negative cross-border externalities or triggered grave humanitarian fallout.

That said there is another dynamic worth mentioning vis-à-vis Article 2: the role of third party mediation mechanisms, usually in the form of regional organizations or regional statesmen who sometimes fill the vacuum created by U.N. absence. The question as far as our analysis is concerned is whether there is a need to create a dummy variable for third party mediators and how they might factor into the Secretary-General's decision-making process.

For the later quantitative tests, I ultimately do not include such a dummy because the U.N. Charter (Articles 33 and 37) encourages such regional arrangements as a first option without necessarily precluding a role for the U.N. It is in fact customary U.N. practice for the Secretary-General to mediate civil wars as a complementary (albeit higher profile and more "global") actor and not a substitute for regional mediators.

The mere presence of regional third party mediators (which occurs in virtually every civil war) is not in itself a determining factor for whether or not a Secretary-General can intervene; rather, such determination is based more on contextual, albeit very politicized interpretations of Article 2. Third party mediators would have factored more if our study was assessing the effectiveness of the Secretary-General's interventions, but that is not the objective of this project.

The Article 33 clause on regional mediators again reads as follows:

> The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.... The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.[288]

Article 37 then complements Article 33 as follows:

> Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.... If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.[289]

The regional mechanisms thus serve as a first mediation option whenever a civil war breaks out; the U.N. comes into the picture only if the conflict persists. The Article 37 provision detailed above usually serves as a trigger for the P-5 to request or tacitly approve an SRSG whenever their interests converge, but is also used by the Secretary-General in his own right, using the powers vested in his Office by Articles 99 and 100 of the U.N. Charter, to make autonomous interventions if he feels that the dispute poses a threat to international peace and security, and usually after regional mediators have failed to resolve the conflict.

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[288]Ibid.
[289] Ibid.

The current civil war in Syria perhaps best showcases the complementarity between the Secretary-General's interventions and the regional mediator mechanism. For Syria, Ban Ki-Moon dispatched his SRSG Kofi Annan (and now Lakhdar Brahimi) to complement and buttress the mediation efforts that were initiated by the Arab League. Once Kofi Annan was dispatched to Damascus, he became the principal mediator, but his role was complementary to, and not a substitute for the Arab League, hence his (and now Brahimi's) working title of "joint U.N./Arab League mediator." The Syria formula has been replicated in most other civil-war interventions, and reaffirms my argument that the presence of third party mediators does not influence the likelihood of an intervention (although again, it could influence the effectiveness and outcome of the SG intervention, something that is outside the purview of this project).

In his memoirs, the third U.N. Secretary-General U Thant (who served from 1961-1971) provided an interesting account of how the dynamics explained above played out during the deadly Nigerian Biafra war in 1967 in which he ultimately decided to (autonomously) dispatch an SRSG in spite of the Article 2 constraint:

> Neither the OAU nor any member-state ever moved to bring the Biafra conflict before the U.N. I firmly believe that the OAU was the most appropriate instrument for promoting peace in Nigeria and that the United Nations should not intervene until all possible regional resources had been exhausted...[290]

Ultimately, U Thant dispatched an SRSG (in this case referred to as a "Personal Representative"), Nils-Goran Gussing of Sweden, to Nigeria without Security Council authorization to engage in fact-finding missions and also minimize the humanitarian fallout of the Biafra war. The memoir indicates that this SRSG mission came about because of the grave humanitarian fallout from the Biafra war and also the crushing weight of global public opinion favoring some form of U.N. intervention.

As a historical side-note, it is important to emphasize that ever since the early 1990s, there has been a robust effort on the part of the P-5 generally (through U.N. Security

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[290] Thant, *View from the UN*, 53-55.

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Council 1674 on the Responsibility to Protect) and also on the part of international civil society to essentially do away with Article 2 and allow the U.N. to intervene in intra-state conflicts, largely as a result of the humanitarian catastrophes of the early 1990s (e.g. former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda).

Methodology for Coding the Secretary-General's Level of Intervention:

For the level/intensity of the Secretary-General's interventions, I subdivide the data on public interventions into three categories: "testing waters" cases, "substantive intervention" cases, and SRSG interventions, based on the nature and content of the Secretary-General's public interventions.

"Testing Waters"/Low Profile Interventions:

"Testing Waters" [291] is a category I create to denote instances in which the Secretary-General engaged in passive, neutral, and gesture-driven diplomacy without publicly taking sides in a conflict or crisis. His actions included calls for humanitarian restrain/cessation of hostilities and diplomatic overtures that fell short of threats, ultimatums, or public condemnation of either side in a conflict. The Secretary-General, most certainly by design rather than by accident, employed a very cautious intervention approach that minimized the likelihood of alienating one or both sides to the conflict, and effectively reduced his chances of engaging in (or being perceived as engaging in) slack.

As a side note, this variable helps us contextualize the assumption articulated in the theory section- that the Secretary-General is in fact a rational actor whose public

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[291] U.N. scholars such as Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider and Paul R. Hensel, "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict," *International Organization* 50, no. 4 (Autumn, 1996): 683-700, and Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002*, 33-49 have referred to this strategy as the "lowest level of U.N. involvement" in conflicts, largely consisting of mere gestures such as calls for actions and good offices (shuttle diplomacy).

interventions are carried out with due consideration of the dynamics at play (by "dynamics at play" I mean being aware that there are consequences to his being perceived as engaging in anti-P-5 slack).

The coding was made much easier by the level of detail and specificity in the declassified papers of the Secretaries-General and the other sources; the crisis summaries clearly denote instances of passive/neutral diplomacy. I was then able to find additional cases in the memoirs of the Secretaries-General and their close aides. For example, Secretary-General U Thant's memoir has a chapter on the Vietnam War in which he makes it clear in the very first paragraph that his diplomatic involvement was indirect at best and took the form of private overtures to the Johnson administration and other key players.

Ultimately, I was able to cross-reference the ICB "testing waters" cases to their corresponding MIDs (i.e. ICB crises that were also MIDs), and also to use data from the mentioned sources to code the "testing waters" variable not only for the ICB data, but also for the MIDs.

<center>Substantive Interventions:</center>

"Substantive Interventions" denotes instances in which the Secretary-General publicly asserted the authority of his Office by either issuing a public statement of condemnation (and therefore taking a side), or personally embarking on a fact-finding mission to the conflict area, or mediating conflicts either from U.N. Headquarters or in the field. This level of intervention raises the stakes for the Secretary-General because by taking such public steps, whether autonomously or with P-5 approval, he stakes the reputation and prestige of his Office.

Examples of fact-finding field trips undertaken by the Secretary-General himself include Dag Hammarskjöld's autonomous missions to Laos and Tunisia in the late

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1950s. Field mediation trips include Dag Hammarskjöld ground-breaking trip to Peking in 1954 and Kofi Annan's famous trip to Baghdad in 1998. The memoirs of the respective Secretaries-General describe these field missions in considerable detail. Mediation or fact-finding missions undertaken by the Secretary-General himself tend to be shorter in duration than the SRSG missions that I describe in the next paragraph, this because the Secretary-General has myriad complex issues on his agenda and cannot be in all the trouble-spots of the world at the same time.

SRSG Interventions:

As explained earlier in this Chapter, SRSG interventions represent the pinnacle of the public interventions in that the Secretary-General not only makes a substantive intervention in his own right, but also dispatches a conflict-specific "Special Envoy" or "Special Representative" or "Personal Envoy" to the conflict theatre to mediate, engage in fact-finding, or (more recently) at the request of the Security Council, to head a peacekeeping mission. Conflict-specific SRSG appointments always entail that the appointee will devote his or her full-time energies to a particular conflict and serve as the Secretary-General's "eyes and ears" on the ground, providing him with regular first-hand updates and seeking regular guidance from him.

Part of my rationale for ranking SRSG interventions higher than the substantive interventions is the fact that SRSG missions are full-time, sustained, and usually prolonged conflict-specific missions that are much more involved in the mediation/fact-finding process than a short visit or public condemnation by the Secretary-General.

Omission of Private-Realm Interventions:

This project does not analyze the Secretary-General's day to day responsibilities which largely consist of private phone calls, discreet meetings, etc., but are

unrecorded, sometimes off the record, and therefore very hard to code. My interviews with senior staff at the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in New York revealed that private realm initiatives that are substantive and impactful enough to matter become public ex-post, usually right after a crisis is over, or through post-crisis public statements by the U.N. itself or by the crisis actors. In other words, the private interventions that are significant enough to matter are ultimately acknowledged through reports, memoirs and other writings by the Secretaries-General and their aides. Those private interventions that are still unknown after the fact are basically "useless"[292] as far as this study is concerned- especially because we have the benefit of hindsight: the observations in our MID/ICB/civil war datasets only go up to 2002.

Methodology for Coding the Secretary-General's Autonomy:

In analyzing the main question of our thesis, it is necessary to distinguish autonomous from P-5 mandated interventions. This distinction applies to SRSG interventions as well as the substantive interventions undertaken by the Secretary-General himself.

Before going into the specifics of the data collection and coding methodology for autonomy, it is important to clarify three crucial points:

- First, for the coding of the autonomy variable, I rely only on official U.N. Security Council documents (specifically, resolutions passed since 1945, Security Council Annual Reports whose contents only re-affirmed the content of the resolutions, and letters exchanged between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council that go back to 1990, but whose contents which did not really add anything new to the findings from the resolutions and annual reports). Outside these sources, there was unfortunately a scarcity of reliable data on SG autonomy. In an ideal world, newspaper reports and memoirs would provide enough data for

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[292] This is the exact phrase used by Mr. Kishore Mandhyan, the Deputy Director for Political, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs in the Executive Office of the United Nations Secretary-General, during a December 14, 2011 interview at the U.N. Secretariat in New York.

us to definitively pinpoint and distinguish tacit approval from explicit request cases; unfortunately, such sources are highly unlikely to give us the levels of specificity and accuracy we would be looking for.

For example, if a newspaper report or memoir provides hearsay evidence on how a Secretary-General received tacit approval from the Ambassador of a P-5 country to appoint a conflict-specific SRSG, it would (first of all) be hard to ascertain, short of an actual document or U.N. vote, whether the P-5 Ambassador in question was conveying his/her government's the official position (at the Head of State and government level), or just expressing his/her personal views. With U.N. Security Council resolutions, we can at least be assured that our data reflects the official positions of the P-5 governments. Further, even if the speculation problem were to be resolved, we would face the challenge of compiling the full breadth and scope of data that we would need given the random and anecdotal nature of press reports and memoirs, and the high likelihood that such sources would not provide data for the vast majority of the cases in our data. Thus, media and other outside sources would likely lead us into the trap of speculation, and worse still compromise the quality and integrity of our data.

As such, official U.N. documents in the form of U.N. Security Council resolutions represent a more plausible and informative indicator of official P-5 preferences; we can discern for sure which cases had (tacit or explicit) P-5 approval and which were autonomous due to P-5 deadlock or apathy/indifference.

- Second, I do not code a dummy variable for U.N. General Assembly resolutions on SRSG appointments (whether under the *Uniting for Peace* mechanism or just general resolutions supporting an SRSG appointment). I reason that such a dummy variable would be superfluous on two fronts:

To begin with, General Assembly resolutions lack the "high stakes" attribute of the legally binding Security Council resolutions in as far as P-5 interests/preferences are concerned. In any case, as already indicated, I code the *Uniting for Peace Resolution* SRSG appointments as "autonomous" because they signify the lack of P-5 consensus and take place in spite of the explicit opposition of one or more P-5 states, and the support of at least one P-5 state. We will see this dynamic in Chapter 6 when we examine the 1954-55 U.S.-China Hostages Crisis.

Also, the General Assembly routinely passes resolutions on a very frequent basis, most of them carrying just symbolic value. At the end of the day, it is near-impossible to find a major conflict or crisis in which the General Assembly did not have something to say via a resolution, and as such, it would be impractical to try and code as "autonomous" only those conflicts that were characterized by both P-5 deadlock/apathy and General Assembly apathy- such a narrow parameter would likely generate a futile project.

- Third, I adopt a <u>conservative</u> approach in my coding of autonomous public interventions. Aside from straight-forward ex-ante P-5 requests/approvals of SRSG or other public interventions, I also code under the "P-5 Mandate" classification cases that fall under any of the following three categories:

First, cases in which the P-5 request or approval came about ex-post, that is, after the Secretary-General had already initiated a public intervention on his own. While it is very possible that most ex-post requests/approvals merely rubber-stamp what started out as an autonomous SG initiative, I choose to err on the side of caution in (plausibly) assuming that such endorsements may also come about via informal channels and prior to the actual passing of a Security Council resolution, in which case even the seemingly "autonomous" beginnings of a public interventions are actually P-5 approved initiatives, at least informally, from the onset. I provide examples of such cases in the next subsection. Ultimately, this

coding methodology, and the knowledge that we may be under-reporting the SG's autonomy, should make us more confident of the statistical results that we will generate in our later quantitative tests.

Second, for SRSG the subset only, there are "dual-track" interventions in which the Secretary-General appointed a Personal Representative at the same time as the Security Council requested/tacitly approved a Special Representative (this dynamic occurred in Cyprus 1964, Middle East 1967/73, and Western Sahara late 1990s). I code such cases as P-5 mandated, again opting for the conservative coding route.

Third, there are protracted conflict cases in which a previous Secretary-General, in past years, appointed an SRSG on the basis of a Security Council resolution. I also code such cases as P-5 mandated based on the precedent set by the prior Security Council resolution. Again, Cyprus, the Middle East, Western Sahara, and Afghanistan are examples of cases that fit into this category. For the regression models in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I code a control dummy variable for cases that had a prior SRSG appointment.

That said, the next few pages provide examples of the wording from actual U.N. Security Council resolutions that guided my coding methodology, starting with SRSG interventions, and then other substantive public (non-SRSG) interventions:

Security Council Resolutions Denoting P-5 Mandate:

Explicit P-5 Mandate

In some cases, the P-5 mandate was explicit as opposed to implicit. My key guideline was that the Security Council resolution had to actually contain the term "request" or an approximation such as "decides." To begin with, here is an example of a straight-

forward ex ante, real-time SRSG request for a brewing regional crisis - Resolution 788 on the situation in Liberia adopted by the Security Council at its 3138th meeting on 19th November 1992 which read in part as follows:

> The Security Council, determining that the deterioration of the situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and security, particularly in West Africa as a whole... Requests the Secretary-General to dispatch urgently a Special Representative Liberia to evaluate the situation, and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible with any recommendations he may wish to make...[293]

Aside from SRSG appointments, the P-5 sometimes made ex-ante requests for the Secretary-General himself to make public interventions, usually in instances of grave international crises requiring very urgent solutions; I make sure to account for this dynamic in my later bivariate and regression tests. Examples include Resolution 457 on the US-Iran hostage crisis passed on 4th December 1979 (Kurt Waldheim actually opens his memoirs with an account of his trip to Tehran to try and negotiate the release of the U.S. hostages; his first Chapter is entitled "Nightmare in Tehran." The resolution partly read as follows:

> The Security Council, deeply concerned at the dangerous level of tension between Iran and the United States of America, which could have grave consequences for international peace and security, requests the Secretary-General to lend his good offices for the immediate implementation of the present resolution and to take all appropriate measures to this end; decides that the Council will remain actively seized of the matter and requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to it on .developments regarding his efforts.[294]

Other times the Security Council would ask, ex ante, for a public intervention without specifying whether an SRSG or other mechanism should be used. For such instances, I first determined the content of the actual intervention (based on my level of intervention methodology) and then labeled it as "substantive intervention" if no SRSG was used.

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[293] United Nations Secretariat, "Resolutions of the Security Council," http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml (accessed May 5, 2014).
[294] Ibid.

For example, Resolution 568 which was passed on 21st June 1985 requested a fact-finding mission to Botswana after a military raid by the apartheid regime; the fact-finding mission ultimately comprised of U.N. officials as opposed to a formally appointed SRSG. The following is the text of the Resolution:

> The Security Council, taking note of the letter dated 17 June 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Botswana to the United Nations and having heard the statement of the Minister for External Affairs of Botswana concerning the recent acts of aggression by the racist regime of South Africa against the Republic Botswana, requests the Secretary-General to send a mission to visit Botswana for the purpose of: (a) Assessing the damage caused by South Africa's unprovoked and premeditated acts of aggression; (b) Proposing measures to strengthen Botswana's capacity to receive and provide assistance to South African refugees... requests the Secretary-General to monitor developments related to this question and to report to the Security Council is the situation demands.[295]

The next example showcases an explicit ex-post request for an SRSG, complete with an acknowledgement of the Secretary-General's ex ante initiatives for that specific crisis -Security Council Resolution 968 passed during the Council's 3482nd meeting on 16 December 1994:

> The Security Council, commending the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, as well as of the countries and regional organizations acting as observers at the inter-Tajik talks which contributed to reaching these agreements... Requests the Secretary-General to continue to pursue through the good offices of his Special Envoy efforts to speed up the progress towards national reconciliation.[296]

Another ex post SRSG request, this time acknowledging the ex ante efforts of the Secretary-General's Personal Representative, but nevertheless requesting a Special Representative as well. In line with my conservative methodology, I coded this as a case of P-5 mandate - Resolution 1740 on Nepal adopted by the Security Council at its 5622nd meeting held on 23 January 2007, which read in part as follows:

> The Security Council, expressing its readiness to support the peace process in Nepal in the timely and effective implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, expressing appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative, the United Nations Country Team including the Office of the High

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[295] Ibid.
[296] Ibid.

> Commissioner for human rights and other United Nations representatives in Nepal, decides to establish a United Nations political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and with the following mandate based on the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his report...[297]

Finally, another poignant example of "ex post" mandate comes from the 1981 Osirak nuclear reactor crisis when the Israeli air force bombed suspected nuclear weapons facilities in Iraq. The immediate reaction to the bombing was that the Iraqis and others called for Security Council for sanctions against Israel, whereas the United States and other allies of Israel objected to sanctions and instead called for a watered down resolution they could vote for. The United States had no diplomatic relations with Iraq, and as such their ambassadors were loath to contact each other directly. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim stepped into the void and initiated a face-to-face meeting between the two ambassadors in a small office he had adjacent to the Security Council:

> I asked Brian Urquhart to seek out the (Iraqi) Foreign Minister and tell him that (U.S.) Ambassador Kirkpatrick would like to talk to him in the little office I had just outside the Security Council chamber. Urquhart returned quickly with the reply, 'As long as it's in your office and in your presence, fine; otherwise, there would be difficulties, since they have no diplomatic relations. But if you invite him and Ambassador Kirkpatrick is there he will come.'...They met in my office in a series of negotiations running over a period of several days. Responding to the desire of both diplomats, I was present throughout, but I did not interfere except to give advice on purely technical points... The negotiations were offered his good offices to both Iran and Iraq tough, but finally Mrs. Kirkpatrick proposed some American concessions on a particular point at issue... The Foreign Minister asked her if this was her bottom line. 'Yes,' she said, 'it is. I have been in Washington and have discussed it with the President and the Secretary of State.'...The upshot was a unanimous vote in the Security Council....In effect, this brought the matter to a close.[298]

The result of these backroom deliberations was the passage of Security Council Resolution 487[299] which, among other things, "requested" the Secretary-General to "keep the Security Council regularly informed of the implementation of the present

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[297] Ibid.

[298] Kurt Waldheim, *In the Eye of the Storm : A Memoir*, 1 US ed. (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1986), 207-208.

[299] United Nations Secretariat, "Resolutions of the Security Council," http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml (accessed May 5, 2014).

resolution" but did not otherwise reveal the ex-ante autonomy that Kurt Waldheim had initiated early on. What this anecdote shows us is that our conservative coded mechanism notwithstanding, it is important to acknowledge that we may be under-reporting the true extent of the Secretaries-General autonomy. In fact, true to form, Kurt Waldheim re-enacted this dynamic at the onset of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, when "no country moved in the Security Council to stop the war", and Waldheim invoked the rarely used Article 99 of the U.N. Charter to convene a Security Council meeting to discuss the conflict, and later dispatched Olof Palme of Sweden as his SRSG for the Iran-Iraq war following Iran's refusal to deal with the Security Council.[300] He then received a Security Council mandate as a formality having initiated the intervention himself.

Tacit/Implicit P-5 Mandate

In line with my conservative coding for autonomy, I also included in the "P-5 mandate intervention" rubric Security Council resolutions that contained terms such as "urge" or "encourage" (if resolution passed ex-ante) or "welcome"/"approve" (if resolution passed ex-post). The logic behind this dynamic is that the Secretary-General would dispatch an SRSG on the basis of tacit approval that was granted via informal channels before the passing of the resolution, or through the anticipated reaction that such approval would be granted via a past resolution on a protracted conflict.

Here is an example of an ex ante tacit approval for an SRSG appointment:

Resolution 872 adopted by the Security Council at its 3288th meeting one 5th October 1993 regarding the situation in Rwanda:

> The Security Council, welcoming the signing of the Arusha peace agreement (including its Protocols) one 4 August 1993 and urging the parties to continue to comply fully with it... welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a

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[300] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 132.

Special Representative who would lead UNAMIR in the field and exercise authority over all its elements.[301]

On the other hand, an ex post tacit approval of an SRSG appointment usually took the form of Resolution 747 which was passed on 24th March 1992 regarding the situation in Angola, and read as follows:

> The Security Council, recalling its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 by which it decided to entrust a new mandate to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II as proposed by the Secretary-General in line with the Peace Accords for Angola, welcoming the appointment by the Secretary-General of a Special Representative for Angola who will be in charge of all current and projected activities of the United Nations in connection with the Accords and will also be the Chief of the Mission, decides to enlarge the mandate of the Mission to include...[302]

As was the case with the explicit mandates, in some instances the Security Council would pass a resolution just tacitly encouraging the Secretary-General himself (and not an SRSG) to mediate a specific conflict or crisis. For example, resolution 436 of 6th October 1978 on the situation in Lebanon read as follows:

> The Security Council, noting with grave concern the deteriorating situation in Beirut and its surroundings, deeply grieved at the consequent loss of life, human suffering, and physical destruction, supports the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring about a durable cease-fire and to keep the Security Council informed on the implementation of the cease-fire.[303]

Operationalizing the Dependent Variable

The main dependent variable in this project is three-fold:

The first dependent variable is designed to test our first main question (Where Does the Secretary-General Go?) and is binary in nature, coded 1 if there was a public intervention of any kind, and zero otherwise.

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[301] United Nations Secretariat, *Resolutions of the Security Council.*

[302] Ibid.

[303] Ibid.

The second dependent variable is designed to test the second part of our "Where Does He Go" question by examining the intensity of the interventions, and is ordinal for both the MID and ICB data. The dependent variable consists of a four-point dependent variable denoting the intensity of the SG's diplomacy as follows: "0" for cases where the Secretary-General made *no public intervention at all* in a conflict or crisis, "1" for cases where he *"tested the waters"* [304] by engaging in passive, neutral, and gesture-driven diplomacy, "2" for cases where he made a *substantive public assertion of his authority* e.g. through public condemnations, mediation, etc. and finally "3" for cases where he intervened substantively as well as dispatched a *conflict-specific SRSG.*

For civil wars, I do not use an ordinal "level of intervention" dependent variable this time around for two reasons: first, there is no "testing waters" variable due to coding challenges and unavailability of data arising from Article 2 (see section below). Second, all but three of the 35 public interventions in the civil wars data were done at the SRSG level (the three exceptions being Vietnam (after the fall of Saigon), the Papua New Guinea civil war of 1988-1991 war, and Turkey's Kurdish civil war of the 1980s). I therefore drop the three non-SRSG cases and use a binary variable with zero denoting cases of non-intervention and 1 denoting cases of SRSG intervention

The third dependent variable is designed to test our third main question (Is the Secretary-General Autonomous?) and is two-fold: first I create a binary variable for P-5 mandate interventions, coded 1 if there was a P-5 mandate and zero otherwise. This methodology is applied across all three datasets (MIDs, ICB, and civil wars).

I then create second ordinal variable for those cases where the intervention took place without a P-5 mandate, but differentiating the degree of autonomy between low-

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[304] Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel, *United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict,* 683-700 and Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002,* 33-49 have referred to this strategy as the "lowest level of U.N. involvement" in conflicts, largely consisting of mere gestures such as calls for actions and good offices (shuttle diplomacy).

intensity autonomy and high profile (e.g. SRSG-type) autonomy. This second variable is coded 0 for no intervention at all, 1 for low intensity autonomy, and 2 for high profile autonomy. The goal is to have a nested model for comparing and contrasting the P-5 mandate and autonomous interventions in our quantitative tests for the MID and ICB data.

For civil wars, I just create another binary variable with 1 denoting autonomous interventions and zero otherwise since the civil war data is examining only SRSG level interventions.

3.4.5: Dependent Variable Time-Series Charts

Figures 5-7 in this section showcase the trends of our main dependent variable (the Secretary-General's public interventions) over time.

Figures 5 and 6 focus on our MID dataset, which has 1,470 MID dyads, of which 307 had a public SG intervention. 220 of these interventions were at the SRSG level (and to a notable extent associated with SRSG interventions in protracted MIDs); 36 were high-profile interventions undertaken by the Secretary-General himself, and 51 were low-profile interventions. During the Cold War era, the Secretary-General intervened in a total of 197 dyadic MIDs; for the post-Cold War era, that figure is 110.

Figure 7 focuses on SRSG interventions in civil wars. The Sambanis and Doyle dataset records a total of 154 civil wars between 1946 and 2002. Of these, the Secretary-General made a high-profile intervention in 76 cases; 41 of these in the Cold War era, and 35 in the post-Cold War era.

Even though these time-series charts only expose the periodic independent variable, we can deduce a number of interesting trends related to our broad main hypotheses

(Hypothesis R1 and I1). The first noticeable trend is that the end of the Cold War led to an increase in the rate of public interventions, most notably for civil wars. This trend supports the H1 realist rationale of greater SG activity when P-5 interests converge, which they did as evidenced by greater post-Cold War unanimity on the need for an enhanced role for the Secretary-General. Part of this post-Cold War increase for civil wars is also attributable to the Article 2 effect I discussed in this chapter, i.e. during the Cold War era, it was common practice for countries to invoke Article 2 whenever they wanted the U.N. to stay out their domestic affairs. There was also the fact that most civil wars were in fact Cold War superpower proxy conflicts, to the extent that the Secretaries-General felt they did not have a lot of room for meaningful progress in terms of resolving those conflicts. It is reasonable to expect a statistically significant finding for the Cold War independent variable when we conduct our quantitative tests in Chapters 5 and 6.

It is interesting to note that the post-Cold War increase is driven by SRSG interventions- as it turns out, Figures 6 and 7 reveal that most of these post-Cold War SRSG interventions were based on a Security Council mandate- further evidence of the realist case. Interestingly enough, Figure 6 shows that the rate of interventions undertaken by the Secretary-General himself, especially the low profile interventions, remained more or less constant throughout the 1946 to 2002 period.

Figures 6 and 7 also provide some suggestive trends regarding our I3 hypothesis- they distinguish P-5 mandate from autonomous interventions in MIDs and civil wars. There are two outstanding trends in both Figures: 1) the rate of P-5 mandate interventions increased after the Cold War- as noted above, this dynamic is attributable to the fact that Security Council mandated SRSG interventions increased sharply after 1990; 2) it is clear that the low-profile autonomy interventions in the MIDs case remained more or less constant during the history of the Organization, whereas 3) most importantly, high profile autonomy was more common, as a percentage of the SG's total activity, during the tenures of Dag Hammarskjöld and U

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Thant (1953-1971). There was hardly any high profile autonomous activity before Hammarskjöld took office in 1953. They key takeaway from Figures 6 and 7 is that autonomy was more likely to occur during periods of intense P-5 deadlock (such as the 1950s and 1960s) than they were in periods of relative P-5 unanimity- thereby supporting the institutionalist claim from Chapter 2 that preference heterogeneity among principals creates room for autonomy.

In terms of providing evidence for either of our two main hypothetical claims, these time-series charts are of course just suggestive at this stage- the next two Chapters (Chapter 5 and 6) will involve our quantitative tests which will test our two main sets of hypotheses.

Figure 5: SG Interventions in MIDS (1946-2002)

Figure 6: SG Autonomy in MIDs (1946-2002)

How Autonomous is the SG? - Militarized Inter-State Disputes (MIDs)

■ P-5 Mandate   ■ Autonomous High Profile   ■ Autonomous Low-Profile

Figure 7: SG Interventions/Autonomy in Civil Wars (1946-2002)

How Autonomous is the SG? Civil War Data

■ P-5 Mandate Interventions   ■ Autonomous Interventions

CHAPTER 4: Where Does the Secretary-General Go?

4.1: Introductory Remarks

This chapter presents quantitative findings on our first main research question (Where does the Secretary-General go?). We will be testing realist hypotheses R1-R2 and institutionalist hypotheses I1/I2 using a series of logit and ordered-logit estimations (the ordered-logit models are specifically designed to test the question of intensity in the MID and ICB data).

The results will demonstrate that both P-5 and U.N. Charter variables have significant and substantive effects. For the three populations of cases (MIDs, ICB and civil wars), the Secretary-General was less likely to intervene during the period of Cold War rivalry, as realism would expect. For the MID data especially (which has a significantly larger population of cases than the ICB and civil war data), SG interventions were less likely whenever parochial P-5 interests were implicated. At the same time, indicators of crisis severity also have significant and substantive effects across all three datasets. This suggests that the Secretary-General's actions are responsive to U.N. Charter concerns, but within constraints. These result also reflect the fact that, to some extent, the realist and institutionalist predictions are not incompatible.

When one focuses on just the ICB data however, with its much smaller N and emphasis on only the most significant of international crises (some of which were not MIDs), a slightly different picture begins to emerge. Although not statistically significant, the ICB results indicate, in substantive terms, that conflict specific P-5 parochial interests, such as two P-5 states pitted against each other, or a P-5 state pitted against a non-P5 state, did not deter the Secretary-General from staging a public intervention. Similarly, the civil war data has a surprising result which shows a slight likelihood of an SG intervention in civil wars where the P-5 had some involvement.

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These ICB and civil war results, although insignificant and therefore only suggestive, give a slight edge to the institutionalist argument specifically outlined in hypothesis I2 (on the effect of conflict-specific P-5 interest variables).

The institutionalist variables perform quite well across MIDs, ICB crises, and civil wars. This result indicates that U.N. Charter variables matter a lot, and not only on the margin after one take realism into account. On the contrary, if one had to choose between a model that has only P-5 variables and a model that has only U.N. Charter variables, the latter actually does better on some measures, statistically as well as substantively.. So the U.N. Charter variables cannot be dismissed as the residual that's left over once realism has had its say. There is one caveat though: the U.N. Charter variables have an advantage in that a number of them are continuous, whereas the P-5 variables are all dichotomous. The P-5 variables are blunter, which may explain why they are not as good at predicting outcomes.

Our overall takeaway from this chapter is that the realist and institutionalist predictions are both valid, with a possible slight edge to the institutionalist predictions. Some of the predictions are also compatible, i.e. it is very likely that the Secretary-General is responsive to both P-5 and U.N. Charter considerations.

The chapter proceeds by first of all outlining the independent variables we will be using in our quantitative tests. I then present some bivariate tests of the independent variables before proceeding to present the hypotheses, a more detailed discussion of the findings, and also the statistical tables. For each set of models, I present a main models table, robustness checks table, and substantive effects table. In this context, the substantive effects tables showcase the probability changes in the likelihood of the Secretary-General's intervention.

4.2: Inter-State Conflicts

4.2.1: Hypotheses

Tables 5-10 in this chapter showcase results on the first research question (Where Does the Secretary-General Go) as it pertains to inter-state conflicts. As noted earlier, the MID dataset constitutes our primary population of cases for inter-state conflicts because of its broad and comprehensive coding methodology, i.e. coding each and every instance of militarized interstate disputes and ensuring that we do not omit any seemingly obscure cases. The ICB data on the other hand is much more limited, as already explained in Chapter 3, and includes only the most significant of international crises. An ICB affirmation of our MID findings will serve as a good robustness check for increasing our level of confidence in the results.

Here are the hypotheses once again:

Where Does the Secretary-General Go?

Realist Hypotheses:

R1: The U.N. Secretary-General's intervention behavior is more likely to be influenced by the parochial interests of the P-5 (whether temporal or conflict-specific) than by the dictates of the U.N. Charter. He is particularly unlikely to intervene in "P-5 vs. P-5", "P-5 vs. Other", or conflicts bordering P-5 states because such conflicts elicit strong parochial -5 interests, trigger Security Council deadlock, and increase the likelihood of P-5 sanctions.

R2: The intensity of the Secretary-General's interventions is likely to be driven more by the configuration of P-5 interests than by U.N. Charter dictates. High profile interventions are less likely in conflicts that elicit strong P-5 parochial interests due to

the SG's fear of P-5 sanctions. Such interventions are more likely in conflicts where P-5 interests converge or are very weak.

Institutionalist Hypotheses:

I1: The U.N. Secretary-General's intervention behavior is more likely to be influenced by the dictates of the U.N. Charter than by the parochial interests of the P-5, and he is as likely to intervene in conflicts that elicit strong P-5 parochial interests as he is in conflicts where P-5 interests converge.

I2: The intensity of the Secretary-General's interventions is likely to be driven more by the dictates of the U.N. Charter than by the configuration of P-5 interests. High profile interventions are more likely in conflicts that threaten international peace and security, irrespective of whether or not they elicit strong parochial P-5 interests (e.g. "P-5 vs. P-5" conflicts, "P-5 vs. Other" conflicts, or conflicts bordering P-5 states).

4.2.2: Inter-State Conflict Independent Variables

Proceeding from the outline of the dependent variable as well as data collection discussion in Chapter 3, I group my inter-state conflict (MID and ICB) independent variables into three separate categories: first *P-5 parochial interests* variables, designed to capture the salience of a MID or crisis to the parochial interests of one or more P-5 states, and especially useful for testing our competing sets of hypotheses based on Scenarios A and B in our 2x2 table in Section 2.4. Second, I have *P-5 convergent interests* variables, designed to capture the salience of a MID or crisis to the convergent/aligned interests of all P-5 states, and useful for testing our hypotheses on Scenarios C and D in the same 2x2 table. Lastly, I have *U.N. Charter* variables designed to capture the salience of MIDs and crises to the dictates of the U.N. Charter and also enable us to conduct our comparative analysis with the realist predictions.

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P-5 Parochial Interests Variables:

P-5 Involvement: For MIDs, I code two variables that indicate the involvement of P-5 state: first if one side in the dyad is a P-5 state (P-5 vs. Other), and second if both sides in the dyad are P-5 states (P-5 vs. P-5).

For the ICB data however, owing to the high level of detail that is available from the International Crisis Behavior Project data, I code for crisis dyads in which the P-5 powers faced-off directly as well as indirectly:

P-5 vs. P-5 Direct (ICB): This variable denotes those crisis dyads in which two or more P-5 states, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia in these data, had a direct military confrontation in terms of their military personnel engaging in an actual face-off and/or combat in the field. Of the 348 crises listed by the International Crisis Behavior Project for the 1945 and 2007 period, 19 involved a "P-5 vs. P-5" direct confrontation.

P-5 vs. P-5 Indirect (ICB): This variable denotes those crisis dyads in which two or more P-5 states faced-off in indirect, sometimes proxy (Cold-War) confrontations as opposed to direct conflict. P-5 participation in such conflicts involved the supply of political and/or military support for countries or non-state actors that advanced P-5-interests, mostly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America where Cold-War proxy wars were fought. There are 12 such crises in the ICB data.

Contiguity to P-5 State/s: I code as "contiguous" any state that either shares a boundary with a P-5 state or is separated from a P-5 state by less than 400 miles of water. I use information from I used information from the *U.S. Library of Congress*

Country Study Series[305] and also the *CIA World Factbook*[306] to code the P-5 boundaries.

I code as "P-5 Border" conflicts those cases in which <u>both sides</u> of a dyad are contiguous to a P-5 state. I also coded as "P-5 Border One" cases in which one of the states in the dyad is contiguous to a P-5 state, but ultimately do not use this specification in my models. I focus on the former because dyads that border a P-5 state constitute a stronger case for "border crisis" characterization- they are more likely to trigger a high degree of interest on the part of the nearby P-5 state which would want to minimize any negative externalities that might arise. The same cannot necessarily be claimed if the P-5 state borders just one side of the dyad, especially in cases where the dyad disputants are located on different continents (e.g. Cuba vs. South Africa MIDs, or a country that borders China participating in the Gulf War I anti-Saddam coalition). This dichotomous variable is not coded as true if the bordering country in question is another P-5 state, e.g. I exclude the contiguity of Russia to the United States.

Cold War Alliance Bloc: For this variable, I draw on data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP[307]) project which maintains data on military alliance agreements signed by all countries of the world between 1815 and 2003. I code it as a binary variable denoting whether or not the countries in the MID or ICB dyad share a defense pact (one that entails active military assistance) with a P-5 state.

I distinguish MIDs or crises in which the dyad countries are military allies with P-5 countries on opposite sides of the East-West divide (cross-bloc allies, e.g. U.S. ally vs. U.S.S.R. ally) from those in which the disputants share a defense pact with P-5 countries on the same side of the East-West divide (same-bloc allies, e.g. U.K. ally vs.

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[305] U.S. Library of Congress, "Library of Congress Country Studies," http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html (accessed May 5, 2012).
[306] Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA World Factbook," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed May 5, 2012).
[307]

France ally). The rationale for the distinction is to ascertain whether or not the Secretary-General would be more likely to intervene in intra-bloc, as opposed to more contentious and Cold-War driven cross-bloc disputes.

I posit that military alliances are likely a better indicator of parochial P-5-interests than colonial ties[308] because in the case of the latter, the P-5 former colonial powers (U.K. and France) have literally scores of former colonies between them with diverse economic and geostrategic value, such that it is very difficult to ascertain whether or not they are of equal importance to the mother country. In any case, I also include variables for former colonial ties so as to avoid possible omitted variable bias.

P-5 Colonial Ties: As indicated in the above paragraph, I also code a dichotomous variable for whether or not both of the states in the MID or ICB dyad are former P-5 colonies (former colonies of Great Britain or France).

I draw on historical data from the website[309] of the (British) Commonwealth Secretariat to code former U.K. colonies, and omit those few recently-joined Commonwealth members that were not British colonies (such as Rwanda and Mozambique). I then cross-referenced my findings with other sources such as the website[310] of the U.K. Government's *Foreign and Commonwealth Office* in order to ensure accuracy. For former French colonies, I acquired my data from a combination of sources: first the website[311] of the *International Organisation of La Francophonie* which represents the French speaking countries of the world, then the website of the Franczone countries and other secondary sources on French colonialism. I do not include cases for which only one of the two states was a former P-5 colony because I

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[308] Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002*, 33-49 share the same view.
[309] British Commonwealth Secretariat, "Member Countries of the Commonwealth," http://thecommonwealth.org/member-countries (accessed May 5, 2012).
[310] British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "What is the U.K. Government Doing Worldwide?" https://www.gov.uk/government/world (accessed May 5, 2012).
[311] Organisation Internationale De la Francophonie, "Official Website of the International Organization of La Francophonie," http://www.francophonie.org/Welcome-to-the-International.html (accessed May 5, 2012).

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reason that the interest on the part of the mother country would not be as profound as in the case of two ex-colonies fighting each other, i.e. a "backyard" crisis.

P-5 Convergent Interests Variables:

Post-Cold War: I code a dummy variable for whether or not a crisis was initiated during the post-1989 period of "unipolarity" (which I code as starting in 1990) when there was a general convergence of interest overlap among the P-5 states.[312] I do not go into the ICB strategy of comparing and contrasting intra-Cold War periodic dynamics ((bipolarity (1955-1962) vs. polycentricism (1963-1989)) because preliminary results from the data suggest that there is not much to learn from such a distinction.

Major Petroleum Exporters: For the Petroleum variable, I code for conflicts in which both dyad participants were major petroleum exporters (either member-states of the *Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries* (OPEC)[313] oil cartel) or major natural gas exporters (countries that exported more than 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year). My rationale for this variable is two-fold:

First there is a domestic politics argument to be made in that crises occurring in major petroleum exporting countries[314] have the potential to trigger petroleum supply shocks and price fluctuations which in turn may affect the domestic political dynamics of the

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[312] Choosing a different cutoff year (e.g., 1989 or 1991) has no effect on the substance of the results. Also, I do NOT include geographical region as an indicator of P-5 parochial interests because I am unsure what dynamics exactly would be captured by including regional dummies once I control for other, more direct, measures of the salience of a conflict to P-5-interests such as alliance ties and contiguity to a P-5. Instead, I test for geography as a control variable.

[313] Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, "Website of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries," http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/ (accessed May 5, 2012).

[314] For example, see Mayra P. Saefong, "Nigerian Elections may Spur the Next Oil Supply Shock: Risk of Politically Sparked Oil Attacks Hangs Over Big Exporter to U.S." http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nigerian-elections-may-spur-next-oil-supply-shock-2011-04-12 (accessed May 5, 2012). Javier E. David, "Greedy' OPEC Manipulates Oil, could Swing Election: Trump," http://www.cnbc.com/id/48811664 (accessed May 5, 2012).

P-5 states, such as electoral outcomes (especially in the western P-5 states) and domestic upheavals - in other words this is a "politics of the gas pump" argument. This dynamic has often times manifested itself whenever there is a crisis in major petroleum economies such as Nigeria (where the U.S. buys 44% of the oil) and also the Middle-Eastern states. The key takeaway here is that the political leaders of the P-5 states are likely to share a common interest of containing crises involving major petroleum exporters so as not to trigger politically risky petroleum supply shocks.

A second, perhaps less plausible argument, is that there is a geo-strategic" common interest among the P-5 to avoid a repeat of the 1973 Middle East crisis and its resultant Arab oil embargo which triggered a global recession. This might explain, for example, why the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s was consistently mediated by the U.N. Secretary-General, with the help of his conflict-specific *SRSG for Iran-Iraq*, and with the tacit support of the P-5 states.

OPEC actually remains a powerful bloc that effectively determines global oil production and price levels- its member-states still account for two-thirds of the world's oil reserves, and, as of April 2009, 41.7%[315] of the world's oil production-statistics that afford them considerable influence over the global economy. This level of clout makes the OPEC states of immense geostrategic importance to the world and it is therefore plausible to assume that greater P-5 attention would be paid to crises in those states.

A plausible counterargument to this OPEC "P-5 convergent interests" line of reasoning would be that some P-5 states such as Russia would find it in their interest to see a global oil disruption because they would stand to replace the major OPEC countries as new global oil suppliers. However the problem with such a counterargument is that even if Russia had such wishes at any point during the Cold-

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[315] See British Petroleum, "British Petroleum Table of World Oil Production," http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/publications/energy_reviews_2006/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/table_of_world_oil_production_2006.pdf (accessed May 5, 2012).

War era, it could not plausibly have filled the supply gap quickly enough to avert a worldwide economic recession (such as the one in 1973). Besides, Russia has only managed to match the OPEC and major natural gas producing states in terms of output within the last 10 years, long after the occurrence of the OPEC MID/ICB conflict dyads we are looking at.

I use data from the website of OPEC to code this variable (and make sure to account for historical membership shifts- e.g. Indonesia was at one time an OPEC member but is not anymore). For natural gas, I use data from the International Energy Agency and include only major natural gas exporters (countries exporting more than 40 billion cubic meters per year).

Least Developed Countries ("Nobody Cares" rationale): For the LDC variable, I draw on data from website[316] of the *United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Land-Locked Developing Countries, and Small Island Developing States* (U.N.OHRLLS) to code a dichotomous variable for whether both the countries in a MID dyad are least developed countries (LDCs). The U.N. defines an LDC as a country that exhibits the lowest indicators of socioeconomic development, and currently classifies 49 countries as LDCs.[317]

My reasoning is that since LDCs are mostly very poor and less likely to matter in terms of geostrategic salience to the P-5 states (even if some of them are former P-5

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[316] United Nations Secretariat, "Website of the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS) " http://unohrlls.org/about-un-ohrlls/ (accessed May 10, 2012).

[317] U.N. criteria for classifying a country as an LDC are as follows: first, low-income (three-year average GNI per capita of less than US $905, which must exceed $1,086 for the country to leave the LDC list). Second, human resource weakness (based on indicators of nutrition, health, education and adult literacy) and finally, economic vulnerability (based on instability of agricultural production, instability of exports of goods and services, economic importance of non-traditional activities, merchandise export concentration, handicap of economic smallness, and the percentage of population displaced by natural disasters)

colonies or military allies), the Secretary-General is more likely to have an incentive to intervene with the expectation that there will be little if any P-5 interference with his efforts. It will however be interesting to see if this expectation holds for the Cold-War era when there were a lot of proxy superpower militarized inter-state disputes, and most LDC vs. LDC conflicts were considered superpower proxy-war theatres.

U.N. Charter Variables:

For the U.N. Charter variables, I code variables that indicate the extent to which a MID or crisis was a threat to international peace and security as denoted by, for example, the severity of violence and protractedness:

Fatality Levels (MID): This variable comes with the Maoz data and denotes MID fatality levels (accounting for the sum total of all the dyads involved in a MID as I am aggregating to the dispute level). The fatality level coding itself ranges from 0 to 6: 0 denotes no fatalities, 1 denotes 1-25 deaths, 2 denotes 26-100 deaths, 3 denotes 101-250 deaths, 4 denotes to hundred 251-500 deaths, 5 denotes 501-999 deaths, and finally 6 denotes 1000 battle deaths or greater- the Correlates of War threshold for a full-blown inter-state war. I split this variable into two sub-categories for greater specificity:

- Battle-Deaths: I code a new "logbattledeaths" variable based on the original MID fatality level variable. For each fatality level coded by the Correlates of War, I replaced the categorical coding with the midpoint of the fatality count associated with that level. Therefore, 13 battle deaths are coded for fatality level 1, 63 for fatality level 2, 175 for fatality level 3, 375 for fatality level 4, 750 for fatality level 5, and then unique (exact) values for each of the battle death cases with over 1,000 fatalities. In this way, we get a more accurate picture of the effect of the fatalities variable that if we had just assigned an arbitrary figure to all 28 full-scale

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wars in the data. I logged this new variable for easier testing in our later quantitative tests.

One slight challenge I faced in this process was that the 1470-observation Maoz MID data had 100 missing/unavailable values for the fatality level variable. In order to make sure that our quantitative models cover all 1,470 MIDs, I filled the missing 100 fatality values with zero's because, as it turns out, the Secretary-General's the rate of public involvement is roughly identical for the Maoz data's zero fatality cases and the 100 missing cases (the rate of intervention for the zero fatality cases, which number 1,082, is 10% whereas the rate of intervention for the 100 missing fatality data cases is 12%). I ultimately argue that it is justifiable to fill the missing fatality cases with zero's because a) if the MID researchers could not verify casualties using public sources, it is unlikely that the U.N. Secretary-General would have felt compelled to intervene based on casualty grounds, (b) the observed frequency of the Secretary-General's interventions in the 100 missing cases is (as noted) indistinguishable from that in zero casualty cases, and (c) upon preliminary testing of the data, our quantitative results are unaffected by this choice to fill the 100 missing values with zero's.

- Anydeaths: I also create an additional dummy variable that indicates whether or not there are any battledeaths. The coefficient for this variable indicates the effect of having any fatalities, whereas the coefficient on the "logbatdeaths" variable above gives us the effect of additional fatalities conditional on there being any. This rationale gives a direct estimate of the difference between fatal and non-fatal MIDs, which may be substantively important.

Cumulative Duration (MID): This variable also comes with the Maoz data and denotes the cumulative number of days from the start to the end of a MID (ranging from 1 day to 4775 days).

No. of Conflict Actors: I code this variable for the MID data, but it comes already coded in the ICB data. It denotes the number of states that were involved in a MID or ICB crisis, and for the ICB data includes states that were perceived by the crisis actors to be involved in the international crisis due to activities such as direct military, semi-military, covert, economic, and political support for at least one side of the crisis dyad. My rationale here is that the greater the number of state actors in a MID or crisis, the greater the potential for negative externalities, and the more the MID/crisis will be perceived as a threat to international peace and security. The variable ranges from 2 to 39 actors in the MID data and from 2 to 34 actors for ICB crises.

Prior MID History: I code this variable to denote "protracted" dyads that have a prior history of conflict (number of prior MIDs for the same dyad). Good examples here include dyads associated with the Middle-East (Palestine) conflict since 1948, and also the Cyprus-Turkey dispute that has taken place since the early 20th century. The number of prior MIDs per conflict dyad ranges from 0 to 60.

Major War Spillovers (MID): I code this variable to denote conflict dyads that result from an ongoing inter-state war (there where 28 inter-state wars between 1945 and 2001). Examples of such occurrences include dyadic conflicts involving Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos during the Vietnam War, and also dyads involving Gulf States such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. This variable actually serves as a robustness-check for the petroleum variable - we need to make sure that any statistically significant petroleum results are not simply capturing the effect of spillover conflicts from the Iran-Iraq war.

Level of Violence (ICB): This variable comes with the ICB data and identifies the extent of violence in an international crisis as a whole, regardless of its use or non-use by a specific actor as a crisis management technique. It is a four-point ordered measure (ranging from 1 to 4) of the maximum level of violence reached over the

course of a crisis and ranges from "no violence" to "minor clashes" to "major clashes" to "full-scale war."

Protracted Conflict (ICB): This variable also comes with the ICB data and is very similar to the "Prior MIDs History" variable that I create for the MIDs: it refers to conflict situations of "extended duration, fluctuating interaction, and spillover of hostility into all aspects of relations among the states involved", according to the ICB description. It is a three-point ordered measure of the length of a conflict and ranges from (1) non-protracted conflict to (2) non-long-war protracted conflict (e.g. 1967 Cyprus II Crisis) to (3) long-war protracted conflict (e.g. Iran-Iraq War).

Geographic Proximity of Principal Adversaries (ICB): This original ICB ordinal variable denotes the geographic proximity of the primary crisis actors as follows: (1) if the principal adversaries were contiguous, i.e. shared a common border as was the case with Thailand and Burma during the 1992 Sleeping Dog Hill Crisis; (2) if the principal adversaries were near-neighbors as was the case with Iraq and Israel during the 1981 Iraq nuclear reactor crisis; and finally 3 if the principal adversaries were distant from each other.[318]

Control/Robustness-Check Variables:

Geographic Location of Crisis: This variable helps ensure that the effects of the main independent variables are not driven by MIDs or crises emanating from a specific part of the world. For example, we need to make sure that the effect of violence or of P-5 involvement is not unique to just conflicts occurring in the African former colonies of Britain and France. Further, this variable also serves as a robustness-check for the petroleum variable - it would be plausible to assume that any statistically significant petroleum results are being driven by protracted Middle-

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[318] These are the examples provided in the ICB codebook.

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Eastern dyads (given that the Middle-East has for decades been the most important region of the world geo-strategically speaking, as far as petroleum is concerned).

Broadly speaking, the geographical region variable also tests for the possibility of regional bias/inconsistencies when it comes to the Secretary-General's choice of interventions. For the ICB data, this variable ranges from 1 to 5 denoting, in ascending (but not ordinal) order, Europe, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. For the MID data, the variable ranges from 1 to 6, with the first five representing dyads from the aforementioned regions. Category six denotes dyads pairs from different continents ("Inter-Continental") and I would expect a higher level of intervention for these globally salient dyads. I use Asia as the base variable for both the ICB and MID tests.

Second-Term Secretary-General: This variable controls for the possibility that our main findings are being driven by interventions occurring during the Secretary-General's second term of office. An unwritten rule since the 1945 founding of the United Nations has been that Secretaries-General serve no more than two terms of office. As such, it would be reasonable to expect some bolder assertions of autonomy during the second term of office when re-election is no longer a concern. This is a similar dynamic to the "second-term effect" that political analysts use to predict programs and legislative agendas from U.S. presidents who no longer face reelection and therefore, as individuals, have no constituencies to appease.

Kofi Annan, for example, was a favorite agent of the P-5 powers, especially the United States, during his first term of office. However he became more outspoken during his second term, especially in his strong criticism of the United States invasion of Iraq, such that he generated considerable resentment from many in the Republican Party. It is therefore worth testing for whether any autonomy is driven by this second term dynamic.

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Strictly speaking, the U.N. Charter is silent on the question of how many terms an individual can serve as Secretary-General. Dag Hammarskjöld, for example, was just weeks away from seeking a third term of office (which the Russians were poised to veto) when he died in an air crash in Zambia in 1961. Similarly, Kurt Waldheim sought a third term of office in 1980, with the support of the United States, but did not get it because the People's Republic of China repeatedly vetoed his candidacy. The current "gentlemen's agreement" among U.N. member-states on a maximum of two terms of office for a Secretary-General did not really take root until the 1980s, beginning with the tenure of Peru's Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

Individual Personalities: This variable serves the purpose of ensuring that the effects of the main independent variables are broadly generalizable and not just attributable to the tenures of a few Secretaries-General. Dag Hammarskjöld, who served as Secretary-General from 1953 to 1961, is widely revered for his bold public assertions of autonomy from the P-5, especially the Soviet Union- to the extent that the television newsreel clips of his 1960 public confrontation with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in front of all the member states during a U.N. General Assembly session have become legendary (see more on the personality dynamic in Chapter Three). Later Secretaries-General were generally not considered to be as independent minded and dynamic, hence the need to test for whether our main statistical findings are broadly applicable to the Office of the Secretary-General.

Secretary-General Home Continent: This variable controls for any differences in intervention behavior between first-world and developing-world Secretaries-General. A key assumption in this regard would be that the first world Secretaries-General (specifically, the Secretaries-General that hailed from western countries) would exhibit more autonomy and perhaps more anti-P-5 slack because their first-world cultures place less emphasis on hierarchical relationships and nurture the spirit of

openness and debate.[319] On the flipside, such an argument would assert the Secretary-General's from developing countries would be more cautious due to cultural and other factors such as the fact that some of them come from poor countries that are dominated by the P-5 powers.[320] As a case in point, some would point to U Thant's reserved demeanor and personal style as a reflection of his Buddhist and acquiescent cultural roots from Southeast Asia (many would say similar things about the current Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon). I ultimately do not include this variable in the final tables due to collinearity.

P-5 Affinity (ICB): This variable came with the Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) ICB version. I include it as a robustness check variable (as opposed to a "P-5 convergent interests" main independent variable) because I am looking to test whether the annual variation in P-5 preference overlap can be a better predictor of the SG's intervention behavior than the much broader Cold War binary independent variable, given that the annual affinity score provides us with a more precise intra-periodic indicator of P-5 preferences. Beardsley and Schmidt use P-5 affinity as a control variable as well (and Cold War as a main independent variable), and I agree with them on need to check the extent, if any, to which U.N. (and in this case the Secretary-General's) actions are driven by the prevailing level of affinity among the P-5 powers using this more particularized measure of P-5 relations. It will be interesting to see whether the affinity variable consumes the effect, if any, of the periodic polarity variable.

Prior SRSG Intervention: I code this variable to address the question of non-independence across cases when it comes to the Secretary-General's intervention

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[319] Many would again provide the example of Dag Hammarskjöld, who famously sparred with P-5 leaders such as Nikita Khrushchev in lively debates conducted in front of all the member-states in the General Assembly Hall, and in front of international TV cameras. U Thant was the exact opposite of Hammarskjöld, preferring low profile and behind the scenes interactions with P-5 leaders.

[320] As a matter of fact, in recent years, there has been criticism against the P-5 countries that their respect of Secretaries-General in part depends on the home region of the personality. As a case in point, in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush and Blair Administrations were accused by many, including Nelson Mandela, of ignoring the counsel of the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan primarily because he was an African Secretary-General whose home country was also a least developed country. Whether or not this was a valid criticism is of course up for debate, but at the very least, we know that such a school of thought exists.

choices. Often times, SRSGs get sent to protracted conflicts that have generated a lot of MIDs and ICB crises since the 1940s and 1950s e.g. India vs. Pakistan, the Israeli-Arab conflicts, as well as the Greece vs. Turkey conflict over Cyprus. In all of these cases, each Secretary-General has dispatched his own choice of individuals to serve as Special Representative. As such there is an argument to be made that for the later Secretaries-General, it was quite easy to continue with the historical SRSG coverage of such protracted conflicts without generating P-5 opposition. It is therefore important to control for such non-independence of cases before making conclusions about the broader effect of our main independent variables.

4.2.3: Inter-State Conflict Bivariate Relationships

The bivariate table in this section outlines the statistical relationship between our primary dependent variable (whether or not the Secretary-General publicly intervened in an international conflict or crisis) and our main sets of independent variables in the MID and ICB data.

For the inter-state conflicts, it is clear that both the realist and institutionalist variables have statistically significant relationships with our main DV- for the P-5 interest variables, the "P-5 vs. other" and "Post-Cold War" variables have a significant effect in both the MID and ICB data. Other P-5 variables in the MID data (which has a larger N) also generate a significant relationship. With the U.N. Charter variables, we seem to have more consistency in terms of similar U.N. Charter variables generating significant relationships- perhaps an indication that our quantitative tests may reveal that the U.N. Charter variables may be the stronger predictor of the U.N. Secretary-General's intervention behavior. Based on these bivariate results, further quantitative testing is justifiable for investigating whether there is evidence of causality.

Table 3: Bivariate Analysis - Inter-State Conflicts

P-5 Interests Variables	MID Data				ICB Data			
	$\chi2$	Corr. Sign	DF	P-Value	$\chi2$	Corr. Sign	DF	P-Value
P-5 vs. P-5	15.77	-	3	**0.000**	2.52	-	3	0.405
P-5 vs. Other	14.52	-	3	**0.002**	9.15	-	3	**0.027**
P-5 Border	6.1	-	3	0.067	1.26	-	3	0.675
Same-Bloc	10.48	-	3	**0.015**	4.71	-	3	0.202
Cross-Bloc	34.43	-	3	**0.000**	3.61	-	3	0.276
Colonial Ties	4.68	-	3	0.195	0.49	-	3	0.946
Petroleum	49.86	+	3	**0.000**	1.76	+	3	0.571
LDCs	12.74	+	3	**0.008**	1.47	-	3	0.734
Post-Cold War	52.09	+	3	**0.000**	11.28	+	3	**0.010**
U.N. Charter Variables								
# of Actors	182.2	+	51	**0.000**	57	+	104	**0.000**
Fatalities	28.06	+	3	**0.000**				
Major War Spillovers	38.88	+	3	**0.000**				
Level of Violence					41.2	+	9	**0.000**
Protracted Conflicts					21.19	+	6	**0.002**
	N = 1470				N = 270			

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4.2.4: Statistical and Substantive Results

- Focusing on just our primary dataset (MIDs), there is robust statistical evidence that both the realist and institutionalist theoretical expectations prevail in our quantitative tests, and as such there is a genuine claim to validity by both sides of realist/institutionalist debate. It is clear that P-5 conflict reduces the likelihood and intensity of SG action.

- The smaller and more specified ICB dataset, which denotes only the most significant of international crises, a portion of which are not MIDs, changes the picture somewhat. The realist expectations are challenged when the results now indicate that the Secretary-General was more likely to intervene in conflicts where strong parochial interests were at stake, such as "P-5 versus P-5" conflicts and "P-5 versus Other" conflicts. The only set of P-5 interest variables where we see similarities between the ICB and MID data in terms of predicting non-intervention, at least substantively speaking, are the Cold War alliance bloc variables, the colonial variable, and the Cold War era variable.

- As noted in the introduction, the institutionalist variables perform quite well in both the MID and ICB data; this result indicates that U.N. Charter variables matter a lot, and not only on the margin after one take realism into account.

On the MIDs statistical results in Tables 4 and 5, both the P-5 and U.N. Charter variables generate many statistically significant results. The effects of the parochial P-5-interests variables (direct P-5 involvement, P-5 border conflicts, and Cross-Bloc P-5 military alliance ties, etc.) conform to the realist expectations; for example, the Secretary-General was less likely to publicly intervene in the MIDs that pitted two P-5 states against each other. The post-Cold War variable (for which we had high expectations in Chapter 3) is the only convergent interest variable that is both significant and robust; major petroleum exporters and LDCs are ultimately not robust predictors. Model 9 shows that many of our independent variables are robust to the

"second term effect", geography fixed effects, prior SG interventions in certain conflicts, and also to fixed personality effects. The U.N. Charter independent variables on the other hand do not generate any surprises- most of our main independent variables are statistically significant across all the models, and crucially, for both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (models 2 and 3).

The more narrowly defined ICB Tables 7 and 8 (with an N of just 270 compared to 1470 for the MIDs) generate statistical results that seem to skew towards the U.N. Charter side of our debate. Of all the P-5 interest independent variables, only the post-Cold War variable is statistically significant and robust. There is a slight exception with the "P-5 versus P-5 Direct" variable in the Model 3 (the Cold War Era model) that variable predicts a significant likelihood of SG interventions, contrary to realist expectations, however the level of significance here is only marginal. For the U.N. Charter variables however, level of violence and numbers of actors are both very significant and robust to all our control variables as is confirmed in Model 9.

The goodness of fit indicators in both the MID and ICB data suggest that the U.N. Charter Model (Model 2) is better at predicting our main dependent variable than the P-5 interests model (Model 1). First, the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria are lower for the U.N. Charter model in both the MID and ICB data. Second, the U.N. Charter models in both datasets also generate a higher proportion reduction in errors statistic (which provides an estimate of how much better the models successfully predict the observed outcomes), something that tells us that the U.N. Charter models explain more of the main dependent variable than their P-5 interests competitor models. Third, the U.N. Charter models in both the MID and ICB data generate a higher "percentage correctly predicted" statistic, albeit not that much higher in the MIDs case. Ultimately though, goodness of fit indicators are not

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that useful when it comes to hypothesis testing because of the absence of confidence intervals.[321]

The substantive effects, especially from the MID data (Table 6) show a clear institutionalist edge- hardly a surprise because as noted in the introduction, we are dealing with continuous U.N. Charter variables in contrast to the binary P-5 interests variables. There is, for example, a notably large substantive effect in terms of the Secretary-General's likelihood to intervene in high battle death and multi-actor conflicts. He was 7.5 times more likely to intervene in a MID if it generated a very high casualty war than if it had no fatalities. He was also six and a half times more likely to intervene in a MID with 39 state actors (NATO bombing of Yugoslavia) than one with just 2 actors. There is also a visible effect for spillovers from full-scale wars (195 percent more likely to intervene).

The ICB substantive effects in Table 9 introduce results which undermine the realist predictions somewhat: the Secretary-General was 50% more likely to intervene in an international crisis that directly pitted two P-5 states against each other, 37% more likely to do so if two P-5 states were pitted against each other in an indirect or proxy conflict, 7% more likely if it was a "P-5 vs. Other" conflicts and 5% more likely if a crisis involved two actors that both bordered a P-5 state. Compare this to the MID data predictions: 77% less likely to intervene if it was a P-5 vs. P-5 MID, 19% less likely if it was a "P-5 vs. Other" MID, and 50% less likely if it was a MID dyad bordering a P-5 state. The one caveat here again is that the ICB results are not statistically significant and represent a very selective population of just the most significant crises. However they are suggestive in terms of lending some credence to the principal agent theory prediction that the Secretary-General, rather than being deterred by conflicts involving strong parochial P-5 interests, is actually more likely to take advantage of P-5 discord and intervene in such crises.

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[321] Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002*, 42-43.

These probability changes are based on the main logit models (Model 5 in both the MID and ICB regression tables); I calculated them using the Clarify software. I report the difference in the predicted probabilities after subtracting the initial probabilities from new probabilities calculated after changing the values in the independent variables (as detailed in the notes accompanying the intervention probability charts) and then dividing the difference by the initial probabilities.

Intensity of Interventions

Tables 10-15 showcase the totality of our ordered-logit estimations as well as substantive effects on the intensity of SG interventions as they pertain to inter-state conflicts. Just a brief recap: The dependent variable in this instance is ordinal and consists of a four-point dependent variable denoting the intensity of the SG's diplomacy as follows: "0" for cases where the Secretary-General made *no public intervention at all* in a conflict or crisis, "1" for cases where he *"tested the waters"* [322] by engaging in passive, neutral, and gesture-driven diplomacy, "2" for cases where he made a *substantive public assertion of his authority* e.g. through public condemnations, mediation, etc. and finally "3" for cases where he intervened substantively as well as dispatched a *conflict-specific SRSG*. The estimates are derived using ordered-logit regression models. Again, the MIDs are our primary dataset, the ICB crises a secondary dataset for robustness check purposes.

The intensity statistical models and substantive effects reveal the same pattern we saw with the binary logit tests- there is robust MID statistical evidence that P-5 interest variables inhibit the Secretary-General's choice of interventions- at the same time, the U.N. Charter variables perform well. The dynamic again gets a bit more complicated when we examine the ICB substantive results which predict SG interventions in

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[322] Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel, *United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict*, 683-700 and Beardsley and Schmidt, *Following the Flag Or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002*, 33-49 have referred to this strategy as the "lowest level of U.N. involvement" in conflicts, largely consisting of mere gestures such as calls for actions and good offices (shuttle diplomacy).

instances of "P-5 vs. P-5" direct or proxy conflict. That said, only the "P-5 vs. P-5" proxy is significant and only marginally, in Model 1 of Table 14, so the support for institutionalism is suggestive and marginal at best. The U.N. Charter variables generate similar results to what we saw in the logit models.

The goodness of fit indicators in both the MID and ICB data again suggest that the U.N. Charter Model (Model 2) is better at predicting our main dependent variable than the P-5 interests model (Model 1). The Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria are lower for the U.N. Charter model in both the MID and ICB data, whereas the proportion reduction in errors and "percentage correctly predicted" statistic are roughly equivalent for our two competing models. From a holistic viewpoint the U.N. Charter models are a slightly better fit than the P-5 interests models. Again, goodness of fit indicators are not that useful when it comes to hypothesis testing because of the absence of confidence intervals.

Table 4: Where Does the SG Go? - MIDs (Main Models)

	(1) P-5 Parochial		(2) U.N. Charter		(3) Cold War		(4) Post-Cold War		(5) Full Model	
P-5 Interests Variables										
P-5 vs. P-5	-0.431	(0.413)			-0.798	(0.577)			-1.733***	(0.539)
P-5 vs. Other	0.0871	(0.167)			-0.178	(0.226)	-0.563	(0.396)	-0.255	(0.190)
P-5 Border	-0.478*	(0.283)			-1.050**	(0.446)	-0.596	(0.562)	-0.854***	(0.325)
Same-Bloc	-0.447*	(0.233)			-0.370	(0.253)			-0.263	(0.247)
Cross-Bloc	-1.105***	(0.327)			-1.681***	(0.432)			-1.321***	(0.387)
Colonial	-0.214	(0.223)			-0.590**	(0.294)	-0.386	(0.517)	-0.547**	(0.250)
Petroleum	1.055***	(0.258)			0.868**	(0.338)	-0.303	(0.570)	0.580**	(0.285)
LDCs	0.191	(0.242)			-0.765*	(0.426)	1.087**	(0.439)	0.016	(0.271)
Post C. War	0.707***	(0.152)							0.906***	(0.171)
U.N. Charter Variables										
Any Deaths			1.000***	(0.349)	-1.048**	(0.421)	-2.105**	(1.071)	1.089***	(0.373)
Battle Deaths			0.352***	(0.076)	0.382***	(0.089)	0.777**	(0.310)	0.407***	(0.082)
Duration			0.149***	(0.032)	0.153***	(0.041)	0.0121	(0.065)	0.131***	(0.034)
# of Actors			0.155***	(0.054)	0.242**	(0.107)	0.811***	(0.270)	0.287***	(0.084)
Spillovers			1.114***	(0.221)	1.417***	(0.261)	1.034	(1.222)	1.529***	(0.248)
Prior MIDs			0.001	(0.006)	0.023**	(0.009)	0.031***	(0.012)	0.020***	(0.007)
Constant	-1.401***	(0.113)	2.396***	(0.166)	2.708***	(0.273)	2.769***	(0.549)	2.773***	(0.224)
Observations	1470		1470		1145		311		1470	
AIC	1436.6		1380.3		903.8		362.1		1275.9	
BIC	1489.5		1417.3		979.5		406.9		1360.6	
% Corr. Pr.	.79		.80		.85		.77		.82	
P.R. Error	-.012		.06		.138		.336		.123	

Standard errors in parentheses
$* p < 0.10$, $** p < 0.05$, $*** p < 0.01$

Note: P-5 vs. P-5 dropped from Post-Cold War model because it predicts failure to intervene perfectly. Cross-Bloc and Same-Bloc only apply to Cold War era

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Table 5: Where Does the SG Go? - MIDs (Robustness Checks)

	(6) 2nd Term of Office		(7) Geography Fixed Effects		(8) Prior SG Intervention		(9) Personality Fixed Effects	
P-5 Interests Variables								
P-5 vs. P-5	-1.725***	(0.538)	-1.957***	(0.568)	-1.677***	(0.572)	-1.705***	(0.577)
P-5 vs. Other	-0.260	(0.190)	-0.385*	(0.213)	-0.320	(0.224)	-0.320	(0.225)
P-5 Border	-0.854***	(0.324)	-0.969***	(0.331)	-0.901***	(0.346)	-0.898**	(0.350)
Same-Bloc	-0.267	(0.248)	0.393	(0.284)	0.791***	(0.300)	0.785***	(0.301)
Cross-Bloc	-1.321***	(0.386)	-1.220***	(0.396)	-1.398***	(0.410)	-1.409***	(0.415)
Colonial Ties	-0.552**	(0.251)	-0.158	(0.278)	-0.050	(0.288)	-0.043	(0.289)
Petroleum	0.574**	(0.286)	0.183	(0.306)	0.229	(0.322)	0.231	(0.324)
LDCs	0.019	(0.270)	-0.052	(0.368)	-0.008	(0.387)	-0.015	(0.390)
Post-Cold War	0.814***	(0.189)	1.051***	(0.206)	0.877***	(0.215)	0.925***	(0.296)
U.N. Charter Variables								
Any Deaths	-1.099***	(0.372)	-1.278***	(0.388)	-1.527***	(0.400)	-1.525***	(0.401)
Battle Deaths	0.408***	(0.082)	0.447***	(0.086)	0.479***	(0.088)	0.480***	(0.088)
Duration	0.131***	(0.034)	0.141***	(0.035)	0.136***	(0.036)	0.136***	(0.036)
# of Actors	0.283***	(0.084)	0.301***	(0.090)	0.301***	(0.090)	0.302***	(0.091)
Spillovers	1.539***	(0.249)	1.596***	(0.256)	1.445***	(0.267)	1.474***	(0.277)
Prior MIDs	0.020***	(0.007)	0.018**	(0.007)	-0.003	(0.008)	-0.003	(0.009)
Control Variables								
2nd Term SG	-0.190	(0.173)	-0.163	(0.177)	-0.176	(0.183)	-0.187	(0.184)
Europe			1.065***	(0.305)	1.194***	(0.324)	1.205***	(0.325)
Americas			-1.288***	(0.433)	-1.022**	(0.442)	-1.015**	(0.444)
M.E./N. Africa			1.059***	(0.260)	0.867***	(0.270)	0.869***	(0.271)
S.S. Africa			0.552*	(0.336)	0.845**	(0.355)	0.863**	(0.361)
Inter-Continental			0.915***	(0.249)	1.082***	(0.262)	1.091***	(0.263)
Prior Intervention					1.490***	(0.180)	1.490***	(0.181)
Trygve Lie							-0.051	(0.404)
Hammarskjöld							0.146	(0.303)
U Thant							-0.005	(0.262)
Waldheim							0.031	(0.275)
Boutros-Ghali							-0.057	(0.285)
Constant	2.671***	(0.241)	-3.412***	(0.308)	-3.956***	(0.328)	-3.994***	(0.372)
Observations	1470		1470		1470		1470	
AIC	1276.7		1225.3		1154.2		1163.8	
BIC	1366.7		1341.7		1276.0		1312.0	
% Corr. Pr.	.82		.82		.84		.84	
P.R. Error	.141		.15		.234		.234	

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Asia is the base variable for geography. Kofi Annan is the base variable for personalities; Javier Pérez de Cuéllar omitted from personalities due to collinearity.

Table 6: Where Does the SG Go? - MIDs (Substantive Effects)

Where Does He Go? MIDs % Change in Probability

■ SG Public Interventions

Probability changes based on the main model: Model 5 in Table 5. "Anydeaths" variable has been left out of the chart because it is meaningless for substantive purposes.

Note on probability changes:

- For the binary variables (which include all the P-5-interests variables and also the Spillovers and Prior MIDs variables), the probability changes are calculated based on a change from 0 to 1.

- MID duration is a logged continuous variable. Its probability change is calculated based on a change from 25 days (median duration) to 4775 days (maximum duration).

- The logged battle deaths variable is logged; its probability change is calculated based on a change from zero casualties to the highest recorded full-scale war casualty figure (1.25 million).

- For the # Actors variable ordinal, the probability changes are calculated based on a change from 2 state actors (median) to 39 state actors (maximum # of Actors)

- For MID history, the chart is showcasing the probability change from the median (5 prior MIDs) to the maximum of 60 prior MIDs.

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Table 7: Where Does the SG Go? - ICB (Main Models)

	(1) P-5 Parochial		(2) U.N. Charter		(3) Cold War		(4) Post-Cold War		(5) Full Model	
P-5 Interests Variables										
P-5 vs. P-5 Direct	0.484	(0.617)			1.141*	(0.683)			0.933	(0.666)
P-5 vs. P-5 Proxy	1.294	(0.847)			1.270	(1.083)			0.731	(0.905)
P-5 vs. Other	0.293	(0.291)			0.158	(0.375)	-0.698	(1.109)	0.137	(0.342)
P-5 Border	0.162	(0.482)			-0.0956	(0.677)	0.474	(1.061)	0.0833	(0.533)
Same-Bloc	-0.532	(0.387)			-0.301	(0.416)			-0.226	(0.413)
Cross-Bloc	-0.334	(0.612)			-0.210	(0.748)			-0.289	(0.694)
P-5 Colony	0.00470	(0.372)			-0.140	(0.447)	1.109	(1.397)	-0.023	(0.408)
Petroleum	0.193	(0.574)			0.560	(0.706)	-0.935	(1.778)	0.344	(0.647)
LDCs	-0.0902	(0.457)			-0.940	(0.594)			-0.612	(0.542)
Post-Cold War	0.851**	(0.353)							1.174***	(0.389)
U.N. Charter Variables										
Violence			0.557***	(0.146)	0.634***	(0.180)	0.644	(0.489)	0.631***	(0.159)
Protracted			0.285	(0.233)	0.144	(0.273)	0.583	(0.822)	0.211	(0.250)
# Actors			0.0753**	(0.037)	0.0842*	(0.045)	0.0336	(0.119)	0.091**	(0.042)
Proximity			0.141	(0.168)	-0.255	(0.244)	1.607**	(0.817)	-0.00497	(0.216)
Constant	-0.436**	(0.217)	-2.595***	(0.569)	-2.222***	(0.698)	-4.272**	(2.075)	-2.746***	(0.649)
Observations	270		270		223		43		270	
AIC	378.9		344.7		290.0		61.58		349.5	
BIC	418.5		362.7		337.7		77.43		403.5	
% Corr. Pr.	.62		.68		.68		.72		.68	
P.R. Error	.132		.267		.21		.249		.291	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: "P-5 vs. P-5 Direct" and "P-5 vs. P-5 Proxy" variables dropped from Post-Cold War model due to perfect failure to predict an SG intervention (there were in fact zero P-5 vs. P-5 Direct crises in the Post-Cold War data). "LDCs" also dropped from Post-Cold War model due to perfect success in predicting an SG intervention whenever two LDCs were pitted against each other. Same-Bloc and Cross-Bloc data only applied to Cold War era crises.

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Table 8: Where Does the SG Go? - ICB (Robustness Checks)

	(6) 2nd Term of Office		(7) Geography Fixed Effects		(8) P-5 Affinity		(9) Prior SG Intervention	
P-5 Interests Variables								
P-5 vs. P-5 Direct	0.906	(0.667)	0.855	(0.688)	0.791	(0.694)	0.914	(0.701)
P-5 vs. P-5 Proxy	0.681	(0.908)	0.744	(0.916)	0.712	(0.920)	0.649	(0.931)
P-5 vs. Other	0.136	(0.342)	-0.067	(0.357)	-0.092	(0.359)	-0.087	(0.361)
P-5 Border	0.099	(0.533)	-0.378	(0.600)	-0.400	(0.603)	-0.387	(0.605)
Same-Bloc	-0.222	(0.414)	-0.254	(0.590)	-0.253	(0.590)	-0.219	(0.595)
Cross-Bloc	-0.266	(0.694)	-0.612	(0.723)	-0.573	(0.728)	-0.715	(0.735)
P-5 Colony	-0.028	(0.407)	0.069	(0.449)	0.074	(0.449)	0.091	(0.452)
Petroleum	0.354	(0.648)	0.146	(0.665)	0.146	(0.668)	0.157	(0.675)
LDCs	-0.625	(0.543)	-0.240	(0.592)	-0.220	(0.589)	-0.165	(0.591)
P. Cold War	1.141***	(0.395)	1.055***	(0.406)	1.030**	(0.409)	0.953**	(0.415)
U.N. Charter Variables								
Violence	0.632***	(0.159)	0.680***	(0.168)	0.690***	(0.170)	0.700***	(0.171)
Protracted	0.209	(0.250)	0.188	(0.255)	0.222	(0.259)	0.091	(0.278)
# Actors	0.092**	(0.042)	0.100**	(0.045)	0.106**	(0.046)	0.110**	(0.046)
Proximity	-0.010	(0.216)	-0.022	(0.225)	-0.028	(0.226)	-0.017	(0.227)
Control Variables								
2nd Term	-0.137	(0.280)	-0.061	(0.286)	-0.063	(0.287)	-0.070	(0.288)
Europe			0.203	(0.639)	0.216	(0.641)	0.203	(0.646)
SS Africa			-1.093**	(0.502)	-1.063**	(0.502)	-1.017**	(0.505)
Americas			-0.887	(0.700)	-0.862	(0.702)	-0.800	(0.708)
M.E./N.A.			-0.410	(0.462)	-0.395	(0.463)	-0.443	(0.466)
P-5 Affinity					-0.614	(0.838)	-0.562	(0.840)
Prior Intervention							0.442	(0.331)
Constant	-2.674***	(0.664)	2.216***	(0.791)	-2.540***	(0.912)	-2.519***	(0.910)
Observations	270		270		270		270	
AIC	351.3		351.1		352.6		352.8	
BIC	408.9		423.1		428.2		432.0	
% Corr. Pr.	.69		.69		.70		.68	
P.R. Error	.3		.309		.318		.267	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Asia is the base variable for Geography.

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Table 9: Where Does the SG Go? - ICB (Substantive Effects)

Where Does the SG Go? ICB % Change in Probability

■ SG Public Interventions

	P-5 Interests Variables									U.N. Charter Variables			
	P-5 vs. P-5 Direct	P-5 vs. P-5 Proxy	P-5 vs. Other	P-5 Border	Same-Bloc	Cross-Bloc	Colonial Ties	Petroleum	LDCs	Post C. War	Violence	Protracted	# of Actors	Proximity
	50%	37%	7%	5%	-11%	-13%	-2%	19%	-29%	73%	162%	26%	84%	0%

The probability chart above is based on the ICB Level of Intervention Full Model (**Model 5 in Table 8**). It is important to recall that this ICB dataset denotes only those crises that had a truly inter-state dyadic component to them (as denoted in Hewitt 2002 dyadic version of the ICB data), and also omits "intra-war" crises:

Note on probability changes:

- For the binary variables (which include all the P-5-interests variables), the probability changes are calculated based on a change from 0 to 1.

- For the violence ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from 1 (no violence) to 4 (full-scale war)

- For the protracted crisis ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from 1 (non-protracted conflict) to 3 (long-war protracted conflict

- For the # actors ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from the median (7 actors) to the maximum (34 actors)

- For the proximity ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from 1 (contiguous) to 3 (distant)

Table 10: Intensity of SG Interventions - MIDs (Main Models)

	(1) P-5 Parochial		(2) U.N. Charter		(3) Cold War		(4) Post-Cold War		(5) Full Model	
P-5 Interests Variables										
P-5 vs. P-5	-0.487	(0.412)			-1.042*	(0.566)			-1.735***	(0.513)
P-5 vs. Other	-0.037	(0.165)			-0.247	(0.219)	-0.270	(0.360)	-0.287	(0.183)
P-5 Border	-0.522*	(0.281)			-1.089**	(0.436)	-0.895*	(0.519)	-0.982***	(0.323)
Same-Bloc	-0.457**	(0.232)			-0.427*	(0.250)			-0.312	(0.244)
Cross-Bloc	-1.116***	(0.326)			-1.795***	(0.425)			-1.413***	(0.378)
Colonial	-0.247	(0.221)			-0.625**	(0.286)	-0.478	(0.483)	-0.580**	(0.242)
Petroleum	1.182***	(0.257)			0.974***	(0.325)	0.092	(0.520)	0.726***	(0.274)
LDCs	0.149	(0.239)			-0.872**	(0.418)	1.106***	(0.415)	-0.028	(0.262)
Post C. War	0.749***	(0.151)							0.910***	(0.167)
U.N. Charter Variables										
Any Deaths			-0.663**	(0.306)	-0.804**	(0.382)	-1.128	(0.797)	-0.839**	(0.326)
Bat. Deaths			0.247***	(0.061)	0.303***	(0.075)	0.421**	(0.204)	0.318***	(0.066)
Duration			0.144***	(0.031)	0.146***	(0.040)	0.054	(0.062)	0.129***	(0.033)
# of Actors			0.119***	(0.041)	0.206**	(0.093)	0.287**	(0.134)	0.199***	(0.066)
Spillovers			1.117***	(0.216)	1.514***	(0.254)	0.166	(1.026)	1.560***	(0.241)
Prior MIDs			0.002	(0.006)	0.029***	(0.009)	0.027**	(0.011)	0.023***	(0.007)
Cut 1	1.380***	(0.112)	2.294***	(0.150)	2.590***	(0.253)	1.739***	(0.324)	2.545***	(0.197)
Cut 2	1.620***	(0.116)	2.541***	(0.154)	2.904***	(0.257)	1.944***	(0.329)	2.818***	(0.201)
Cut 3	1.814***	(0.119)	2.737***	(0.157)	3.164***	(0.262)	2.106***	(0.333)	3.038***	(0.204)
Observations	1470		1470		1145		311		1470	
AIC	1912.3		1882.8		1238.3		514.9		1757.5	
BIC	1975.8		1930.5		1324.0		567.2		1852.8	
% Cor. Pr.	.04		.04		.05		.08		.05	
P.R. Error	-3.582		-3.603		-4.548		-1.617		-3.537	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: P-5 vs. P-5 dropped from Post-Cold War model because it predicts failure to intervene perfectly. Cross-Bloc and Same-Bloc only apply to Cold War era.

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Table 11: Intensity of SG Interventions - MIDs (Robustness Checks)

	(6) 2ⁿᵈ Term Of Office		(7) Geography Fixed Effects		(8) Prior SG Intervention		(9) Personality Fixed Effects	
P-5 Interests Variables								
P-5 vs. P-5	-1.727***	(0.512)	2.012***	(0.539)	-1.818***	(0.554)	-1.811***	(0.557)
P-5 vs. Other	-0.294	(0.183)	-0.443**	(0.206)	-0.402*	(0.214)	-0.403*	(0.215)
P-5 Border	-0.982***	(0.322)	1.105***	(0.328)	-1.022***	(0.338)	-1.021***	(0.341)
Same-Bloc	-0.316	(0.244)	0.304	(0.279)	0.683**	(0.293)	0.684**	(0.293)
Cross-Bloc	-1.418***	(0.378)	-1.355***	(0.387)	-1.582***	(0.401)	-1.580***	(0.407)
Colonial Ties	-0.584**	(0.242)	-0.152	(0.269)	-0.015	(0.277)	-0.014	(0.278)
Petroleum	0.714***	(0.275)	0.374	(0.293)	0.456	(0.308)	0.453	(0.311)
LDCs	-0.018	(0.262)	-0.056	(0.358)	0.069	(0.377)	0.075	(0.380)
Post-Cold War	0.788***	(0.185)	0.998***	(0.201)	0.811***	(0.209)	0.777***	(0.287)
U.N. Charter Variables								
Any Deaths	-0.853***	(0.327)	-1.035***	(0.339)	-1.260***	(0.351)	-1.262***	(0.352)
Battle Deaths	0.320***	(0.066)	0.354***	(0.069)	0.381***	(0.071)	0.381***	(0.071)
Duration	0.130***	(0.033)	0.141***	(0.034)	0.137***	(0.035)	0.137***	(0.035)
# of Actors	0.195***	(0.066)	0.202***	(0.071)	0.210***	(0.071)	0.210***	(0.071)
Spillovers	1.576***	(0.242)	1.653***	(0.249)	1.514***	(0.257)	1.509***	(0.265)
Prior MIDs	0.023***	(0.007)	0.022***	(0.007)	0.001	(0.008)	0.001	(0.008)
Control Variables								
2nd Term SG	-0.252	(0.170)	-0.225	(0.173)	-0.228	(0.178)	-0.227	(0.179)
Europe			1.296***	(0.298)	1.478***	(0.315)	1.477***	(0.316)
Americas			1.214***	(0.429)	-0.928**	(0.436)	-0.926**	(0.439)
M.E./N. Africa			1.091***	(0.253)	0.861***	(0.262)	0.863***	(0.264)
S.S. Africa			0.568*	(0.329)	0.803**	(0.349)	0.801**	(0.353)
Inter-Continental			1.006***	(0.244)	1.213***	(0.256)	1.213***	(0.257)
Prior Intervention					1.567***	(0.176)	1.568***	(0.177)
Trygve Lie							-0.040	(0.389)
Hammarskjöld							-0.015	(0.294)
U Thant							-0.013	(0.253)
Waldheim							-0.031	(0.268)
Boutros-Ghali							0.040	(0.276)
Cut 1	2.413***	(0.214)	3.186***	(0.286)	3.773***	(0.307)	3.759***	(0.350)
Cut 2	2.687***	(0.217)	3.475***	(0.289)	4.086***	(0.311)	4.072***	(0.354)
Cut 3	2.908***	(0.220)	3.710***	(0.292)	4.341***	(0.315)	4.328***	(0.357)
Observations	1470		1470		1470		1470	
AIC	1757.3		1697.5		1615.3		1625.3	
BIC	1857.8		1824.5		1747.6		1784.0	
% Corr. Pr.	.05		.06		.07		.07	
P.R. Error	-3.543		-3.495		-3.48		-3.471	

Standard errors in parentheses
$* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01$

Note: Asia is the base variable for geography. Kofi Annan is the base variable for personalities; Javier Pérez de Cuéllar omitted from personalities due to collinearity.

Table 12: Intensity of SG Interventions - MIDs (Substantive Effects)

Intensity of SG Interventions: % Change in Probability

■ SG Himself Low-Profile   ■ SG Himself High-Profile   ■ SRSG

Chart showing percentage change in probability across variables. Y-axis: -200%, 200%, 600%, 1000%.

P-5 Interests Variables: P-5 vs. P-5, P-5 vs. Other, P-5 Border, Same-Bloc, Cross-Bloc, Colonial Ties, Petroleum, LDCs

U.N. Charter Variables: Post C. War, Battle Deaths, Duration, # of Actors, Spillovers, Prior MIDs

Note: Percentage labels on the bars in Table 13 have been abbreviated for spacing and aesthetic purposes: 0.6 means 60%, 1.2 means 120 %, 8 means 800 percent, etc.

Probability changes based on the main model: Model 5 in Table 11. "Anydeaths" variable has been left out of the chart because it is meaningless for substantive purposes.

Note on probability changes:

- For the binary variables (which include all the P-5-interests variables and also the Spillovers and Prior MIDs variables), the probability changes are calculated based on a change from 0 to 1.

- MID duration is a logged continuous variable. Its probability change is calculated based on a change from 25 days (median duration) to 4775 days (maximum duration).

- The logged battle deaths variable is logged; its probability change is calculated based on a change from zero casualties to the highest recorded full-scale war casualty figure (1.25 million).

- For the # Actors variable ordinal, the probability changes are calculated based on a change from 2 state actors (median) to 39 state actors (maximum # of Actors)

- For MID history, the chart is showcasing the probability change from the median (5 prior MIDs) to the maximum of 60 prior MIDs.

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Table 13: Intensity of SG Interventions - ICB (Main Models)

	(1) P-5 Parochial		(2) U.N. Charter		(3) Cold War		(4) Post-Cold War		(5) Full Model	
P-5 Interests Variables										
P-5 vs. P-5 Direct	0.219	(0.576)			0.753	(0.627)			0.535	(0.615)
P-5 vs. P-5 Proxy	1.255*	(0.756)			1.111	(0.839)			0.634	(0.773)
P-5 vs. Other	0.060	(0.268)			-0.183	(0.347)	0.053	(0.940)	-0.127	(0.315)
P-5 Border	0.040	(0.446)			-0.078	(0.597)	0.247	(1.058)	-0.168	(0.475)
Same-Bloc	-0.548	(0.376)			-0.240	(0.400)			-0.180	(0.395)
Cross-Bloc	-0.237	(0.567)			-0.005	(0.657)			0.037	(0.618)
P-5 Colony	-0.121	(0.358)			-0.024	(0.429)	-0.006	(1.206)	-0.174	(0.383)
Petroleum	0.379	(0.538)			0.490	(0.661)	-0.343	(2.120)	0.415	(0.601)
LDCs	-0.183	(0.435)			1.486***	(0.574)			-0.870*	(0.498)
Post-C. War	0.890***	(0.320)							1.262***	(0.349)
U.N. Charter Variables										
Violence			0.498***	(0.131)	0.611***	(0.164)	0.152	(0.321)	0.564***	(0.142)
Protracted			0.504**	(0.217)	0.375	(0.258)	0.572	(0.683)	0.438*	(0.233)
# Actors			0.067**	(0.028)	0.081**	(0.035)	0.138	(0.095)	0.089***	(0.031)
Proximity			0.033	(0.152)	-0.284	(0.227)	0.375	(0.517)	-0.130	(0.198)
Cut 1	0.330	(0.210)	2.621***	(0.525)	2.349***	(0.663)	2.001	(1.454)	2.652***	(0.595)
Cut 2	1.043***	(0.220)	3.386***	(0.541)	3.185***	(0.680)	2.878*	(1.485)	3.462***	(0.610)
Cut 3	1.628***	(0.235)	4.013***	(0.556)	3.896***	(0.700)	3.590**	(1.509)	4.131***	(0.625)
Observations	270		270		223		43		270	
AIC	636.2		598.8		477.2		124.8		598.1	
BIC	683.0		624.0		531.8		144.1		659.3	
% Corr. Pr.	.20		.20		.20		.19		.23	
P.R. Error	-.792		-.792		-.99		-.297		-.741	

Standard errors in parentheses
"Note: Put your notes here."
$* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01$

Note: "P-5 vs. P-5 Direct" and "P-5 vs. P-5 Proxy" variables dropped from Post-Cold War model due to perfect failure to predict an SG intervention (there were in fact zero P-5 vs. P-5 Direct crises in the Post-Cold War data). "LDCs" also dropped from Post-Cold War model due to perfect success in predicting an SG intervention whenever two LDCs were pitted against each other. Same-Bloc and Cross-Bloc data only applied to Cold War era crises.

Table 14: Intensity of SG Interventions - ICB (Robustness Checks)

	(6) 2nd Term of Office		(7) Geography Fixed Effects		(8) P-5 Affinity		(9) Prior SG Intervention	
P-5 Interests Variables								
P-5 vs. P-5 Direct	0.504	(0.615)	0.333	(0.643)	0.298	(0.648)	0.340	(0.649)
P-5 vs. P-5 Proxy	0.558	(0.784)	0.642	(0.797)	0.634	(0.795)	0.592	(0.805)
P-5 vs. Other	-0.133	(0.315)	-0.313	(0.330)	-0.324	(0.331)	-0.326	(0.331)
P-5 Border	-0.145	(0.476)	-0.462	(0.530)	-0.481	(0.533)	-0.473	(0.533)
Same-Bloc	-0.176	(0.395)	-0.338	(0.574)	-0.334	(0.574)	-0.316	(0.575)
Cross-Bloc	0.069	(0.619)	-0.270	(0.651)	-0.259	(0.652)	-0.292	(0.653)
P-5 Colony	-0.185	(0.382)	-0.117	(0.410)	-0.109	(0.410)	-0.103	(0.411)
Petroleum	0.431	(0.604)	0.287	(0.614)	0.277	(0.617)	0.301	(0.617)
LDCs	-0.882*	(0.498)	-0.543	(0.541)	-0.524	(0.541)	-0.493	(0.543)
Post-Cold War	1.227***	(0.354)	1.108***	(0.361)	1.088***	(0.364)	1.048***	(0.369)
U.N. Charter Variables								
Violence	0.566***	(0.142)	0.601***	(0.147)	0.606***	(0.148)	0.605***	(0.148)
Protracted	0.434*	(0.233)	0.436*	(0.235)	0.455*	(0.239)	0.396	(0.254)
# Actors	0.091***	(0.032)	0.090***	(0.033)	0.093***	(0.033)	0.095***	(0.034)
Proximity	-0.140	(0.198)	-0.125	(0.207)	-0.129	(0.207)	-0.125	(0.208)
Control Variables								
2nd Term SG	-0.166	(0.263)	-0.084	(0.266)	-0.081	(0.266)	-0.085	(0.266)
Europe			0.469	(0.599)	0.465	(0.600)	0.449	(0.602)
SS Africa			-0.847*	(0.450)	-0.832*	(0.451)	-0.822*	(0.452)
Americas			-0.579	(0.681)	-0.568	(0.682)	-0.545	(0.681)
M. East/N.A.			-0.276	(0.410)	-0.272	(0.410)	-0.310	(0.415)
P-5 Affinity					-0.356	(0.764)	-0.344	(0.764)
Prior Intervention							0.205	(0.296)
Cut 1	2.566***	(0.608)	2.268***	(0.710)	2.443***	(0.806)	2.421***	(0.806)
Cut 2	3.378***	(0.622)	3.094***	(0.721)	3.270***	(0.816)	3.250***	(0.816)
Cut 3	4.048***	(0.637)	3.774***	(0.734)	3.949***	(0.827)	3.928***	(0.828)
Observations	270		270		270		270	
AIC	599.7		600.4		602.2		603.7	
BIC	664.5		679.6		685.0		690.1	
% Corr. Pr.	.22		.20		.21		.21	
P.R. Error	-.759		-.801		-.774		-.783	

Standard errors in parentheses
$* p < 0.10$, $** p < 0.05$, $*** p < 0.01$

Note: Asia is the base variable for Geography.

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Table 15: Intensity of SG Interventions - ICB (Substantive Effects)

Intensity of SG Interventions: ICB % Changes in Probability

■ SG Himself Low-Profile   ■ SG Himself High-Profile   ■ SRSG

	P-5 Interests Variables									U.N. Charter Variables			

(Chart values by category — P-5 vs. P-5 Direct, P-5 vs. P-5 Proxy, P-5 vs. Other, P-5 Border, Same-Bloc, Cross-Bloc, Colonial Ties, Petroleum, LDCs, Post C. War; Violence, Protracted, # of Actors, Proximity)

P-5 vs. P-5 Direct: 0.0, 0.2, 0.6
P-5 vs. P-5 Proxy: 0.0, 0.3
P-5 vs. Other: 0.0, -0.1, -0.1, 0
P-5 Border: 0, 0, 0
Same-Bloc / Cross-Bloc / Colonial Ties: 0, 0, 0.0
Petroleum: 0.0, 0.1
LDCs: 0, 0, 0
Post C. War: 0.2, -0.5
Violence: 0.1, 0.7, 1.5
Protracted: 0.5, 1.4, 2.9
# of Actors: 0.2, 0.4, 1.1
Proximity: -0.4, 0.0, 2.8, 0, 0, 0

Note: Percentage labels on the bars in Table 16 have been abbreviated for spacing and aesthetic purposes: 0.8 means 80%, -0.1 means -10 %, 2.8 means 280 percent, etc.

It is important to recall that this ICB dataset denotes only those crises that had a truly inter-state dyadic component to them (as denoted in Hewitt 2002 dyadic version of the ICB data), and also omits "intra-war" crises:

Note on probability changes:

- For the binary variables (which include all the P-5-interests variables), the probability changes are calculated based on a change from 0 to 1.

- For the violence ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from 1 (no violence) to 4 (full-scale war)

- For the protracted crisis ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from 1 (non-protracted conflict) to 3 (long-war protracted conflict

- For the # actors ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from the median (7 actors) to the maximum (34 actors)

- For the proximity ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from 1 (contiguous) to 3 (distant)

4.3: Civil Wars

4.3.1: Hypotheses

This section contains logit regression models as well as intervention probability charts addressing the civil wars portion of our first main question of where the Secretary-General intervenes, broadly speaking. Once again, here are the competing hypotheses we are testing:

Realist Hypothesis:

R1: The U.N. Secretary-General's intervention behavior is more likely to be influenced by the parochial interests of the P-5 (whether temporal or conflict-specific) than by the dictates of the U.N. Charter. He is particularly unlikely to intervene in (civil wars) involving the P-5 or bordering P-5 states because such conflicts elicit strong parochial P-5 interests, trigger Security Council deadlock, and increase the likelihood of P-5 sanctions.

Institutionalist Hypothesis:

I1: The U.N. Secretary-General's intervention behavior is more likely to be influenced by the dictates of the U.N. Charter than by the parochial interests of the P-5, and he is as likely to intervene in conflicts that elicit strong P-5 parochial interests (e.g. in civil wars involving the P-5 or bordering P-5 states) as he is in conflicts where P-5 interests converge.

4.3.2: Civil War Independent Variables

I group my civil wars independent variables into just P-5 parochial and U.N. Charter categories. I do not have a category for P-5 "convergent interests" variables because

unlike the MID/ICB data, we are dealing with country-level as opposed to inter-state dyadic data.

Civil Wars P-5 Parochial Interests Variables:

P-5 Involvement: This binary variable comes with the Sambanis and Doyle dataset and denotes P-5 participation in civil wars, specifically, instances where there was direct military participation or extensive political support for one or more of the civil war participants by a P-5 state. All Central-American wars, for example, are coded as having experienced major involvement by the United States. Cases of P-5 participation in U.N. Peace Operations are not included in this variable; instead, they are included in the "external actors" variable which is explained in the U.N. Charter variables section.

Oil Exporter: This binary variable also comes with the Sambanis and Doyle dataset and denotes civil war countries that were dependent on oil exports. In the interstate conflicts chapter, I created a "petroleum exporters" variable that coded for just OPEC and major natural gas exporters dyads because the rationale was to capture dyads that were most likely to trigger a convergence of P-5 interests. However when it comes to this chapter, most civil wars have occurred in low income countries including oil exporters that are not part of the MID/ICB petroleum subset. As such, it makes a lot of sense to go beyond just the OPEC cartel and utilize the more comprehensive Sambanis and Doyle "oil exporters" variable.

In any case, just to be sure, I also coded and tested for the OPEC variable because a handful of OPEC countries such as Nigeria have had civil wars. Unsurprisingly, there were no significant findings. I tested for another Sambanis and Doyle variable called "fuel exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports" but ended up not including it in the final models because there were no significant findings either (same for another Sambanis and Doyle variable called "manufacturing exports as a percentage of

total merchandise exports"). I further coded and tested for major gold and diamond exporters but did not find any significant results either. Ultimately, in as far as P-5 interests are concerned, I concluded that the "oil exporter" variable perhaps best captures P-5 economic interests in primary-commodity exporting civil war countries.

Contiguity to P-5 State: I coded this binary variable using the same rationale as its counterpart variable in the interstate conflicts chapter: a state that either shares a boundary with a P-5 state or is separated from a P-5 state by less than 400 miles of water. I used information from the *U.S. Library of Congress Country Study Series*[323] and also the *CIA World Factbook*[324] to code the P-5 boundaries. As was the case before, this dichotomous variable is not coded as true if the bordering country in question is another P-5 state, e.g. I exclude the contiguity of Russia to the United States.

P-5 Colonial Ties: The Sambanis and Doyle dataset comes with separate variables for former U.K. and France colonies, however for the sake of consistency with the interstate chapter, I code an original variable combining British and French colonies to create a "former P-5 colony" variable. Like before, I draw on historical data from the website of the (British) Commonwealth Secretariat to code for former U.K. colonies, and omit those few recently-joined Commonwealth members that were not British colonies (such as Rwanda and Mozambique). I then cross-referenced my findings with other sources such as the U.K. Government's *Foreign and Commonwealth Office* in order to ensure accuracy. For former French colonies, I (like before) acquired my data from a combination of sources: first the website of the *International Organisation of La Francophonie* which represents the French speaking countries of the world, then the website of the Franczone countries and other secondary sources on French colonialism.

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[323] U.S. Library of Congress, *Library of Congress Country Studies*
[324] Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*

Civil Wars U.N. Charter Variables:

For the U.N. Charter dynamic, I coded variables that indicate the extent to which a civil war may have posed a threat to international peace and security as denoted by, for example, extreme fatality levels and negative externalities to surrounding countries.

Fatalities: This variable comes with the Sambanis and Doyle dataset and denotes the total number of fatalities, combining civilian and battle deaths attributable to a civil war. I reason that extreme fatality levels (especially civilian fatalities that may sometimes be attributed to acts of genocide and crimes against humanity) are quite likely to invoke international outcry and compel the Security Council or the Secretary-General himself to sidestep Article 2 and declare the conflict to be of concern to international peace and security- thereby opening the door for U.N. diplomatic or other kinds of intervention.

It is not always easy to generate an exact number of fatalities in a civil war due to lack of outsider access, and as such, Sambanis and Doyle clarify that for this variable, they sometimes arrive at estimates by calculating the mean of the difference between low and high fatality estimates. In cases where a range as opposed to a precise number is given in their sources, they report the highest estimate under the assumption that deaths are often underreported in civil wars (and especially taking into account deaths that are indirectly attributable to civil wars). In cases where precise and reliable data on total deaths is unavailable, Sambanis and Doyle use battle death data (often times Correlates of War battle deaths data).

Mega-Displacement: This variable denotes civil wars that displaced at least 1 million civilians both internally and externally due to a civil war. The rationale for including this variable is rather straightforward: massive displacement of civilians, especially across national borders, exacts negative externalities on surrounding countries and

transforms a civil war from a purely internal matter for one state into a threat to regional and/or international peace and security. Further, it is very hard to get fine-grained data on displacement, and it therefore makes sense to use this binary indicator (0 if less than 1 million displaced, and 1 if more than 1 million displaced).

# of Civil War Participants: This ordinal variable also comes with the Sambanis and Doyle data and denotes the number of participants in a civil war, combining domestic and international parties that participated actively in the fighting. It is useful not only for denoting the extent of fractionalization within a civil war country, but also for denoting a conflict's potential to exact negative externalities, especially when surrounding states become participants, e.g. the 1997 civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which was labeled "Africa's first World War" because of the direct military involvement of at least five surrounding countries.

External Actors: This binary variable also comes with the Sambanis and Doyle data. Intervention in this instance means outside (non-P-5) actors either military participating or politically supporting one or more of the parties to the civil war. The one exception for possible political participation by the P-5 in this variable is U.N. peacekeeping missions (which spiked post-1990 according to Gilligan and Stedman[325]) and tend to deploy as neutral actors). U.N. peacekeeping operations post-1990 have often times involved a request from the Security Council for the Secretary-General to deploy a conflict-specific mediation/peace-building SRSG into the civil war arena. This variable is an even better and more direct indicator of a conflict's potential to exact negative externalities.

Duration: This variable also came with the Sambanis and Doyle dataset and denotes the duration of civil wars as measured in months. My rationale for including it is that the longer and more protracted a civil war becomes, the more likely it is to exact negative externalities on surrounding countries and possibly beyond. The minimum

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[325] Gilligan and Stedman, *Where do the Peacekeepers Go?*, 37-54.

civil war duration as coded in the dataset is one month; this includes wars during which the majority of deaths occurred in just a few days or weeks, but which Sambanis and Doyle still coded as one month in order to enable the computation of battle intensity (defined as total deaths per capita per month). In cases where the available data is presented in just years, Sambanis and Doyle estimate war duration by multiplying the number of years by 12 months except in instances where 1 year is noted, in which case they code 6 months as most conflicts did not last a full calendar year. For ongoing civil wars, Sambanis and Doyle calculate the duration of civil wars from start until 1999, the final year of observation in the dataset.

Control/Robustness-Check Variables

Geographic Location of Crisis: This control variable serves as a robustness check to help us ensure that the effects of the main independent variables are not driven by civil wars emanating from just a specific part/s of the world, and also informs us about any inconsistencies in the Secretary-General's regional intervention choices. It ranges from 1 to 5 denoting Europe, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Prior War within 10 Years: This variable also comes with the Sambanis and Doyle dataset and denotes cases where there was another international, civil, or colonial and extra-systemic war in the 10 year period before the start of the current war. This variable is coded 0 for no previous war and 1 for previous war. Sambanis and Doyle clarify that they used the 1994 Correlates of War and other civil/international war datasets in order to code this variable. They also clarify that they excluded World War 2, following similar practice in the Democratic Peace literature. They cite Sri Lanka as a "borderline" case (the first Sri Lankan war ended some 11 years before the start of the second one but Sambanis and Doyle still coded Sri Lanka as a 1). This variable performs a similar task to the "Prior MIDs" variable that we had in the interstate

chapter in that it points to cases of protracted conflict and tests the likelihood of an SRSG intervention in such instances.

Democracy: This variable also comes with the Sambanis and Doyle data and denotes the average democracy score for the 10 year period prior to the onset of the civil war using the Polity-98 database. Sambanis and Doyle clarify that this variable is based on indigenous democratic and political institutions, and is therefore coded as 1 (very low) for those countries that just emerged from colonial rule/wars during the period of interest. They also clarify that for Eastern/Southern European countries such as Tajikistan and Georgia, they use the Polity score for Russia for the 1982 to 1992 period, whereas for Bangladesh before 1971, they the use the Polity score for Pakistan. I follow the lead of Gilligan and Stedman[326] in including this variable. Part of the rationale that Gilligan and Stedman had for this variable was to test a thesis from Andreas Andersson[327] that U.N. peacekeeping decisions reflect a desire on the part of at least some P-5 states to spread democracy.

While there are clearly problems with the Andersson thesis (considering that its validity would only apply to the western P-5 states and not to Russia and China), it is nevertheless worth asking whether democracy preservation would motivate the western P-5 states to push for SRSG interventions via Security Council resolutions. The underlying assumption would be that Russia and China, as veto-wielding Security Council members, would be apathetic or indifferent to such missions because democracy preservation (as opposed to democracy "promotion") involves restoring a democratic regime that was already there and was only disrupted by civil strife. A good example of this dynamic is the July 1994 *Operation Restore Democracy* which was authorized by Security Council Resolution 940 (with affirmative Russia and China votes) to deploy a U.S.-led multinational force to remove the military regime

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[326] Ibid.
[327] Andreas Andersson, "Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–1996," *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 2 (06/01; 2014/05, 2000): 1-22.

installed by the 1991 Haitian coup d'état that overthrew the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

More importantly, and in line with the main question of our thesis, it is worth asking whether the Secretary-General himself would view democracy preservation missions as easier to justify on his part, and also perhaps "easier" to resolve when compared to civil wars occurring in autocracies. The logic here is that the Secretary-General would plausibly have a propensity to intervene in democratic-state civil wars in order to increase his chances of success and develop/sustain a reputation for effectiveness.

Prior SRSG Intervention: I include this control variable in order to address the question of non-independence across cases when it comes to the Secretary-General's intervention choices. As already noted in the inter-state conflict chapter, SRSGs often get dispatched to protracted conflicts, with different U.N. Secretaries-General dispatching their own choice of individuals to serve as their Special Representatives to these conflicts, e.g. the Afghanistan civil war has had SRSG coverage from the early 1980s to the present.

4.3.3: Civil War Bivariate Relationships

The bivariate table in this section outlines the statistical relationship between our primary dependent variable (whether or not the Secretary-General publicly intervened in an international conflict or crisis) and our main sets of civil war independent variables.

For the civil war bivariate relationships in Table 16, it is evident that U.N. Charter variables are the only ones generating significant relationships- again, quite likely an indication that our quantitative tests in Chapter 4 and 5 may reveal that the U.N. Charter variables to be the stronger predictor of the U.N. Secretary-General's intervention behavior. The Post-Cold War variable in this instance is representing

both the climate of relations among the P-5 and the Article 2 effect as discussed in the Research Design section:

Table 16: Bivariate Analysis - Civil Wars

P-5 Interests Variables	χ^2	Corr. Sign	DF	P-Value
P-5 Participation	3.153	+	1	0.076
Oil Reserves	1.942	+	1	0.163
P-5 Border	2.398	-	1	0.121
P-5 Colony	0.627	+	1	0.428
U.N. Charter Variables				
External Actors	17.37	+	1	**0.000**
War Duration	76.05	+	57	**0.047**
# of Actors	30.09	+	7	**0.000**
Fatalities	63.89	+	64	0.480
Mega-Displacement	19.62	+	1	**0.000**
Genocide/Politicide	0.422	+	1	0.516
Polarity/Article 2				
Post-Cold War	15.49		1	**0.000**
	N = 154			

4.3.4: Statistical and Substantive Results

Tables 17-19 showcase results on the (Where Does the Secretary-General Go?) question as it pertains to civil wars.

As was the case with the MID and ICB data, both P-5 and U.N. Charter variables have significant effects, however of the four P-5 interests independent variables, only the P-5 border variable is robust across all our models in terms of predicting non-intervention in civil wars that take place in countries adjacent to P-5 states. In all likelihood, this result represents civil wars in countries that surround China, of which there are many, because in the control variables section of Table 18, I use Asia as my base regional variable and notice that for the majority of the other regions, there was a higher likelihood of intervening than there was in Asia.[328] Two other P-5 variables, oil reserves and P-5 participation, are statistically significant but are not robust- their significance is limited to Model 1.

As was hinted in the introduction, we get a surprise finding in Model 1 of Table 17. P-5 participation in a civil war increases the likelihood of a public intervention by the Secretary-General, although very slightly. As was the case in the ICB data, this result challenges the realist assumptions about the Secretary-General staying out of P-5 conflicts. The substantive effect is rather small: the Secretary-General was 6% more likely to intervene in such civil wars; however this finding gives a slight edge to the institutionalist argument. Another unexpected result occurs with the Colonial Ties variable, although not statistically significant, its substantive effect indicates that the Secretary-General was 24% more likely to intervene in a civil war that involved a former P-5 colony. As was the case with the MID and ICB data, the civil war

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[328] During my interviews with staff members in the Policy Support Unit of the Department of Political Affairs at the U.N. Secretariat in New York in December 2011, it was confirmed that the Secretary-General has had a historical tendency to intervene less in Asia than in other regions because the Asians have been rather particular about guarding their sovereignty and resorting to regional instruments for resolving their conflicts. They indicated, for example, that the 2007 opening of an SRSG mediation Office in Kathmandu, Nepal, directed at helping resolve the Nepalese civil war, marked a watershed moment in terms of opening the door for possible future Asian acceptance of U.N. interventions.

independent variables do very well in terms of substantive effects because some of them are continuous.

For the U.N. Charter variables, external actors, number of participants, and mega-displacement intuitively turn out to be statistically significant because they proxy for civil wars whose effects spill over into neighboring countries and assume an inter-state character with wider regional, continental, or even global ramifications. Also, unsurprisingly, the post-Cold War variable is highly statistically significant, with a large co-efficient, because it is proxying for both the convergence of P-5 interests after the Cold War (and the beginning of an era in which the U.N.'s mediation came to be seen as a global public good- see qualitative evidence section) and the weakening of the Article 2 effect. The fatalities variable is also significant but is not robust across all models.

As for goodness of fit indicators, we get the same result as in the MIDs and ICB data: the U.N. Charter Model (Model 2) is better at predicting our main dependent variable than the P-5 interests model (Model 1): the U.N. Charter Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria are lower than their P-5 interests counterparts. Also, the U.N. Charter model has a higher proportion reduction in errors statistic, as well as a higher "percentage correctly predicted" statistic.

Table 17: Where Does the SG Go? - Civil Wars (Main Models)

	(1) P-5 Parochial		(2) U.N. Charter		(3) Cold War		(4) Full Model	
P-5 Interests Variables								
P-5 Participation	0.858**	(0.372)			0.262	(0.614)	0.115	(0.522)
Oil Reserves	-0.772**	(0.392)			-0.709	(0.615)	-0.765	(0.504)
P-5 Border	-0.852*	(0.472)			-1.279*	(0.741)	-1.301**	(0.618)
Colonial Ties	0.251	(0.378)			0.862	(0.545)	0.478	(0.473)
U.N. Charter Variables								
External Actors			1.349***	(0.457)	0.264	(0.653)	1.212**	(0.528)
Duration			-0.163	(0.170)	-0.051	(0.194)	-0.152	(0.183)
# of Participants			0.557***	(0.177)	0.556***	(0.203)	0.527***	(0.187)
Fatalities			0.111	(0.126)	0.152	(0.155)	0.196	(0.136)
Mega-Displacement			1.701***	(0.617)	1.590**	(0.666)	1.811***	(0.642)
Genocide/Politicide			-0.070	(0.542)	0.213	(0.581)	-0.044	(0.573)
Polarity/Article 2 Variable								
Post-Cold War	1.754***	(0.417)	2.354***	(0.531)			2.660***	(0.573)
Constant	-0.560	(0.361)	4.225***	(1.330)	4.384***	(1.583)	4.800***	(1.451)
Observations	154		154		106		154	
AIC	196.5		160.5		122.2		160.2	
BIC	214.7		184.8		151.5		196.7	
P.R. Error	.33		.59		.51		.59	
% Corr. Pr.	.67		.80		.81		.80	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 18: Where Does the SG Go? - Civil Wars (Robustness Checks)

	(5) Geographic Regions		(6) Democracy		(7) Prior Conflict Last 10 Years	
P-5 Interests Variables						
P-5 Participation	0.011	(0.544)	-0.093	(0.556)	-0.079	(0.558)
Oil Reserves	-0.789	(0.554)	-0.836	(0.561)	-0.839	(0.561)
P-5 Border	-1.308**	(0.667)	-1.380**	(0.680)	-1.383**	(0.682)
Colonial Ties	0.537	(0.501)	0.504	(0.505)	0.496	(0.506)
U.N. Charter Variables						
External Actors	1.311**	(0.557)	1.375**	(0.560)	1.382**	(0.561)
Duration	-0.152	(0.194)	-0.161	(0.194)	-0.164	(0.195)
# of Participants	0.530***	(0.205)	0.537***	(0.203)	0.550***	(0.210)
Fatalities	0.209	(0.142)	0.242*	(0.144)	0.242*	(0.144)
Mega-Displacement	1.854***	(0.650)	1.837***	(0.651)	1.846***	(0.653)
Genocide/Politicide	0.014	(0.588)	0.161	(0.601)	0.201	(0.621)
Polarity/Article 2 Variable						
Post-Cold War	2.804***	(0.627)	2.955***	(0.656)	2.975***	(0.661)
Control Variables						
Europe	-0.039	(0.994)	0.174	(0.992)	0.160	(0.993)
Latin America	0.481	(0.857)	0.557	(0.862)	0.516	(0.874)
M. East	-0.161	(0.769)	-0.038	(0.785)	-0.085	(0.801)
S.S. Africa	-0.145	(0.672)	0.033	(0.683)	0.027	(0.684)
Democracy			0.707	(0.547)	0.705	(0.548)
Previous Conflict					-0.133	(0.478)
Constant	-5.019***	(1.562)	-5.661***	(1.665)	-5.634***	(1.668)
Observations	154		154		154	
AIC	167.5		167.8		169.7	
BIC	216.1		219.4		224.4	
P.R. Error	.62		.61		.58	
% Corr. Pr.	.81		.80		.79	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Asia is the base variable for Geography; whereas autocracy is the base variable for democracy.

Table 19: Where Does the SG Go? - Civil Wars (Substantive Effects)

Where Does the SG Go? Civil Wars % Change in Probability

Variable	% Change
P-5 Participation	6%
Oil Reserves	-32%
P-5 Border	-51%
Colonial Ties	24%
Outside Actors	87%
Duration	-20%
# Actors	59%
Fatalities	42%
Mega-Displacement	99%
Genocide	-2%
Post-Cold War	177%

P-5 Interests Variables | U.N. Charter Variables | Article 2

Note: The probability changes above are calculated based on a change from zero to one for all the P-5 Interests variables plus the Outside Actors variables, all of which are binary in nature.

For the ordinal variables, the probability changes are calculated as follows:

- Duration: based on a change from 36 months (median for the 154 cases) to the maximum of 600 months.

- # Participants: based on a change from 3 participants (minimum for the 154 cases) to the maximum of 11 participants.

- Fatalities: based on a change from 30,000 fatalities (median) to the maximum of 3 Million fatalities.

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4.4: Where Does the SG Go? – The Qualitative Evidence

This section showcases the extent to which historical archival records support this chapter's our main hypotheses and quantitative findings. The historical evidence is presented in the format of two anecdotal references (Indo-China in 1954 and Tibet in 2000) in contrast to the lengthy and exhaustive case study presentation that we will see in Chapter 6. The evidence is largely sourced from the declassified papers of the different Secretaries-General and biased towards the 1945-71/post-1990 periods (Kurt Waldheim and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar never declassified their papers). What little qualitative evidence there is from the Waldheim and de Cuéllar tenures of office is drawn from their own memoirs/biographies and other U.N. documents.

Most intriguing is the realist and institutionalist disagreement on why the Secretary-General may choose to not intervene at all in some conflicts and crises (hypotheses R1-R2 vs. hypotheses I1 and I2), even in major conflicts that may constitute a threat to international peace and security. The quantitative evidence resented plenty of statistical and substantive evidence in support of both sets of arguments; the qualitative evidence in this section sheds more light on the realist rationale by detailing the public scrutiny that the Secretary-General went through at the hands of the international media at the height of major crises. In this way, the qualitative evidence helps us contextualize the realist predictions in real-life historical scenarios.

4.4.1: The Realist Evidence: Fear of Hurting P-5 Sensibilities

The first archival anecdote in this subsection (1954 Indo-China) is drawn from the *escalatory phase* of the Cold War (1945-1950s) when tension between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. were at the highest; the second (Tibet) is drawn from the year 2000. This diversity in time-period is designed to showcase the consistency of the realist expectations across time under certain circumstances, notwithstanding the post-Cold War spike in the Secretary-General's rate of intervention.

1954 Indo-China: No Public Appeal

Our first anecdote comes from the actions of Dag Hammarskjöld at the height of the First Indo-China War (also known as the Anti-French Resistance War in contemporary Vietnam) which occurred from 1946 to 1954, following the post-World War 2 French re-occupation of Indo-China. This war pitted French-led forces against the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap. Most of the clashes occurred in the area around Tonkin, North Vietnam, but spilled over into the neighboring French Indo-China colonial territories of Laos and Cambodia.

This conflict had two key dimensions to it: first, it took the form of an insurgency against French colonial rule in Indo-China spearheaded by the Viet Minh. In reaction to this challenge, the French government did something similar to what the British had done at the turn of the 20th century during the Anglo-Boer Wars: they drafted troops from their colonial empire (mostly North Africa and Indo China itself, with the help of French professional and Legionnaire units) to suppress the insurgency in what grew to become a protracted conflict. In this sense, France as a P-5 state had very strong parochial interests at stake in terms of the risk of protecting an important geographical area of their colonial empire.

Second, the Indo-China war became an extension of the global Cold War- especially when, in the midst of the Chinese civil war, Chinese communists reached the Northern border of Vietnam in 1949 and, alongside the Soviet Union, started supplying the Viet Minh/Pathet Lao[329] forces with modern weaponry. The United States in turn started covertly supplying the French with financial and military assistance sometime in mid-1950 after the capture of Hainan Island by Chinese Communist forces, and the fear by

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[329] The Viet Minh were a Vietnamese communist coalition whose main purpose was to secure the independence of Vietnam from France after World War 2. The Pathet Lao were the Laotian equivalent of the Viet Mihn- a communist coalition fighting for the independence of Laos from France.

the Truman administration that a Viet Minh/Pathet Lao victory would lead to a communist-dominated Southeast Asia. In the midst of the Korean War especially, the Indo-China conflict came to be seen by both superpowers as essentially part of a broader proxy war in East Asia.

Perhaps the two most outstanding episodes of the First Indo-China War were, first, the March 1953 invasion[330] of Laos by the Viet Minh/Pathet Lao forces, followed by (second) the battle of Dien Bien Phu[331] in March 1954 in which the French forces suffered a devastating defeat that heavily influenced the outcome of the 1954 Geneva Accords (which partitioned Vietnam into the Communist North and the pro-Western South along the 17th parallel).

The United Nations as an organization did not intervene in Indo-China as a result of Security Council deadlock. For example, on June 18th 1954, the Soviet Union vetoed a draft Security Council resolution submitted by Thailand that asked the Security Council to dispatch a fact-finding commission to investigate the threat posed to Thailand by the Indo-China conflict. Minutes from the Security Council session on that day indicate that the Soviet Permanent Representative to the U.N. justified the U.S.S.R. veto with some openly anti-American rhetoric[332].

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[330] ICB lists this invasion as a full-fledged international crisis and list it as Crisis #139 in the ICB data- see Jonathan Wilkenfeld and others, *ICB Data Viewer, Vol. 10*, 10th ed. (Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2007)

[331] Also listed in ICB as an international crisis #145

[332] The Soviet U.N. Representative justified the veto on the grounds that "the question of the restoration of peace in Indo-China is at present being considered by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in Geneva, and that the participants in that conference are the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States which are permanent members of the Security Council... Thailand's request for consideration of the question of sending military observers to Thailand and the borders of Indo-China represents a camouflaged attempt by the United States to deepen the conflict in that part of the world, to spread hostilities and to prevent a peaceful settlement of the Indo-Chinese question."

Dag Hammarskjöld on his part was publicly reluctant to even issue a call for action/restraint, evidently because of the superpower sensibilities involved and also because he likely did not want to jeopardize preparations for the aforementioned Geneva Conference which ultimately partitioned Vietnam.

On February 24th, 1954, at the height of the Indo-China hostilities, Dag Hammarskjöld held a press conference in New York during which news reporters pressed him about his seemingly puzzling silence on the unfolding crisis. His responses clearly revealed his sensitivity to the great power sensibilities at stake- the following is a transcript from that exchange as outlined in Hammarskjöld's public papers:

Reporter Question: May I start by asking whether you would wish to join Mr. Nehru in calling for a cease-fire in Indo-china?[333]

Hammarskjöld: The desirability of the cease-fire in Indo-China is something which I think needs no discussion. On the other hand, I do not feel that this is the time when I should make any such pronouncement. After all, the question of Indo-China is one of those which will probably be discussed at the Geneva conference. There is no need for a special pronunciamento from the Secretary-General. His general approach to the problem must be obvious to everybody.[334]

Follow-Up Question: What is your general approach to the problem?

Hammarskjöld: ... From my point of view, it is not something that I need to tell you; it seems quite obvious. On the other hand, as I see it, it would not serve any useful purpose if I- if you will permit me to put it this way- went into the headlines in making an appeal for it.

Second Follow-Up Question: Do you plan to attend the Geneva conference?

Hammarskjöld: No, I do not.

Third Follow-Up Question: May I follow that up? Under Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary-General has special powers which enable him to bring to the attention of the United Nations organs any situation which in his view is threatening international peace and security. How does the Secretary-General reconcile the fact that he is not informed of the Indo-Chinese situation while it is obviously threatening

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[333] Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, Vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 227-229.
[334] Ibid., 227-229

international peace and security...? Does the Secretary-General have a representative, a pipeline, to the Indo-Chinese situation? How does the Secretary-General appraise it?

Hammarskjöld: Do you think generally that we should have pipelines in that way for the Secretary-General in various spheres? After all, a few facts are common knowledge. To the extent the Secretary-General needs more precise information, he is in a position to ask for such precise information, if he finds it necessary in order to get the basis for his action. I do not see that there is anything that should cause you worry.[335]

Hammarskjöld's responses were surprising given the U.N.'s record in intervening at the SRSG level in Indonesia, India-Pakistan, Palestine just a few years prior, such that it is reasonable to conclude that the lurking elephant in the room at this juncture was that Hammarskjöld did not want to publicly insert himself in a protracted conflict that was laden with Cold War rivalries.

Tibet 2000- "Member-State Sensibilities Matter"

Another good example of a Secretary-General acquiescing to P-5 sensitivities is that of Tibet, which every Secretary-General from the 1950s or the way to Ban Ki-moon has tended to avoid. The good thing about the Tibet issue is that it shows how the fear among Secretaries-General of hurting P-5 sensibilities has persisted into the post-Cold War era. Tibet is always treated as an internal issue of the People's Republic of China and no Secretary-General has attempted to mediate or even issue public commentary about the dispute.

A good example of how the office of the Secretary-General has been cautious to not hurt China's sensibilities over Tibet occurred in August 2000, when Kofi Annan implicitly barred the Dalai Lama from attending a World Summit on Religious

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[335] Ibid., 227-229

Leaders at U.N. headquarters in New York. When asked about this during a press conference on August 24, 2000, Kofi Annan responded as follows:

> **Question:** You have been and a lot of criticism lately because of the Dalai Lama not attending the World Summit on Religious Leaders. Do you have any comment or defense of the U.N. position?[336]
>
> **Kofi Annan:** Let me say that I understand that many people are understandably and deeply disappointed that the Dalai Lama will not be here for the Religious Summit next week. But let me also say that this house is really a house for the member states and their sensitivities matter. This is an issue that the organizers of the meeting have known all along...[337]

Kofi Annan's response in this particular case is as straightforward as it gets vis-à-vis P-5 sensibilities. Thanks to the declassification of his papers, we now know for sure that Kofi Annan did not even make an attempt to diplomatically intervene in the Tibet affair - the only mention of Tibet or the Dalai Lama in all of the thousands of declassified papers is this one incident regarding the religious summit. The declassified papers also revealed an internal review within the Executive Office of the Secretary-General published on March 22nd 2001. In that internal review, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Public Information Shashi Tharoor observed that "the Religious Summit helped build bridges with religious and spiritual leaders, however the impression was given that the Secretary-General had pressured the (U.N.) Organization to exclude the Dalai Lama."[338] There is no record of Kofi Annan ever challenging the conclusions of the internal review, or publicly attempting to project a different posture over Tibet.

4.5: Conclusion

The key takeaway from this chapter is that both P-5 and U.N. Charter variables have significant and substantive effects- the Secretary-General's actions are responsive to U.N. Charter concerns, but within constraints imposed by the P-5 variables. This is

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[336] Jean E. Krasno, ed., *The Collected Papers of Kofi Annan: U.N. Secretary-General, 2000-2001*, Vol. 2 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), 1190.

[337] Ibid., 1190

[338] Ibid., 1426

certainly the case with the MID data, and supports the realist view. The smaller and more restricted ICB data however complicates the picture somewhat- some of the ICB results indicate, at least in substantive terms, that conflict specific P-5 parochial interests, such as two P-5 states confronting each other, or a P-5 state fighting a non-P5 state, did not deter the Secretary-General from staging a public intervention. Similarly, the civil war data also has a surprising result which shows a slight likelihood of an SG intervention in civil wars where the P-5 had some involvement. These ICB and civil war results therefore give a slight, if only suggestive edge to the institutionalist argument specifically outlined in hypothesis I2 (on the effect of conflict-specific P-5 interest variables). The next Chapter analyzes the question of autonomy and strives to arrive at a more definitive answer to the question of our thesis by separately testing P-5 mandate and autonomous interventions.

Chapter 5: Is the Secretary-General Autonomous?

5.1: Introductory Remarks

In Chapter 4, we established that both P-5 and U.N. Charter variables have significant effects, and that overall, P-5 conflict reduces the likelihood and intensity of SG action. The U.N. Charter variables performed quite well across MIDs, ICB crises, and civil wars; they evidently matter in their own right and not only on the margins of realism. At first glance then, the results from Chapter 4 indicate that realism has a very strong moderating effect on the Secretary-General's actions.

This chapter takes things a step further by splitting our main dependent variable into two categories: first interventions authorized by the Security Council, and second interventions undertaken by the Secretary-General on his own initiative and to varying degrees (low profile autonomy and high profile autonomy). The aim is to ascertain whether there are notable differences in the effect of our P-5 interest variables on these new dependent variables. Our primary focus is on how these two dependent variables perform under Scenario A in our 2x2 hypothesis box, where both U.N. Charter and parochial P-5 interests are very strong. In line with hypotheses R3 and R4, the realists would predict that the Secretary-General is not likely to assert autonomy under that Scenario A. The institutionalists on the other hand would expect the Secretary-General to assert autonomy based not only on his U.N. Charter impetus but also his likelihood of exploiting of P-5 divisions in line with principal-agent theory. They would point to hypotheses I3 and I4.

Scenarios C and D in our 2x2 hypothesis table characterize conflicts where P-5 interests converged (either due to P-5 weak parochial interest, inaction/apathy or humanitarian impulses). These conflicts are not a primary focus because they do not address our main research question, plus there is not a significant difference in realist and institutionalist predictions. However we will look out for any evidence of formal autonomy even under such circumstances (in line with the institutionalist predictions in Scenarios C and D in our 2x2.

The realists would not expect any autonomous interventions in "P-5 vs. P-5", "P-5 vs. Other", "P-5 Border" and other conflicts that elicit strong parochial P-5 interests. If the realists are right, then SG autonomy, if any, will be limited to low profile initiatives during such conflicts. The institutionalists on the other hand would predict the exact opposite under those same conflict-specific configurations- they would expect a positive effect from those variables on our autonomy dependent variable, and especially on our high profile dependent variable.

Against this background, the results in this chapter convincingly support the institutionalist assumption that the Secretary-General is likely to assert autonomy in conflicts that elicit strong P-5 interests. This outcome holds across all three datasets (MIDs, ICB, and civil wars), and especially in the inter-state conflict data where conflict-specific P-5 interests are easier to measure. There is also some evidence of autonomy in instances of P-5 preference convergence (although not as strong as that of P-5 mandated interventions under similar circumstances), a finding that points to the possibility that the Secretary-General exerts formal autonomy as a principle and not as an opportunistic strategy based on conflict-specific P-5 dynamics.

These results reveal our most important finding in the thesis: the negative P-5 effect that we found in Chapter 4 masks two different phenomena. First, when P-5 interests are involved, the probability of Secretary-General intervening based on a Security Council mandate goes down—in fact, we do not observe any mandated/requested interventions in P-5 vs. P-5 cases in both the MID and ICB data. This is very much in line with the realist predictions. On the other hand however, in the absence of a P-5 mandate, these conditions do lead to an increased probability of the SG taking some action on his own.

As such, P-5 conflict is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of a Security Council mandated intervention, but with an increase in the likelihood of an

autonomous intervention without a mandate. Again, our estimates from Chapter 4 tell us that the overall effect of P-5 conflict is negative, and from a broad perspective, this effect swamps the findings that emerge from this chapter. The results in this chapter show, rather convincingly, that the picture is more complicated than the realist assertion to the effect that "the SG can't act when the P-5 are in conflict"- on the contrary, our data indicates that the SG has found a way to act autonomously in some of these instances. This is the core contribution of the thesis and demonstrates a mechanism of SG autonomy in the face of P-5 conflict.

5.2: Hypotheses and Statistical Evidence

Tables 20-25 show the statistical and substantive results on the question of how the autonomous the Secretary-General is. The statistical tests again, cover the three populations of cases we have been looking at: militarized interstate disputes, ICB international crises, and civil wars. The regression tables report tests on two different dependent variables. In column (1), the dependent variable is the dichotomous indicator for whether or not the P-5 mandated or requested an intervention. Estimates in this column are derived from a logit model. In column (2) the dependent variable is the ordered indicator of autonomous intervention where 0 indicates no intervention, 1 indicates a low profile autonomous intervention, and 2 indicates a high-profile autonomous intervention. Estimates in column (2) are derived from an ordered-logit model. Since autonomous interventions can only happen in the absence of a Security Council mandate, the sample in these tests conditions on there being no mandate. Here are the hypotheses on autonomy once again:

Realist Hypotheses:

R3: The Secretary-General is unlikely to initiate autonomous diplomatic interventions, even in instances where P-5 interests converge, because he will want to minimize the likelihood of sanctions and other acts of antagonism from the P-5 principals.

R4: The Secretary-General is especially unlikely to assert autonomy in "P-5 vs. P-5", "P-5 vs. Other", or conflicts bordering P-5 states because such conflicts elicit strong parochial -5 interests, trigger Security Council deadlock, and increase the likelihood of P-5 sanctions.

Institutionalist Hypotheses:

I3: The Secretary-General is likely to initiate autonomous diplomatic interventions (interventions without the approval of the P-5) irrespective of whether or not there is P-5 unanimity because his actions are primarily guided by U.N. Charter dictates.

I4: The Secretary-General is especially likely to assert autonomy in "P-5 vs. P-5", "P-5 vs. Other", or conflicts bordering P-5 states because a P-5 split on the Security Council, or a split between the Security Council and the General Assembly, creates space for him to assert autonomy, in line with PA theory.

Autonomy Statistical and Substantive Results:

- First, there is robust statistical as well as substantive evidence that the Secretary-General exerts autonomy in "P-5 vs. P-5", "P-5 vs. Other", "P-5 Border" and other conflicts that elicit strong P-5 interests (in line with the institutionalist predictions). On the other hand, Security Council mandated interventions are highly unlikely, in fact non-existent, under such circumstances. This finding validates hypothesis I4 and undermines hypothesis R4.

- There is also some evidence of autonomy in instance of P-5 preference convergence (although not as strong as that of P-5 mandated interventions under similar circumstances), a finding that validates hypothesis I3 and points to the

possibility that the Secretary-General exerts formal autonomy as a principle and not as an opportunistic strategy based on conflict-specific P-5 dynamics.

The MID and ICB statistical results in Tables 20 and 22 have one identical and conspicuous feature: in MIDs or crises where two P-5 powers where pitted against each other, there was not a single instance where the Secretary-General was granted a mandate by the Security Council to intervene. Rather, his interventions in these types of conflicts were autonomous in nature, and statistically significant in the ICB instance. Another outstanding outcome in both the MID and ICB data is that the post-Cold War era is statistically significant only for the P-5 mandate interventions: there was an unmistakably sharp increase (note the size of the coefficient) in P-5 mandated interventions after 1990, a dynamic that makes sense given the increased unanimity on the Security Council in the post-Cold War years.

The U.N. Charter independent variables on the other hand are statistically significant in many cases for the P-5 mandate and autonomous interventions (e.g. battle deaths, level of violence, and #of Actors), a dynamic that shows both types of interventions adhere to the dictates of the U.N. Charter. Again, this is not a surprise given that after 1990 especially, the Security Council has developed a habit of rubberstamping the Secretary-General's interventions in the world's intractable conflicts, whether or not the interventions have a good chance of succeeding. Last but not least, the MID data present strong evidence of the so-called "Hammarskjöld effect": as is evident in Table 20, that Hammarskjöld was the least likely of all the Secretaries-General to intervene based on a P-5 mandate, and also the most likely to intervene autonomously. I explore the "Hammarskjöld effect" in considerable detail in the qualitative section.

For the substantive effects, and focusing on the inter-state conflict data where conflict specific P-5 interests are easier to measure, the effect of the P-5 conflict main independent variables is made all the more clear. For the "P-5 versus P-5" conflicts, there was not a single mandate from the Security Council in both the MID and ICB

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data. On the other hand however, for MIDs, the Secretary-General was 70% more likely to make an autonomous low-profile intervention and 90% more likely to make a high-profile autonomous intervention in "P-5 vs. P-5" conflicts. For ICB crises that directly pitted two P-5 states against each other, the probability was 40% more likely for the autonomous low-profile interventions and 170% more likely for autonomous high-profile interventions. When it came to "P5 vs. Other" conflicts, the MID data indicates that the Secretary-General was 50% less likely to intervene based on a mandate from the Security Council, but 90% more likely to stage a low-profile autonomous intervention and 100% more likely to stage a high profile autonomous intervention. In the ICB case, the corresponding probabilities for "P-5 vs. Other" conflicts are as follows: 50% less likely for the Security Council mandate interventions, but 20% more likely for low profile autonomous interventions and 40% more likely for high profile autonomous interventions.

When it came to conflicts dyads occurring along the borders of a P-5 state, the MID data indicates that the Secretary-General was twice less likely to intervene based on a mandate from the Security Council, but 10% more likely to do so on his own, whether in a low profile or high profile autonomous fashion. In the ICB data, the corresponding probabilities for "P-5 border" conflicts are as follows: 50% less likely to intervene based on a Security Council mandate, but 20% more likely to do so in a low-profile autonomous fashion and 60% more likely to stage a high profile autonomous intervention.

The periodic post-Cold War independent variable also generates some noteworthy results: in the MID data, the Secretary-General was three times as likely to intervene based on a Security Council mandate, in line with the realist predictions, but also 70% more likely to stage either a low-profile high-profile autonomous intervention, something that speaks to the possibility of his asserting autonomy based on principle and not on P-5 considerations (i.e. asserting autonomy even in periods when P-5 interests converge). Realists would hardly expect any autonomy after the Cold War,

however this outcome is present only in the MID data and not in the more restrictive ICB data. We also observe a high level of responsiveness to U.N. Charter concerns in both the Security Council mandate interventions and the autonomous interventions- in the MID data there is a notably high substantive effect generated by the battle deaths and number of actors variables for the high profile autonomous interventions- so it is evident that the Secretary-General is very responsive to U.N. Charter dictates not only as a conduit of the Security Council but also in his own right.

Last but not least, there is strong substantive support for the "Hammarskjöld effect" in the MID data. Dag Hammarskjöld was the most likely of all the Secretaries-General to exert autonomy: four times more likely to stage a high-profile autonomous intervention and almost 3 times more likely to stage low-profile autonomous interventions in MIDs. He was also the least likely Secretary-General to make an intervention based on a Security Council mandate: he was twice less likely to do so. His immediate successor U Thant ranks second to him in terms of propensity for autonomy; this makes a lot of sense given that U Thant simply took over some of his predecessor's autonomous missions, e.g. Thailand vs. Cambodia MIDs in the 1960s.

Is the Secretary-General Autonomous? Results from Civil Wars

The statistical findings in the civil war data generate a few surprises. The first unexpected surprise is the positive probability of a Secretary-General intervention in civil wars involving a P-5 state: 36% more likely for P-5 mandate interventions and 5% more likely for autonomous interventions. However we have to bear in mind that the P-5 involvement variable is harder to capture in instances of civil war; in many such cases, the involvement was restricted to political, monetary, military, or other support for one or more of the conflict parties. Another surprise finding is generated by the Colonial Ties independent variable: the Secretary-General was 41% more likely to intervene based on a Security Council mandate, and 42% more likely to do so autonomously. However we also have to remember that these positive results likely capture post-Cold War dynamics when the rate of SG intervention in civil wars went

up anyway and the colonial indicator was no longer as sensitive as it was in the Cold War days when civil wars carried the stigma of "East vs. West" battlegrounds.

Another notable P-5 interest result, and one that is quite similar to what we found in the MID and ICB data, has to do with civil wars that occurred along the borders of a P-5 state. For such conflicts, the Secretary-General was 78% less likely to intervene based on a Security Council mandate, and 33% less likely to do so autonomously. Although the autonomous indicator is not positive this time around, in contrast to the MID and ICB result for the same variable, we can still see that it is higher than the Security Council mandate indicator. Further, the end of the Cold War has a rather large and highly significant P-5 mandate intervention coefficient, whereas there is no such effect whatsoever in the autonomous model. This shows that the so-called "Article 2" effect should only matter when we are examining the P-5 mandate interventions and not the autonomous ones.

We also notice evidence of the Secretary-General's responsiveness to U.N. Charter concerns outside the confines of Security Council mandate interventions. This trend is evident in three of our U.N. Charter independent variables: first, the SG was almost 4 times more likely to autonomously intervene in a civil war if the number of actors increased from 2 to 11, but only 2.5 times more likely to do so based on a Security Council mandate. For conflicts that displaced 1,000,000+ civilians, the SG was 258% more likely to intervene autonomously, but only 108% more likely to do so based on a Security Council mandate. The finding on genocide/politicide is rather interesting: the Secretary-General was 8% more likely to autonomously intervene if a civil war generated genocide and/or politicide, but 19% less likely to do so based on a mandate from the Security Council. Once again, the evidence here seems to support of the institutionalist, rather than the realist predictions. I have not gone in-depth into the goodness of fit measures as I did with the "where does he go" models because this time around we are testing two different dependent variables.

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Table 20: How Autonomous is the SG? - MIDs

	(1) P-5 Mandate Interventions		(2) Autonomous Interventions (Conditional on No P-5 Mandate)	
P-5 Interests Variables				
P-5 vs. P-5			0.476	(0.630)
P-5 vs. Other	-0.746**	(0.298)	0.693**	(0.312)
P-5 Border	-1.525***	(0.515)	-0.007	(0.443)
Same-Bloc	1.315***	(0.407)	-0.459	(0.481)
Cross-Bloc			-1.052**	(0.446)
Colonial Ties	0.992**	(0.404)	-0.428	(0.378)
Petroleum	-0.268	(0.382)	0.916*	(0.522)
LDCs	0.144	(0.499)	0.143	(0.551)
Post-Cold War	1.226***	(0.364)	0.498	(0.525)
U.N. Charter Variables				
Any Deaths	-1.010**	(0.461)	-1.109**	(0.510)
Battle Deaths	0.327***	(0.094)	0.351***	(0.096)
Duration	0.118**	(0.047)	0.186***	(0.055)
# of Actors	0.066	(0.054)	0.152*	(0.081)
Spillovers	2.201***	(0.357)	0.189	(0.449)
Prior MIDs	0.009	(0.010)	-0.019	(0.015)
Control Variables				
2nd Term SG	-0.331	(0.248)	-0.002	(0.252)
Europe	3.145***	(0.522)	-0.301	(0.469)
Americas	-0.172	(0.729)	-0.808	(0.557)
M.E./N. Africa	2.701***	(0.445)	-0.794**	(0.402)
S.S. Africa	1.785***	(0.531)	0.336	(0.507)
Inter-Continental	2.912***	(0.470)	-0.477	(0.347)
Prior Intervention	1.984***	(0.238)	0.817***	(0.268)
Trygve Lie	-0.193	(0.510)	0.784	(0.622)
Dag Hammarskjöld	-1.188**	(0.483)	1.458***	(0.454)
U Thant	-0.400	(0.343)	1.170***	(0.432)
Waldheim	-0.171	(0.349)	0.497	(0.463)
Boutros-Ghali	-0.068	(0.334)	0.138	(0.526)
Constant (Logit)	-5.746***	(0.565)		
Cut 1 (Ordered-Logit)			4.336***	(0.511)
Cut 2 (Ordered-Logit)			5.181***	(0.526)
Observations	1246		1264	
AIC	753.6		781.5	
BIC	886.9		930.6	
% Corr. Pred.	.88		.05	
P.R. Error	.267		-10.971	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: P-5 vs. P-5 and Cross-Bloc dropped from Model 1 due to perfect failure to predict SG interventions.

Table 21: How Autonomous is the SG? - MIDs % Changes in Probability

See next page, and note: **Percentage labels on the bars in Table 21 have been abbreviated for spacing and aesthetic purposes: 0.9 means 90%, 1 means 100 %, 36 means 3,600 percent, etc.**

Note on probability changes:

- For the binary variables (which include all the P-5-interests variables and also the Spillovers and Prior MIDs variables), the probability changes are calculated based on a change from 0 to 1.

- MID duration is a logged continuous variable. Its probability change is calculated based on a change from 25 days (median duration) to 4775 days (maximum duration).

- The logged battle deaths variable is logged; its probability change is calculated based on a change from zero casualties to the highest recorded full-scale war casualty figure (1.25 million).

- For the # Actors variable ordinal, the probability changes are calculated based on a change from 2 state actors (median) to 39 state actors (maximum # of Actors)

- For MID history, the chart is showcasing the probability change from the median (5 prior MIDs) to the maximum of 60 prior MIDs.

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Legend: ■ P-5 Mandate　■ Low-Profile Autonomous　■ High-Profile Autonomous

Categories:
- P-5 Interests Variables: P-5 vs. P-5, P-5 vs. Other, P-5 Border, Same-Bloc, Cross-Bloc, Colonial Ties, Petroleum, LDCs, Post C. War
- U.N. Charter Variables: Battle Deaths, Duration, # of Actors, Spillovers, Prior MIDs
- Personalities: Lie, Hammarskjöld, U Thant, Waldheim, Ghali

Table 22: How Autonomous is the SG? - ICB

	(1) P-5 Mandate Interventions		(2) Autonomous Interventions (Conditional on No P-5 Mandate)	
P-5 Interests Variables				
P-5 vs. P-5 Direct			1.187*	(0.703)
P-5 vs. P-5 Proxy	0.981	(1.239)	0.372	(0.915)
P-5 vs. Other	-0.829	(0.609)	0.119	(0.377)
P-5 Border	-0.970	(0.959)	0.062	(0.586)
Same-Bloc	-0.005	(0.943)	-0.381	(0.663)
Cross-Bloc	-1.394	(1.538)	-0.422	(0.686)
P-5 Colony	0.419	(0.614)	-0.367	(0.487)
Petroleum	-0.994	(1.114)	0.518	(0.674)
LDCs	-0.928	(0.849)	-0.314	(0.623)
Post-Cold War	1.410**	(0.548)	0.579	(0.453)
U.N. Charter Variables				
Violence	0.650***	(0.229)	0.386**	(0.179)
Protracted	0.413	(0.374)	-0.023	(0.294)
# Actors	0.114**	(0.046)	0.120**	(0.049)
Proximity	-0.417	(0.392)	-0.012	(0.230)
Control Variables				
2nd Term SG	-0.130	(0.414)	-0.085	(0.309)
Europe	1.370	(0.998)	-0.408	(0.698)
SS Africa	-0.379	(0.705)	-0.839	(0.517)
Americas	0.259	(1.033)	-0.908	(0.785)
M. East/N.A.	0.558	(0.677)	-0.604	(0.470)
P-5 Affinity	-0.573	(1.154)	-0.488	(0.885)
Prior Intervention	0.352	(0.451)	0.161	(0.346)
Constant (Logit)	-4.645***	(1.274)		
Cut 1 (Ordered-Logit)			1.886**	(0.882)
Cut 2 (Ordered-Logit)			3.073***	(0.902)
Observations	254		226	
AIC	219.3		405.5	
BIC	293.6		484.2	
% Corr. Pred.	.84		.20	
P.R. Error	.069		-1.368	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: P-5 vs. P-5 Direct dropped from P-5 Mandate model because of perfect failure to predict an SG intervention.

Is the SG Autonomous? ICB % Change in Intervention Probability

■ P-5 Mandate   Low Profile Autonomous   ■ High Profile Autonomous

Note: Percentage labels on the bars in Table 23 have been abbreviated for spacing and aesthetic purposes: 0.4 means 40%, 1.7 means 170 %, 4.3 means 430 percent, etc.

Notes on Table 23:

- For the binary variables (which include all the P-5-interests variables), the probability changes are calculated based on a change from 0 to 1.

- For the violence ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from 1 (no violence) to 4 (full-scale war)

- For the protracted crisis ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from 1 (non-protracted conflict) to 3 (long-war protracted conflict

- For the # actors ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from the median (4 actors) to the maximum (34 actors)

- For the proximity ordinal variable, the probability change is calculated based on a change from 1 (contiguous) to 3 (distant)

The probability chart above is based on the ICB Level of Intervention Full Model (**Model 5 in Table 8**). It is important to recall that this ICB dataset denotes only those crises that had a truly inter-state dyadic component to them (as denoted in Hewitt 2002 dyadic version of the ICB data), and also omits "intra-war" crises.

Table 24: How Autonomous is the SG? - Civil Wars

	(1) P-5 Mandate		(2) Autonomous Interventions (Conditional on No P-5 Mandate)	
P-5 Interests Variables				
P-5 Participation	0.036	(0.575)	-0.003	(0.838)
Oil Reserves	-0.701	(0.553)	-1.164	(0.874)
P-5 Border	-2.466***	(0.873)	-0.526	(0.887)
Colonial Ties	0.669	(0.540)	0.282	(0.773)
U.N. Charter Variables				
External Actors	2.430***	(0.690)	-0.221	(0.829)
Duration	-0.216	(0.218)	0.156	(0.253)
# of Participants	0.334*	(0.183)	0.514**	(0.238)
Fatalities	0.254*	(0.153)	0.233	(0.193)
Mega-Displacement	1.270*	(0.648)	1.760**	(0.842)
Genocide/Politicide	-0.133	(0.652)	0.180	(0.851)
Polarity/Article 2 Variable				
Post-Cold War	3.850***	(0.794)	1.187	(1.039)
Control Variables				
Democracy	0.702	(0.619)	0.460	(0.829)
Previous Conflict	-0.245	(0.516)	-0.461	(0.704)
Europe	0.404	(1.066)	0.175	(1.536)
Latin America	1.112	(0.950)	-0.527	(1.621)
M. East	0.237	(0.836)	-0.033	(1.202)
S.S. Africa	-0.259	(0.767)	0.259	(0.939)
Constant	-6.667***	(1.909)	-6.117***	(2.368)
Observations	154		99	
AIC	156.2		110.6	
BIC	210.9		157.3	
P.R. Error	.51		.29	
% Corr. Pr.	.83		.85	

$* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01$

Note: Asia is the base variable for Geography; whereas autocracy is the base variable for democracy.

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Table 25: How Autonomous is the SG? - Civil Wars (Substantive Effects)

Is the SG Autonomous? Civil Wars % Change in Intervention Probability

■ P-5 Mandate Interventions   ■ Autonomous Interventions

Note: The probability changes above are calculated based on a change from zero to one for all the P-5 Interests variables plus the Outside Actors variables, all of which are binary in nature.

For the ordinal variables, the probability changes are calculated as follows:

- Duration: based on a change from 36 months (median for the 154 cases) to the maximum of 600 months.

- # Participants: based on a change from 2 participants (minimum for the 154 cases) to the maximum of 11 participants.

- Fatalities: based on a change from 30,000 fatalities (median) to the maximum of 3 Million fatalities.

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5.3: Autonomy Qualitative Evidence

This section introduces qualitative historical evidence to help us contextualize the quantitative findings on the question of autonomy, as well as expose real-world dynamics that are hard to quantify and whose existence/impact may not have been reflected in our results. The qualitative evidence is once again presented via brief anecdotal references and largely sourced from the declassified papers and memoirs of the different Secretaries-General.

The first part of this section presents anecdotal evidence on high profile autonomous interventions (initiated by Dag Hammarskjöld) that the Secretary-General undertook on his own initiative without a mandate from the Security Council (and sometimes without a symbolic mandate from the General Assembly either), thereby staking his prestige and reputation, often times against strong P-5 opposition. I provide two examples of the "Hammarskjöld Effect" and then show a few examples of its effect on later Secretaries-General.

I follow this up with an anecdote of how the P-5 would sometimes try very hard to thwart an autonomous intervention that impinged on their parochial interests, and then bring the analysis to full circle by a few anecdotes of the strategies that Secretaries-General have used to counter the realist offensive: first one more example of the "Humanitarian SRSG" dynamic that we saw in Chapter 2, and then the strategy of "informal autonomy" where the Secretary-General received Security Council approval to intervene in a conflict, but then went on to either disregard the boundaries set by the Security Council resolution, or went against the expressed wishes of one or more P-5 states.

Informal autonomy is revealed only by the qualitative data in this section and is otherwise very difficult to quantify; nevertheless it is a pertinent dynamic for our study because it alerts us to an important finding: the end of the Cold War saw a sharp decrease in overtly autonomous interventions, but did not necessarily mark the end of

autonomy. On the contrary, there is evidence of increased informal autonomy within the bounds of Security Council mandates, a strategy that earned Boutros-Ghali the title of "the New Hammarskjöld" and ultimately the wrath of the Clinton administration.

5.3.1: Institutionalist Apogee: the "Hammarskjöld Effect"

The term "Hammarskjöld effect" essentially refers to the inventiveness with which Dag Hammarskjöld approached his role as Secretary-General in instances of Security Council deadlock or inaction. Specifically, he became the first Secretary-General to undertake high-level diplomatic initiatives without the authorization of the Security Council or, for that matter, even the General Assembly in some cases.

The "Hammarskjöld Effect" constituted the ultimate institutionalist and traditional principal-agent theory expectations, that is, a dynamic where a Secretary-General was able to initiate an autonomous role for himself during instances of Security Council deadlock or inaction, and actually make a difference in crises, thereby expanding the possibilities of the Office in ways that have since benefited his successors.

Constitutionally speaking, the key to understanding why something like the "Hammarskjöld effect" was able to take off is that the U.N. Charter, like its predecessor the Charter of the League of Nations, was a brief and circumscribed document that had a lot of vagueness and contradictions to it. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, Article 98 designates the Secretary-General as a repository of Security Council delegated powers, whereas Articles 99 and 100 designate him as an autonomous actor with discretionary powers. Indeed, some U.N. scholars such as Peter Heller have noted that the U.N. Charter is "often vague, contradictory, or even

silent on some important aspects of conflict management."[339]   Not only was the Secretary-General's own job description described in vague terms, but there is also nothing in the Charter that states what the Secretary-General cannot do.

Thus, the U.N. Charter contains loopholes that were ripe for exploitation by the right personality in the form of Hammarskjöld, who proved to be a master at manipulating that document's vagueness and ambiguities to his own advantage.   Key to his innovation was his assertion that the Secretary-General was obligated to make interventions whenever the Security Council was deadlocked or indifferent, because the Office "provided the means for smooth and fast action, which might otherwise not have been open to the Organization."[340]

As the following set of anecdotal case references will reveal, Hammarskjöld tended to assert his overt autonomy in crises that evoked strong parochial P-5 interests. In this way, he was the ultimate anti-realist in as far as our hypotheses were concerned. The inceptive illustration case of the "Hammarskjöld effect" took place in 1955 with Dag Hammarskjöld's trip to Peking, People's Republic of China, to negotiate the release of 11 American fliers who had been captured by the Chinese authorities in the dying days of the Korean War. Dag Hammarskjöld's intervention in this crisis was unique in two ways: First, it marked the first time that a Secretary-General undertook a field trip to a crisis theater with the expressed[341] intention of mediating that crisis in his own capacity.   Second, Hammarskjöld's trip to China marked the first time that a Secretary-General made a high-profile intervention without a mandate from the Security Council. I cover this case study in great detail in Chapter 6 (and it very much

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[339]Heller,
the United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1961, 17.
[340] Pechota, *The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace*, 614. Hammarskjöld's successor U Thant also spoke in favor of the proactive approach as a means of forestalling Security Council confrontations that would lead to deadlock.
[341] Again, see detailed case study in Chapter 6.

aligns with Scenario 1 in our 2x2 hypothesis table). Another Hammarskjöld Scenario 1 intervention worth mentioning but not detailed here are the 1956 Suez Crisis.

1959 Thailand-Cambodia: Circumventing the Member-States Altogether

In 1958, a fresh crisis broke out between Cambodia and Thailand relating to several border incidents. The governments of the two countries considered taking the dispute to the Security Council, but Hammarskjöld quietly[342] urged them to accept, instead, the mediation of his personal representative, Baron Johan Beck-Friis[343], who he appointed without any mandate or resolution from either the Security Council or General Assembly, let al.one any discussion of the crisis by those two bodies.[344] Within a space of one month, from January 22nd to February 23rd, 1959, the Thailand-Cambodia crisis was successfully mediated by Baron Beck-Friis, and the two governments restored their diplomatic ties. The implications of Hammarskjöld's actions were quite profound: for the first time in the history of the United Nations, a Secretary-General was able to proactively nudge two crisis actors to bypass both the Security Council and the General Assembly, take it upon his Office to mediate the crisis, and ultimately succeed in defusing[345] it.

Three factors played to Hammarskjöld's favor in this particular crisis: first, the matter was not referred to the Security Council or General Assembly to begin with; as a result there were no protracted debates that could have potentially hampered Hammarskjöld's initiative. Second, both Thailand and Cambodia sides seem to have genuinely sought a settlement (see quote below) , something that made them receptive. Third, the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute did not involve any of the P-5 directly or

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[342] Kirgis and others, *United Nations Mediation of Regional Crises*, 137.

[343] Beck-Friis was a Swedish national just like Hammarskjöld.

[344] Based on his prior signature achievements in the 1955 U.S.-China Hostage Crisis (see Chapter 6) and also the 1956 Suez Crisis, Hammarskjöld took it upon himself to take this unprecedented step and not risk possible Security Council blockage of his initiative by the U.K. and France who he had displeased during Suez.

[345] For specifics on how this particular phase of the Thailand-Cambodia border crisis was defused, see Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, 229.

indirectly, and thus, unlike the Berlin Crisis of that same year, there were no P-5 sensibilities to assuage. This third dynamic is borne out by the fact that four days before dispatching Spinelli to Thailand and Cambodia, Hammarskjöld informed the Security Council of his mediation efforts and SRSG appointment, then inquired if any member-state had objections, to which there were none.[346] The "peripheral crisis" caveat aside, Hammarskjöld set an important precedent that would enhance the stature of his Office and benefit both himself and his successors in subsequent "higher stakes" crises involving parochial P-5 interests.

Hammarskjöld summarized his thoughts on this crisis during a press conference held at U.N. Headquarters on February 26th, 1959, at the exact moment when the Spinelli mediation mission was publicly known to be succeeding. Among other things, Hammarskjöld took the opportunity to express the hope that his Thailand-Cambodia conflict resolution formula could be applied to future conflicts:

> Normally, a conflict of the type we had (in Thailand and Cambodia) would probably have gone to the Security Council, and we would have had a decision which, perhaps, in substance would have meant the same as the decision now taken. However, the parties agreed not to raise the issue in the Security Council but, anticipating a possible outcome, to direct parallel invitations, as it were, to the Secretary-General to send someone to assist them in getting over the difficulty. I responded to the invitations and a representative was sent there, with the acquiescence of members of the Security Council. You can see how much more effective and smooth working such a technique is than the regular one, which involves all the meetings and debates, and so on. That is a good case in point to demonstrate how, pragmatically, we can find better ways to do the job, without at all departing from the Charter but, so to speak, adjusting the procedure so as to meet a concrete situation as conveniently and efficiently as possible. Those examples could be multiplied. I believe that in the future we shall have further cases that we perhaps cannot think of now.[347]

[346] Hammarskjöld sent a letter to all the members of the Security Council on December 17th 1958 informing them of the SRSG mission and announced the Spinelli appointment on December 22, 1958 after the Security Council expressed no objection or reservation. See Ibid., 226.

[347] Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1958-1960*, Vol. 4 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 327.

1960 Bahrain: Requested By the Crisis Actors Themselves

The "pinnacle" of the "Hammarskjöld effect", as it were, was reached during his mediation of the U.K.-Saudi Arabia Bureimi Oasis dispute from 1959-1961. Sovereignty over the strategically important Bureimi as well as the allegiance of its 10,000 inhabitants/9 villages were claimed by multiple crisis actors, some of who happened to be British protectorates: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on one side, and the Sheik of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat/Oman on the other side.[348] The British pitted themselves against the Saudis by favoring their colonies. What made Hammarskjöld's intervention this time around most interesting was the fact that it was requested by the crisis actors themselves, first by Prince Faysal, the Saudi Arabian Prime Minister/Foreign Minister, and later welcomed by the British. Again, something unprecedented was occurring in the history of the United Nations: two crisis actors were requesting the Secretary-General's mediation outside of the purview of the Security Council and General Assembly.

Hammarskjöld began mediating the U.K.-Saudi dispute in November 1959 with a series of exploratory talks; thereafter he proposed five specific proposals that formed the core of his mediation effort.[349] In July 1960, he asked his home government of Sweden for the loan of the Swedish diplomat, Herbert de Ribbing, to serve as his personal representative in the mediation process because he himself was by this time preoccupied with the more pressing Congo crisis.[350] Ultimately, Hammarskjöld's SRSG mediation effort led to the resolving of this crisis: region of Saudi Arabia

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[348] Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1972), 311. This ancient feud was revived by a rumor, since proved unfounded, that the area under the oasis might contain oil. The British government had inserted itself into this feud by spearheading a 1955 military expedition that displaced Saudi settlers from the oasis, and by partitioning the oasis between Abu Dhabi and Muscat in 1959, to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia. What made this UK Saudi-Arabia dispute quite complex was the fact that diplomatic relations between two countries had been suspended since the Suez crisis of 1956, and third party mediation efforts by the Arab League had proved fruitless. These dynamics created a situation that was ripe for someone like Hammarskjold to come in and break the deadlock.

[349] See Ibid., 312-313

[350] Ibid., 312-313

reestablished diplomatic relations- although this occurred 16 months after Hammarskjöld's untimely 1961 death, plus no oil was found in Bureimi (but plenty in Abu Dhabi).[351] With this outcome, the Bureimi crisis died a natural death. The key takeaway from the Bureimi crisis was not only that Hammarskjöld's autonomously mediated at the request of the crisis actors, but also that one of those actors was a P-5 country. This dynamic only served to demonstrate the dazzling heights to which Hammarskjöld had taken the Office, and the very high bar that he set for his successors.

5.3.2: "Hammarskjöld Effect" Manifestations in Later Secretaries-General:

Pérez de Cuéllar: Peking Formula in Baghdad- Part 1: 1990

In the immediate run-up to the first Gulf War of 1991, Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar traveled to Baghdad to meet Saddam Hussein without a Security Council mandate in a last last-ditch mediation effort to avert the breakout of war. The inspiration behind his trip seems to have been Dag Hammarskjöld's 1955 *Peking Formula*[352], i.e. the strategy of negotiating in his own capacity as Secretary-General and standard-bearer of the U.N. Charter, and all the neutrality that this entailed. Following a Security Council setting January 15, 1991 as a deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the United States took a unilateral initiative in seeking to arrange a meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz.[353] De Cuéllar then explained his rationale for an autonomous intervention:

> While welcoming the American initiative, I felt that Iraq was unlikely to make significant concessions directly to the United States. The loss of face would be too great for a man of Saddam Hussein's megalomanic pride to accept. In light of my experience with Tariq Aziz in Amman, and the unsuccessful efforts of Gorbachev's

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[351] Ibid., 314
[352] See Case Study on U.S.-China Hostages crisis for a definition and description of Hammarskjöld's Peking Formula. Alternatively, see Ibid.
[353] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 253.

special emissary, of Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, of the former German Chancellor William Brandt and of the other dignitaries who had traveled to Baghdad and talked directly with Saddam, I did not have much hope that war could be avoided, especially given the massive buildup of American forces in Saudi Arabia that by then had taken place. Still, every possibility had to be explored, and I felt that if Saddam were to make the necessary concessions, it would be easier for him to do it to a U.N. representative than to the United States or any country friendly to it... Recalling the extensive and eventually successful discussions I had with Saddam in seeking an end to the Iran-Iraq war, I began in early December to think of seeking a meeting with him in a last effort for peace[354]

De Cuéllar then traveled to Baghdad in early January 1991 and applied the "Peking Formula" to his conversation with Saddam Hussein. He later wrote in his memoirs:

In opening the substantive conversation, I emphasized to Saddam, as I had previously done with Tariq Aziz, that I was in Baghdad on my own initiative, without any specific mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly and carrying no messages from anyone. My visit had, however, received strong support from world leaders, including President Bush, with whom I had spoken four times since meeting with him at Camp David. While under no instructions from the Security Council, I had an obligation to report to the Council on our conversation and therefore would have to leave Baghdad that night. I was confident that the President "as a military man" would understand that obligations must be respected...[355]

Ultimately, de Cuéllar's last-minute effort was not successful- as history would have it, Gulf War I broke out a few days later. Nevertheless, this shows how the precedent set by Dag Hammarskjöld's in 1955 persisted into the post-Cold War era. De Cuéllar dedicated five pages of his memoir to this one meeting with Saddam Hussein, and even reports that at the end of the meeting, Saddam authorized his to inform the Security Council that he (Saddam) wished to continue discussions through the Secretary-General.[356] Ultimately, what this shows is that the stature of the Office continued to hold high long after Hammarskjöld.

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[354] Ibid., 253-254

[355] Ibid., 264 See also Lankevich,
the United Nations Under Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, 1982- 1991, 110-111. Lankevich also confirms the autonomous tone of de Cuéllar's mission. Additionally, U.N. resolutions from the time confirm that de Cuéllar did not have a mandate from either the Security Council or the General Assembly to make this particular trip.
[356] Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir, 267.

During the North Korea nuclear crisis of 1993-94, Boutros Boutros-Ghali traveled to Pyongyang to meet with North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung from December 24-26 1993 without a mandate from the Security Council and against the expressed wishes[357] of the Clinton administration. The North Koreans had refused the IAEA access to two hitherto undeclared nuclear sites and war with the United States seemed like a real possibility. The U.N. General Assembly conveyed a message of international consensus[358] against the DPRK's actions, but did not grant Boutros-Ghali a mandate to intervene in the crisis. Boutros-Ghali had two cards up his sleeve in making the trip: first and foremost, like Hammarskjöld and other predecessors, he was traveling in his own capacity as U.N. Secretary-General and standard-bearer of the U.N. Charter.

Second and perhaps more intriguing, he was traveling as a former Egyptian Foreign Minister will had close links[359] with top government officials in both North and South Korea. Whether by design or by accident, when Boutros-Ghali arrived at the demilitarized zone and made his way to the North Korean side of the border, he was

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[357] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished : A U.N.-U.S. Saga*, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1999), 125 ; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Charles Hill and United Nations, *The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 932. Both these sources detail the American opposition to the trip. Only after it seemed that Boutros-Ghali had made up his mind to go did Madeleine Albright pay him a confidential visit to brief him on the U.S. "carrots" for North Korean cooperation. Further, the General Assembly had passed a resolution urging the DPRK to open the two sites up for inspection. The IAEA on its part carefully avoided saying that the DPRK had broken the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which meant the matter would not go to the Security Council at the time of this trip.

[358] Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished : A U.N.-U.S. Saga*, 125.

[359] Boutros-Ghali notes in his memoir that during the 1973 October War between Egypt and Israel, Kim Il Sung had sent to Egypt a squadron of MiG fighter aircraft with North Korean pilots; the North Korean pilots had patrolled Egyptian airspace throughout the war and the general in command of the Egyptian Air Force at that time was Hosni Mubarak... As a result of this support, President Mubarak maintained strong diplomatic ties with the DPRK. This was in addition to the fact that Boutros-Ghali knew a lot of senior North Korean officials from his days as Egyptian Foreign Minister and meeting them at various third world and non-aligned conferences. As for South Korea, the Korean government in Seoul was well aware that as Egyptian Foreign Minister, Boutros-Ghali had persistently argued in Cairo for the establishment of Egypt-ROK relations in view of the fact that nearly half the world's nations had diplomatic ties to both Koreas. Thus, he had a lot of reasons to feel good about the prospects for his trip. See Ibid., 125-129

saluted by an honor guard of Korean and U.N. soldiers, but no American troops were to be seen- whether or not the American absence was ordered by the Clinton administration, this only served to enhance Boutros-Ghali's neutralist credentials as he traveled to Pyongyang. Indeed, the North Koreans informed Boutros-Ghali that they were not supposed to be talking to him because the United Nations had been the belligerent party during the Korean War, but that as an old friend, they were making an exception in his case- to get around the awkwardness, he was called "the Egyptian Secretary-General."[360]

The mediation mission itself yielded little in terms of immediate results because the North Koreans seemed to prefer direct negotiations with the Americans; nevertheless, they held Boutros-Ghali in high esteem[361] because he was known to be disliked by the United States. The DPRK took the extra step of supporting an aircraft at his disposal to take him to the next stop on his itinerary, Beijing, at no cost to the United Nations. Boutros-Ghali carried with him a message from the North Koreans to the effect that it was "imperative" that the United States dispatch a high-level emissary to Pyongyang in order to defuse tensions, a message that Boutros-Ghali relayed to both the United States and the former president Jimmy Carter. In the end, it was Jimmy Carter's private mission that helped defuse the crisis by negotiating a deal that was first disavowed then later accepted by the Clinton administration.

Two weeks after the trip, Boutros-Ghali sent a now-declassified letter, dated January 6 1994, to North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung in which the autonomous nature of his initiative was brought into full view:

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[360] Ibid., 127
[361] Kim Il-Sung held a grand banquet in Boutros-Ghali's honor. North Korean officials later showed Boutros-Ghali the latest issue of an Arab language magazine on whose cover was a cartoon depicting him as America's most hated enemy. Again, see Ibid., 125-129

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As I indicated during my visit to Northeast Asia, one of my objectives in visiting the Korean Peninsula was to help, if at all possible, in defusing the tension which had escalated in recent months. Although I carried no mandate, either from a United Nations body or from any Member State, I felt that it was my duty, on behalf of an organization devoted to peace, to express the concern of the international community regarding an issue which could have ramifications well beyond Korea. As I pointed out during my stay in Pyongyang, there is deep concern that this crisis, if not resolved positively and soon, might have an impact on the entire system of nuclear non-proliferation, including the renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995.[362]

Again, this example shows the growth and maturity of the *Peking Formula*[363] strategy that Hammarskjöld had initiated in 1955.

Kofi Annan: Peking Formula in Baghdad- Part 2 (1997)

Kofi Annan traveled to Baghdad in February 1998 to negotiate directly with Saddam Hussein an end to the UNSCOM I crisis which threatened the breakout of war between the United States and Iraq.[364] Ever since the end of the Gulf War I in 1991, Saddam Hussein's regime had acquiesced to Security Council resolution 687 which called on Iraq to give up its WMD capacity. However the Iraqi government repeatedly denied U.N. inspectors access to suspected WMD sites, to the extent that the Clinton administration strongly considered military action against Iraq. Annan had the reluctant approval of the Clinton administration which had initially opposed[365] the idea of him going to Baghdad- he did not want to be seen as America's "messenger boy" but agreed to deliver the U.S. ultimatum to Saddam without carrying with him any actual written instructions.[366]

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[362] Boutros-Ghali, Hill and United Nations, *The Papers of United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali*, 932-933.

[363] Again, see Case Study on U.S.-China Hostages crisis for a definition and description of Hammarskjöld's Peking Formula. Alternatively, see Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 130-131.

[364] See Wilkenfeld and others, *ICB Data Viewer, Vol. 10* Crisis Number: 422 of 455 UNSCOM I for a summary of this crisis.

[365] Traub, *The Best Intentions : Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power*, 80.

[366] Ibid., 80

Annan did not have a specific Security Council mandate for the trip, although it was understood that he had the tacit support of the Council members including a reluctant United States to convince Saddam to comply with the series of Council resolutions that had been passed on the issue of Iraq WMDs. The first thing Annan did was to seek advice from one of his predecessors Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (who as reported earlier in this section had also made an independent trip to Baghdad on the eve of Gulf War I) on how to handle Saddam during the negotiations. Most pertinent during this mission was Anna's direct reference to Hammarskjöld's Peking Formula, as was reported by his biographer James Traub was at constantly at his side during this crisis:

> Iqbal Riza (Anna's Chief of Staff) had asked to see a copy of Brian Urquhart's biography of Dag Hammarskjöld: he wanted to re-read the passage about the "Peking Formula," lest Annan need to furnish some justification for this exercise in personal diplomacy. Annan himself was no such legal stickler, but his view of the Office assumed just such a right and an obligation. When I spoke to him, while his aides were consumed with a frenzy of preparation, he used language worthy of his great predecessor: "There may be times when the Secretary-General has to stand alone and use the moral authority of the Office, and one should not shy away from that and I do not intend to shy away from that.[367]

The negotiations themselves went well for Annan. He had a three hour meeting with Saddam Hussein with just one other person, an interpreter, in the room. He convinced Saddam to accept the Security Council terms within reasonable limits, and left Baghdad with a memorandum of understanding that was later approved by the Security Council. While still in Baghdad spoke with (Heads of State/Government). He also worked hard to safeguard his autonomy, as was noted by Traub:

> (After the meeting with Saddam), Annan began making phone calls: Clinton, Tony Blair, Chirac, Mubarak, Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian foreign minister. He told each that he had "a good text" but refused to provide details, lest any of them try to unravel what he had so laboriously tied up.... Then at 2:30 a.m. Madeleine Albright had called, demanding to have the text read to her. Albright was very fond of Annan, but she tended to browbeat him, especially when she feared he was going soft...

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[367] Ibid., 80

> Albright cross-examined the groggy Secretary-General, who put her off with uncharacteristic asperity. "She was," Annan said, "quite nervous and agitated.[368]

Annan himself, as it turns out, was under no delusion as to the possibility that the United States and its Western allies view his mission with suspicion given their policy of regime change in Iraq. In his memoir released in 2012, he wrote: "in November 1997, I personally stepped into the Iraq quagmire for the first time. I knew full well that my interventions would be met with suspicion and maneuvering on all sides, but I was equally certain that there was a vital role to be played."[369] He then gives his own version of events as to just how autonomous he was from the United States and its allies:

> I resolved to go to Baghdad and on the Sunday before my mission, Albright came up to New York and met me at the residence of the Secretary-General to give me her "red lines"... I knew that the purpose of her visit had as much to do with internal US politics as with the mission itself. For the Clinton administration, that meant, on many occasions, needing to seem tough with the U.N. She then asked if I would go "even if we wouldn't want it." I told her that I would be going to Baghdad with a strong consensus from the Council that Iraq must return to compliance- but I would also be preparing my own negotiating points. I had to remind her of my role as Secretary-General, answerable to 191 other member states and of our duty to seek peaceful resolution of disputes.[370]

Annan's impressions of the meeting with Saddam indicate that he felt the memorandum of understanding was made possible because Saddam Hussein trusted and respected him, he wrote in his memoir: "Saddam thanked me and praised my courage, adding that "I know powerful people did not want you to come"; stating that he trusted me, he authorized his team to complete the draft agreement and we received his approval by midnight."[371]

In retrospect, the mission was a short-lived success because they are the eight year later, the Clinton Administration initiated a five day bombing campaign in Iraq from

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[368] Ibid., 84-85
[369] Kofi A. Annan and Nader Mousavizadeh, *Interventions : A Life in War and Peace* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 323.
[370] Ibid., 326
[371] Ibid., 328

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16 to 20 December 1998 after Iraq had failed to live up to its end of the bonding as specified in Annan's memorandum of understanding. Most significantly, 2003 brought about the US invasion of Iraq and the public health the Saddam regime. Nevertheless, Annan's long-term failure to avert war notwithstanding, his trip showed the resiliency and efficacy of Hammarskjöld's Peking Formula if and when applied pertinent crisis.

5.3.3: Realist Backlash: Limitations to the "Hammarskjöld Effect"

The next anecdote briefly highlights an instance in which Dag Hammarskjöld asserted his autonomy but the outcome was not as positive because his initiative clashed with the strong parochial interests of a determined P-5 state.

1961 Bizerte: Hammarskjöld Publicly Humiliated By A Determined P-5 State

The Bizerte Crisis of 1961 is a "Scenario B" type of crisis (based on our hypothesis 2x2) and serves as a realist cautionary tale of what can sometimes happen when a Secretary-General tries to assert his autonomy in a crisis where a determined P-5 state has strong parochial interests to protect in an instance that does not pose an immediate threat to international peace and security. This crisis occurred from July 17 to September 29, 1961, and pitted France against its former colony Tunisia: after granting Tunisia independence in 1956, the government of Charles de Gaulle maintained a number of military garrisons, barracks, and a large naval base near the city of Bizerte. In 1961, the Tunisian President accused French troops of violating to Tunisian territory and ultimately demanded their removal from the country, in the process imposing a land and air blockade around the Bizerte area, an act that led to clashes between French and Tunisian troops. Amidst Security Council deliberations boycotted by France, Hammarskjöld embarked on a fact-finding trip to Tunisia from July 24th to 27th, 1961 based on an appeal from Tunisian President Bourguiba, and

entirely on his on authority as he had done in the Laos case two years earlier.[372] President de Gaulle reacted negatively to Hammarskjöld's independent initiative, considered Hammarskjöld an "interloper", and condemned the U.N. intervention as an intrusion on sovereign Francophone affairs.[373] The stage was thus set for what would undoubtedly become a humiliating fact-finding trip for Hammarskjöld.

After his consultations with the Tunisian president, Hammarskjöld decided to visit the Bizerte French Naval base on July 26th 1961 without prior explicit[374] permission from the French authorities.[375] In spite of his public statements to the effect that his trip to the naval base was intended at getting the French side of the story, Dag Hammarskjöld and his delegation were halted by French press troopers on the outskirts of Bizerte, had their automobiles searched, were told that their authority was not "recognized", and had their request for a meeting with the French commanding officer declined.[376] Hammarskjöld's close aide Brian Urquhart described the scene as follows:

> ...at 3:40 PM, the party arrived at the canal outside Bizerte, where they were stopped by French paratroops. The Secretary-General's car was followed by several press vehicles, while other newsmen had cameras already mounted when he arrived, so the paratroops would have been in no doubt as to his identity. They demanded, nonetheless, to search the car for weapons. Hammarskjöld protested strongly, but the paratroopers insisted that they had their orders and could not know for sure whether he was really Hammarskjöld or not.... Hammarskjöld and his party went on to the Governor's residence in Bizerte, where Spinelli telephoned Admiral Amman. The admiral expressed his regrets that the incident, claiming they had been no time to warn the French paratroopers of the Secretary-General's arrival, and then, evidently under instructions, excused himself from meeting Hammarskjöld.[377]

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[372] Heller,
the United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1961, 79.
[373] Ibid., 79
[374] Hammarskjöld had informed the French Consul in Tunisia of his decision to visit Bizerte, but did not secure explicit permission from Paris.
[375] Ibid., 80
[376] Ibid., 80
[377] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold,* 537.

Hammarskjöld's diplomatic initiatives ultimately yielded little- his three proposed Security Council draft resolutions were not adopted by the Council in part because the U.S. and the British were reluctant to cast a negative vote against a fellow NATO member and western ally.[378] This outcome essentially marked the end of his involvement in the Bizerte; when the crisis was eventually resolved via direct French-Tunisian negotiations as opposed to a U.N. initiative.[379] Ultimately, Bizerte demonstrated the limits of the Secretary-General's effectiveness when faced with a determined P-5 principal.

5.3.4: Institutionalist Response to the Realist Backlash

Informal (Unquantifiable) Autonomy

Up to this point in the thesis, I have restricted my definition of "autonomy" to instances where the Secretary-General intervened in international crises, and to varying degrees, without authorization from the Security Council. This definition was clear-cut enough to code and quantify in our logit and ordered-logit models. However the historical evidence shows that cases of informal autonomy (i.e. autonomy that occurred within the context of a Security Council mandate) were more significant than one would expect, especially after the Cold War- significant enough to cause the same level of backlash that we saw with Hammarskjöld's more overt and assertive autonomy. Informal autonomy in this instance refers to "ex post" autonomy, i.e. autonomy that occurs after a P-5 mandate has been granted, not before. In the data chapter, I already coded all cases of ex ante P-5 mandate as being under the rubric of P-5 mandate interventions. Informal autonomy however is very difficult to quantify in the context of this project, but is nevertheless important enough to address based on its historical significance. This section will briefly discuss the tenure of Boutros-Ghali, who covert autonomous initiatives earned him the wrath of the Clinton administration

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[378] Heller,
the United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1961, 80.
[379] Ibid., 81

and ultimately a U.S. veto against a second term of Office.

Boutros-Ghali: The "New Hammarskjöld"

Boutros-Ghali became Secretary-General at a unique moment in the U.N.'s history-
when the P-5 briefly shared a multilateral global vision with United Nations at the
center. The U.N. had enjoyed an elevated status in 1992 when the Security Council
met at the level of heads of state and government for the first time ever, and made a
commitment to peace enforcement as well as to unenhanced diplomatic role with the
Secretary-General's office. What followed this historic summit was "the most eventful
and active period in the U.N.'s half-century of existence" as characterized by 10 major
peace operations, a more than doubling of the Secretary-General's diplomatic
intervention rate, and five mega conferences all within a five-year span, from 1992 to
1997.[380] Boutros-Ghali was able to finalize peace initiatives that his predecessor de
Cuéllar had launched in places such as Cambodia, Mozambique, South Africa, El
Salvador, and Guatemala. However there were also some negatives: the United
Nations faced severe budgetary constraints after 1993 do you do the reluctance of the
U.S. government to pay its financial dues to the organization, and also the U.N.'s
failure to enforce peace in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. It was in the context of these
failures that Boutros-Ghali's informal autonomy ultimately cost him his job.

There were two primary causes of Boutros-Ghali's friction with the United States: his
innate personal traits and his informal autonomy. Not long into the start of his term of
Office, Boutros-Ghali came across as having a detestable personality, something that
led his critics to start using adjectives such as "independent", "outspoken", "arrogant",
and "heavy-handed" to describe him.[381] He began asserting himself in the Security

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[380] Stephen F. Burgess,
the United Nations Under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-1997, ed. George J. Lankevich, Vol. 6
(Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 195.
[381] Ibid., 177

Council to a greater extent than any of his predecessors had done by frequently telling the Council what they should and should not do about immediate crises- something that surprised many.[382] At first, Boutros-Ghali got away with this style because he had come into office during a period of multilateral idealism, as already mentioned, in which both the Bush and Clinton administrations tolerated a somewhat more outspoken and energetic Secretary-General.[383] Also, he had promised that he would serve only one term of office and as such, is outspokenness was not of particular concern to the U.S. and the other P-5 states.

However U.S. attitudes towards Boutros-Ghali changed after the latter's more blunt and caustic public criticisms of the Security Council. For example, in 1995 he publicly criticized the Security Council for ""micromanaging" peacekeeping operations at the expense of his authority and that of ground commanders", and further criticized "certain governments" for "demanding strong and costly action in world crises and then failing to support it."[384] At the peak of the Bosnian conflict in 1992, Boutros-Ghali criticized the "expenditure of men and money on what he called 'a white man's war' while the Security Council took a pass on yet more brutal conflicts in Africa."[385] Boutros-Ghali also frequently criticized the United States for failing to pay its U.N. dues and overall projected a tone that a lot of people in the U.S. Congress and the Clinton administration did not like.[386] To make matters worse, these events coincided with what James Traub has called Boutros-Ghali's "extreme bad luck"- i.e. evaporation of the American multilateral idealism that had peaked in the early 1990s and dissipated in 1993 because of the tragic events in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, combined with the conservative Republican victory in the 1994; the combination of

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[382] Ibid., 178
[383] Ibid., 177
[384] New York Times, "Boutros-Ghali Criticizes Interference in Peacekeeping,"
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Boutros-Ghali-Criticizes-Interference-in-3049311.php (accessed March 11, 2014).
[385] Traub, *The Best Intentions : Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power*, 43.
[386] Ibid., 63

these factors constituted a "toxic combination" of negative public opinion and a hostile U.S. Congress towards the U.N. and Boutros-Ghali himself.[387]

Operationally speaking, Boutros-Ghali's informal autonomy under P-5 mandates proved especially divisive in the cases of Bosnia and Somalia. On Bosnia, Boutros-Ghali carried on the Security Council mandate that had been granted to his predecessor Javier Pérez de Cuéllar by the Security Council, but Boutros-Ghali insisted on an additional clause to the mandate: that of his Office having a decisive input on where and when NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb artillery positions could be ordered- this as part of his efforts to protect U.N. peacekeepers that might be in harm's way.[388] This later became known as the "dual key" confrontation between the U.S. and Boutros-Ghali- and later, when it was determined that NATO warplanes had not taken decisive action against Bosnian Serb gunners, the United States blamed this outcome on Boutros-Ghali.[389] During the same Bosnian conflict, Boutros-Ghali accused the Security Council of "using phrases and making demands that it knows cannot be implemented, in order to please public opinion" and of "using the United Nations as a substitute for making their own hard decisions and allocating adequate resources."[390]

On Somalia, Boutros-Ghali had a public disagreement with the United States just after the Black Hawk Down incident when US Secretary of State Warren Christopher asked him not to make a pre-planned trip Somalia because it would "aggravate the situation" and "fuel unrest."[391] However Boutros-Ghali refused and proceeded with the trip anyway, later explaining his rationale as follows:

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[387] Ibid., 62
[388] Burgess,
the United Nations Under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-1997, 179.
[389] Ibid., 179
[390] Ibid., 179-180
[391] Boutros-Ghali later wrote in his memoir that the real reason for this request was so the United States could implement an exit strategy without losing face, and "extricate itself unilaterally from Somalia and then see the international community's involvement there closed out"- see Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished : A U.N.-U.S. Saga*, 110.

My U.N. colleagues urged me to do what the United States wanted and stay away. I was about to take their advice when the White House revealed to the press that the United States had told me not to go Somalia. This put me into an impossible situation. Under the U.N. Charter the Secretary-General is not to accept instructions from a member state. The United States could be oblivious to this principle, but I could not. Now I had to go.[392]

This is an example of an instance where the Secretary-General did have a P-5 mandate for his diplomatic activities in a particular crisis, but developed a tendency to assert his independence in the context of that mandate- in this instance publicly disagreeing with the sole superpower. This incident only added to the list of complaints that the Clinton administration and the U.S. Congress would have against Boutros-Ghali and did not bode well for his prospects of re-election. All this led to his being dubbed "The New Hammarskjöld" and ultimately his being vetoed for a second term of office.

5.4: Conclusion

This chapter has convincingly demonstrated that the Secretary-General is likely to assert formal autonomy in conflicts that elicit strong P-5 interests, and especially in the inter-state conflicts where conflict-specific P-5 interests are easier to measure. The chapter has also presented evidence in favor of formal autonomy during instances of P-5 preference convergence (although this evidence not as strong as that of P-5 mandated interventions under similar circumstances). These findings indicate that P-5 interests are not an inhibitor to the Secretary-General's intervention behavior when we focus on just his autonomous interventions. Further, the Secretary-General exerts formal autonomy as a principle and not as an opportunistic strategy based on conflict-specific P-5 dynamics.

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[392] Ibid., 110

What this chapter has done is to reveal the most important finding in the thesis: the negative P-5 effect that we found in Chapter 4 masks two different phenomena. First, when a conflict elicits strong P-5 interests, the probability of the Secretary-General intervening based on a Security Council mandate goes down, however in the absence of a P-5 mandate, the probability of autonomous SG action goes up.

Our broad finding then is that the realist assertion of SG inaction whenever a conflict elicits strong P-5 interests is rather simplistic. On the contrary, the picture gets more complicated once we split the intervention dependent variable and examine autonomous interventions on their own. Using that rationale, the realist predictions hold true only for Security Council mandated interventions, whereas the institutionalist predictions hold true for the autonomous interventions. This is again the core contribution of the thesis and demonstrates a mechanism of autonomy in the face of P-5 conflict.

Chapter 6: Why the Secretary-General Matters: Case Study Evidence

Opening Remarks

This chapter focuses on three case studies selected to showcase the relevance of the Secretary-General's conflict diplomacy: the U.S.-China 1954-1955, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the Lebanon Hostages Crisis of the late 1980s/early 1990s. The cases have been selected based on the following criteria: 1) they all elicited the strong parochial interest of one or more P-5 states, 2) the Secretary-General intervened autonomously and not based on a mandate from the Security Council, and 3) the diplomatic intervention was ultimately successful and publicly lauded by the crisis actors, including the P-5 state/s in question. These dynamics allow us to make greater sense of the hypotheses we devised in Chapter 2, as well as the quantitative findings from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

The core of these case studies is their showcasing the Secretary-General's ability to exert autonomy in instances of P-5 deadlock. Two of the cases (U.S. China Hostages Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis) have been selected based on "Scenario A" in our 2x2 hypotheses table in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, where strong parochial P-5 interests were coupled with strong collective U.N. charter interests. Out hypotheses then presented two conflicting predictions from realists and institutionalists for that scenario: first the realist prediction that the Secretary-General is unlikely to intervene, let al.one exert autonomy, due to fear of sanctions by P-5 powers who have shown a propensity to criticize and discourage any autonomy as we saw in section 2.3.1.

The institutionalist prediction on the other was such a scenario makes it highly likely that the Secretary-General would exert autonomy given the space that a split multiple principal would afford him, and also the support (formal or informal) that he would receive from the majority of the member states in pushing for collective U.N. interests. For institutionalists, stronger U.N. Charter interests will almost always entail a high-profile intervention and also autonomy irrespective of opposition from one or more P-

5 states. These case studies showcase exactly why our U.N. Charter variables prevailed in both our quantitative chapters.

The Chinese Hostages Crisis was a classic "Scenario A" situation in which the United States and the USSR, as veto wielding Security Council members, differed on how to handle the issue of 10+ US military personnel held in China as prisoners. The Soviet Union had opposed virtually every Korean War related resolution, and both the Security Council and the General Assembly were split on what to do about the hostage issue. The hostage crisis also elicited the collective U.N. interest because there was a real danger that China and the U.S. might go to war based on the concurrent Taiwan Straits Crisis. The United States enjoyed the support of the majority of General Assembly member states at that point in time, and went on to pass, with help from its allies, a symbolic General Assembly resolution that strongly condemned China and requested that Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld negotiate the release of the U.S. hostages. The USSR and its Communist bloc allies voted against this resolution, a dynamic that made this a classic split multiple principal situation that created room for the Secretary-General's autonomy.

As the case study will show, Hammarskjöld went on to intervene even though he only had the backing of the United States and its allies, but did so on his own terms, distancing himself from the condemnatory anti-China General Assembly resolution, emphasizing the autonomy and independence of his office as a standard-bearer of the U.N. charter, and also undertaking a field mediation trip to the crisis theater, the first time that a Secretary-General had ever done so. He ultimately succeeded in securing the release of the prisoners and forever changed the scope as well as public perception of the Office of the Secretary-General.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was another classic "Scenario A" situation: the United States and the USSR almost went to war, and the Security Council was powerless to do anything about it because both powers wielded the veto. The real possibility of a nuclear holocaust turned this crisis into one that affected the collective U.N. interest, and galvanized a number of member states to encourage Secretary-General U Thant to autonomously intervene and try to defuse this crisis. U Thant autonomously made a public intervention which at first was not well received by both the Americans and the Russians (in line with realist expectations). He not only faced opposition and misgivings from both the U.S. and Russian Permanent Representatives at the United Nations, but also, as declassified records will show, from the highest authorities in the United States and U.K. governments.

The trepidation with which U Thant's autonomous intervention was initially treated is captured in a telephone conversation between President John F. Kennedy and his closest ally, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who upon hearing President Kennedy's read-out of the text of U Thant's initial public appeal, commented "I think that's a dangerous message he sent" – full citation in the main text. However the initial misgivings were soon toned down after Nikita Khrushchev replied favorably to U Thant's initial appeal, a reply that is widely credited as having been a first and indispensable step towards the diffusion of this crisis. The case study will show how U Thant went on to play a central and effective role in this crisis, and was later credited publicly by both sides as having contributed significantly to the crisis abatement.

The Lebanon Hostage Crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s is more of a "Scenario B" instance based on our 2 x 2 hypotheses table in section 2.4 of Chapter 2. This was a situation in which the Western P-5 states- the United States, Britain, and France, had a very strong parochial interest in resolving the hostages issue because their nationals when being targeted for kidnappings in the Middle East. This crisis does not fit the mold of "Scenario A" because unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, its wider implications

barely affected the majority of U.N. member states (the Lebanon terrorist were conducting an asymmetric struggle against a just the western great powers), the P-5 states, e.g. Great Britain, initially preferred to deal with the hostage takers directly. Again, in spite of the initial misgivings, the United States and its Western allies ultimately accepted an offer from Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to mediate the crisis based in part on the prestige and respect he had earned with the Iranians based on his successful mediation of the Iran-Iraq war. Pérez de Cuéllar was ultimately effective at mediating the crisis, and secured the release of all the hostages. His role was publicly acclaimed by President George H.W. Bush who presented him and his SRSG Giandomenico Picco with prestigious awards at a White House ceremony.

Ultimately, these three case studies showcase the point that the institutionalist viewpoint which prevailed in our quantitative tests can be contextualized and validated with historical case studies.

1954 U.S. Airmen in China

6.1.0: Introduction and Background

The 1954 crisis over the U.S. airmen in China constitutes an interesting case study because it pitted a P-5 superpower against a major military power (the People's Republic of China) that was not yet a United Nations member and was closely allied with the USSR. This case marked a number of firsts: it was the first time that a U.N. Secretary-General made a high-profile public diplomatic intervention without a mandate from the Security Council. Second, it marked the first time that a Secretary-General explicitly distanced himself from a U.N. resolution (and thereby went beyond what the U.N. Charter had envisioned) and instead carved out an independent and autonomous role for himself as a basis for his intervention. Third, this marked the first time that a Secretary-General would undertake a field trip to a crisis theater as part of his diplomatic intervention- prior to this, Secretaries-General had tended to dispatch an SRSG to do the mediation on the ground- but this time a precedent was being set with the Secretary-General asserting himself as the main mediator on the ground. The success of this intervention would set the standards for later Secretaries-General in terms of what a Secretary-General could do to defuse a major international crisis.

This crisis originated from the downing of two U.S. military aircraft on Chinese soil during the final days of the Korean War. Two U.S. civilians, presumably CIA agents, were shot down in their C-47 transport plane while flying over Manchuria during the Korean War- they were "evidently attempting to drop Chinese Nationalist agents into Communist China."[393] In a separate incident, a U.S. B-29 bomber carrying a crew of 11 fliers was shot down over the People's Republic of China during a leaflet dropping mission in January 1953. The Chinese government first confirmed the capture of these men "for violation of Chinese territorial air" on June 10, 1954 during the Geneva

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[393] Stanley Meisler, *United Nations : The First Fifty Years*, 1st ed. (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 85.

conference on Indochina. Although the focus of the Geneva conference was Indo-China not the Korean War, U.S. and Chinese representatives nevertheless met privately to discuss two issues: first the issue of Americans, both military and civilian, still being held in China, and second the issue of Chinese students in the United States who, the Communist Chinese government complained, were being prevented from returning to mainland China.[394] No agreement was reached but in the course of the talks the Chinese confirmed that, besides some American civilians, fifteen United States Air Force men were being held for "violation of Chinese territorial air"[395] but did not provide concrete information as to what they would do with the POWs. Then, on November 24, 1954, Radio Peking announced that 11 U.S. airmen, as well as two "special agents of the CIA", had been convicted of espionage by a military tribunal and sentenced to prison terms ranging from four years to life.[396]

The publicizing of the capture, trial, and conviction of these American military personnel immediately triggered public outcry in the United States. The United States sent "the strongest possible protest" to the Chinese government; the Pentagon asserted that the charges against the airmen were 'utterly false' and that "the continued wrongful detention of these citizens furnishes further proof of the... regime's disregard for accepted practices of international conduct."[397] On November 26 1954, two days after the Radio Peking announcement, the U.S. State Department sent an "unusually strong" note to China via Britain, "vigorously" protesting the imprisonment and calling for release of the men "forthwith" noting that the Chinese authorities "should bear in mind that the long list ... of outrages against American nationals, which the American people have borne with restraint, thus far, is significantly extended by the... announcement of November 23."[398] The powerful Republican leader in the Senate, William F. Knowland, called for a naval blockade of China if the men were not freed;

[394] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 415.
[395] Ibid., 415
[396] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 96-98.
[397] Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, 25.
[398] Ibid., 25

other public figures also called for forceful action if necessary, however the Eisenhower Administration, while pledging "tireless efforts" to free the men, opposed resort to the use of force.[399] Thus, an international crisis of significant proportion was at hand.

The Chinese government on its part ignored the diplomatic protest, leaving the United States in a major dilemma as to what option to pursue. Four courses of action were open to the Eisenhower administration: (1) War with China, which was not a nuclear weapon state at this point. However in light of the Korean War stalemate and the demonstrated cost of going to war with the Chinese, President Eisenhower instinctively rejected this option against the advice of some advisors who believed a fresh showdown with the Chinese would occur anyway because of the concurrent Taiwan straits crisis, and that time was not on America's side;[400] (2) Blockade- this option was deemed impractical as well as provocative; (3) Joint action by nations that had signed the Manila Pact- this option was rejected after it was determined that other countries would be reluctant to assist in a blockade; (4) United Nations diplomacy-this was deemed the preferred course of action.[401]

President Eisenhower went on to hold a press conference during which he asserted that since the U.S. personnel had flown over China under U.N. command during the Korean War, "the U.N. now has a responsibility to try and free them... how the U.N. can possibly disabuse itself of a feeling of responsibility in this matter and retain its self-respect, I wouldn't know."[402] The stage therefore was set for the U.N. to discuss the matter and determine what course of action to take, bearing in mind that the People's Republic of China was not yet a member state.

[399] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 415.
[400] Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, 25-26.
[401] Ibid., 26
[402] Meisler, *United Nations : The First Fifty Years*, 85.

A predictable Soviet veto on the Security Council (as had been the case with all Korean War draft resolutions) necessitated bringing the matter to the General Assembly, where the U.S. enjoyed majority support as of 1955, for the passage of a non-binding but symbolically powerful resolution. Preliminary U.S. diplomatic consultations indicated that the fifteen other U.N. members-states who had contributed forces to the Korean action would join in sponsoring a resolution that would declare the imprisonment of the U.S. military personnel a violation of the Korean War Armistice Agreement on repatriation of prisoners of war, and call for their release.[403] A draft resolution was then submitted for discussion in the General Assembly on December 8 1954, pitting the U.S. and its allies against the Soviet bloc members: Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, and the U.S.S.R. itself, all of who vigorously opposed the draft resolution. The result was a final December 10 vote of 47 to 5 in favor of the resolution, with seven abstentions. At the insistence of the United States, and against European reservations, the resolution issued a strong condemnation of China- the following was the exact wording of the December 10 resolution (General Assembly Resolution 906)[404]:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item proposed by the United States of America as the Unified Command regarding eleven members of the United States armed forces under the United Nations Command captured by Chinese forces when undertaking a mission on 12 January 1953, at the direction of the United Nations Command,
Recalling the provisions of article III of the Korean Armistice Agreement regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war,
1.   *Declares* that the detention and imprisonment of the eleven American airmen, members of the United Nations Command, referred to in document A/2830, and the detention of all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command desiring repatriation is a violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement;
2.   *Condemns*, as contrary to the Korean Armistice Agreement, the trial and conviction of prisoners of war illegally detained after 25 September 1953;
3.   *Requests* the Secretary-General, in the name of the United Nations, to seek the release, in accordance with the Korean Armistice Agreement, of these eleven

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[403] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 416.
[404] The draft resolution was adopted without change, becoming General Assembly Resolution 906 (IX).

United Nations Command personnel, and all other captured personnel of the United
Nations Command still detained;

4.   *Requests* the Secretary-General to make, by the means most appropriate in
his judgment, continuing and unremitting efforts to this end and to report progress
to all Members on or before 31 December 1954.[405]

The United States further informed the General Assembly that the Chinese
government had admitted that they were also holding four U.S. fighter pilots shot
down near the Yalu River between October 1952 and January 1953 during the Korean
War, and as such, although the resolution was not revised to mention those four
airmen, there was an informal understanding that it would apply to these additional
four men as well.[406] It was against this background, and the specific request from the
General Assembly resolution that Dag Hammarskjöld was presented with the
challenge of finding a diplomatic strategy to negotiate the release of the U.S.
servicemen from China.

6.1.1: Institutional and Geopolitical Challenges Vis-à-vis China

In embarking on this intervention, Hammarskjöld faced a number of challenges, both
institutional and geopolitical.

The institutional challenge was four-fold:

First, the General Assembly resolution did not represent the unified voice of the P-5 or
of the collective U.N. membership, and hence Hammarskjöld could not really claim to
be acting "in the name of the United Nations" as the resolution had asked him to.
Instead, this was a resolution representing the will of just the U.S. and its allies who at
that point happened to constitute a majority of the General Assembly membership; it
was opposed entirely by the Soviet Union and its allies. This lack of member-state
unanimity presented a problem for Hammarskjöld because he would be negotiating

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[405] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag
Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 417.
[406] Ibid., 417

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with China, a country whose communist regime was firmly aligned with the Soviet bloc at the time.

Second, the General Assembly mandate represented unchartered waters for the Organization- never before had a Secretary-General been asked to undertake such a politically sensitive assignment, one involving polarized great powers, "in the name of the organization." The nearest thing to a precedent was the action by the General Assembly in 1948, repeated in 1949, instructing Hammarskjöld's predecessor Trygve Lie to enlist the services of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies in arranging the repatriation from Yugoslavia and other East European countries of thousands of Greek children who had been removed from their homes during the bloody guerrilla fighting in northern Greece from 1946 to 1948."[407] However these earlier mandates were purely humanitarian in nature and were approved by all U.N. member states including the Soviet bloc; the China resolution on the other hand had a markedly anti-Chinese tone and was opposed by the Soviet bloc; it had the makings of a political "hot potato." The Chinese government was already up in arms condemning the GA resolution- Chinese radio broadcasts were already rejecting the argument that the fliers were prisoners of war and instead arguing that they were spies who had intruded into China, been caught, tried, and convicted, and that therefore the provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement were not applicable to them.[408]

Third, China was not yet a member state of the United Nations, and was therefore not likely to be fazed by a General Assembly resolution, especially one as divisive as Resolution 906. Since its 1949 formation, the People's Republic of China had campaigned vigorously to take its rightful place at the U.N., but the General Assembly (at that point dominated by U.S. and its allies) had rejected resolutions to this effect, instead preferring to allow the Chiang Kai-shek Government, which had fled to

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[407] Ibid., 417
[408] Ibid., 417

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Taiwan after being defeated, to continue as China's U.N. representative.[409] There was a brief moment in 1950 when it seemed like Washington's China policy might change, but this possibility was soon offset by Peking's intervention in the Korean War, a move that gave birth to fresh anti-Chinese feeling in both the U.S. and among the America's allies at the U.N.[410] In any case, the condemnatory nature of the resolution meant the Chinese were less likely to be receptive to U.N. overtures, and Hammarskjöld would face a major challenge in using that document as a basis for his negotiations with the Chinese.

As if lack of precedent, ongoing U.N. deadlock and China's non-membership were not enough hurdles, there was also the fact that China had ongoing disputes with the U.N. predating the hostage crisis. First, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution in February 1951 condemning China was an "aggressor" in the Korean War and another resolution in May 1951 requiring/asking all U.N. Member States to impose an embargo on China. Later, as the Korean War raged in the winter of 1950-1951, the Chinese government refused to engage in talks with U.N. Cease-Fire and Good Offices Committees headed by the President of the General Assembly, Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, who had a mandate from the Assembly to work for a negotiated end to the fighting in Korea.[411] Additionally, the Chinese were disgruntled with the U.N. over the issue of Korean War POWs- while the U.N. had passed a resolution condemning Chinese and North Korean "atrocities" against U.N. POWs, the Chinese complained when the U.N. did not do the same over alleged U.S. mistreatment of Chinese and North Korean POWs in South Korean camps at Pongam Island and Geoje Island; the Chinese also had issues with U.N. silence over perceived U.S. and South Korean breach[412] of the POW "indirect repatriation" agreement from the Korean War

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[409] Qu Xing, "International Negotiator: Mission Beijing," in *The Adventure of Peace: Dag Hammarskjöld and the Future of the U.N.*, eds. Sten Ask and Anna Mark-Jungkvist, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 50.

[410] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 94-95.

[411] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 418.

[412] The Chinese complained that the U.N. turned a blind eye to the Armistice breach in which a scheme drawn up by South Korea's Syngman Rhee Government and Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek Government

Armistice talks. These grievances led the Chinese government to conclude that the U.N. had "forfeited its eligibility and moral capacity to treat the Korea issue in a fair and reasonable way", and to unequivocally condemn Resolution 906 as "shameful." The ramification for Hammarskjöld's intervention was that the Chinese were unlikely to negotiate with him on the basis of the General Assembly resolution- the Chinese viewed the U.N. as a U.S. and western dominated organization that did not have their best interests at heart; Hammarskjöld would have to tread very carefully if he was to retain any hope of successfully carrying out his mandate.

From a geostrategic perspective, the hostages crisis was just one element in an escalating Chinese-American (Cold War fueled) conflict that was threatening to escalate into full-scale war. The Taiwan Straits crisis had been triggered in early September 1954, just two months before the Radio Peking hostage announcement, when Communist Chinese military forces had started shelling Quemoy Island just off the Chinese coast, which alongside the similar island of Matsu, and a handful of other islands, was in the hands of the besieged nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek.[413] The Chinese proclaimed the shelling a first step toward the liberation of Taiwan (Formosa); the unspoken objective may also have been "to eliminate convenient stepping stones for a possible Nationalist attack on the mainland supported by United States air and naval power."[414] The shelling was immediately followed by the formalization of U.S. support for Chiang Kai-shek via a mutual defense treaty which committed the U.S. to defend Taiwan if it was attacked from the mainland- this treaty was signed on December 2 while the U.S. administration was preparing to take up the issue of the prisoners at the U.N.[415] The U.S. government subsequently deployed its Seventh Fleet to patrol the Formosa (Taiwan) Strait, a move that heightened the probability of a naval conflict with Communist forces.

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ensured that tens of thousands of Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war were forcefully recruited into the armed forces of these two regimes, and were thus denied their right of repatriation.

[413] Meisler, *United Nations : The First Fifty Years*, 85.
[414] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 418.
[415] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 98.

All of a sudden, the fear of all-out war became real- Mao Tse-tung expressed "a readiness to sacrifice 300 million Chinese people in war, if need be."[416] British Prime Minister Winston Churchill feared the outbreak of World War III so much that he wrote President Eisenhower and opined that the Americans could easily "drown any would-be Chinese invaders of Formosa (Taiwan)" and therefore had no need to defend low (strategic) value islands of Quemoy and Matsu.[417] President Eisenhower tried to downplay World War III fears by declaring an ambiguous American policy that pledged the U.S. defense of Quemoy and Matsu if he determined that such an attack was prelude to a future invasion of Formosa; nevertheless he made his determination known to the Chinese by telling a news conference that he was prepared, if necessary, to use tactical atomic weapons against military targets in Asia.[418]

The Eisenhower administration's primary objective seems to have been "maintaining Taiwan as a powerful military base against Chinese Communist expansion"; however the Chinese Nationalists continued to publicly advocate for returning to the mainland, and had strong advocates in the United States, among them Republican Senator Knowland and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford.[419] Eisenhower's political party, the Republicans, were very vocal throughout, accusing the Truman (Democratic) administration of having "lost China" to the Communists, and characterizing communism as "monolithic and the Chinese as brainwashed figurines managed by the evil machinations of the post-Stalin Svengalis in the Kremlin."[420] Indeed, the atmosphere was one in which war mongering and saber rattling were the order of the day, and Hammarskjöld's prospects with the Chinese seemed very dim, at best.

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[416] Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, 34-35.
[417] Meisler, *United Nations : The First Fifty Years*, 86.
[418] Ibid., 86
[419] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 418.Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 48-61.
[420] Meisler, *United Nations : The First Fifty Years*, 86.

From the Chinese perspective, the open hostility with the United States had become "the most sensitive issue" in Chinese foreign policy- not only had Washington refused to the Peking communist government any diplomatic recognition, it publicly pledged support for the Kuomintang Government's "right" to continue representing China at the U.N. and engaged in direct combat with Chinese troops in Korea.[421] The U.S. had also signaled its opposition to the communists' "One China" goal by its signing of a Common Defense Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek's government in December 1954, a move that "sparked enormous indignation and anti-American protests in the People's Republic."[422]

Scholars such as Miller (1961) have argued that China's underlying objective in triggering this crisis may have been "to force the United States into direct negotiations for the release of the prisoners, thus extending *de facto* recognition to the Chinese government"[423], as well as to possibly force America into some impulsive course of action that would damage its standing as a leader of the western alliance. President Eisenhower echoed the second assumption when he stated at a press conference his belief that the Chinese action was a "deliberate attempt ... to goad us into some impulsive action in the hope of dividing us from our allies, breaking down and destroying all the work that has been going on over the past years, to build up a true coalition of free governments..."[424] Whatever the truth, the combination of these factors meant that Hammarskjöld's initiative was sure to be met with skepticism if not outright Chinese hostility- after all he was the Secretary-General of a "U.S.-dominated" institution that had done a lot between 1950 and 1954 to alienate and antagonize China.[425]

Thus, it was against the background of these institutional and geopolitical challenges that Hammarskjöld was asked to intervene in this crisis.

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[421] Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 50.
[422] Ibid., 50.
[423] Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, 28.
[424] Ibid., 28.
[425] Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 50.

6.1.2: Hammarskjöld's Intervention Strategy

Upon being tasked by the General Assembly to secure the release of the U.S. prisoners, Hammarskjöld executed a three-pronged strategy at the onset:

Public Neutrality

The first thing Hammarskjöld did was to avoid partial and impulsive public statements that might have antagonized the Soviet bloc and/or China itself. China's deep antagonism towards the U.S. and U.N. has already been outlined. The Soviet Union's attitude was a bit more complex- the superpower Cold War was less rigid in 1954 than it had been in 1950, the U.S.S.R. it was not a direct participant in this crisis, and had mellowed[426] a bit in its anti-U.S. posture following the Korean War Armistice Agreement and the passing of Joseph Stalin. However there was a risk that its anti-U.S. rancor in this matter, as evidence by its blocking of collective U.N. action, could have extended to the person of Dag Hammarskjöld if he had made any partial public statements.

Hammarskjöld avoided the pitfalls that doomed the career of his predecessor at the onset of the Korea War in 1950: Trygve Lie had been the first speaker when the Secretary Council met in emergency session on June 26, 1950, to discuss the invasion of South Korea. He "condemned in strong terms, with moral overtones" the actions of the Kim Il Sung regime; in contrast, Hammarskjöld "did not speak during the long debates on the procedure and substance of the U.S. prisoners question although he was active behind the scenes."[427] Hammarskjöld's statement upon being handed the General Assembly mandate also avoided partisan commentary and "gave the impression that he was interested only in carrying out the will of the Assembly."[428]

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[426] Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, 54.
[427] Ibid.
[428] Ibid.

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Hammarskjöld faced the delicate challenge of trying to resolve the hostage crisis at a time when it seemed likely that the U.S. and China might to go war with each other, as noted earlier. As a result, Hammarskjöld was very careful not to make public comments regarding the Taiwan Crisis that might have alienated either side during the hostage issue negotiations. For example, during a press conference on April 19, 1955, at the height of the hostage crisis, Hammarskjöld was asked by members of the U.N. Press Corp about why the United Nations was not involving itself in the Taiwan issue given the gravity of that crisis, and here is what he had to say:

Question: Since the Formosa question was again brought up, can you tell us why you feel that it is not the right time for the United Nations to look into it?[429]

Hammarskjöld: To put it in the simplest terms, I feel that other activities are still going on which should be permitted to run their full course, before the time has arrived for a more general approach. That is my feeling about it.[430]

Follow-Up Question: As regards the United Nations not looking into the Formosa question now but allowing other activities to take their course, does it not amount to abrogation of its responsibility?[431]

Hammarskjöld: No, it does not, because the United Nations responsibility is not only to act, but to act at the right moment and in the right way, and I hope that nobody will consider it wise for the United Nations to act irrespective of the value of action merely in order to show up with an action.[432]

Hammarskjöld responses to these questions were interestingly vague- it is quite easy to discern that he did not want to antagonize either the Eisenhower administration or the Chinese.

Ultimately, Hammarskjöld carefully avoided three things during the crisis: "he carefully avoided any public opinion on the validity of charges and counter-charges

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[429] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 477.

[430] Ibid., 477

[431] Ibid., 477

[432] Ibid., 477

made by various Member states; he carefully avoided suggesting publicly a solution for the prisoners of war problem beyond the specific mandate given to him by the General Assembly; he also carefully avoided referring to the airmen as United States airmen, but rather as United Nations personnel- which was technically the case."[433] This approach helped deflect any unnecessary and distracting public criticism, and enabled Hammarskjöld to keep his focus on the task at hand.

Decision to Travel to Peking

Second, as intense negotiations were taking place behind the scenes on how to word the General Assembly resolution, the United States and its allies decided to entrust the negotiation responsibility to the Secretary-General as opposed to the President of the General Assembly because they "believed that he was more likely to get results than anyone else", and with Hammarskjöld's tacit acquiescence, they inserted the clause involving his Office in the resolution. Hammarskjöld's close confidant and veteran U.N. diplomat Brian Urquhart summarized the behind the scenes machinations as follows:

> The original idea had been to ask the President of the Assembly, Eelco van Kleffens of The Netherlands, and van Kleffens got as far as drafting a message to Chou En-lai and looking for an expert on China to be his representative... Hammarskjöld had felt obliged to point out that the President of the Assembly did not function as such after the session was over and that there would therefore inevitably be procedural complications. Additional disadvantages were the Netherlands' sponsorship of the resolution condemning Peking and its membership in NATO, both of which might well disqualify van Kleffens as a negotiator with Peking... On the morning of December 6, (U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations) Lodge informed Hammarskjöld that Washington's ideas had changed and that the intention was to involve him personally in conducting the negotiations, since it was believed that he was more likely to get results than anyone else. To Lodge's request for his own reactions, Hammarskjöld replied that if he was requested by the General Assembly to

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[433] Ibid., 477

undertake a mission of this kind under Article 98 of the Charter, he clearly could not refuse.[434]

The American determination to have Hammarskjöld undertake the negotiations was very likely a result of the inadequate channels of communication that existed between Communist China and the United States, in part due to the latter's refusal to diplomatically recognize the former. At this point in time, the Chinese would not trust any Western power to be an honest broker, whereas the Secretary-General had the confidence of not only the United States but also a vast majority of other Member states, and was therefore in a strategic position to open channels of communication with Peking.[435] There was also the fact that "by mid-1954, China was again interested in gaining admission to the United Nations"; therefore, it is very likely that the American calculus concluded that the Peking government was less likely to rebuff and offend the chief of the Organization it wished to join.[436] Thus, the risk of failure aside, the stage was set for Hammarskjöld's personal involvement.

The immediate question was whether Hammarskjöld would appoint an SRSG to represent him in negotiations with China (as had been the case in previous high profile U.N. interventions in India-Pakistan and Palestine), or whether he would take the unprecedented step of negotiating himself. Hammarskjöld ultimately decided to make a field trip to Peking and negotiate directly with the Chinese Premier, Zhou En Lai, in what would be the first time that any Secretary-General had undertaken such a trip, and also the first time that a Secretary-General was making a high profile intervention without a mandate from the Security Council. His rationale was that an SRSG would not have enough clout for a mission of this importance, as Brian Urquhart once again explains what happened behind the scenes:

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[434] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 98-99. Aside from the General Assembly resolution, Hammarskjold was also informed by Henry Cabot Lodge that Great Britain and France, America's two principal Western allies, agreed with this US view. See Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 81.
[435] Miller, *Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy*, 35.
[436] Ibid., 35.

Hammarskjöld had first thought of using an intermediary, perhaps of Swiss nationality, but he soon came to the conclusion that such an arrangement would not carry enough weight. After another two hours of thought he decided that he personally must make the effort, as he called it, "to crash the gate" by asking for a personal interview with Chou En-Lai in Peking.[437]

Upon making this decision, Hammarskjöld sent two personal cables to Premier Zhou En-Lai within minutes of the General Assembly's passage of Resolution 906. The first cable was published and publicized just hours later; in it, Hammarskjöld was very careful not to mention the controversial resolution (which the Chinese were sure to condemn), but rather just focused on the specific task that he has been asked to undertake, as per the highlighted portion of the publicized cable below. At first he intended to send this publicized message through the Swedish Embassy in Peking, but this would have entailed coding, transmission, and delivery delays, so he decided to send it by direct commercial cable; "by this means his message could be in Chou En-Lai's hands almost as quickly as news dispatches reporting the Assembly's vote and the (anti-Chinese) text of the resolution adopted."[438] The publicized cable read as follows:

New York, 10 December 1954- The General Assembly of the United Nations has requested me to seek the release of 11 United Nations Command personnel captured by Chinese forces on 12 January 1953 as well as of all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command still detained. Taking into consideration all facts and circumstances **the Secretary-General must, in this case, take on himself a special responsibility.** In light of the concern I feel about the issue, I would appreciate an opportunity to take this matter up with you personally. For that reason I would ask you whether you could receive me in Peking. I would suggest a visit soon after 26 December and would, if you accept my proposal, ask you what dates at about that time would be suitable to you. (Signed) Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General, United Nations.[439]

In the second (confidential) cable sent to Chou through Indian channels, Hammarskjöld mentioned the "extraordinary nature of the initiative, this being the first time that the Secretary-General of the United Nations personally visits a capital for negotiations"...and suggested establishing "a confidential contact through the

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[437] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 99.
[438] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 420-421.
[439] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 100.

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Chinese Ambassador in Stockholm, through whom practical arrangements could be made", and mentioned that he himself would be in Stockholm on December 19 and 20.[440]

The rationale behind Hammarskjöld's rapid dispatchment of the two cables was that "a delay of a day or two might have opened the possibility of a Chinese rejection of the resolution before his message arrived, something that would have made it difficult if not impossible for Zhou En-Lai to respond affirmatively to his proposal to come to Peking.[441] Ultimately, the hope was for the Chinese Government to accept his visit without necessarily recognizing the General Assembly resolution. Upon sending the two cables, Hammarskjöld waited 24 hours before publicizing his message- whose text is reproduced below:

Hammarskjöld's two-track strategy proved to be spot-on in terms of delivering the desired effect: on the same day that the Resolution 906 passed, Zhou En-Lai addressed the issue of the U.S. airmen at a meeting with the visiting Burmese Prime Minister U Nu by saying the following: "We will not change our verdicts on the eleven American spies in the slightest simply because of America's clamoring, Britain's echoing, and the U.N. General Assembly's resolution."[442] However he made no public comment about Hammarskjöld's proposed visit because the Secretary-General's cable had indeed arrived before the news of Resolution 906; instead he set about working behind the scenes on a separate reply to Hammarskjöld.

Declassified Chinese Foreign Ministry archives[443] have revealed that Zhou En-Lai called in the principal officials at China's Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Public

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[440] Ibid., 101.
[441] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 420.
[442] Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 52.
[443] The Chinese Foreign Ministry archives are not available in English- instead they were translated by the Chinese scholar Qu Xing, Op. Cit., and used in her book chapter Ibid. Qu Xing does not provide specific citation for the archives, except acknowledge that the consulted, translated, and quoted from them.

Security for two consecutive days of meetings on 14-15 December to work out a reply to Hammarskjöld's cable. The team decided that the General Assembly resolution and the U.N. Secretary-General's proposed visit should be treated separately: "We should express our formal position but not turn down Hammarskjöld's request for a visit."[444] It seemed Hammarskjöld's gamble had paid off.

On 17 December, Zhou En-Lai responded to Hammarskjöld via two telegrams. The two-fold reply from the Chinese Premier was rather interesting- the first telegram welcomed Hammarskjöld's request for negotiations and pledged to welcome him to Peking, but in the second telegram, Zhou En-Lai stressed that he would be willing to receive Hammarskjöld as a standard-bearer of the U.N. Charter and not as a conduit to the Western powers and the condemnatory GA resolution they had passed. The first telegram received in New York read as follows:

> Peking, December 17, 1954- I acknowledge the receipt of your cable of December 10, 1954, in which you indicated your wish to visit China. Regarding the case of the United States spies mentioned in your cable, our position has been set forth in my other cable addressed to you. In the interest of peace and relaxation of international tension, I am prepared to receive you in our capital, Peking, to discuss your pertinent questions. We welcome you to China. Please decide for yourself the date of your visit and inform us of your decision. Chou En-Lai, Prime Minister of the State Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China.[445]

Zhou En-Lai second reply read in part as follows:

> ...deciding the case of foreign spies captured in China is a matter that comes under Chinese domestic jurisdiction... It is totally unreasonable for the U.N. to attempt to interfere with China's decisions in the U.S. espionage case, based on conclusive evidence, instead of condemning America's violation of the U.N. Charter by dispatching spies to invade China for subversive purposes. Amid American clamor and manipulation, the U.N. ignores the facts that 48,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war were detained and miserably kidnapped. However, it vilifies China's verdict in the case of the eleven U.S. spies. This cannot but stir up enormous indignation among the Chinese people.[446]

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[444] Ibid., 52.
[445] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 423.
[446] Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 52.

This second telegram further "sought to emphasize the distinction between Hammarskjöld's mission and the General Assembly's resolution" and asserted that the General Assembly resolution was "absurd and slanderous" while accusing the United States of aggression in "seizing" Taiwan and the Pescadores and concluding a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek.[447] "The Chinese people desire peace," Chou En-Lai concluded, "but they will never beg for peace at the expense of their territory and sovereignty."[448] China's strategy was thus clear: "it was not prepared to make any concessions on the question of the American airmen, which meant Hammarskjöld's mission to seek their immediate release was an impossible one...however Zhou's approval of his visit to China offered Hammarskjöld an opportunity to display his diplomatic skills and move the issue towards a solution."[449]

Peking Formula- Re-Interpreting the U.N. Charter

Upon receiving the replies from Zhou En-Lai, Hammarskjöld began to publicly emphasize the spirit of Article 100 of the U.N. Charter which emphasized the authority of his Office as an independent entity that did not answer to any government but rather advanced the interests of international peace and security under the U.N. Charter. His end-game was to devise and institutionalize what he called the "the Peking formula"- his strategy of communicating to the Chinese Premier that he was not party to the condemnations contained in the General Assembly resolution, but rather that he was coming as an independent agent representing the interests of international peace and security under the U.N. Charter. His close confidant Sir Brian Urquhart summarized this approach in a paragraph that became a reference point for later Secretaries-General such as Kofi Annan[450] who went back to read it prior to embarking on a similar trip to meet Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in 1997:

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[447] Cordier and Foote, Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956, 421.
[448] Ibid., 421.
[449] Xing, International Negotiator: Mission Beijing, 52-53.
[450] See Traub, The Best Intentions : Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power, 80.

Hammarskjöld explained that in fulfilling his obligation to try to reduce international tensions anywhere in the world, the Secretary-General did not work for any one nation or even for a majority of nations as expressed in a vote in the General Assembly but under his constitutional responsibility for the general purposes set out in the Charter, which were applicable to members and non-members of the United Nations alike. It was on this basis that he had come to Peking. The General Assembly resolution had brought to the fore a case where Hammarskjöld had both the right and the duty to act as Secretary-General, but the Charter of the United Nations, not the condemnation of the General Assembly in its resolution of December 10, formed the legal basis for his present visit. This formulation of the basis for independent intervention by the Secretary-General later became known as the "Peking formula."[451]

Hammarskjöld then made the trip to Peking in January 1955 to hold negotiations with the Chinese Premier which were to last for five days. What was unfolding in this case was nothing short of extraordinary: this was the first time that a Secretary-General of the United Nations was visiting a foreign capital for negotiations. In approaching the Chinese Premier so publicly and directly, Hammarskjöld was risking a rebuff that could have potentially destroyed the possibility of getting the prisoners released, and also served as a serious blow to the prestige his Office and person.[452] This was a particularly delicate mission given the increasing tensions between the United States and China over the crisis and the angry mood of the American public.[453]

It was thus against such a background that Hammarskjöld commenced his negotiations with Premier Zhou En-Lai for the release of the American prisoners.

6.1.3: Negotiations with Zhou En-Lai

Hammarskjöld flew into Peking on Hammarskjöld flew into Peking on January 5, 1955, and spent five days negotiating the POW issue with Zhou En-Lai. By all accounts, Hammarskjöld and his delegation were received with the utmost courtesy.[454]

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[451] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 105.

[452] Ibid., 105.

[453] Ibid., 105. Even the American Permanent Representative to the U.N. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. asserted later on that in offering to go to Peking, Hammarskjöld had "put his life's reputation as a diplomat on the chopping block."

[454] For example, see John McCook Roots, *Chou : An Informal Biography of China's Legendary Chou En-Lai*, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977), 160.

The negotiations were spread across four working sessions of three to five hours' length at the Chinese Premier's Office in the Hall of Western Flowers on the afternoons of January 6, 7, 8 and 10; only the two principals and not their aides[455], spoke during these meetings. Outside the confines of the meeting rooms, the press was informed only of the time, duration, and attendee list as well as pertinent social functions and sight-seeing- nothing of substance was given out.[456] Over time it would transpire that the negotiations took the form of intellectual sparring sessions; upon his return to New York, Hammarskjöld characterized Zhou as someone who "to me appears as the most superior brain I have so far met in the field of foreign politics."[457] The talks centered on the U.S. fliers issue but also touched on other[458] subjects such as broader U.S.-China relations, Taiwan, and also the issue of China's U.N. representation- however this section only focuses on the main aspect of the visit (U.S. fliers).

At the onset of the first meeting, Hammarskjöld re-emphasized his "Peking formula" to Zhou, stating, according to his declassified papers, that he

> ...had not come to Peking as the representative of a majority that had condemned the People's Republic for the imprisonment of the fliers but in his own right, acting on the basis of responsibilities deriving directly from the Charter, to take initiatives that might help to reduce international tensions. (He had) accepted the Assembly's mandate to seek the release of the fliers in a matter where he had the right and duty to act independently as Secretary-General in any case. Thus he could recognize that discussion of the case did not imply acceptance of any part of the resolution by the Chinese People's Republic government.[459]

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[455] Hammarskjold was accompanied at the meetings by four individuals: United Nations Under-Secretary T Ahmed S. Bokhari, Humphrey Waldock, professor of International Law at Oxford University, who was "borrowed" for the occasion, Per Lind, his personal assistant, and Gustav Nystrom, brought from Sweden to act as interpreter. Chou En-lai had with him the Vice-Foreign Minister, an "Assistant Minister," Chiao Kuan-hua (later Vice-Foreign Minister and chief of the Chinese delegation to the 1971 General Assembly), an interpreter, and his own professor. See Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 436-437.

[456] Ibid., 437.

[457] Meisler, *United Nations : The First Fifty Years*, 88.

[458] See Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 438-439.

[459] Ibid., 437.

Chinese Foreign Ministry archives acknowledge this "Peking formula" self-introduction; they quote Hammarskjöld as having said that "under the U.N. Charter, the Secretary-General was eligible and obligated to take any initiative he deems fit, in order to control or reverse developments that lead to grave tension."[460] After this "breaking the ice" strategy, Hammarskjöld then went on to appraise Zhou of his independent analysis of the POWs issue, emphasizing that he believed the B-29 crew were "innocent of the crime of espionage because they were engaged in a legitimate leaflet-dropping operation ordered by the United Nations Command when brought down"... and that in emphasizing this belief, he was "not challenging the sovereign right of Chinese courts to convict but seeking to straighten out conflicting views on the facts and on applicable international law."[461]

Chinese Foreign Ministry archives support this narrative, as well as add that Hammarskjöld "hoped Zhou would assess the case from a political viewpoint and, if possible, release the airmen - perhaps on the ground of their good behavior during the two years they had been imprisoned"...that "the fate of the men might determine the future course of peace..". and also that "international law could properly be applied to wartime practices as well, so the issue was not purely an internal Chinese affair."[462]

Zhou En-Lai on his part provided his viewpoints to Hammarskjöld- he "refused to move an inch from the position already taken by the Chinese courts and government", even after rearguing the case with Hammarskjöld three times during the meetings, and also "insisted that the B-29, like Downey's C-47, was on a CIA spy mission, and the leaflet dropping was only a cover... China knew the United States employed both types of planes to drop agents for Chiang Kai-shek with portable radios of exactly the same type as found on the B-29 and took advantage of Korean war air operations for

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[460] Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 53.
[461] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 437.
[462] Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 54.

the purpose."[463] According to Chinese Foreign Ministry archives, Zhou ultimately posited the following viewpoints: "In view of the fact that Hammarskjöld had stated the previous day that the fate of the American airmen was likely to determine the future course of peace, and that by his choice of words he had implied a threat of war, Zhou specifically pointed out that "China loves peace, but we will not surrender our territory and sovereignty in exchange for peace. China opposes war, but will not be daunted by the threat of war. This has been proven by past experience and will continue to be proven in the future... Zhou did not shut the door on a solution, despite his strongly-worded statement that China would neither brook foreign interference in its internal affairs nor be subdued by threats- he told Hammarskjöld that "these people will be released and return home in due course."[464]

Thus, at the end of the four intense negotiation sessions, it was evident that Hammarskjöld would not be able to secure an immediate release of the fliers; if anything, his immediate achievement was to open a direct channel of communication with the Chinese Premier that improved the prospects of securing the prisoner release at a later date. The timing of such a future release would "obviously be influenced by other developments in the presently strained and dangerous state of Chinese-American relations."[465]

The only immediate concession Hammarskjöld was able to attain while in Peking was to request and secure an assurance on the well-being of the imprisoned B-29 fliers. Zhou En-Lai provided films and photographs of all of the prisoners; additionally, he invited visits to China of the families of the imprisoned men, but also asked Hammarskjöld to relay to the Americans his own requests for some humanitarian concessions as well as explain Peking's position on Taiwan to the United States

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[463] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 437.

[464] Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 56.

[465] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 439.

government.[466] However as indicated earlier, the substance of the negotiations was kept secret from the outside world; the only public announcement made after the discussions was the following joint but vague communique issued by Hammarskjöld and Zhou En-Lai, which did not even mention the U.S. fliers at Zhou's request:

> Following the U.N. Secretary-General's proposal in a cablegram dated December 10, 1954, that talks be held in person, and following the welcome expressed by the Premier of the State Council and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China in his reply, dated December 17,1954, we held talks in Beijing on the 6th, 7th, 8th and 10th of January, 1955. The talks concerned various matters relating to the relaxation of international tension. We found the talks helpful and hope to continue our discussions as proposed.[467]

The key takeaway from this vague communique was its last sentence: the two leaders signaled to the world that their series of meetings were only the beginning, not the end of the negotiation process- this was a point that Hammarskjöld in his statement to the press upon arrival at New York International Airport on January 13, 1955, as well as during his press conference the following day at U.N. Headquarters.[468] Hammarskjöld said nothing publicly about the prisoner films and photos he had brought with him, or about Zhou's invitation to the U.S. families to visit their relatives in China; inevitably, hostile news stories "began to appear that the mission was a failure."

Hammarskjöld nevertheless delivered news of Zhou En-Lai's concessions to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in Washington D.C. on January 19th; Dulles in turn publicly expressed his own and President Eisenhower's "appreciation of Hammarskjöld's efforts and the hope that "the United Nations would persist effectively in the course upon which it had embarked."[469] The U.S. State Department also acknowledged publicly for the first time that Hammarskjöld had requested and received information on the well-being of the prisoners, although nothing was said about Chou's invitation to the prisoners' families. Peking Radio broke the silence on Zhou's

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[466] Ibid., 439.
[467] Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 57-58.
[468] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 441-455.
[469] Ibid., 456.

invitation two days after Hammarskjöld's meeting with Dulles- the State Department publicly frowned on the announcement and even advised the families against visit a communist country "where the normal protection of an American passport cannot be offered."[470]

U.S.-China relations took a turn for the worse within a few days of the Hammarskjöld-Dulles D.C. meeting. In the midst of the ongoing Taiwan Straits Crisis, President Eisenhower, as part of his attempt to arrange a cease-fire in the Formosa Straits through the United Nations Security Council, "decided first to ask Congress for advance approval of Presidential authority to use United States forces not only to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores against attack but also to act against mainland concentrations of Communist forces facing the coastal islands if these appeared to Eisenhower to be part of an attempt to invade Taiwan itself."[471] The U.S. Congress approved the request, first on January 24 by a House of Representatives by a vote of 409-3 and then on January 28 by a Senate vote of 85-3. This dynamic increased, once again, talk of possible war breakout in the Taiwan Straits, in spite of "the United States Administration's insistence that it was purely defensive in character and was aimed at reducing the risk of war breaking out."[472] Meanwhile the Security Council remained deadlocked over the Taiwan issue due to predictable Soviet opposition to U.S. intentions in the Taiwan Straits.

Hammarskjöld in the meantime kept his private line of communication with Zhou En-Lai "open and functioning"[473] in spite of the U.S. rejection of family visits and Security Council's Taiwan deadlock. He made no public commentary on his ongoing efforts, but behind the scenes, events began to move- on April 5, the United States made the humanitarian gesture than Zhou had asked for via Hammarskjöld- it announced its decision to grant exit permits to 76 Chinese students wishing to return

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[470] Ibid., 457.
[471] Ibid., 457
[472] Ibid.
[473] Ibid., 459

to the Chinese mainland.[474] Then, on May 29, at least partly in response to a message Hammarskjöld had sent to Zhou En-Lai, the Chinese government announced the release of the four U.S. jet fighter pilots who had been captures separately from the 11-man B-29 crew. The text of the message from Peking was announced in an impersonal Note to U.N. Correspondents whose text is reproduced below:

> The Swedish Ambassador in Peking, Hugo Wistrand, yesterday was handed a letter from the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Chou En-lai, addressed to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the text of which was received by the Secretary-General by cable today. In this letter Mr. Chou En-lai announced that the investigation of the cases of the four fliers, Captain Harold E. Fischer, Lt. Col. Edwin L. Heller, 1st Lt. Lyle W. Cameron and 1st Lt. Roland W. Parks, had been completed and that on May 24 the Chinese Supreme Court pronounced its decision that all of these four fliers should be deported immediately from the territory of the People's Republic of China. They would probably reach Hong Kong by May 31. [They did —Ed.]
> In his letter, Mr. Chou En-lai refers to the latest demarches of the Secretary-General to Peking concerning the cases of all the imprisoned fliers, first, a personal demarche of the Secretary-General through the Chinese ambassador in Stockholm, General Keng Piao, on April 23 and second, a follow-up demarche of the week before last, made on behalf of the Secretary-General by the Swedish Ambassador in Peking.[475]

The outstanding thing about Zhou's letter is that it clearly acknowledged the role that Hammarskjöld played in securing the release of the first four fliers, even though the 11-man B-29 crew was still in Chinese custody. Alongside the correspondents' note, Hammarskjöld also released his own personal statement which read as follows:

> My first thought is of the happiness of the men and of their families that they will soon be home again. My colleagues and I in the Secretariat are also thankful for whatever contribution our efforts may have made to this result. So long as the problem of the eleven fliers still detained remains unresolved, we shall, of course, in no way relax our efforts.[476]

Thus, in spite of the ongoing public acrimony between the U.S. and China, Hammarskjöld was making progress on the diplomatic front. Arthur R. Rovine, a former legal advisor of the US State Department and one of the leading authorities on

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[474] Ibid., 469
[475] Ibid., 490.
[476] Ibid., 490-491.

the Office of the Secretary-General, summarized this phase of Hammarskjöld's interventions as follows:

> Essentially, Hammarskjöld performed what might be called communications and mediation functions. He served as a kind of substitute for diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking by passing messages and information between the two parties and of course by outlining various bases and possible solutions himself. His diplomatic handling of the problem was superb, as he refrained from commenting on the validity of the legal charges and made no public recommendations for settlement beyond the constant stress on the humanitarian aspects of the problem and the need for peaceful settlement.[477]

It would of course be far reaching to suggest that the actions of the Chinese were attributable only to Hammarskjöld- the last section of this case study examines other possible motivations behind the Chinese gestures, but what is undeniable is that Hammarskjöld played a role that was acknowledged by the crisis actors themselves. His private efforts continued, and ultimately led to the release of the prisoners, as is outlined in the next section.

6.1.4: Release of Prisoners and Public Acclaim

Hammarskjöld's continuing efforts to secure the release of the 11-man B-29 crew, as evidenced by a further exchange[478] of messages with Zhou En-Lai on July 9 and 11 1955, began to gather momentum because the near-war tensions between China and the United States had by then begun to subside. This was evidenced by the fact that while attending the First Asia-Africa Summit in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955, Zhou En-Lai made public his willingness to establish direct contact with the United States: "The Chinese people are friendly with the American people and do not wish for war with America. The Chinese Government is ready to sit down at the negotiating table with America and discuss the question of easing tensions across the Taiwan Straits."[479] This statement reaffirmed the point made earlier on in this case study about

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[477] Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 82.

[478] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 572.

[479] Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 58-59.

the Chinese trying to use the prisoner issue to force a de facto U.S. recognition of their government. Zhou's statement had strong repercussions around the world. Britain, India, Indonesia, Burma and other countries all offered to mediate between China and the U.S; Secretary of State Dulles on his part remarked that "he would not rule out the possibility of bilateral talks with China."[480]

Then, on July 13 1955, the U.S. government relayed a proposal to China via Britain that the two countries should each send an ambassadorial representative to talks in Geneva; the Chinese government agreed and the two sides launched the talks in Geneva on 1 August 1955. However on 31 July, one day prior to the talks, China announced a surprise decision to release the 11 B29 fliers- the decision was communicated formally to the United States government at the start of the Geneva talks, however Zhou En-Lai sent an advance private message (9 hours before the Peking Radio announcement) to Hammarskjöld informing him of the decision. As was the case with prior messages between Dag Hammarskjöld and Zhou En-Lai, the text of the message was not made public at the time. Nevertheless, in that note, reproduced below, Zhou En-Lai made it very clear that the Chinese decision to release the American prisoners was more a result of the efforts of Hammarskjöld the individual and less a result of the condemnatory U.N. General Assembly resolution. As if to drive this point home, Zhou En-Lai made sure to send the message via the Swedish Ambassador to the People's Republic of China (Sweden was Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's home country), and not though official U.N. channels. The Swedish Ambassador's cable to Hammarskjöld read as follows:

> I was called today by Zhou En-Lai at one o'clock who asked me to transmit the following:
>
> 1. Thanks for cable from Geneva.
> 2. The Chinese government has decided to release the imprisoned U.S. fliers. This release from serving their full term takes place in order to maintain friendship with Hammarskjöld and has no connection with the U.N. Resolution. Zhou En-Lai expresses the hope that Hammarskjöld will take note of this point.
> 3. The Chinese government hopes to continue the contact established with Hammarskjöld.

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[480] Ibid., 59.

4. Zhou En-lai congratulates Hammarskjöld on his 50th birthday.[481]

What is clear from this message is that Zhou En-Lai acknowledged Hammarskjöld as a principal player who had played a major role in the hostage negotiation and release.

In light of this achievement, Hammarskjöld received many congratulatory messages from many quarters- President Eisenhower thanked him publicly on August 1, 1955, the same day as the Peking Radio broadcast, via the following statement: "The United States extends thanks to all who have contributed to this humanitarian result, particularly to the United Nations and its Secretary-General, who actively sought this result."[482] Other laudatory messages came from General Twining of the U.S. Air Force and Moshe Sharett, the Israeli Foreign Minister; the Nebraska legislature passed a resolution honoring Hammarskjöld for his part in securing the release of the prisoners.[483] Additionally, in September 1955, the commander of the downed B-29, Colonel John K. Arnold, came to United Nations Headquarters to express "tremendous appreciation" to Hammarskjöld for his "personal role and the role of the United Nations in securing our release from China and return home"[484]; there were also many letters from the families of the freed prisoners.

6.1.5: Reflections on Hammarskjöld Role

This turn of events was undoubtedly a triumph for Hammarskjöld personally, and also for the Office of the Secretary-General. This episode would form the basis for future autonomous diplomatic interventions by the Secretary-General as noted throughout the thesis. In the words of Hammarskjöld's close confidant Sir Brian Urquhart, the success of this mission established Hammarskjöld (and by implication his Office) once

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[481] Urquhart, Op. Cit., p. 126. This message is also verifiable in Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives- see Ibid., 60.
[482] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 573.
[483] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 128.
[484] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 573.

and for all as a major resource of the international community for dealing with difficult problems, and as an important international figure in his own right.[485] Urquhart adds that from his personal observations, after August 1955, Hammarskjöld's style changed noticeably, as if, at the completion of the affair of the American prisoners in China on his 50th birthday, he had "come of age" as Secretary-General.[486] He also succeeded in "introducing the United Nations as a factor in China's consideration of the prisoners issue and opening the door for direct consultations between the U.N. and China- something that contributed in part to China's success in attaining its rightful U.N. seat some 16 years later.

However it would be improper to apportion the credit for this outcome solely to Hammarskjöld's efforts- there were obviously some great power dynamics that are worth briefly revisiting. As alluded to earlier, the Chinese government was "motivated by a desire to force the U.S. to the negotiating table" and thereby achieve two objectives: first to effect a de facto recognition by an Eisenhower administration that until this point was not even willing to recognize the legitimacy of the Mao regime, and second "to discuss the overarching issue in U.S.-China relations- the withdrawal of troops from Taiwan."[487] There is a plausible argument to be made that the imprisoned fliers provided the Chinese with the calling card they needed to engage the Eisenhower administration and achieve the two aforementioned objectives. In that sense, an argument could be made that Hammarskjöld's mediation, effective though it was, was ultimately a convenient tool deemed useful in the grand Chinese strategy vis-à-vis the complex relationship with the United States.

Anecdotal evidence of this additional dynamic was evident in the fact that the Peking Radio announcement of the prisoner release was made a few days after United States had finally agreed to begin direct talks on the ambassadorial level on August 1 in Geneva. The Chinese representative to the ground-breaking U.S.-China

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[485] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 131.
[486] Ibid., 131.
[487] Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 58.

ambassadorial meetings in Geneva, Wang Ping-Nan, "began his talks in Geneva with United States Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson by formally communicating the decision to release the fliers"[488] as a conciliatory gesture, and expressing the hope that "this measure taken by the Chinese government will have a favorable effect on our talks."[489] The Mao regime had indeed been seeking for months to open bilateral discussions with the United States on a higher level than the previous consular contacts.[490] According to his aide Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld was "under no illusions that his own efforts and his fiftieth birthday were the sole motive forces."[491] Hammarskjöld himself refrained from claiming public credit for this outcome of events- when asked at a press conference about taking credit for these events, he said he would "leave to history evaluation of the various factors and personalities[492] involved", but added as a "personal note" that "nothing" since he became Secretary-General had given him "greater cause for gratitude than my trip to Peking."[493]

All that said, Hammarskjöld succeeded in serving as the principal mediator in this crisis and forever changing the stature and dynamic of the U.N. Secretary-General's Office from one that was largely perceived as a repository of the Security Council's power to one that was autonomous and capable of making game-changing initiatives in its own right. The "Peking Formula" would become etched in U.N. diplomacy and influence virtually all of Hammarskjöld's successors in instances where they had to autonomously intervene in difficult crises. Hammarskjöld's achievement was to really transform the Office of the Secretary-General into a key force in international diplomacy-during his own tenure, a popular phrase among U.N. delegates after this

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[488] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 573.

[489] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 127.

[490] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 573.

[491] Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, 127.

[492] Indian Prime Minister Nehru had also tried to mediate the crisis, and was, alongside Hammarskjöld, privately informed by Zhou En-Lai of the prisoner release- see Xing, *International Negotiator: Mission Beijing*, 60-61. however his role was much more limited as he was not recognized by the U.S. and the U.N. as Hammarskjöld was.

[493] Cordier and Foote, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, 573.

achievement was "leave-it-to-Dag"[494] whenever a crisis broke out and a diplomatic solution was necessary.

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[494] Heller,
the United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1961, 42.

Cuban Missile Crisis

The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary-General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks- President John F. Kennedy letter to Nikita Khrushchev, October 28 1962

6.2.0: Introduction and Background

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was perhaps the single lowest point of the superpower Cold War. The Soviet installation of offensive missiles in Cuba, occurring not long after America's Bay of Pigs fiasco, was a move that not only benefited Cuba's security, but also gave the Soviet Union two advantages: first, Soviet missiles on Cuban soil would have outflanked the North American missile defense system which was "directed entirely against an attack from the north", second, Cuba would have provided a base for operation in Latin America.[495] The installation of just 60 missiles, for example, "some with a range of 1000 miles, a few with ranges of 1,500 to 2,000 miles, would have doubled the capacity of Russia to strike the United States."[496] As such, the stakes could not have been higher for the United States. President Kennedy was determined to do all he could to prevent such missiles from becoming operational. The end result was a crisis that more than any other brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war.

U Thant's role in helping defuse this crisis is relatively unknown because the prevailing historical narrative has tended to focus more on the military brinksmanship, President Kennedy's bravery and resolve, etc., and less on the diplomatic role played by third parties during the crisis. Nevertheless, U Thant played a pivotal role in staving off nuclear conflict, a role that some historians[497] have called the greatest achievement of his 10 year tenure of office.

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[495] Rikhye, *Critical Elements in Determining the Suitability of Conflict Settlement Efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General*, 72-73.

[496] Ibid., 72-73

[497] For example, see Ramses Nassif, *U Thant in New York, 1961-1971 : A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General ; with a Foreword by Sir Brian Urquhart* (London: C. Hurst, 1988), 25.

At the core of this case study is some previously unavailable evidence from U.S. and Soviet archives that reveal the true nature, extent, and impact of U Thant's intervention. These archives shed much more light on the events that occurred than do the memoirs of some of the key participants such as Robert F. Kennedy[498]. Rather than serving as a blow by blow account of the Cuban Missile Crisis, this section will focus more on the U Thant diplomatic missions and its immediate impact, using the actual crisis as a background aide.

American archives consist primarily of the Kennedy White House tapes: during much of the crisis, a tape recorder was running in the White House situation room which no one, except for President Kennedy and possibly his brother Robert, knew about.[499] President Kennedy's taping system involved microphones concealed in unused light fixtures in the White House Cabinet Room and also in the president's desk in the Oval Office; these tapes present us with an unparalleled record of frank deliberation in a time of crisis.[500] The Cuban missile crisis tapes transcripts were later published in a volume called *The Kennedy tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*. This edited book also contains transcripts of Kennedy's conversations with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at the height of the crisis. For the first time, the tapes revealed the centrality of U Thant's role (he was mentioned by name at least 90 times during the White House ExComm discussions.

The American archives reveal the centrality of U Thant's role in the following way:

1) Immediate and decisive effect of his two public appeals, first for the Soviet Union to diverge ships headed for Cuba and bound by interception by the U.S. Navy, and second on the modalities for avoiding confrontation with Soviet ships still headed towards Cuba.

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[498] RFK's book is called "Thirteen Days." There was also a Hollywood movie of the same name, starring Kevin Costner and others, that was released at the start of the new millennium.
[499] Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), ix-x.
[500] Ibid., ix-x

2) U Thant's effect of moderating the actors behavior through his continued mediation as shown by President Kennedy's own words- specifically when the president made some decisions to not escalate conflict at certain points in the crisis because he retained hope in U Thant's mediation effort

3) His role as a resource for shuttle diplomacy and conveyer of important information to the Russians during some of the most dire moments of the crisis.

4) His mediation skills as evidenced by his forwarding of independent proposals that were ultimately adopted as part of the final settlement- proposals such as the U.S. guarantee for the security and sovereignty of Cuba.

The Soviet archives on the other hand are centered on the transcripts of cables exchanged between the Soviet Foreign Ministry and various high-ranking Soviet officials who were either in Washington D.C., Havana, or at the United Nations during and right after the crisis. The officials in question include the USSR Ambassador to the USA, A.F. Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev, the Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations V.A. Zorin, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and Premier Khrushchev's special envoy to the United Nations for the Cuban missile crisis, Kuznetsov, and also Soviet Politburo member A.I. Mikoyan. More often than not, these cables also reveal the central and indispensable role that U Thant played in the crisis.

The Soviet archives reveal U Thant's centrality in the following way:

1) The immediate and decisive effect of his initial appeal for the Soviet Union to diverge ships headed for Cuba and bound by interception by the U.S. Navy, as was the case with the Kennedy tapes

2) His centrality even after the escalatory phase of the crisis was over: while the Kennedy tapes revealed his centrality during the crisis itself, the Russian archives detailed his negotiations with leading Soviet personalities such as

Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, and Zorin during the difficult US Soviet negotiations at the U.N. to finalize the terms of agreement for resolving the crisis on issues such as the terms of verifying their withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

3) How the Soviets courted U Thant's support by backing his proposed inspection plan even at the price of additional tensions with Havana.

4) Like the Kennedy tapes- his role as a source for shuttle diplomacy and conveyer of important information to the Russians during some tense situations.

5) Like the Kennedy tapes- his mediation skills as evidenced by his forwarding of independent proposals such as Red Cross involvement in proposed inspections.

6) Like the Kennedy tapes- his role in hosting tripartite talks between Cuba, the USSR, and the United States in his conference room at U.N. headquarters that hammered out the details of what became a comprehensive agreement to end the crisis.

6.2.1: U Thant's First Appeal and its Impact

The public phase of the Cuban Missile Crisis commenced on the evening of Monday, October 22nd, 1962, when U.S. President John F. Kennedy made a televised speech announcing the Soviet placement of offensive missiles in Cuba and his government's naval blockade around the island. Earlier that evening, U Thant had received a briefing by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, alerting him to the tone and content of the speech. U Thant later described the unprecedented challenge posed by the crisis and President Kennedy's speech:

> (This was) a most critical moment, and perhaps the most critical moment since the end of World War II. I watched President Kennedy's (blockade announcement) speech on television (in my Office on the 38th floor of the U.N. Secretariat Building) and in my memory, it was the grimmest and gravest speech ever made by a head of state... The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the edge of a nuclear holocaust. Never in the history of the United Nations did it face a moment of graver responsibility and grimmer challenge.[501]

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[501] Thant, *View from the UN*, 155 & 158.

U Thant's initial intervention following came about due to his conviction that a nuclear war could be triggered as a result of a miscalculation or mistake in judgment by either the American blockade ships or the approaching Soviet ships.[502] As such, he decided to autonomously take action in the form of a public de-escalation appeal to both the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union during an emergency[503] U.N. Security Council meeting on the night of October 24th 1962. The impetus for U Thant's initiative partly came from the global outpouring of anxiety and apprehension over the real prospect of global nuclear Armageddon- his Office received a joint intervention appeal[504] from 45 U.N. member-states; hundreds[505] of letters of appeal from members of the general public. Such collective appeals must have certainly helped U Thant to legitimately claim that he was representing the interests of international peace and security. It is important to emphasize that U Thant made his initial appeal without having consulted the crisis actors, and maintained his autonomy when it came to the content and timing of his actions throughout the crisis.[506]

The content of U Thant's first appeal, as revealed in his Security Council statement, was as follows: he sent identical messages to Kennedy and Khrushchev urging a moratorium of 2-3 weeks on all Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, and also a voluntary suspension of U.S. quarantine measures involving the searching of Soviet ships, as a

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[502] Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 105.

[503] The emergency U.N. Security Council was requested by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba (President Kennedy had requested this Council meeting in his televised address on October 22nd, 1962; the meeting itself took place on the night of October 24th).

[504] Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 105. The plea from the 45 member states was presented to U Thant by the Permanent Representatives of Cyprus, the United Arab Republic, and Ghana, who asserted that they were speaking on behalf of the 45 member states, and asking the Secretary-General to impress upon the crisis parties- the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Cuba, to refrain from any actions that might aggravate the situation.

[505] Ibid., 114 The quantity of the letter from the general public was revealed in a telegram sent from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to the U.S. State Department in Washington D.C. dated 27 October, 1962, 2 PM, reporting on a meeting between American diplomats and the Secretary-General at 11:45 that morning: "The Secretary-General mentioned the great concern all over the world as to seriousness of situation. He stated he had received 620 telegrams, mostly from the U.S., as to his proposals, only five of which were negative."

[506] Ibid., 110 The autonomous nature of the intervention was indeed later confirmed by some of the principal players in the Cuban missile crisis, such as U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in his famous memoir.

first step towards a negotiated peaceful settlement.[507] He also offered to make himself available to both governments "for whatever services I may be able to perform" in search of a peaceful solution.[508] U Thant then made a separate appeal to Cuban leader Fidel Castro to "suspend the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba during the period of negotiation.[509] Interestingly, the initial reaction to U Thant's joint appeal from both American and Soviet officials to U Thant's appeal was negative.

Declassified U.S. archives and memoirs/biographies of some of the U.S. principals reveal that the initial American reaction to U Thant's appeal was "publicly guarded and privately almost hostile" because U Thant's appeal did not call for a construction freeze and/or withdrawal of the Soviet missiles.[510] Ambassador Adlai Stevenson met with U Thant before the dispatch of the identical message to Kennedy/Khrushchev and expressed this reservation, asking him for a 24-hour dispatch delay and a mention of the missiles at the Security Council; U Thant declined to comply with Stevenson's wishes on both counts.[511] Upon hearing of this incident, President Kennedy instructed his Secretary of State Dean Rusk to "get back to Stevenson"[512], i.e. to try and persuade U Thant to delay his public appeal. Even more poignant was the reaction of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan- who upon hearing President Kennedy's verbatim read-out of U Thant's appeal during a phone conversation commented: "I think that's a very dangerous message he's sent", to which President Kennedy replied: "Yes. We will point out the deficiencies in it- that there's no guarantees against a breach of the quarantine, and also the work on the missile sites will continue, and the danger will be greater in 2 weeks."[513]

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[507] United Nations Security Council Official Records, No. 1024, October 24, 1962
[508] Ibid
[509] Thant, *View from the UN*, 163.
[510] A. walter Dorn and Robert Pauk, "Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 2 (2009): 268-269.
[511] Porter, McKeever (1989), Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Legacy, New York, Quill (Harper): 524.
[512] May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 372.
[513] Ibid., 388.

Declassified Soviet archives reveal that the Soviet Permanent U.N. Representative V.A. Zorin objected U Thant's not publicly criticizing the U.S. for blockading a sovereign U.N. member-state. In an October 25th telegram addressed to his superiors at the U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry, Zorin wrote the following:

> ...Having learned in the afternoon of the content of the message to the USSR and the USA prepared by U Thant, we told him that we considered it incorrect and wrongheaded of the acting Secretary-General to place on the same level a party on one hand that has taken provocative actions and imposed a naval blockade, and on the other hand parties that have been engaging in normal shipping activity and taking lawful measures for safeguarding their countries' defense. We emphasized that the acting Secretary-General's most urgent obligation is to exert necessary pressure on the government of the USA to make them lift the illegal blockade of the Cuban coast, and end their acts of piracy that violate maritime freedom.[514]

U Thant provided a somewhat more dramatic account of this event in his memoir when he narrates the details of the conversation he had with Ambassador Zorin when the latter approached him in person to issue the protestation:

> I told him (Ambassador Zorin) that I was no longer the representative of my country, but the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, and that my conscience was clear about the propriety and correctness of my action... I asked him to see me the next day at 2:45pm to continue the discussion for a few minutes... He came to my office at the appointed time, accompanied by the Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative, Ambassador Platon Morozov, and an interpreter. I repeated my stand taken on the previous day. Since he went on insisting that my statement was "a bad one," I had to cut the conversation short. I told him firmly that if he really felt that way, he had better condemn me openly in the Security Council meeting scheduled late in the evening. He was visibly taken aback by that suggestion... We broke off our conversation and left my office together.[515]

Thus, it initially seemed as if the USA and the U.S.S.R. would both ignore U Thant's appeal. However, to the surprise of Ambassador Zorin (and quite likely of U Thant himself), Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was the first to respond to the appeal, and positively so. On October 25, U Thant received a cable from Premier Khrushchev which read as follows:

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[514] V. A. Zorin, "Telegram from Soviet Delegate to the United Nations V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin- New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives*, ed. James Heshberg, trans. John Henriksen, Winter 1996/1997 ed., Vol. 8-9, 285-286, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_P-5.pdf; (accessed October 15 2013).

[515] Thant, *View from the UN*, 164.

Dear U Thant: I have received your message and have carefully studied the proposal it contains. **I welcome your initiative.** I understand your concern over the situation which has arisen in the Caribbean, for the Soviet Government too regards it as highly dangerous and as requiring immediate intervention by the United Nations. **I wish to inform you that I agree with your proposal**, which is in the interest of peace. With respect, (signed) Nikita Khrushchev[516]

Upon dispatching this cable, Khrushchev ordered most of the Soviet ships headed towards Cuba to turn back to the U.S.S.R. Of key note was the fact that Khrushchev's positive response to U Thant's cable helped him save face[517] - his recall of most of the Soviet ships was in effect a show of statesmanship in light of the Secretary-General's publicly acclaimed[518] appeal. Thus, the immediate impact and effectiveness of U Thant's first appeal was apparent in Khrushchev's action. While it is hard to predict what would've happened if all those ships had steamed ahead to the American quarantine line, it is nevertheless safe to assume that without the ship recall, the likelihood of a major confrontation (whether by design or by accident) would have been much higher, based on the fact that during the Cuban missile crisis, there were a few "accidental" close calls that threatened the breakout of nuclear war.

The importance of U Thant's first appeal was re-affirmed less than a year after the crisis- Ambassador Adlai Stevenson addressed a Senate hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs on March 13, 1963, and said the following: "At a critical moment - when the nuclear powers seemed set on a collision course - the Secretary-General's intervention led to the diversion of the Soviet ships headed for Cuba and interception by our Navy. This was an indispensable first step in the peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis."[519]

U Thant also succeeded in terms of changing the Kennedy administration's perception of his Office and person- the effect of his appeal on Khrushchev showed that he was

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[516] Ibid., 165

[517] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 268.

[518] The acclaim came from outlets such as the New York Times whose front page headline on October 25 read as follows: "Thant Bids U.S. and Russia Desist 2 Weeks." See Ibid.: 266

[519] Adlai E. Stevenson, *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson*, 1st ed. (Boston, Little, Brown), 325.

more than just a bureaucrat at the top of an IO; he was an actor that could substantively assist with defusing the crisis. Declassified White House ExComm discussions as well as State Department papers reveal that the Kennedy administration initially envisioned a limited U.N. role in the crisis- first as a forum in which they could galvanize world opinion to their side, and second as an entity that could provide reliable observers to verify a possible Soviet missile withdrawal; they did not at all discuss a possible role for U Thant.[520]

Based on this limited expectation of the U.N.'s role, the Kennedy administration initially went only as far as notifying[521] U Thant about the Soviet missile installations some two days before President Kennedy's televised address in anticipation of the inevitable Security Council deliberations that would impact world opinion. However this quickly changed after the demonstrated impact and effectiveness of the first appeal; the Kennedy administration began to view U Thant as a potential mediator, and actually went on to engineer the timing and content of a second appeal, as outlined in the next section.

6.2.2: U Thant's Second Appeal and its Impact

The necessity of a second appeal from U Thant emanated from two factors: first, his first appeal only succeeded at convincing Khrushchev to recall most, not all most of the Soviet ships headed for Cuba. There were still some ships headed for the American interception line - something that could lead to a confrontation and the outbreak of war; the most critical phase of the Cuban missile crisis was thus yet to occur, and President Kennedy's resolve to enforce the quarantine and risk nuclear war was yet to be fully tested.[522] The Soviet tanker Bucharest was rapidly approaching the

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[520] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 264. May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 201. and also U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63: Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (1996), Washington D.C., 11:44.

[521] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 265.

[522] Ibid.: 268. This sentence is partly a paraphrase of a sentence in the cited source.

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interception line and the Americans would be obliged to stop it. Second, Kennedy and Khrushchev communicated directly by cable during the crisis, but the timing/sequencing of the direct communication was not in sync with the timing of U Thant's messages- as such, Kennedy received a very hostile[523] cable from Khrushchev before the latter replied to the U Thant appeal, to the extent that the positive tone of the reply to U Thant must have seemed incredible to Kennedy: Khrushchev's positive public reply to U Thant seemed for a while to be accompanied by hostile private cables. In this way, the stakes were very high at this point in the crisis, and a second appeal from U Thant was in order as far as the Kennedy administration was concerned.

Faced with a hostile cable from Khrushchev, and unaware of the latter's favorable response to U Thant's first appeal, President Kennedy was confronted with a most undesirable dilemma: to either let the Soviet ships pass and in so doing indicate a lack of resolve to enforce the quarantine, or stop them and risk a naval clash and possible nuclear war.[524] It was at this stage that President Kennedy came up with a novel idea: for the United States to ask U Thant to make a fresh appeal to the Soviets that they should halt their approaching ships for a few days while negotiations were being attempted, but to do so "in a way that gives them enough of an out to stop their shipments without looking like they completely crawled down."[525]

The President opined to his Under Secretary of State George Ball: "we should get ourselves back to U Thant and say that he can request the Soviet Union to hold up their shipping... for the immediate area, that we would be glad to get into

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[523] Khrushchev sent a cable to Kennedy, received on October 24, that accused the latter of issuing unreasonable ultimatums and explicitly stated that the Soviet government "could not instruct their captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading the island"... and that the Soviets would "be forced on our part take the measures to protect our rights- we have everything necessary to do so"- see Ibid., 269.

[524] Ibid., 269.

[525] Memorandum of telephone conversation at 11:15 p.m., October 24, between President Kennedy and Under Secretary of State Ball, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63: Cuban Missile Crisis and its Aftermath (Washington, DC, 1996, 11:190, cited in Ibid., 270.

conversations about how the situation could be adjusted.[526] After the conversation with Kennedy, Ball called Secretary of State Rusk, who suggested that Ball immediately contact Ambassador Stevenson at the U.N. and ask him to "see if U Thant, on his own[527] responsibility, could ask Mr. Khrushchev not to send his ships pending modalities."[528] Ambassador Stevenson went on to "get U Thant out of bed (not, apparently, an easy feat) and induced him to issue a direct appeal on October 25"[529]; in addition, the Secretary of State Rusk sent Ambassador Stevenson a cable as well as a one-page telegram containing instructions on what U Thant's appeal should and should not say, and listing the point that the Kennedy administration wanted U Thant to pass on to Khrushchev as his own.

In this way, the Kennedy administration transformed the office of the Secretary-General into a harbinger of shuttle diplomacy with the Russians during the crisis. Interestingly, Ambassador Stevenson passed on this request to U Thant at a point in time when the United States had still not responded to Thant's first appeal of October 24. That response[530] was only sent to U Thant later on the afternoon of October 25 and was positive in terms of promising to work with U Thant, but not as decisive as

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[526] Ibid., 270.

[527] Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 266 contextualizes this episode as follows: *"According to President Kennedy's biographer, Barbara Leaming, as the moment of the entry into force of the quarantine approached at 10 AM on 24 October, President Kennedy searched for a means to permit Premier Khrushchev to back down without sacrificing his dignity. He (President Kennedy) hit on the idea of asking U.N. Secretary-General U Thant to intervene in such a way as to give the Soviets "enough of an out to stop their armaments without looking like they completely crawled down"...U Thant, awakened in the night, agreed to convey to the Soviets that if they would consent to halt their shipments for the time being, the United States wanted to talk. "Otherwise", Kennedy said sadly at the close of the late-night phone conversation with (Under-Secretary George) Ball, "we just have to go with this thing."*

[528] Memorandum of telephone conversation at 11:25 p.m., October 24, between Secretary of State Rusk and Under Secretary of State Ball, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63: Cuban Missile Crisis and its Aftermath (Washington, DC, 1996, 191-192, cited in Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 270.

[529] May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 392.

[530] President Kennedy's response to U Thant's first appeal read as follows: *"I deeply appreciate the spirit which prompted your message of yesterday... In your message and your statement to the Security Council, you have made certain suggestions and have invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured. Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly these arrangements with you. I can assure you of our desire to reach a satisfactory and peaceful solution to this matter.* (Signed John F. Kennedy)- see Thant, *View from the UN*, 166.

the Soviets in terms of concrete actions or pledges- at least not until the second appeal had been sent out.

U Thant dispatched his second set of public appeals at 2:26pm on October 25; remarkably, the second appeal "contained almost word for word what Ambassador Stevenson had requested in writing earlier that day."[531] Below is out of production of the memo from Secretary of State Rusk to Ambassador Stevenson, followed by the wording of U Thant's second set of appeals to both President Kennedy and premier Khrushchev- notice how remarkably similar the letter to Khrushchev is to the wording of the memo below:

Verbatim Contents of Secretary Rusk/Ambassador Stevenson Memo to U Thant:

1) An expression of concern that Soviet ships might be under instructions to challenge the quarantine and consequently create a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and Western Hemisphere ships which could lead to an escalation of violence.

2) An expression of concern that such a confrontation would destroy the possibility of the talks such as you have suggested as a prelude to a political settlement.

3) An expression of hope that Soviet ships will be held out of the interception area for a limited time in order to permit discussions of the modalities of an agreement.

4) An expression of your confidence, on the basis of Soviet ships not proceeding to Cuba, that the United States will avoid a direct confrontation with them during the same period in order to minimize chances of an untoward incident.[532]

[531] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 272.
[532] Memo handed to Secretary-General U Thant by Ambassador Stevenson, File: Cuba-Adlai Stevenson October 1962," DAG1/5.2.2.6.2, box 1, U.N. Archives, New York.

The following is the full wording f U Thant's 2nd Appeal to Khrushchev- notice the similarity between the highlighted text and the American memo!:

> In continuation of my message of yesterday and my statement before the Security Council, I would like to bring to your Excellency's attention my grave concern that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba might challenge the quarantine imposed by the United States and produce a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and United States vessels, which could lead to an aggravation of the situation. What concerns me most is that such a confrontation and consequent aggravation of the situation would destroy any possibility of the discussions I have suggested as a prelude to negotiations on a peaceful settlement. In the circumstances I earnestly hope that Your Excellency may find it possible to instruct the Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba to stay away from the interception area for a limited time only, in order to permit discussions of the modalities of a possible agreement which would settle the problem peacefully in line with the Charter of the United Nations. I am confident that, if such instructions could be issued by Your Excellency, the United States authorities will take action to ensure that a direct confrontation between their ships and Soviet ships is avoided during the same period in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident taking place. If I could be informed of the action taken by Your Government on the basis of this appeal, I could inform President Kennedy that I have assurances from your side of your cooperation in avoiding all risk of an untoward incident. I am at the same time addressing the enclosed appeal to President Kennedy.[533]

The key dynamic point out here is that in asking the U.N. Secretary-General to issue this second appeal as his own and not one dictated by the Americans, President Kennedy was using U Thant's Office as a face-saving mechanism for his nemesis. The Soviet Premier had just turned back most of his ships; to accept a proposal from U Thant would consequently not be viewed by the international community as a capitulation to the United States, but rather as a show of statesmanship and self-restraint, especially given that the Secretary-General's initiatives were receiving widespread supported by the international community.[534] Against some misgivings from the hawks in his administration, President Kennedy "realized that he could use a mediator to get his opponent gracefully disengage without appearing to surrender or display weakness; as in other mediated conflicts, compromises proposed by the mediator often originate with one of the protagonists, but when presented as the

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[533] Thant, *View from the UN*, 462-463.
[534] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 273.

mediator's idea they appear more palatable- in effect, President Kennedy facilitated the transformation of the Cuban missile crisis from a bilateral to a mediated one."[535]

U Thant's appeal to President Kennedy, copied to Khrushchev and sent simultaneously with the U.S.-influenced appeal to Khrushchev, read as follows:

> I have today sent a further message to Chairman Khrushchev expressing my grave concern that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba might challenge the quarantine imposed by your government and produce a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and United States vessels, which could lead to an aggravation of the situation... I would now like to appeal to Your Excellency that instructions may be issued to the United States vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident. If I could be informed of the action taken by your government on the basis of this appeal, I could inform Chairman Khrushchev that I have assurances from your side of your cooperation in avoiding all risk of an untoward incident. I would express the further hope that such cooperation could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of which the quarantine measures themselves could be called off as soon as possible.[536]

The effect of U Thant's second set of appeals was immediate- it was met with positive feedback from both Khrushchev and Kennedy. Here is the text of President Kennedy's second letter to the Secretary-General where he is accepting the latter's independent proposals, and also pledging to take the Secretary-General's cue as to how the negotiations would proceed:

> I have your further message of today and I continue to understand and welcome your efforts for a satisfactory solution. I appreciate and share your concern that great caution be exercised pending the inauguration of discussions... **If the Soviet government accepts and abides by your request "that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba... stay away from the interception area" for the limited time required for preliminary discussion, you may be assured that this government will accept and abide by your request** that our vessels in the Caribbean "do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next 10 days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident." I must inform you, however, that this is a matter of great urgency in view of the fact that certain Soviet ships are still proceeding toward Cuba and the interception area... I share your hope that Chairman Khrushchev will also heed your appeal and that we can then proceed urgently to meet the requirements that these offensive military systems in Cuba be

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[535] Ibid., 273.
[536] Thant, *View from the UN*, 461.

withdrawn, in order to end their threats to peace. I must point out to you that present work on these systems is still continuing.[537]

Premier Khrushchev on the other hand also provided a positive second response whose text read as follows:

> Dear U Thant: I have received and studied your telegram of 25 October. I understand your anxiety for the preservation of peace, and I appreciate highly your efforts to avert military conflict.... Indeed, if any conflict should arise on the approaches to Cuba- and this may become unavoidable as a result of the piratical measures taken by the United States- this would without question seriously complicate the endeavors to initiate contacts in order to put an end, on a basis of negotiation, to the critical situation that has now been thrust on the world by the aggressive actions of the United States....**We therefore accept your proposal, and have ordered the masters of the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba but not yet within the area of the American warships' piratical activities to stay out of the interception area, as you recommend**... But we have given this order in the hope that the other side will understand that such a situation, in which we keep vessels immobilized on the high seas, must be a purely temporary one; the period cannot under any circumstances be of long duration. I thank you for your efforts and wish you success in your noble task. **Your efforts to ensure peace will always meet with understanding and support on our part. The Soviet government has consistently striven, and is striving, to strengthen the United Nations- that international Organization which constitutes a forum for all countries of the world, regardless of their socio-political structure, in order that disputes arising may be settled not through war but through negotiations. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.** (Signed) Nikita Khrushchev.[538]

Again, it is remarkable to note the positive nature of the second set of replies that he received from both Kennedy and Khrushchev.

Interestingly, declassified U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry archives reveal that the Soviets had their suspicions that U Thant's second appeal was in reality an American proposal- in a telegram to his superiors at the USSR Foreign Ministry on October 25, the same day that the second appeal went out, the Soviet permanent representative to the U.N. V.A. Zorin wrote the following:

> The possibility cannot be ruled out that U Thant, under American influence, is attempting to put forth as a primary measure the proposals made by him in his second message to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, especially the one stipulating that Soviet

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[537] Ibid., 462-463.

[538] Ibid., 463-464. Khrushchev reiterated his acquiescence to U Thant's autonomous appeals in his October 26 cable to JFK- see May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 488.

vessels bound for Cuba keep away from the interception area for a certain period of time, and that the USA for the duration of that same period avoid immediate encounters between their ships and Soviet vessels... We ask to be briefed on your decision as to the level, form, and direction of further negotiations.[539]

In any case, irrespective of the views of the Soviet Foreign Ministry officials, Khrushchev ultimately decided to provide U Thant with a favorable answer as outlined above.

U Thant also sent a message to Fidel Castro informing him of the positive responses he had received from Kennedy and Khrushchev, and asking that the construction of major military installations in Cuba, especially the missile sites, be suspended in the interim.[540] Castro responded forcefully with a Cuban list of complaints against the United States, but nevertheless invited the Secretary-General to visit Cuba for direct discussions.

The overall impact of U Thant's two appeals was that by averting a potentially disastrous naval confrontation, they paved the way for "a period of negotiations between the two parties that finally focused on the core issues of Cuban security and the missiles, leading to the dissolution of the naval confrontation just two days later."[541] Kennedy and Khrushchev were finally able to apply their minds to the goal of resolving the crisis itself: "in letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy on October 28, 1962, firm undertakings were made regarding the settlement of the crisis."[542] Among the undertakings agreed in principle during those two days, "the USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the

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[539] Zorin, *Telegram from Soviet Delegate to the United Nations V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962*, 288.

[540] Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 111.

[541] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 274.

[542] U.S. Draft Declaration on the Settlement of the Missile Crisis, reproduced in Thant, *View from the UN*, 468.

further introduction of such weapons into Cuba."[543] The United States on its part would agree to "agree- upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments- a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba."[544]

Aside from the two public appeals and their impact, U Thant would spend late October and most of November 1962 hosting and facilitating U.S.-Soviet negotiating teams whose task was to codify the undertakings agreed to by Kennedy and Khrushchev- I focus on U Thant's mediation later in this case study.

At this point, it makes sense to ponder as to why the superpowers took a liking to U Thant and responded positively to his appeals. In this vein, it is important to recall the historical context at the time of the crisis: U Thant was the acting Secretary-General after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld in 1961. The Soviet Union was reluctant to confirm his appointment after the public clashes it had had with his immediate predecessor Dag Hammarskjöld, and the perception it had developed of the U.N. Secretary-General's Office as a pro-western entity.[545] Instead, the Soviet Union was at this point calling for a new "troika" system of three high officials representing the Eastern and Western blocs, and the nonaligned nations to replace the Secretaries-Generalship. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had criticized and sometimes outright blocked the Secretary-General's autonomous initiatives in earlier crises such as the 1950 Korean War and 1960 Congo crisis for the U.S.S.R., and Guatemala 1954 for the USA.

One possible reason for the change of heart could be that at the time, the White House and the Kremlin did not have a "hotline" direct telephone link via which to communicate, and therefore could use a credible and established line of

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[543] Ibid., 468
[544] Ibid., 468
[545] This perception came from the public clashes the U.S.S.R. had with Trygve Lie over Korea, and Hammarskjöld over Congo in 1960.

communication such as the Office of the U.N. Secretary-General. Another more obvious reason is that each side understood what was at stake (the real possibility of a nuclear holocaust and the end of the world), and that as such, they had nothing to lose by turning to a neutral actor such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations for mediation, as opposed to relying on just their own diplomats and advisors, some of whom were hawkish and were at the time recommending full-scale war. Besides, public opposition to the Secretary-General's initiative would have backfired given the broad public support that U Thant was receiving. Also, we now have documented evidence of how the leaders of the superpowers perceived U Thant the person and also the United Nations as an organization. Evidence from the writings of Nikita Khrushchev, for example, reveals that he had a very favorable view of U Thant as a person, as can be seen in the following sentiments from his memoir:

> I was acquainted with U Thant. He was a representative from Burma, and we had good relations with Burma at that time, and even today our relations are friendly. We assumed that the representative from Burma would pursue a more flexible policy, and that at any rate he would not agree to a policy that was harmful to the socialist countries and the non-aligned countries. And, as became clear subsequently, we were not mistaken... U Thant showed that he was a man of principle. He didn't simply do the bidding of the United States, but pursued a policy that took into account for the interests of all countries... I think U Thant coped well with his task. He came into conflict more than once with the United States.... U Thant, in my opinion, was just the right candidate and he coped with his duties admirably.[546]

Interestingly, and perhaps just as crucial, Khrushchev had faith in the utility of the United Nations as an institution, in spite of its image from the 1940s and 1950s as a U.S. dominated organization, and notwithstanding his own personal clashes with Dag Hammarskjöld just a year before the Cuban Missile Crisis:

> As for the United Nations in general, I have a positive evaluation of its activities, although, as history has shown, the way many questions have been solved by the United Nations was not absolutely satisfactory for us or even contradicted our interests. But the U.N. is a useful institution. International problems flow together like so many small streams into one enormous collecting tank or pool – the United Nations. I consider this institution indispensable... The U.N. provides an opportunity for discussion of all the issues that arise and for an international exchange of opinions

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[546] Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich,,Khrushchev, Sergeï., "Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev. Volume 3, Volume 3," (Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA., 1997), 283-284.

> to take place.... The United Nations does not resolve conflicts, but it does moderate the passions of hotheads. Everyone is affected by the moderating spirit (at the U.N.) which has a calming effect. That is my understanding of the significance of the United Nations. It is an institution that seeks to preserve peace... The United Nations is the best thing that has been conceived so far under present-day conditions.[547]

The United States on its part had no reason to dislike the United Nations at this point because it had enjoyed the support of the majority of the organization's member states in the 1940s and 1950s, as was pointed out earlier. It was only the in the 1960s, as many more countries in Asia and Africa became independent, that the United States lost its numerical edge to the "nonaligned" movement. As such, it was not only the existential threat and broad public support generated by the crisis that worked in U Thant's favor, but also the disposition of the governments of both superpowers towards him as a personal supports the United Nations in such a time of great crisis. Collectively, these factors contributed to the positive and effective outcome both were pants first two public appeals.

6.2.3: Moderating Effect on Crisis Decisions

U Thant's first two public appeals were just the tip of the iceberg as far as his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis was concerned: the bulk of his diplomatic work took place behind the scenes as he constantly communicated with the US and Soviet governments and became a de facto mediator. The most impactful aspect of his mediation was that the declassified records reveal his moderating effect on the actions of President Kennedy. This effect was first reviewed on October 25 when the Kennedy administration was mounting over how to confront the Soviet ships acquiesced to headed towards Cuba. White House Ex-Comm transcripts reveal that President Kennedy's actions were tempered by his knowledge that the Secretary-General was working for conflict resolution. In a 6pm October 25 phone conversation with British Prime Minister Macmillan, President Kennedy's first substantive comment was the following:

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[547] Ibid., 284-288.

We have tomorrow 2 or 3 vessels, including particularly an East German vessel which has probably 6 or 700 passengers... it may have 6000 tons of cargo on it. So we are going to have to stop that, we think... Now we have got two tracks running. One is that one of these ships, the selected ships which Khrushchev continues to have come towards Cuba. On the other hand we have U Thant, and we don't want to sink a ship and then right in the middle of when U Thant is supposedly arranging for the Russians to stay out. So we may have to let some hours go by... In other words, I don't want to have a fight with a Russian ship tomorrow morning, and a search of it at a time when it appears that U Thant has got the Russians to agree not to continue... I think tomorrow night we will know a lot better about this matter of the U.N.'s actions and Khrushchev's attitude about continuing his shipping, and also what attitude he will take in regard to our searching them.[548]

Right after this particular phone conversation with Prime Minister Macmillan, President Kennedy rejoined the meeting of the White House Executive Committee (Ex-Comm) and turned back on his secret Cabinet Room tape recorder at the moment Secretary of Defense McNamara was getting back to the issue of what needed to be done about an East German passenger ship that was approaching the quarantine line. Here is a brief reproduction of their conversation:

Secretary of Defense McNamara: ...what we know, as of this evening, is that the Völkerfreundschaft...should pass through the barrier today, and we have the destroyer U.S.S. Pierce following it. The question is, should we ask it to halt and submit to inspection? If it did not halt, should we pass it without forcing it to halt, or should we force it to halt? If we were to force it to halt, should we use fire, or should we put a Navy ship in front of it? If we use fire, and damage the ship, with 1,500 people on board, and find that it's hard to explain, does not include items on the prohibited list, have we not weakened our position?[549]

President Kennedy response: I think the only problem really is this U Thant message where he is saying to us that we not, that we avoid an incident if Khrushchev keeps his ships out... I think the only argument for not stopping it, actually, is this U Thant thing, where we have an incident of a kind tomorrow morning on the ship at the time when supposedly he's asking the Russians to stay out of the area, before we've got an answer.[550]

In other words, President Kennedy was determined to avoid confrontation at the quarantine line unless and until he knew whether and how Premier Khrushchev would

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[548] May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 428-429.
[549] Ibid., 430
[550] Ibid., 430-431

respond to U Thant's second message. As was demonstrated in the previous section, Premier Khrushchev responded positively to U Thant's second appeal, and a possible confrontation averted, thanks in part to President Kennedy's sense of restraint. The truce at sea permitted the two adversaries to focus their energies more on the core issues at the heart of the crisis: missile removal and the future status of Cuba's security.

The White House ExComm transcripts show that U Thant played this "calming" role on at least four other occasions during the high point of the crisis (between October 25 and 27) During the 10am meeting on October 26, when the ExComm principals were considering whether to institute a POL[551] (petroleum, oil and lubricants) blockade around Cuba, Secretary of State replied, "I think that there would be some advantage in having a little shot at the U Thant talks for 24 hours before we consider putting on the POL."[552] Later during that same meeting, when the ExComm principals contemplated an escalation of the confrontation through use of flares (for night-time surveillance of Cuba), Secretary of State Dean Rusk again objected: "Mr. President, I wonder really again, on the nighttime reconnaissance, whether we ought to start that tonight, until we've had a crack at the U Thant discussions"[553].

Then, at 4pm on October 27, when the crisis was at its most intense and the ExComm principals were debating the merits and modalities of a military strike on Cuba, Secretary of Defense McNamara interjected as follows:"...if tomorrow we don't have a favorable answer from U Thant or Khrushchev...is it important to strike tomorrow? Or do we have some more time?"[554]; President Kennedy's reply to this idea was: "if we don't get an answer from U Thant, then we ought to consider whether Monday

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[551] The POL idea was proposed by Deputy National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, but was ultimately rejected by the other principals who doubted its effectiveness.
[552] Ibid., 448
[553] Ibid., 449
[554] Ibid., 545

morning [October 29] we... I'm not convinced yet of an invasion, because I think that's a bit much. I think we may..."[555].

Thereafter, at 9pm on the same crisis-climax day, October 27, a debate raged among the ExComm principals on whether United States reconnaissance aircraft should retaliate on Cuban anti-aircraft defenses if fired upon, and in so doing also take out the Soviet missile sites. The following is an abridged transcript of that discussion:

> **Secretary of Defense McNamara:** I think that the point is, that if our planes are fired on tomorrow, we ought to fire back. That's what I'd have, as far as... The best indication of the anti-aircraft sites that we have is around the missile sites.[556]
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> **Secretary of State Rusk:** But why fire back at the missile on the ground on the basis that you are fighting back at the anti-aircraft [guns]?[557]
>
> **Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon:** Because that's where they are.[558]
>
> **President Kennedy:** Let me say, I think we ought to wait till tomorrow afternoon, to see whether we get any answers if U Thant goes down there [to Havana].[559]

Later during that same 9pm meeting, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy remarked:

> **Robert F. Kennedy:** Why don't we just wait another 18 hours... We call up the planes tonight, and we wait. We find out if U Thant is successful... Then we find that he's not successful, the whole thing looks like it's collapsing, and we're going to have to go in there. So then we call them [the NATO allies] together...[560]

Last but not least, U Thant's restraining effect also had an effect on Security Council deliberations on October 25, the day when Ambassador Adlai Stevenson famously interrogated[561] Soviet ambassador Zorin in front of the world television cameras. As

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[555] Ibid., 566

[556] Ibid., 611-612

[557] Ibid., 612

[558] Ibid., 612

[559] Ibid., 612

[560] Ibid., 620-621

[561] This public and very famous interrogation is mostly remembered by Ambassador Stevenson's question: "Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the USSR has placed and displacing medium and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no- don't wait for the translation- yes or no?"... When Ambassador Zorin refused to answer the question, Stevenson famously said: "I am prepared to

the crisis unfolded, the Security Council, whose proceedings during the crisis were beamed live on television across the globe, naturally emerged as a forum that both superpowers want to use to their advantage to sway world opinion to their point of view. Right before the start of that meeting, President Kennedy had instructed Ambassador Stevenson over the phone that his speech be moderate in tone, pending the outcome of U Thant's second appeal on the Soviet ships (as outlined in the previous section).[562] It was only after Khrushchev's positive reply to U Thant's second appeal that the Kennedy White House gave Ambassador Stevenson the green light to go on the offensive against Ambassador Zorin during that Security Council meeting.[563]

Ultimately, like his two public appeals, U Thant's restraining effect had the overall impact of paving the way for the aforementioned issue-specific exchanges between Kennedy and Khrushchev that led to the end of the naval confrontation on October 28.

6.2.4: Centrality of U Thant's Mediation

U Thant's two appeals and his moderating effect as outlined above calmed the situation in the Atlantic Ocean and was a primary factor in helping avert a naval conflict and possible nuclear war. However the calming of the naval situation was only a first step to resolving the crisis- attention would soon focus on substantive negotiations on the Soviet missile that triggered the crisis in the first place. Intense negotiations took place at U.N. Headquarters in New York under the auspices of U Thant, first to diffuse the immediate and most dangerous phase of the crisis from October 26-28, and thereafter to hammer out the specific details of the final settlement from the end of October to late November 1962 (see next subsection). U Thant played a three-fold central role during the October 26-28 negotiations: first he hosted the U.S. and Russian negotiating teams in New York. Although he was aware of several

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wait for my answer until hell freezes over" - see Larson, David L. (ed.) (1963), The Cuban Crisis of 1962: Selected Documents and Chronology, Boston: 138
[562] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 275.
[563] Ibid.: 275

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private channels of communication that Kennedy and Khrushchev had at this time, such as the academic Bertrand Russell, U Thant hosted and guided the teams of diplomats whose job it was to hammer out the minute details of issues that their leaders agreed on in principle, and codify them in formal documents of agreement.[564] Part of his role in this context also included serving as a conduit for shuttle diplomacy between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Second, he was credited with formulating independent negotiation proposals, one of which (the U.S. pledge to not invade Cuba) became a central tenet of the final agreement. Third, he was instrumental in bringing Fidel Castro into the fold after the latter had expressed bitterness at being left out of the superpower negotiations.

For the negotiations at U.N. Headquarters in New York (first on October 26-28 to defuse the immediate threat of war, and later the post-crisis negotiations), the Kennedy administration dispatched a negotiation team headed by John McCloy[565] who had served as Assistant U.S. Secretary of War during World War II as well as President of the World Bank. The Soviets dispatched a team headed by their First Deputy Foreign Minister, Vasily V. Kuznetsov[566]. These two negotiating teams actively engaged in direct negotiations under the good offices of U Thant, and were in constant telephone communication with their governments; they served the valuable purpose of executing the minute details of issues that were agreed to in principle at the Head of State level.[567] His mediator role was formally recognized by Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy in which Khrushchev wrote:

> It is good, Mr. President, that you agreed for our representatives to meet and begin talks, apparently with the participation of U.N. Acting Secretary-General U Thant. Consequently, to some extent, he assumes the role of intermediary, and we believe

[564] Rikhye, *Critical Elements in Determining the Suitability of Conflict Settlement Efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General*, 77.

[565] McCloy had a reputation as a tougher negotiator than Ambassador Stevenson- see May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 440.

[566] Kuznetsov was mentioned by name as Khrushchev's special envoy to the U.N. talks in Khrushchev's October 29 cable to JFK- see Ibid., 634

[567] Rikhye, *Critical Elements in Determining the Suitability of Conflict Settlement Efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General*, 78.

that he can cope with the responsible mission if, of course, every side that is drawn into this conflict shows goodwill.[568]

U Thant's biggest contribution to the October 26-28 negotiations was his proposal to Ambassador Stevenson and Secretary of State Rusk on the afternoon of October 26 that "a deal could be reached by trading an American guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba for the dismantling and removal of all Cuban missile sites and offensive weapons a proposal that went on to become the backbone of the final crisis settlement.[569]

Historians such as Ernest May and Philip Zelikow have questioned whether such as a substantive proposal could really have come from U Thant himself, or whether it was suggested to him by Khrushchev via a KGB official in New York.[570] In his memoir, U Thant asserts that this was his own idea, derived from comments made by Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on October 8, prior to the start of the Cuban Missile Crisis: "were the U.S. able to give us proof... that it would not carry out aggression against our country, then... our weapons would be unnecessary and our army redundant.[571] Thus, if this were in fact a Khrushchev proposal, then we would have on our hands a case of Khrushchev following in Kennedy's footsteps in terms of using the mediator to present proposals to his opponent as a way of making them more palatable and testing their viability.[572]

However, declassified Soviet archives seem to support the assertion that this was U Thant's idea- in an October 26 telegram to the U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry, Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations V.A. Zorin wrote the following:

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[568] May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 506.
[569] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 279.
[570] Ibid., 279.
[571] Ibid., 279. See also May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 464.
[572] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 279.

> In response to our question about what plans U Thant had concerning the basis upon which a conclusive settlement would be attainable, U Thant answered that he found the key to this in Dorticos's speech to the General Assembly on 8 October of this year, in which the latter announced that if the USA were to give effective guarantees that they will not undertake a military invasion of Cuba, and will not aid its invasion by anyone else, it would not be necessary for Cuba to take military measures, or to even maintain its army. U Thant said that today he had explained his point of view to Stevenson, and that the latter had promised to inform Kennedy about it.[573]

In a separate telegram to the U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry authored on that the same day October 26, Ambassador Zorin also reports on his conversation with Cuban Permanent Representative to the U.N., Garcia-Inchaustegui, in which the latter independently stated that U Thant had just "expressed his ideas for using Dorticos's proposal of 8 October in the General Assembly as a way to achieve lasting normalization of the Caribbean basin situation."[574] Thus, in the absence of credible evidence of any KGB involvement, it can be assumed that U Thant was the true originator of this idea, and thus played a very central role in the mediation process.

U Thant also aided the negotiations by serving as a real-time conduit between the Kennedy and Khrushchev administrations, as the crisis was unfolding. Private channels of communication such as Bertrand Russell notwithstanding, the Kennedy tapes and well as Russian archives (see next subsection) indicate that U Thant was the official channel of communication outside of the Kennedy-Khrushchev cable exchanges. For example, during the 10am ExComm meeting on October 27, the most tense day of the crisis, there was mounting concern in the White House ExComm meeting that the Soviet ship *Grozny* was getting dangerously close to the quarantine line- President Kennedy dealt with this situation by asking U Thant to "tell the Soviet

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[573] V. A. Zorin, "Telegram from Soviet Delegate to the United Nations V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin- New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives*, ed. James Heshberg, trans. John Henriksen, Winter 1996/1997 ed., Vol. 8-9, 290, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_P-5.pdf; (accessed October 15 2013).
[574] Ibid., 289

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Representatives in New York (exactly) where the quarantine line was being drawn, so that they could decide whether to turn back the Grozny."[575]

Later that same day, during the 4pm ExComm meeting, President Kennedy received a formal recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue an order for a massive air strike against Cuba on October 28 or 29 and prepare to invade - this after a U-2 plane went missing over Cuba and U.S. pilots reported being shot at over Cuba.[576] Instead of following the cue of hawks and escalating the situation, President Kennedy sent a message[577] to U Thant some assurances that Soviet construction work on missile sites in Cuba had ceased.[578] Then during the 9pm ExComm meeting that same tense day, as the Grozny was still approaching the quarantine line, President Kennedy said the following:

> I think we ought to maybe call Stevenson... Tell U Thant this: That the ship is coming on, and have him call Zorin or whoever it is. After all, the assurance was to U Thant, not to me, that they'd keep them out of there. So, for the U.N., the record is clearer... He (Khrushchev) gave U Thant the assurance he wouldn't send these ships. So I think that we ought to tonight call Stevenson to inform U Thant that this ship is continuing to approach, and that we'd like to get some answer from them, whether this is going to be called back. Or otherwise the confrontation must take place...[579]

Later during that same 9pm meeting, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy reported to the ExComm principals that "U Thant was working very hard to persuade the Soviets not to shoot at US planes and not to challenge the U.S. quarantine the next morning", adding that "the atmosphere in New York seemed optimistic."[580] In this way, the superpowers, especially the Kennedy administration, used U Thant as a

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[575] May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 493.

[576] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 281.

[577] The message read in part as follows: *"A number of proposals have been made to you and to the United States in the last 36 hours. I would appreciate your urgently ascertaining whether the Soviet Union is willing immediately to cease work on these bases in Cuba and to render the weapons inoperable under United Nations verification so that various solutions can be discussed."*- see Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 114.

[578] May and Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes : Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 524.

[579] Ibid., 615

[580] Ibid., 629

communication channel of last resort before taking fateful decision that could have doomed the world in terms of triggering a nuclear war.

Additionally, on October 27, the same day that tension was at its highest, the Kennedy administration again attempted to use U Thant as a conduit for a U.S. proposal to be communicated as his own- in what was "perhaps one of the strongest testimonies about the faith that Kennedy had in Thant."[581] This initiative later became known as the "Cordier maneuver", and is summarized as follows by the historian Bertrand G. Ramcharan:

> President Kennedy, still seriously worried about the situation, asked Secretary of State Rusk to secretly contact the former United Nations Chef de Cabinet, Andrew Cordier (then at Columbia University in New York), and provide him with a statement that Secretary-General U Thant might issue if necessary in dire circumstances calling for the removal of American Jupiter missiles in Turkey and the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Rusk contacted Cordier, and they agreed that if Rusk received a further message, he should contact the Secretary-General to issue a statement. In this way, President Kennedy would be seen to agree to a U.N. proposal rather than a Soviet one regarding the removal of the Jupiter missiles.[582]

In the end, the "Cordier maneuver" was rendered moot- on October 28, on October 28, the Kennedy administration received notice of Khrushchev's acceptance of the U.S. proposal (with the Turkish missiles aspect being kept secret[583]).

Declassified Soviet Foreign Ministry archives on their part also reveal the centrality of U Thant's mediation- the Soviets certainly perceived him as an independent and impartial mediator. One of Ambassador Zorin's telegrams to his superiors in Moscow from October 26 read as follows:

> We told U Thant that the Soviet Union has already approved two of his proposals, proceeding in such a way as to frustrate the American provocation that threatens the peace, and also that it is now up to U Thant, in his capacity as acting General Secretary of the U.N., to exert the necessary pressure on the USA with the aim of reaching a provisional agreement for 2 to 3 weeks, based on the initial proposal of U

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[581] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 284.
[582] Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 115.
[583] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 282.

Thant himself. We emphasized that it is necessary to act quickly, since our ships cannot remain on the open sea for an indefinite period of time, and since the situation cannot be allowed to get out of control. U Thant said that he would do all he could, although he asks us as well to think of measures that would be favorably received by the USA.[584]

In particular, the Russians seem to have understood the influence that U Thant's initiative had on international opinion, and in that way attributed to U Thant the stature of an opinion-influencer and therefore a central actor in the crisis. This is exemplified in the text of a cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko sent to the U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev on 27 October 1962, just after Khrushchev had acceded to U Thant's second appeal:

It is almost impossible for the Americans to launch an adventurist invasion of Cuba, using their armed forces, in a response to our steps, undertaken in connection with U Thant's initiative, particularly in response to our last action. They know very well that if under present circumstances they were to start an intervention it would brand them as aggressors and hold them up to shame as enemies of peace imitating the worst patterns of Hitlerian perfidy.[585]

This view point is further advanced by Ambassador Zorin in an October 27 telegram to the Soviet Foreign Ministry in which he writes: "we will continue to exert pressure on U Thant and the U.N. delegates from the neutral countries (in particular, we had a conversation today to this effect with the delegate from the United Arab Republic in the Security Council) with the aim of persuading them to support the Soviet proposals, and of exerting pressure on the USA and its allies."[586] Thus, there can be no doubt as to the centrality of U Thant in the mediation process.

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[584] Zorin, *Telegram from Soviet Delegate to the United Nations V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962*, 290.

[585] Andrey Gromyko, "Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev, 27 October 1962," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin- New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives*, ed. James Heshberg, trans. John Henriksen, Winter 1996/1997 ed., Vol. 8-9, 291, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_P-5.pdf;; (accessed October 15 2013).

[586] V. A. Zorin, "Telegram from Soviet Delegate to the United Nations V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 27 October 1962," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin- New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives*, ed. James Heshberg, trans. John Henriksen, Winter 1996/1997 ed., Vol. 8-9, 292,

6.2.5: U Thant's Diplomacy Vis-à-Vis Fidel Castro

U Thant then made a trip to Cuba on October 30 and 31 for two main purposes: first as part of his effort to deflect the risk of war- Khrushchev's pledge of October 28 had still not convinced the hawks in the Kennedy administration to back down. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memo to President Kennedy on October 28, just after Khrushchev's pledge was received, "interpreting the Khrushchev statement as an effort to delay U.S. action 'while preparing the ground for diplomatic blackmail'; they recommended an air strike the next day forward by an invasion unless there was irrefutable evidence that dismantling had begun."[587] Thus, although the naval confrontation had been averted, there still remained a risk that the U.S. could attack Cuba and war could break out, and Castro was a key player in determine the outcome of all this. So on October 28, U Thant announced that he would go to Havana to "try to secure Castro's consent in the establishment of a U.N. mission to verify the dismantling of the missile sites."[588] President Kennedy responded to U Thant's latest gesture by lifting the quarantine and overflights of Cuba for the period of the Secretary-General's visit in a bid to try and promote the success of his mission.[589]

The second reason for the Cuba trip was that unlike Kennedy and Khrushchev, U Thant viewed Castro as an indispensable actor from the onset of the crisis- he had been in constant communication with him, most notably on October 26 when he sent a cable requesting that Cuba place a moratorium on missile construction work while U.S.-Soviet negotiations were underway. Castro replied on October 27 that he could

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http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_P-5.pdf;;; (accessed October 15 2013).

[587] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 282.

[588] Ibid.: 284   See also Vasili Kuznetsov, "Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign Ministry, 29 October 1962," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin- New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives*, ed. James Heshberg, trans. John Henriksen, Winter 1996/1997 ed., Vol. 8-9, 299-300, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_P-5.pdf; (accessed October 15 2013).

[589] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 284.   The world's media praised U Thant's initiative in this instance as well.

do so only if the United States stopped its threats of aggression and lift the naval blockade- nevertheless he invited U Thant to make a visit to Cuba.[590] U Thant's outreach notwithstanding, Castro was later taken aback by the October 28 announcement of a tentative U.S.-Soviet agreement, and particularly "bitter"[591] and "angered"[592] by the fact Khrushchev had kept him completely out of the loop on the aforementioned October 27 and 28 exchanges with Kennedy. As a result, in undertaking his trip to Cuba, U Thant faced the unenviable task of first mollifying a humiliated Castro and then convincing him to allow U.N. supervision of the missile dismantling as proposed by Khrushchev[593], or perhaps inspection by the Red Cross or the Havana-based Ambassadors of several Latin American countries as proposed by U Thant himself[594]. Castro rejected the idea of U.N. inspectors in his country as an unacceptable invasion of Cuba's sovereignty, and reiterated his criticisms of the United States; however after a lengthy one-on-one meeting, U Thant was able to win some concessions from Castro.[595]

U Thant left Cuba with three main concessions from Castro- first he continued with his restraining effect on the crisis by convincing Fidel Castro to delete from a planned speech some sections that criticized Khrushchev for agreeing the U.N. inspection of the missile sites as per the aforementioned October 27 and 28 cable exchanges with Kennedy.[596] Second, he received in-person assurances from the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba and also the Soviet general in charge of the missile installations that significant dismantling efforts were underway (complete with numerical specifics), and that the missiles would be completely dismantled by November 2, 1962; the Soviets even invited U Thant to visit a missile site, but he declined, saying that the verbal

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[590] Ibid., 284.

[591] Nassif, *U Thant in New York, 1961-1971 : A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General ; with a Foreword by Sir Brian Urquhart*, 32.

[592] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 285.

[593] Ibid.: 285

[594] S. A. Mikoian and Svetlana Savranskaya, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis : Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Krushchev, and the Missiles of November* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ;Stanford, California, 2012), 222.

[595] Ibid., 222.

[596] Ibid., 222.

assurances were enough.[597] Third, he convinced Castro to return the body of the U.S. pilot who had been shot down on October 27.[598] The trip was not a complete success however- as indicated earlier, Castro rejected the idea of U.N. observers, and even refused to allow the Secretary-General to leave behind one or two U.N. aides for direct liaison with the Cuban government... but on balance, it was a notable success in its contribution to the abatement of the crisis.

6.2.6: U Thant's Impact on Post-Crisis Tripartite Negotiations

Following the interim Kennedy-Khrushchev informal agreement of October 28 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis entered a less dangerous phase of intense negotiations aimed at codifying that informal agreement as well as resolving the outstanding issues of missile removal verification and withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 bomber aircraft from Cuba. U Thant hosted the negotiations at U.N. Headquarters in New York; many of the sessions took place in U.N. Secretariat conference rooms with U Thant shuttling back and forth between negotiating teams or hosting them in his 38th floor conference room.[599] As indicated earlier, the Soviets were led by Khrushchev's Special Envoy, Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov, whereas the American negotiating team was led by former World Bank President John McCloy. Kuznetsov came to New York with explicit instructions from the U.S.S.R. government to "aid U Thant in his efforts to eliminate the dangerous situation that has arisen."[600] First hand testimony from U Thant's military attaché General Indar Jit Rikhye, suggests that U Thant's presence had a moderating effect on the aggressiveness of the negotiators, "using all

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[597] Ibid., 222. See also Nassif, *U Thant in New York, 1961-1971 : A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General ; with a Foreword by Sir Brian Urquhart*, 34.

[598] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 285-286. See also Nassif, *U Thant in New York, 1961-1971: A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General ; with a Foreword by Sir Brian Urquhart*, 35.

[599] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 287.

[600] Vasili Kuznetsov, "Record of Conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, 29 October 1962 (from the Diary of Kuznetsov)," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin- New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives*, ed. James Heshberg, trans. John Henriksen, Winter 1996/1997 ed., Vol. 8-9, 295-299, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_P-5.pdf; (accessed October 15 2013).

the tact at his command to keep the discussions under restraint"[601] and in particular "blunting the sharpness of McCloy's belligerent approach to the discussions."[602]

U Thant achieved a number of things during his facilitation of the post-crisis negotiations: first he originated[603] the idea of neutral personnel from the International Committee of the Red Cross to inspect Soviet ships at sea as at of the dismantlement verification, this after Fidel Castro had rejected the idea of U.N. inspectors. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. initially agreed to this proposal, but later abandoned it, agreeing instead during the same U.N. talks to have U.S. ships and reconnaissance planes do the verification[604] at sea. Regardless, U Thant's achievement in this context was to "keep the negotiations alive by providing reassurance that verification would take place."[605] Second, U Thant helped convince Fidel Castro to remove the IL-28 Soviet bombers from Cuban territory, and helped in the drafting of a Soviet-Cuban draft protocol as well as a U.S. draft declaration on the "settlement of the crisis", all steps that led to President Kennedy's November 19 1962 announcement that he was finally lifting the blockade on Cuba.[606]

Declassified Russian archives reveal the significant extent to which U Thant was involved in the post-crisis negotiations: he is not only mentioned by name in almost every cable or telegram between Moscow and New York or Moscow and Havana, but is also revealed as a central figure involved in the minute details of the negotiations. Additionally, the Soviets continued to court his support during this period, long after the TV cameras had beamed the Security Council debates, by "backing his ultimately

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[601] Rikhye, *Critical Elements in Determining the Suitability of Conflict Settlement Efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General*, 78.

[602] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 287.

[603] See also Kuznetsov, *Record of Conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, 29 October 1962 (from the Diary of Kuznetsov)*, 295-299.

[604] The U.S. ships/planes would come near Soviet vessels, then the Soviet crews would remove the canvas covers they had over the missiles so their U.S. counterparts would count them. The Soviets shared the ship itineraries with the U.S. military. See Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 288. See also Nassif, *U Thant in New York, 1961-1971 : A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General ; with a Foreword by Sir Brian Urquhart*, 37.

[605] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 288.

[606] Ibid.: 288

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futile Cuba inspectors plan, even at the price of additional tensions with Havana"[607]. Evidently, "the U.S. interest in engaging the United Nations in negotiations with the USSR was at its peak at the height of the crisis, when Washington was desperately seeking any approaches to resolve it peacefully... but when the danger for the United States receded, and the crisis was moving towards resolution, Washington started to gradually push the United Nations aside, trying to narrow all negotiations to a direct settlement with the Soviet Union- at the same time, for Moscow, the active engagement of the U.N. was becoming even more desirable."[608]

Evidence of U Thant's involvement in the minute details of the post-crisis negotiations is revealed in a telegram from Khrushchev's Special Envoy to the New York negotiations, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, to the Russian Foreign Ministry on October 30 1962, in which he wrote:

> We are communicating several thoughts... on our possible position and tactics in the course of future negotiations U Thant and the Americans... According to facts released by the U.N. Secretariat, U Thant wants to create a monitoring apparatus composed of representatives from a selection of neutral countries belonging the U.N. - Sweden, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic, Mexico, Brazil, [and] Yugoslavia, and also Switzerland. There is also an idea about delegating the monitoring process to eight neutral countries represented in the Committee on Disarmament... The Americans, U Thant has informed us, are putting forth a variant in which the monitoring groups consist of representatives from the USA, USSR, and Cuba. All of the issues laid out here will be the subject of discussions immediately after U Thant's return from Cuba, i.e., after 1 November. We request you examination.[609]

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[607] James Hershberg, "Introduction to New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin- New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives*, ed. James Heshberg, Winter 1996/1997 ed., Vol. 8-9, 274, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_P-5.pdf;;; (accessed October 15 2013). See also Mikoian and Savranskaya, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis : Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Krushchev, and the Missiles of November*, 345.

[608] Ibid., 238

[609] V. A. Zorin and V. Kuznetsov, "Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the U.N. Zorin to U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry , 30 October 1962." in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin- New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives*, ed. James Heshberg, trans. John Henriksen, Winter 1996/1997 ed., Vol. 8-9, 302-303, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_P-5.pdf;; (accessed October 15 2013).

The part on courting U Thant even at the rice of increasing tensions with Cuba is revealed in a cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev on 31 October, 1962, in which he send him the following marching orders:

> Visit Fidel Castro and tell him the following:
> 1. Say, that in Moscow we consider it necessary to satisfy U Thant's desire that the launchers, which are being dismantled, be shown to him and persons accompanying him, among them General Rikhye, even in the course of dismantling. It is advantageous for us, especially taking into account that U Thant has promised to make a statement immediately on his return to the USA, that the Soviet Union had fulfilled its commitments... Immediately inform about these instructions Pavlov [Pliyev], who has to fulfill them without delay.
>
> 2. Inform Fidel Castro that in Moscow it is considered advantageous U Thant's proposal about creating U.N. posts on the territory of Cuba... Immediately inform Pavlov [Pliyev] about these instructions too. Express confidence that Fidel Castro and his friends would also accept U Thant's proposal, which is very important for us.[610]

Further evidence of the extent to which the Russians tried to court the Secretary-General is provided in the transcripts of meetings that took place at the National Palace in Havana on November 4 and 5 between senior Soviet CCPU CC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan and the Cuban Leadership (Fidel Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, President Osvaldo Dorticos, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez). At one point during these sessions, Mikoyan remarked how "U Thant has played a good role... you cannot ask more, given his situation, he even seems to have a little sympathy for our position", to which Fidel Castro later on replied: "I understand very well the interest of keeping U Thant on our side, but for us, (sovereignty and the need to reject inspectors) is a critical issue... such an inspection will undoubtedly have a painful effect on the moral condition of our people."[611] Castro ultimately refused to allow any U.N.

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[610] Andrey Gromyko, "Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev, 31 October 1962," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin- New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives*, ed. James Heshberg, trans. Vladimir Zaersky, Winter 1996/1997 ed., Vol. 8-9, 305-306, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_P-5.pdf;;; (accessed October 15 2013).

[611] Cuban Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Cuban Leadership, Havana, 4 November 1962: Meeting of the Secretariat of the CRI with Mikoyan at the National Palace, Sunday, 4 November

inspectors into Cuba, having felt humiliated by his Russian allies as already indicated. However this does not change the standing that U Thant had in the eyes of the Russians- and besides, he did receive assurances that the missiles would be dismantled within three days, which they ultimately were.

Ultimately, U Thant's success in dealing with Fidel Castro was less notable both during the crisis and after in part because the two superpowers conducted their New York negotiations without consulting Castro. When Soviet officials spoke of inspection, the Secretary-General apparently had assumed that they had consulted Castro, and when Castro expressed a willingness to receive U Thant in Havana, the Secretary-General erroneously believed that the main purpose of the visit was to set up the inspection machinery.[612] In a letter to Nikita Khrushchev dated October 28, 1962, U Thant indicated that "he hoped to reach a satisfactory understanding with Kuznetsov, as well as with Premier Castro on the modalities of verification by United Nations observers "to which you have so readily agreed."[613] However when the Secretary-General and his delegation flew into Cuba on November 1 1962, they returned to New York the following day "with their baggage including typewriters and other equipment intended to form the nucleus of a U.N. presence because Castro had plainly refused to allow U.N. inspections"[614]. As already indicated though, the Secretary-General did secure Russian assurances that the missiles were being dismantled and that their shipment back to the Soviet Union was in progress.

1962. See also Mikoïan and Savranskaya, *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis : Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Krushchev, and the Missiles of November*, 238.
[612]Cordier and Harrelson, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: U Thant, 1961-1964*, 237.
[613] Ibid., 237
[614] Ibid., 237

6.2.7: Reflections on U Thant Role

U Thant has put the world deeply in his debt- President John F. Kennedy

The archival and historical evidence in this case study has demonstrated that U Thant was a central and indispensable actor in the Cuban Missile Crisis, one whose actions had a significant impact on the actions of both Kennedy and Khrushchev and played a discernible role in helping avert the breakout of war. It would of course be unrealistic and historically inaccurate to attribute the outcome of the crisis to just the efforts of U Thant- besides, Kennedy and Khrushchev had direct as well as other third party channels of communications, plus the actions of naval and air force commanders in the conflict theater also played a role in either escalating or averting war. For example, based on the secret direct agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev to trade the Cuban missile withdrawal with a withdrawal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey (negotiated between Robert F. Kennedy and the U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Washington D.C.), the Russian negotiating team in New York received strict instructions not to mention the Jupiter missiles issue during the negotiations.[615] However that said, U Thant's role is one that was central, as was acknowledged by the leaders of the two superpowers as well as other third party observers.

His first appeal, though initially received with trepidation by either side, led to Khrushchev's recall of many Cuba-bound ships, and also a shift in the way Kennedy perceived U Thant- from a bureaucrat to a potential mediator. His second appeal and subsequent mediation activities solidified his mediator role- he was able to serve as a real-time conduit between the two sides (e.g. Grozny incident), propose innovative ideas of his own (e.g. diversion of ships, non-invasion of Cuba pledge), as well as moderate the behavior of the crisis actors by his very participation, especially the

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[615] Andrey Gromyko, "Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Soviet Mission in New York, 1 November 1962," in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin- New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives*, ed. James Heshberg, trans. John Henriksen, Winter 1996/1997 ed., Vol. 8-9, 310, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHPBulletin8-9_P-5.pdf;; (accessed October 15 2013).

Kennedy administration as revealed in the ExComm transcripts. His moderating impact evidently helped prevent escalation and possibly the breakout of war. Many, including Thant himself, believed that this was the single most important initiative taken by him during the crisis.[616] While it is true that both Kennedy and Khrushchev wanted to avoid a nuclear confrontation, it is equally true that U Thant's intervention offered them a convenient way out and made it easier for them to back down without losing face.[617]

Both sides later came to extensively use and consider him in their overall strategy vis-à-vis the other side, as revealed by the archival evidence. From a mediation viewpoint, U Thant ultimately performed a multidimensional role in terms of "facilitating face-saving and de-escalation, transmitting messages, fostering confidence, making independent proposals, and ultimately affecting the negotiations profoundly."[618] The faith of both the U.S. and Soviet sides in U Thant is evident in their "discussions of him, requests to him, and in his many successful initiatives"- ultimately his role was as important as that of military and the resolve of the two sides, especially the Americans to use it.[619]

A key lesson for mediation scholars from this case study is that sometimes during conflicts, "a mediator's offer to assist may initially be rejected by one or both of the parties, but then embraced; initial rejections of the mediator should not be construed as final, for they can indeed be reversed when calmer minds prevails, and the mediator's actions greatly appreciated later."[620] A second lesson for mediation scholars is that mediators can elicit concessions from crisis actors "in such a manner that they do not appear as submission or capitulation", as was evident in the letters to/from Kennedy and Khrushchev.[621] A third lesson is that in some cases of conflict, a mediator may not

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[616]Cordier and Harrelson, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: U Thant, 1961-1964*, 237.

[617] Ibid., 236

[618] Dorn and Pauk, *Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 292.

[619] Ibid.: 292

[620] Ibid.: 290

[621] Ibid.: 290

necessarily control the proposals and communications between the protagonists, as Kissinger did in his Camp David "shuttle diplomacy", but may nevertheless effect significant impact via a less formalized role that does not control all communications and dominate the process"[622], as U Thant did.

For the field of history, there is consensus[623] that U Thant's important has been sidelined or even forgotten by most historians- as a matter of fact even during the crisis itself, the Secretary-General's phone was overshadowed to some degree by the dramatic nature of the near confrontation, such that the post crisis public recognition given to U Thant by both the US and USSR (see next paragraph) has largely been ignored by historians.[624] There is a need for historians to re-evaluate the narrative that tends to attribute the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis to President Kennedy's strength and resolve, evidently at the expense of recognizing the role of U Thant.

After the crisis, U Thant deservedly received praise from many quarters: in his letter of October 28, 1962 to Premier Khrushchev, President Kennedy wrote: "The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary-General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks."[625] Just after the crisis ended, President Kennedy remarked in an interview with the New York Times Magazine: "U Thant has put the world deeply in his debt."[626] After the U.N. negotiation concluded in late November 1962, Ambassador Stevenson and the lead Soviet negotiator Vasili V. Kuznetzov sent a joint letter to U Thant which read in part as follows: "On behalf of the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our Governments to avert the serious threat to the peace

[622] Ibid., 290
[623] Rikhye, *Critical Elements in Determining the Suitability of Conflict Settlement Efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General*, 80.
[624] Cordier and Harrelson, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: U Thant, 1961-1964*, 236.
[625] Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 83.
[626] Gertrude Samuels, "The Mediation of U Thant," *New York Times Magazine*, December 13, 1964, 115.

which recently arose in the Caribbean area..."[627] The compliments to U Thant were not just limited to the diplomats or leaders of the two superpowers. The Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations, Ambassador Quaison-Sackey, who had taken a lead role in the 50-state appeal to U Thant, expressed his appreciation for the Secretary-General's "tremendous show of statesmanship and initiative" [628]during an open meeting of the Security Council on October 25th, 1962. Ultimately, the United States and the Soviet Union rewarded U Thant by offering him a full term as Secretary-General.[629] The U.S.S.R. also dropped its demand for a "troika" to replace the Secretaries-Generalship.

In his memoir, U Thant himself later reflected on the crisis:

> I was suddenly called upon to act as a go-between, so as to gain time for the main contestants to save face and, incidentally, to help save humanity from imminent nuclear annihilation. The public—in the United States, in the Soviet Union, in Cuba, the world over—did not know how much it owed to the United Nations for being involved at that decisive moment. Not only was the United Nations the only spot on the globe in which the three contestants could and did literally face each other without a resulting catastrophe. The man in the street, lined up behind one side or the other, did not realize how much his survival depended on what the United Nations did to help the rival factions gain the time they both needed to effect the compromise that eventually came about.[630]

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[627] Thant, *View from the UN*, 193.

[628] Ramcharan, *Preventive Diplomacy at the U.N.*, 115.

[629] Bernard J. Firestone, *The United Nations Under U Thant, 1961-1971*, Vol. 3 (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 15.

[630] Thant, *View from the UN*, xvi-xvii.

Lebanon Hostages Crisis

6.3.0: Introduction and Background

The Lebanon Hostages crisis of the 1980s was unlike any that the United Nations had faced before. In prior hostage crises, the precipitating actor was either a nation-state or a recognized/established terrorist organization. Prior to the 1980s, hostage crises had included the aforementioned U.S.-China Hostages Crisis of 1954-55, the 1967 Guinea-Ivory Coast crisis[631], and also the U.S.S.R.-Ghana crisis of 1968[632], all of which were successfully negotiated and resolved by U.N. Secretaries-General. The 1960s saw "an increase in civilian aircraft hijackings, the kidnapping of diplomats, and acts of terrorism employed as a political weapon" by established terrorist groups - the late 1960s saw U Thant playing an important role in resolving two highly publicized (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) airplane hijackings: first involving an Israeli El Al airliner in July 1968, then in 1969 involving a TWA airliner[633]. Kurt Waldheim successfully negotiated in 1974 the release of three West German and 18 French nationals imprisoned in Guinea for alleged participation in an anti-government plot; as well as the release of eight French hostages who had been seized by the Polisario Front in Mauritania.

The unique thing about the Lebanon Hostages Crisis though is that it involved a group of western hostages held by a nebulous and intricate web of terrorist organizations linked to Hezbollah, itself a client organization of a third-party state actor (the Islamic Republic of Iran). Pérez de Cuéllar described the hostage takers in this crisis as follows:

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[631] Cordier and Harrelson, *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: U Thant, 1968-1971*, 391.

[632] Ibid., 249.

[633] Ibid., 390.

The groups that seized the hostages were shadowy to the end... (there were) three underground Shi'ite groups functioning in association with Hezbollah, a public organization of fundamentalist Shia that had strong ties with Iran. At various times the groups identified themselves as the Islamic Jihad, the Revolutionary Justice Organization and the Organization of the Oppressed of the Earth. None of the groups ever asked the United Nations to provide assurance against pursuit or retaliation. It is doubtful whether they ever existed in a structured sense. I believe that they operated under the guidance, if not complete control, of Hezbollah. Hezbollah, in turn, was clearly dependent on support from Iran and accordingly was subject to strong Iranian influence.[634]

Thus, the Lebanon Hostages crisis represented unchartered waters for the United Nations. Its roots emanated from the protracted Middle-East conflict that was triggered in 1948 and the anti-Israel sentiment that festered in the region after four wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (in pursuit of the PLO) and subsequent retreat to Lebanon's southern borders proved especially decisive: retreating Israeli armies were replaced by a multinational peacekeeping force that not only failed to keep the peace but also triggered the formation of Hezbollah. Ultimately, Hezbollah evolved into a major anti-Western/anti-Israeli force in the Middle East; starting in 1983, it alongside other radical Shiite groups launched a violent campaign against western interests.

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war further solidified Hezbollah's anti-western stance because the Western powers shared a common disdain for Hezbollah's patrons, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and supported Saddam Hussein in a not-so-subtle fashion during that war. Some key Gulf emirates such as Kuwait joined the anti-Iran and anti-Hezbollah camp by providing massive financial assistance to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. These dynamics would in time lead to Hezbollah's kidnapping of western civilians.

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[634] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 127.

The 1983 Kuwait bombings stand out as a triggering event for the Lebanon Hostages Crisis- a group of Shiite radicals called the Al Dawa launched a series of six attacks against key foreign and Kuwaiti installations on 12 December 1983, two months after Hezbollah's famous anti-U.S. 1983 Beirut barracks bombing. The six attacks involved a suicide bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City and car/truck bomb attacks at the French Embassy, Kuwait International Airport, Kuwait's main oil refinery and water desalinization plant (the Shuaiba Petro-chemical plant), the Electricity Control Center and the living quarters for American employees at the Kuwait Offices of the Raytheon Corporation, which at that point was installing a missile system for the Kuwaiti military. Al Dawa's motivation for the attacks was to first deter Kuwait and other oil-rich Persian Gulf Arab states from financially supporting[635] Saddam Hussein's war against Iran (in 1983-84 alone, Kuwait had provided $7 billion in financial assistance to Saddam and was Iraq's second largest benefactor after Saudi Arabia[636]). An equally important motivation was to deter the Western powers from assisting Saddam's war effort. In all, the six Kuwait attacks killed just six people and were quickly followed by Kuwait's capture and life sentencing of the 17 Al Dawa perpetrators.

The unintended effect of this Kuwaiti victory, however, was to drive Hezbollah and other Shiite radical groups into desperation mode and the adoption of civilian kidnappings as an asymmetric anti-western/anti-Arab oil state strategy. Shortly after these events, "freedom for Kuwait's Al Dawa 17 became a primary concern of the larger Hezbollah movement in Lebanon; Hezbollah reasoned that Western states might exert pressure on Kuwait if some of their citizens were taken as hostages in Lebanon."[637] In this way, Lebanon by the mid-1980s became infamous for

[635] Shireen Hunter, *Iran and the World : Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 117.

[636] Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, *Iran and the Arab World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 77.

[637] Lankevich,
the United Nations Under Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, 1982- 1991, 120.

kidnappings of western civilians, be they journalists, U.N. workers, academics, suspected CIA operatives, or even hostage negotiators- by 1988, when the issue gained enough salience to attract a high-profile intervention by Secretary-General Javier UN, at least 23 kidnappings had occurred and at least three hostages had been killed.[638]

6.3.1: Motivations for Pérez de Cuéllar's Intervention

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's intervention in the Lebanon Hostages Crisis was motivated by three main factors:

The first motivation was his peripheral but nevertheless intimate involvement in the cases of two hostage cases in Lebanon, both of them involving Hezbollah-affiliated shadowy underground groups. The first case involved Alec Collett, a British journalist who was kidnapped on March 25, 1985, by the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems. Pérez de Cuéllar had "known and liked Collett as a good-humored and intelligent journalist" at the U.N., and worked to negotiate his release with his captors, however the British government engaged in its own direct negotiations without the Secretary-General's involvement, and specifically asked to handle the issue "without UN involvement."[639] Tragically, Collett's captors announced his execution on April 23, 1986, a development that led Pérez de Cuéllar to later write: "until then, nothing had brought home to me so forcefully the brutality and utter senselessness of hostage-taking."[640]

The second case involved Lieutenant Colonel William R. Higgins, a U.S. Marine serving in the U.N. Military Observer Group in southern Lebanon who was abducted on February 17, 1988, by the "Organization of the Oppressed of the World". The Secretary-General worked hard to try and secure the release of Higgins; however his efforts were undermined by the July 30, 1989 Israeli abduction of a prominent Shi'ite

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[638] Ibid., 120
[639] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 101.
[640] Ibid., 101

fundamentalist leader in Lebanon, Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid.[641] Barely 24 hours after Sheik Obeid's abduction, Higgins' captors announced his execution as a retaliatory measure for the Obeid abduction; Pérez de Cuéllar later wrote of how he "was profoundly shocked to hear that an officer clearly identified as a U.N. observer fulfilling a mission of peace should have been brutally murdered."[642]

The second factor was Pérez de Cuéllar's successful mediation of the Iran-Iraq war- in April 1988, he had proposed a ceasefire plan to the leaders of Iran and Iraq that included a "D-Day" complete ceasefire date followed by the withdrawal of forces the day after and consultations on adherence to Security Council Resolution 598 (1988).[643] Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei and Iraq's Saddam Hussein (via his Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz) accepted the Secretary-General's plan and ultimately to direct negotiations under Pérez de Cuéllar's auspices.[644]

As a result of the Secretary-General's mediation, as well as broader geopolitical factors such as the thawing Cold War environment that made global conflicts more amenable to diplomatic resolution, the Iran-Iraq War was brought to an end. As far as the Lebanon Hostage Crisis was concerned, Pérez de Cuéllar's Iran-Iraq War success enhanced his stature in the eyes of the Iranian regime, and made him a credible potential mediator for the hostage issue. On his part, Pérez de Cuéllar "hoped to use the good will and prestige he gained in Teheran as a wedge to solve the hostage situation- precisely which Hezbollah groups actually held hostages was always unclear, but no one doubted the influence that revolutionary Iran held over them."[645] Thus, broader events set the stage for the Secretary-General's intervention to resolve the Lebanon Hostages Crisis once and for all.

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[641] Ibid., 103
[642] Ibid., 103
[643] Ibid., 169
[644] Ibid., 167-176
[645] Lankevich,
the United Nations Under Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, 1982- 1991, 121.

The third motivating factor was the change of administrations in both the United States and Iran over the course of 1988 and 1989. In the United States, Ronald Reagan was replaced by George W. Bush who had extensive multilateral experience having served, among other things, as U.S. Ambassador to China and to the United Nations. Bush's background translated into a less hawkish foreign policy when compared to his predecessor, a genuine embrace of multilateralism, and also a veiled overture to the Islamic Republic during his January 1989 inaugural speech. Giandomenico Picco, who later served as Pérez de Cuéllar's Personal Envoy for the Lebanon Hostage Crisis, summarized Bush overture and its effect on U.N. calculus as follows:

> On January 20, 1989, George Bush was sworn in as the forty-first president of the United States. A former ambassador to the United Nations and director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Bush was far more experienced in world affairs than his predecessor. Moreover, he had gathered around him a very sophisticated foreign policy team. In his inaugural speech, he spoke directly to the hostage issue and allusively to Iran: 'There are, today, Americans who are held against their will in foreign lands, and Americans who are unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here and will be long remembered. Goodwill begets goodwill. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly moves on... "Goodwill begets goodwill": that was the key sentence that would officially trigger Pérez de Cuéllar's operation to free the hostages in Beirut. Those code words soon became the basis of everything I did until the last of the hostages was released and I resigned from the United Nations in June 1992... in my mind and the minds of many of my closest colleagues, it was a public promise by the leader of the West's most powerful nation that could not be made without being kept. The Bush administration would not make formal contact with the Secretary-General until August 1989, but the president's words that day in January were enough to strengthen our determination to proceed.[646]

Pérez de Cuéllar himself also quotes this portion of President Bush's inaugural address and observes that "this was one of very few statements in the address referring to individual foreign policy issues and underscored the importance he attributed to this issue and to improved U.S.-Iranian relations."[647]

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[646] Giandomenico Picco, *Man without a Gun : One Diplomat's Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War*, 1st ed. (New York, N.Y.: Times Books/Random House, 1999), 104-105.

[647] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 105.

Meanwhile in Iran, the hardline Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, and was replaced by the mellower Ayatollah Khamenei; almost concurrently, in July 1989, the moderate Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Interestingly, just after taking power, Rafsanjani publicly broached the idea of America's unfreezing of blocked Iranian assets in exchange for Iranian help in convincing Hezbollah and its related organizations to free the hostages.[648] Very soon thereafter, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah (Sheik Mohammed Hassan Fadlallah) asserted his willingness to consider freeing the Lebanon hostages.[649] Pérez de Cuéllar himself observed that as these events were unfolding, he "was convinced, in my own mind, that if the western hostages in Lebanon were released, President Bush would act swiftly to free Iranian assets blocked by the United States or respond with appropriate gestures."[650]

6.3.2: Pérez de Cuéllar's Intervention Strategy

Based on his analysis of these unfolding dynamics, Pérez de Cuéllar sensed that a window of opportunity was opening for a possible diplomatic solution to this issue, albeit under the right conditions and with the right mediator. In early 1989, he approached the newly inaugurated President George H.W. Bush and informed him that he, as U.N. Secretary-General, was "ready to help in any way I could to resolve the hostage problem."[651] Part of Pérez de Cuéllar's rationale in taking this initiative was the United States would logically find it difficult to engage in direct negotiations with a country with whom it had no diplomatic relations since 1979, and which it listed on its list of state sponsors of terrorism. In light of the difficulties that the U.S. had had with trying to negotiate with Hezbollah (not to mention the long-standing American policy of non-negotiation with terrorists organizations), George H.W. Bush seized on the Secretary-General's initiative and responded in August 1989 by asking Pérez de

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[648] Ibid., 105
[649] Lankevich,
the United Nations Under Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, 1982- 1991, 121.
[650] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 105.
[651] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 104.

Cuéllar to "communicate a number of thoughts" to the newly elected Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Picco provides the following rationale as to why he thinks the Bush administration decide to use the Secretary-General's good offices for the crisis:

> In early August 1989, President Bush contacted Pérez de Cuéllar and asked him to receive Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, with an eye toward communicating with Rafsanjani. The White House had come to us because it realized we had direct access to the Iranian leadership and would be received on a one-on-one basis by the new Iranian president. It was another indication of the secretary-general's enhanced profile in international affairs...[652]

It was at this stage that Pérez de Cuéllar decided to autonomously employ the ultimate tool of intervention available to any Secretary-General seeking to mediate a major international crisis: the appointment of a Personal Envoy (Giandomenico Picco) that would focus his or her full-time energies on just this crisis. Interestingly George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft wrote a joint memoir in their post White House years entitled A World Transformed, but do not address the Lebanon hostage crisis. The only direct accounts we have available as to what took place during this initial phase are from the memoirs of Picco, Pérez de Cuéllar and some of the hostages that were later released. Picco describes in details what happened after the initial consultations between the White House and Pérez de Cuéllar:

> At the beginning of August, Pérez de Cuéllar decamped to the Hamptons on the south shore of Long Island for ten days' vacation as he did every year. Messages and officials were shuttled back and forth every day. Plans were made for Scowcroft's visit. Scowcroft explained that Bush was prepared to embark on a series of reciprocal gestures that would ease relations and free the hostages... Scowcroft's message was simple: both he and the president wanted a message delivered directly to Rafsanjani, with no intermediaries. They also wanted to hear his reaction to it. The Secretary-General and the National Security Adviser played a bit with the wording; then Pérez de Cuéllar told Scowcroft that he would "work on the message and have Picco deliver it to the President of Iran." My boss then called me in to discuss the message. We agreed that it would be better to cast the message not as having come directly from Bush but rather as coming from Pérez de Cuéllar, explaining Bush's thinking. This might seem like a distinction without a difference, but relations between Washington and Teheran were so strained that if Rafsanjani were forced at some point to admit to radical factions in Iran that he had accepted a message from the American president,

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[652] Picco, *Man without a Gun : One Diplomat's Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War*, 111.

it would gravely embarrass him. We felt that we needed to protect Rafsanjani as the new man in Iran.[653]

This account is reminiscent of what Dag Hammarskjöld did in the Chinese Hostages Crisis, i.e. asserting his autonomy by determine the exact shape and form of his mediation, and asserting his own identity independent of the superpower on whose behalf he was acting.

Selection of Picco as SRSG

Pérez de Cuéllar selected his protégé and close confidant Giandomenico Picco, to serve as his Personal Envoy for this most delicate of tasks- and explained his rationale, as earlier cited in the SRSG section of Chapter 3, that Picco had "the initiative, courage, and for discretion required for this work."[654] Picco's first port of call was Washington D.C. to meet with George H.W. Bush's national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, who gave him a "non-paper" containing suggestions on what to say to President Rafsanjani. Pérez de Cuéllar then decided to dispatch Picco to Tehran and have him deliver the message orally and in-person to Rafsanjani, instead of delivering a written message. In his memoir, Pérez de Cuéllar described the gist of this oral message as having been his personal assurance that he "had known President Bush well for a good many years and was familiar with his thinking... and knew he would like to see improved US Iranian relations."[655] Picco then conveyed to Rafsanjani the Secretary-General's offer of his good offices to help mediate the hostage crisis.

Rafsanjani's initial response was that of caution and skepticism, but later he suggested a quid pro quo: the United States could signal its benign intentions by pressuring the Lebanese Maronites (a Christian group against whom the Shi'ites were fighting) to release Iranian hostages in its custody; the Secretary-General on his part could "take a firmer and more resolute attitude on implementation of Security Council Resolution

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[653] Picco, *Man without a Gun : One Diplomat's Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War*, 111-112.

[654] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 105.

[655] Ibid., 105.

598, which set forth the conditions for ending the Iran-Iraq War (the resolution's text provided, inter alia, for the withdrawal of "all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay")."[656]

Shortly after Picco's trip to Tehran, the Bush administration asked Pérez de Cuéllar to convey as a "signal"[657] to the Iranian leadership a message that 19 Iranians who had been held by the Lebanese Maronites had been released to the International Committee of the Red Cross, as per Rafsanjani's request. This development helped kick start the process: soon after, Rafsanjani suggested that Pérez de Cuéllar become directly involved as a mediator, and that the Secretary-General come up with a formula for resolving the hostages issue, with the tacit understanding that Iran could exercise its influence over Hezbollah because Pérez de Cuéllar "was respected as Secretary-General by both sides".[658]

At this juncture, Pérez de Cuéllar suggested "the release of some Iranian assets and compensation for the weapons purchased by the previous Iranian regime in the United States but never delivered"...and also "American support in bringing about the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Iran" as steps that the U.S. could take in exchanging for Iranian help in helping free the western hostages.[659] It was on this basis that negotiations for the release of the hostages commenced. Giandomenico Picco would spend several years shuttling back and forth between Iran, Lebanon, and the U.S. in a bold and often dangerous negotiation process.

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[656] Ibid., 106.
[657] Ibid., 106 & 108.
[658] Ibid., 107.
[659] Ibid., 107.

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Given the sensitivity of the negotiations (sensitivity in the sense that the United States had an official policy of non-negotiation with terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, not to mention a Congress that would not have allowed any negotiations with the Iranian regime in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal... just as many conservatives in Iran would be opposed to Rafsanjani's rapprochement with the Bush administration), the Secretary-General decided to use a strategy of utmost secrecy in handling this issue. In his memoire, Pérez de Cuéllar writes that

> All activities connected with the hostages were kept secret, no mean achievement in the United Nations. For the most part, only Picco and I knew about developments. Picco was ideally suited for the challenge of lengthy and devious negotiations in which pride and hatred, faith and distrust were intermingled. He gained and retained the confidence of all the parties in this secret game- a signal achievement, and one essential, I believe, to the ultimately fortunate outcome.[660]

Giandomenico Picco provided an even more vivid account of the extent to which extreme care was taken to ensure the confidentiality of this mission. In his own memoir of the hostage crisis, he writes:

> I never mentioned the subject of the hostages in New York outside the most tightly restricted circles; success, if we were to have it, required complete secrecy within the United Nations itself—virtually an oxymoron. Even within the Secretary-General's office we never discussed the case in ways that might reveal my involvement. Everything I did on the hostage issue was marked for the files, "No Distribution. Original 1 — Sec. Gen., G.P. Copy." It went into the "pink folder," inviolable to everyone except me and my assistant, Judith Karam. When I would tell Judy, "Put this in the pink folder," she knew what I meant. The two of us defended the file as if it meant my life, which is precisely what it would mean later in Beirut. To this day, I regret that, during those years, it was necessary to deceive the Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet, Virendra Dayal, who had no knowledge of the details of my operations—or even my whereabouts. I would make three (airline) reservations at a time to cover my tracks.[661]

Prior to Picco's appointment, the government of Switzerland had been involved in a separate effort to try and secure the release of the Lebanon hostage (Switzerland

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[660] Ibid., 108-109.

[661] Picco, *Man without a Gun : One Diplomat's Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War*, 107.

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housed the U.S. special interests Office in Iran in lieu of an American Embassy) - however in time the Swiss withdrew because Rafsanjani preferred the mediatory role of Pérez de Cuéllar.[662]

Negotiations with Iran and Hezbollah

Pérez de Cuéllar's negotiations with Hezbollah began in earnest in March 1991 when the government of Iran offered to assist SRSG Picco establish contacts with Hezbollah and its affiliated groups in Lebanon. Picco arrived in Beirut on February 15, 1991 and was picked up by two Iranian Embassy vehicles that took him to the office of the spiritual leader of Hezbollah, Sheikh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah. This meeting would mark a first in a series of meetings between Picco and the groups that had custody of most of the Western hostages and also had knowledge of some missing Israeli soldiers.

Fadlallah reiterated what Pérez de Cuéllar had long suspected- that only the Iranian government had the leverage to help Picco establish direct contacts with the "responsible groups", and that also opined that "neither the United States nor the United Kingdom could deal directly with "these people", whereas the Secretary-General of the United Nations, whose involvement he considered "essential" could afford to do so with the help of Iran, but that the issue of Lebanese "prisoners of war" in Israeli custody hard to be part of the equation as well.[663] The state of Israel was thus brought into the mix by Hezbollah which demanded the release of its people being held in Israeli prisons as a necessary ingredient for resolving the Lebanon hostage problem.

Another unexpected twist came with the outbreak as well as outcome of Gulf War I, which compelled Iran to recalibrate its demands and place a higher priority on its removal from the U.S. State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism

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[662] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 109.
[663] Ibid., 109-110.

(something that would enhance its international stature and perhaps attract much needed western economic investment in Iran). Initially, as indicated earlier, Iran had pressed for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598, and especially the provision on with drawing Iraqi forces to internationally recognized boundaries as a condition for its helping secure release of the western hostages. However in the midst of Gulf War I, Saddam Hussein (in a bid to protect his eastern flank) reached a bilateral agreement with Iran in which the latter's border claims were accepted, all Iraqi troops were withdrawn from Iranian territory and the release of Iranian POWs in Iraq was pledged. In this way, Iran secured the implementation of three provisions of Security Council Resolution 598. Additionally, invading Iraqi troops freed 15 Shi'ite terrorists who had been imprisoned in Kuwait, and whose release had been long demanded by Lebanese Shi'ite groups. These developments helped to at least narrow the list of demands that Iran and Hezbollah had of the United Nations as well as of the western powers, and would bode well for the future of the hostage negotiations.

Pérez de Cuéllar faced an arduous task in mediating the hostage crisis. Along the way, he had to alter his roadmap a few times because of changing priorities on the part of the Iranians, the Americans, and also the Israelis. For example, in June 1991, he proposed a plan whereby "all the western hostages would be freed by their captors, seven Israeli soldiers would be returned to Israel and then all Lebanese being held by Israel would be freed."[664] However either side wanted the other to be the first to deliver in this proposed quid pro quo, largely due to mistrust about the other side's sincerity. Pérez de Cuéllar provided an example of this challenge in his memoir:

> We developed several approaches... one, which became known as 9 plus 2 plus 500, was that the nine Western hostages and two Israeli bodies under Shi'ite control be exchanged for the (500) Lebanese held under Israeli control. Picco briefed General Scowcroft on this plan on June 28 at the White House. Scowcroft thought that if the releases were to be implemented simultaneously, it smacked of a "deal," which was against American policy. If, on the other hand, the release of the 9 plus 2 was to take place first, as I was proposing, the United States was prepared to look at it closely. General Scowcroft said that the United States could not tell the Secretary-General that the release of the Western hostages would be reciprocated; but when Picco suggested

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[664] Ibid., 110.

that the Israelis, at U.S. prompting, could commit themselves to release the Lebanese prisoners; he did not reject the idea. The United States, he stressed, was in favor of the release of all hostages by all parties who held them. Including Israel.[665]

The Israelis on their part also proved intractable. Pérez de Cuéllar had to ask for President Bush's assistance in convincing a skeptical Israel to live up to its side of the bargain. He eventually started negotiating directly with the Israelis, who insisted that they would never accede to the Hezbollah/Iranian demand of freeing all Lebanese hostages under their custody unless the other side helped them fulfill the "sacred duty" of securing the return of missing Israeli soldiers, or their bodies if they were deceased.[666] What followed a long and arduous process of "give and take" whereby the Israelis would release Lebanese prisoners in a phased manner in exchange for evidence concerning the fate of its POWs and MIAs.

Giandomenico Picco was the "primary figure"[667] in all the mediation activities that took place on the ground. He traveled extensively into Iran, Lebanon, and Israel, engaging in secret negotiations with the three entities, sometimes at great personal risk to himself. For the most part, arrangements for the release of the Western hostages were made between Picco himself and Hezbollah groups.[668] The U.N. scholar George Lankevich summarizes Picco's role as follows:

> Picco began an arduous series of trips to Israel designed to win its cooperation in freeing Western hostages; in September British national Brian Ken-nan was freed after Tel Aviv ordered the release of forty Lebanese detainees. Pérez de Cuéllar and Picco deftly juggled the conflicting goals of Israel (to obtain a full accounting of six MIAs in Lebanon), Lebanon (to win freedom for its prisoners), Iran (to enhance its international image and obtain condemnation of Iraqi aggression in 1980), and Western states anxious for their nationals. As inducements to various parties, U.N. diplomats could offer few vague promises of reconstruction loans, Washington's probable release of Iranian assets, or the thanks of the world. Picco had to undergo clandestine

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[665] Ibid., 111.

[666] Ibid., 114.

[667] Lankevich,
the United Nations Under Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, 1982- 1991, 122; Abraham D. Sofaer and George Pratt Shultz, Taking on Iran : Strength, Diplomacy and the Iranian Threat, Updat ed., Vol. 637 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2013); Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'Allah in Lebanon : The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). are some of the third parties that confirm this aside from Picco and Cuellar.

[668] Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir, 122.

meetings with Hezbollah, during which he was forced to change cars, negotiate with masked men, and endure interminable delays. He flew thousands of miles to attend sessions in which he himself could become a hostage.[669]

Picco proved to be a trusted negotiator for all sides; he never visited Beirut "without securing the release of some hostage" and ultimately secured the forensic evidence that the Israelis were asking for in relation to their MIA soldiers.[670] He was the central mediator on the ground throughout this entire process, and personally received the released hostages who were released in trickles of one or two at a time.[671] Pérez de Cuéllar described the role of his Personal Envoy as that of a skilful mediator as opposed to just a conduit in the following way:

> I must emphasize here that while the Iranians exercised strong influence on Hezbollah and the underground groups associated with it, their control was not complete. The groups required some direct persuasion—they needed to use an American term, to be massaged. The details of the releases also had to be worked out. This is the task that Picco accomplished with remarkable skill and a great deal of courage...I can say here that he put his life on the line venturing to meetings in Lebanon that even the Israelis, who are no strangers to that country, counseled against.[672]

Picco went through many painstaking maneuvers to mediate with the shadowy figures behind Hezbollah. He describes one of his meetings with the leader of one the Hezbollah affiliated terrorist groups, who he had to meet in the Shiite part of Beirut by walking alone to a pick up point:

> It was 1AM Beirut, not the best time to be strolling alone in Western clothes through the Shiite area of town. I had to think about being picked up by the "wrong" people. Some of my handlers had occasionally expressed regret for the treatment I had to endure. There was rarely any communication with the handlers aside from grunted orders as "get out" or "down." Until I would actually arrive at the rendezvous and find myself facing Abdullah, I always had the secret fear that the cars, handlers, and drivers represented not Abdullah and his groups but some splinter group that had come to kidnap me for its own reasons. They could have been the Hammadis, who, I

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[669] Lankevich,
the United Nations Under Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, 1982- 1991, 122.
[670] Ibid., 122.
[671] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 124.
[672] Ibid., 124.

learned a few months later, wanted to kill me because I could not free their relatives in Germany.[673]

"Carrots" Approach vis-à-vis Iran and Hezbollah

Pérez de Cuéllar put the limited political leverage he had over Iran and Hezbollah to good use in pushing the negotiations forward; he used three "carrot" strategies to nudge the two entities forward with the hostage releases:

First, he took advantage of the fact that the Iranians had been pressing him to visit Tehran as part of their attempt to gain increased stature vis-à-vis the West; he would make his visit in September 1991 and meet with Rafsanjani in person after the Iranians had started to secure the release of some hostages. A detailed account[674] of this meeting is provided in Pérez de Cuéllar's memoir.

Second, as alluded to earlier, the Iranians wanted the Secretary-General to deliver an official U.N. position blaming Iraq for the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. Pérez de Cuéllar writes that he "arranged for several highly reputable European scholars to prepare an independent report on the origins of the war with the idea that I would use their report as the basis for my own report to the Security Council; I had little doubt that the scholars would conclude that Iraq bore the major blame."[675] He however held back the release of the report as a possible bargaining chip because the hostages were being released in trickles from Lebanon.[676]

Third, he used his leverage to gradually accede to a Hezbollah-Iranian request for a revival of a U.N. reconstruction program for Lebanon, which had been halted some years earlier due to an increase in violence. The Hezbollah spiritual leader Fadlallah had specifically asked whether the program be revived and U.N. funds made available.

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[673] Picco, *Man without a Gun : One Diplomat's Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War*, 209.
[674] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 120-121.
[675] Ibid., 111.
[676] Lankevich,
the United Nations Under Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, 1982- 1991, 122-123.

Pérez de Cuéllar describes how he offered this "carrot" in the context of the hostage crisis:

> Unspoken was the implication that this could facilitate progress on the hostages. Since the aid program had been authorized by the General Assembly and the need for it in Lebanon had grown rather than diminished, I did not feel that the provision of reconstruction funds would constitute payment for the hostages. So I authorized Picco to inform his Lebanese interlocutors that I had contacted the major donors and had received indications of readiness to contribute to the reconstruction of Lebanon. The U.N. fund that had been established for this purpose would be used for the benefit of all communities. Picco also informed them that I had requested the former Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, to serve as my Special Representative for Lebanese Reconstruction.[677]

Later on during the crisis, the Lebanon U.N. fund would be replenished by European funds as part of an effort to obtain the release of some German hostages also being held captive in Lebanon.[678] This "carrots" approach strategy paid immediate dividends: Islamic Jihad, one of the groups associated with Hezbollah, "issued a communique that it intended to send an envoy" to meet with Pérez de Cuéllar, and that envoy turned out to be one of the hostages, John McCarthy, a young Irishman; a few days later, American hostage Edward Austin Tracy and a Frenchman, Jerome Leyraud, who had been seized only three days before apparently by a group that was opposed to the hostage releases, were also freed.[679]

6.3.3: Cruciality of Pérez de Cuéllar's Stature

Throughout these negotiations, the Secretary-General's stature was of utmost importance in ensuring progress. As was noted earlier, the Iranian president as well as the spiritual leader of Hezbollah had both expressed a preference to have Pérez de Cuéllar as the mediator for this crisis. This subsection provides a few anecdotes that demonstrate the extent to which Pérez de Cuéllar's stature made him the most favorable individual to mediate this crisis.

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[677] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 113.
[678] Ibid., 123-124.
[679] Ibid., 113.

The first anecdote comes from the release of John McCarthy, an Irish hostage was freed in the immediate aftermath of Pérez de Cuéllar's decision to revive the U.N.'s Lebanon reconstruction program. He carried with him a lengthy letter from the Islamic Jihad which, in spite of containing anti-U.N. polemics, contained an operative sentence that read as follows:

> Convinced that it is necessary to act in order to liberate our fighters who are rotting in the prisons of occupied Palestine and of Europe and to resolve the affair of the persons we hold, we ask that you [the Secretary-General] work personally, within the framework of a global solution, for the liberation of all of those detained in the world. In this case, we would be ready to bring to an end the process that we have begun today and to liberate within 24 hours the persons whom we hold.[680]

In addition, McCarthy also brought Pérez de Cuéllar an oral message to the effect that Hezbollah was eager to end the hostage problem, and that the Islamic Jihad specifically sought the Secretary-General's involvement alone (as a mediator).[681]

A second and perhaps more poignant anecdote come from the memoir of Giandomenico Picco. He describes one of his rendezvous' with the Beirut shadowy terrorist groups in which, in his own words, his life was spared because he was a representative of the Secretary-General and not of the Security Council:

> For about a half hour, I had the feeling that they were driving around and around to disorient me. Eventually we stopped, and before releasing the pressure, they slid a hood over my head... I found myself in a room with walls completely draped in anonymous white sheets.... I was told to remove my shoes. While my clothes and gear were being inspected, I was quickly frisked for weapons... Then he asked me a question unexpected in this environment, one that revealed a political sophistication: "Who sends you? Is it the Secretary-General or the Security Council?"... The question was, in fact, so serious that had I given the wrong answer, I could have paid for it dearly. If I replied that I had been sent by the Security Council, I would have been putting myself at risk, for that implied working for one of the major powers- the permanent five members of the Council. I replied truthfully, stating that I had been sent by the Secretary-General. My interlocutor was obviously pleased. "That is why you are here and why we will be dealing with you. If you had not come from the Secretary-General, then we would have had a problem.[682]

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[680] Ibid., 113 See alsoLankevich,
the United Nations Under Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, 1982- 1991, 122.
[681] Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace : A Secretary-General's Memoir*, 113-114.
[682] Picco, *Man without a Gun : One Diplomat's Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War*, 160-161.

Such was the stature that Pérez de Cuéllar the person and also the Office of the U.N. Secretary-General enjoyed in the eyes of both the Iranians and the Hezbollah affiliated terrorist groups, a stature that no western politician or representative could ever have hoped to enjoy. Picco later wrote a Foreign Affairs article is which he opined that such stature came from two attributes- credibility and no vested interests:

> To have no army and no central bank is no witness. Because the Secretary General's institution does not carry with it those basic tools of states, its strength and effectiveness derive mainly from the lack of traditional vested interests and from credibility. Years after the hostage- taking saga in Lebanon was over, some of those who had been engaged in the practice were asked why the Secretary General's office was chosen as the instrument of resolution instead of a state. The answer was quick and clear: credibility and no vested interests. I can attest more personally than is comfortable to the truth of that response. During the course of the Secretary General's operation that led to the release of 11 Western and 91 Lebanese hostages, the recovery of the remains of two Americans, and the identification of the remains of two Israelis, I met several times as the U.N. negotiator with the hostage-takers under unorthodox circumstances. One of the first questions asked me was whether I was an emissary of the Secretary General or the Security Council. I gave the right answer. Had I said "the Security Council," as I was subsequently informed, I would have been killed.[683]

6.3.4: Outcome and White House Acclaim

In November 1991 the United States agreed to pay $278 million as compensation to Iran for military equipment purchased by the Shah's regime but never delivered. The U.N. finally released its report affirming that Iraqi aggression had precipitated the Gulf War of 1980. Later in December, the final month of Pérez de Cuéllar's tenure as U.N. Secretary-General, the bodies of the last two unaccounted for American hostages were discovered in Lebanon. In the end, each crisis actor attained at least some of its goals. Lankevich summarize the win-win dynamics in the following way:

> "a Secretary-General trusted by all and his Personal Envoy with access to all parties had successfully negotiated a puzzle thought to be insoluble, western lives had been saved, Iran had regained some stature, Israel received vital information on its MIAs, and Hezbollah's secret power was enhanced."[684]

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[683] Picco, *The U.N. and the use of Force: Leave the Secretary General Out of it*, 16.
[684] Lankevich,
the United Nations Under Javier Pérez De Cuéllar, 1982- 1991, 123.

What the Lebanon Hostages Crisis shows us is that there are unique circumstances in which even the most powerful country in the world will need the Secretary-General's good offices and actually put them to good use in advancing its interests. As an affirmation of this fact, Pérez de Cuéllar and Picco were honored at a White House ceremony- Pérez de Cuéllar received the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom, and Picco received the U.S. Presidential Award for Exceptional Service. President Bush referred to Pérez de Cuéllar as "the man who made the hostage release his personal responsibility, a man whose life work in service to humanitarian ideals has won him honor the world over..."[685] The exact citation for Picco's award read as follows:

> The United States honors Mr. Picco in recognition of his distinguished role in facilitating the release of hostages held in Lebanon. His skillful diplomacy with Middle Eastern governments and officials and representatives of the hostage holders has resulted in freedom for many individuals held in the region outside the due process of law, including six Americans... His personal courage in the face of danger and his dedication to the mission represent the best tradition of international civil service.[686]

6.3.5: Reflections on Pérez de Cuéllar Role

As indicated earlier, this case study is not an exhaustive account of the events that occurred over the course of the Lebanon hostage crisis. Such an account would be too long for this project; besides, books[687] been written about this story not only by Picco himself but also by some of the former hostages involved.

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[685] George H.W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, "Remarks on Presenting the Medal of Freedom and the Presidential Award for Exceptional Service to United Nations Officials, 12/12/1991. ," http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=3740&year=1991&month=12 (accessed May 6, 2014).

[686] Ibid.

[687] See Picco, *Man without a Gun : One Diplomat's Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War*, 334; Joseph Cicippio and Richard W. Hope, *Chains to Roses : The Joseph Cicippio Story* (Waco, Tex.: WRS Pub., 1993), 202; Terry Waite, *Taken on Trust* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1993), 370.

The enormity of what Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar and his Personal Envoy Giandomenico Picco achieved during the hostages crisis is perhaps best understood when one quotes from the memoirs of some of the hostages were freed in Lebanon. Joseph J. Cicippio, for example, who spent 5 years in captivity, made the following testimonial about Picco's role:

> Picco knew...how perilous his mission was, and yet he agreed to meet with the various leaders of the kidnap groups. He was never threatened, but later learned that he had come close to being abducted after Israel apparently reneged on a promise to free Shia prisoners who were being held in Israel.... My feeling is that he, more than any other diplomat or government go-between, helped solve the hostage problem. To me, Giandomenico Picco is a true hero.[688]

Another freed hostage, Terry White, wrote his own memoir in which he stated: "Senor Picco is a brave and modest man to whom we owe much..."[689] In the end, all the western hostages in Lebanon were freed.

Ultimately, the Lebanon case study demonstrates that the Secretary-General's autonomous initiatives are not limited to "Scenario A" dynamics where strong P-5 parochial interests collide with strong collective U.N. Charter interests. They can also occur in "Scenario B" situations where strong parochial P-5 interests are coupled with weak U.N. Charter interests. The Secretary-General is capable of asserting autonomy in conflicts that elicit strong parochial P-5 interests even when he does not have the support of the majority of the member-states and when the U.N. Charter argument might be harder to make. It also shows that his stature and leverage are not limited to the way nation-states view him; his Office carries an aura of neutrality and impartiality that makes him an important bridge between the powerful states and non-state actors that they would otherwise not be able to negotiate with directly. There is also an important lesson for mediation scholars from this case- how to negotiate with nebulous non-state actors who may not be as receptive to traditional mediation

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[688] Cicippio and Hope, *Chains to Roses : The Joseph Cicippio Story*, 131.
[689] Waite, *Taken on Trust*, xi.

strategies that have worked with state actors and more established non-state actors like rebel groups involved in major civil wars.

Closing Remarks

In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the U.N. Secretary-General has the ability to exert autonomy in instances of P-5 deadlock, irrespective of any P-5 opposition or misgivings, and to actually be effective under such circumstances. The U.S.-China hostages crisis in particular has shed more light on the "Hammarskjöld effect" that we found in our MIDs autonomy tests of Chapter 5; Dag Hammarskjöld was able to successfully navigate the otherwise perilous path of P-5 deadlock and attain a *Man with no Name* stature for himself by exploiting P-5 deadlock to enhance the stature and scope of his office.

Hammarskjöld succeeded thanks in part to a carefully orchestrated intervention strategy that avoided the pitfalls that befell his predecessor Trygve Lie, whose public and openly anti-Russian tone during the Korean War effectively ended his tenure as Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld on the other hand proceeded on the cautious path of public neutrality, a proactive strategy that involved traveling to a capital a capital city of a non-member state for negotiations, and also re-interpreting the U.N. Charter beyond what the original of framers had intended to good effect. What he achieved during this crisis not only validates the institutionalist and principal agent theory predictions, but also set the tone for his future successors who openly referred to his accomplishments during this crisis as their motivation for their own efforts, e.g. Kofi Annan and his trip to Baghdad in 1997. Pérez de Cuéllar's accomplishments in Lebanon, as already noted, demonstrate that the Secretary-General is capable of asserting autonomy and being effective in "Scenario B" situations where strong parochial P-5 interests are coupled with weak U.N. Charter interests.

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There cannot be a better selection of cases than these three because they involved one or both superpowers, and straddle across three different Secretaries-General. I deliberately avoided selecting cases where the P-5 parochial interest was weak, i.e. "Scenario C" or "Scenario D" cases because a public intervention/autonomy in those instances is more intuitive and does little to resolve the realist/institutionalist debate that is at the core of our study. It was only fitting that we examined high-profile interventions in crises where one or more superpowers had a lot at stake, and the intervention in itself was a risk on the part of the Secretary-General in terms of either getting sanctioned by the P-5 state/s in question, or losing face if his intervention had resulted otherwise. These three case studies prove, very convincingly, that the Secretary-General of the United Nations is an autonomous actor whose actions are primarily driven by the U.N. Charter, and who will intervene in crises if there is enough U.N. Charter impetus to do so, irrespective of opposition by one or more P-5 states.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications

7.1: Main Contributions of the Dissertation

The empirical findings from the thesis have revealed the following:

First, the thesis has demonstrated that both P-5 and U.N. Charter variables have significant effects on the Secretary-General's intervention behavior, and that broadly speaking, P-5 involvement and/or strong parochial interest in any conflict reduces the likelihood and intensity of the Secretary-General's action. That said, the U.N. Charter variables also matter in their own right and not only on the margin after one takes realism into account- they are actually better at statistically and substantively predicting outcomes, although this is likely because a number of them are continuous, compared to the dichotomous P-5 variables.

More importantly however, the P-5 conflict finding from the above paragraph masks two different phenomena. First, whenever the P-5 are involved and/or have a strong parochial interest in a conflict (e.g. "P-5 vs. P-5" conflict, "P-5 vs. Other" conflict, or "P-5 border" conflict), the probability of Secretary-General intervening based on a Security Council mandate goes down. As a matter of fact, we do not observe any mandated/requested interventions in P-5 vs. P-5 cases in the inter-state conflict data. This is very much in line with the realist predictions. On the other hand though, in the absence of a P-5 mandate, these conditions do lead to an increased probability of the SG taking some action on his own. Aside from these two phenomena, we also find evidence of SG autonomy in instances of P-5 preference convergence (although not as strong as that of P-5 mandated interventions under similar circumstances), a finding that points to the possibility that the Secretary-General exerts formal autonomy as a principle and not as an opportunistic strategy based on conflict-specific P-5 dynamics.

Further, statistical as well as substantive results from the inter-state conflict data indicates that the Secretary-General's autonomous public interventions occurred for the most part during the Cold War era, when the P-5 relations were largely deadlocked. This is a rather important finding in that it conforms to the traditional principal-agent theory prediction that an agent is more likely to assert autonomy whenever a multiple principal is deadlocked. In this context, there is also some significant evidence in support of the "Hammarskjöld effect": Dag Hammarskjöld, who served as Secretary-General at the height of the Cold War (1953-1961), was the most autonomous of all the Secretaries-General when it came to public interventions in international conflict and crises. He was least likely among all the Secretaries-General to make a public intervention with the explicit or tacit approval of the P-5.

The core contribution of the thesis is therefore as follows: P-5 involvement and/or strong parochial interest in a conflict is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of a Security Council mandated intervention, but with an increase in the likelihood of an autonomous intervention without a mandate. The climate of relations among the P-5 also has an effect on the Secretary-General's propensity for autonomy- he is more likely to assert autonomy during period of P-5 animosity than he is during periods of P-5 unanimity. It is therefore logical to conclude that the realist assertion of the Secretary-General staying out of P-5 conflicts is rather simplistic and needs to take into account the possible alternative sets of outcomes once we isolate the autonomous interventions from the Security Council mandate interventions. This result demonstrates a mechanism of autonomy in the face of P-5 conflict and validates the predictions from principal-agent theory. This outcome will not only surprise many realist scholars but also a lot of U.N. critics and skeptics.

Collectively, these findings challenge the notion that the Secretary General of the United Nations is simply a puppet of the great powers. On the contrary, they show that he is more likely to intervene in difficult or severe cases, often without the explicit, let al.one implicit approval of the P-5. In other words, the Secretary General

is able to advance the principles of the U.N. Charter in spite of the material limitations of his Office, and also the realities of a world that is heavily influenced and shaped by the (indispensable) great powers.

7.2: Policy Implications

Empirically, this study has two main implications for policy makers.

First, this study provided empirical evidence of the Secretary-General's autonomy as well as relevance in conflict diplomacy. Until this study not much was known, at least methodologically speaking, about the U.N. Secretary-General's proclivity for impartiality when it comes to his choices (and in this instance, especially the autonomous choices) of which conflicts to intervene in. As noted in the introduction, impartiality and bias play an important role in determining the success of third-party conflict management efforts. We now have strong evidence that the U.N. Secretary-General is an actor who is more likely than not to fulfill the mandate of his Office and advance the cause of the U.N. Charter. At the end of the day, the U.N. is a major and relevant force in the realm of conflict diplomacy.

Second, this study provides a basis for advocates of the United Nations to push for greater resourcing as well as promotion of this institution as a principal forum for addressing matters of international peace and security. The U.N. Reform agenda is still a work in progress, and debate continues to rage among the U.N.'s advocates as well as its detractors about its efficacy, with unforeseen but potentially profound consequences for the Organization's legitimacy and future from the perspective of its member states. In recent years, some skeptics have even called for the U.N.'s dissolution in favor of regional or ideological arrangements. This study however shows that there is an argument to be made for the U.N.'s historical relevance as well as potential relevance as we head into a multipolar 21st century. There is an argument

to be made for greater financial and logistical resourcing of the Organization and especially the mediatory role of the Secretary-General.

7.3: Recommendations for Future Research

As far as future research on the topic, I would first of all suggest a qualitative investigation into the content and substance of the Secretary-General's autonomous public interventions. Of particular importance would be the question of what challenges and constraints the Secretary-General faces whenever he decides to autonomously intervene in a conflict or crisis (especially when there is active opposition from one or more P-5 states), and how he ultimately overcomes those obstacles.

U.N. scholars have highlighted some of the substantive constraints that the Office of the Secretary-General faces especially when dispatching SRSGs into the field, e.g. inadequate staffing and funding both at headquarters and in the field missions. One senior Secretariat official who served as an SRSG made the following observation in context: "...*the staffing situation is deplorable- no start up; no backup; never enough personnel; never sufficient resources.*"[690] To add to this complexity, SRSGs who are appointed from within the upper echelons of the U.N. Secretariat are seldom relieved of their Secretariat responsibilities. The SRSG tasks are just an addition to their other duties.

Against this background, a core objective of a future study could be to compare and contrast the implementation of the P-5 approved and autonomous interventions, specifically focusing on whether there are differences in funding/resourcing between the two, and ultimately whether a lack of political (and perhaps material) support from the P-5 significantly affects or even hinders the execution of the autonomous missions.

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[690] Puchala, *The Secretary-General and His Special Representatives*, 94.

This would help provide some answers to the ultimate question of whether the backing of the great powers is an essential or even necessary ingredient for the Secretary-General's odds of success, or whether the United Nations has enough leverage as an institution to autonomously succeed in many situations.

More importantly, there is a need to study the efficacy and effectiveness of the Secretary-General's public interventions. Now that we know he is capable of acting autonomously, the next question that needs to be answered is whether his interventions are effective in terms of altering the outcome of international conflicts and crises. The thesis has focused on the circumstances under which the Secretary-General may intervene in international conflicts and crises; it did not delve into the question of how effective those interventions are.

A study on the Secretary-General's effectiveness would be important for two main reasons:

First, there is no systematic evidence in political science literature thus far that indicates that the abstract principles of the U.N. Charter and the dispatch of U.N. mediators have great practical utility in peacemaking situations.[691] To put this point in context, it would be misleading to attribute the late 1980s Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan or the end of the Iran-Iraq war solely or even largely to the efforts of Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar because there were other, perhaps more important, geopolitical dynamics at play in those two situations, e.g. mounting Soviet casualties, Mujahidin intractability, and internal U.S.S.R. political dynamics in the case of Afghanistan, plus political will on the part of Iran and Iraq to end their war which by the late 1980s has resulted in a stalemate. Thus, how consequential or effective the Secretary-General was in these two examples is a difficult dynamic to measure.

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[691] Puchala, Ibid., also echoes this point.

Similarly, in many of the post-Cold War instances where Secretaries-General have, through their SRSGs, played a role in helping bring an end to civil wars and international crises; it is not easy to discern the extent of their influence and contribution, at least from a quantitative angle. As such, evidence of the normative and practical influence and/or impact of the U.N. Secretary-General remains ambiguous, and demands further research.

Second, the need for an effectiveness study of the Secretary-General's Office points to a key question facing all mediation scholars: that of producing evidence that third party mediation by itself succeeds in moving disputing parties to settle their differences. As noted in the literature review in Chapter 1, international relations scholars are divided on this issue. Puchala (1993) poignantly notes that as a general rule, conciliation and mediation tend to produce specific results only after one or more of three factors come into play: first a desire by the disputing parties themselves to settle the dispute, as was the case in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Iran-Iraq in the 1980s; second when the great power patrons of the disputants begin to exert pressure for dispute settlement, again, as was the case in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Iran-Iraq, and Namibia, and third whenever one of the disputants is satisfied with gains made at the same time that the other side wants no further losses, as was the case in the Iran-Iraq war.

The overarching point here is that even the most talented and dedicated mediators can only do so much to halt a conflict if the disputants themselves or their great-power backers have little interest in resolving that conflict. As such, the Secretary-General's public interventions should be viewed not only in the context of their potential and their successes, but also in the context of their limitations- they are just one of many factors that may contribute to the pacific settlement of a conflict or crisis. In other words, the Secretary-General may be more likely to succeed when other variables align in his favor- and these are the dynamics future researchers should explore in greater detail.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: List of International Crisis Intervention Cases

(Note- for Militarized Inter-State Dispute (MID) data, please contact the author)

Crisis Name	Year	SG Intervention Type	Autonomous Intervention?
GREEK CIVIL WAR	1946	High Profile SG Himself	No
AZERBAIJAN	1946	Low Level	Yes
INDONESIAN INDEP. I	1946	Low Level	Yes
MARSHALL PLAN	1947	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
INDONESIAN INDEP. II	1947	High Profile SG Himself	No
KASHMIR I	1947	SRSG	No
PAL. PRT./ISRAEL IND.	1947	SRSG	No
INDONESIAN INDEP. III	1948	High Profile SG Himself	No
COMMUNISM IN CZECH.	1948	Low Level	Yes
BERLIN BLOCKADE	1948	Low Level	Yes
SINAI INCURSION	1948	SRSG	No
SOV. BLOC-YUGOSLAVIA	1949	Low Level	Yes
KOREAN WAR II	1950	Low Level	Yes
KOREAN WAR I	1950	SRSG	Yes
HULA DRAINAGE	1951	Low Level	Yes
PUNJAB WAR SCARE II	1951	SRSG	No
QIBYA	1953	High Profile SG Himself	No
BURMA INFILTRATION	1953	Low Level	Yes
GUATEMALA	1953	Low Level	Yes
TAIWAN STRAIT I	1954	Low Level	Yes
GAZA RAID-CZECH ARMS	1955	High Profile SG Himself	No
QALQILYA	1956	Low Level	Yes

HUNGARIAN UPRISING	1956	Low Level	Yes
SUEZ NATN.-WAR	1956	SRSG	Yes
FRANCE/TUNISIA	1957	Low Level	Yes
IRAQ/LEB. UPHEAVAL	1958	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
BERLIN DEADLINE	1958	Low Level	Yes
FORMATION OF UAR	1958	SRSG	Yes
CAMBODIA/THAILAND	1958	SRSG	Yes
GHANA/TOGO BORDER I	1960	SRSG	Yes
CONGO I- KATANGA	1960	SRSG	No
BIZERTA	1961	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
GOA II	1961	Low Level	Yes
WEST IRIAN II	1961	SRSG	Yes
CUBAN MISSILES	1962	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
YEMEN WAR I	1962	SRSG	Yes
MALAYSIA FEDERATION	1963	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
KENYA/SOMALIA	1963	Low Level	Yes
CYPRUS I	1963	SRSG	No
JORDAN WATERS	1963	SRSG	No
BURUNDI/RWANDA	1963	SRSG	Yes
OGADEN I	1964	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
YEMEN WAR II	1964	Low Level	Yes
GULF OF TONKIN	1964	Low Level	Yes
YEMEN WAR III	1964	Low Level	Yes
GUINEA REGIME	1965	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
PLEIKU	1965	Low Level	Yes
RANNOFKUTCH	1965	SRSG	No
DOMINICAN INTERVENTION	1965	SRSG	No
KASHMIR II	1965	SRSG	No
YEMEN WAR IV	1966	Low Level	Yes
EL SAMU	1966	SRSG	Yes
SIX DAY WAR	1967	SRSG	No
CYPRUS II	1967	SRSG	No
ESSEQUIBO I	1968	High Profile SG Himself	Yes

TET OFFENSIVE	1968	Low Level	Yes
PRAGUE SPRING	1968	Low Level	Yes
KARAMEH	1968	SRSG	No
BEIRUT AIRPORT	1968	SRSG	No
SHATT-AL-ARAB II	1969	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
VIETNAM SPRING OFF.	1969	Low Level	Yes
WAR OF ATTRITION	1969	Low Level	Yes
FOOTBALL WAR	1969	Low Level	Yes
INVASION OF CAMBODIA	1970	Low Level	Yes
BLACK SEPTEMBER	1970	SRSG	No
INVASION OF LAOS II	1971	Low Level	Yes
BANGLADESH	1971	SRSG	No
VIETNAM PORTS MINING	1972	Low Level	Yes
OCT. KIPPUR WAR	1973	SRSG	No
FINAL N. VIETNAM OFF	1974	Low Level	Yes
CYPRUS III	1974	SRSG	No
MAYAGUEZ	1975	Low Level	Yes
WAR IN ANGOLA	1975	Low Level	Yes
BELIZE I	1975	Low Level	Yes
MOROCCAN MARCH	1975	SRSG	No
EAST TIMOR I	1975	SRSG	No
LEB. CIVIL WAR	1976	Low Level	Yes
FRENCH HOSTAGES MAUR.	1977	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
OGADEN I	1977	Low Level	Yes
VIETNAM INV./CAMBODIA	1977	Low Level	Yes
MAPAI SEIZURE	1977	SRSG	No
RHODESIA RAID	1977	SRSG	No
CHIMOIO-TEMBUE RAIDS	1977	SRSG	No
SINO/VIETNAM WAR	1978	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
FALL OF AMIN	1978	Low Level	Yes
ANGOLA INVASION SCARE	1978	Low Level	Yes
CASSINGA INCIDENT	1978	SRSG	Yes
AIR RHODESIA INCIDENT	1978	SRSG	Yes

CHAD/LIBYA IV	1979	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
US HOSTAGES IN IRAN	1979	High Profile SG Himself	No
NORTH/SOUTH YEMEN II	1979	Low Level	Yes
SOVIET THREAT/PAK.	1979	Low Level	Yes
RAID ON ANGOLA	1979	Low Level	Yes
RAID ON SWAPO	1979	SRSG	No
AFGHANISTAN INVASION	1979	SRSG	Yes
OPERATION SMOKES HELL	1980	Low Level	Yes
LIBYA/MALTA OIL DISP.	1980	SRSG	Yes
ONSET IRAN/IRAQ WAR	1980	SRSG	Yes
IRAQ NUCLEAR REACTOR	1981	High Profile SG Himself	No
ESSEQUIBO II	1981	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
OPERATION PROTEA	1981	Low Level	Yes
FALKLANDS/MALVINAS	1982	High Profile SG Himself	No
WAR IN LEBANON	1982	High Profile SG Himself	No
KHORAMS HAHR	1982	SRSG	No
SINO/VIETNAM CLASHES	1984	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
VIET./INCURSIN./THLND	1984	Low Level	Yes
BASRA-KHARG ISLAND	1984	SRSG	No
BOTSWANA RAID	1985	High Profile SG Himself	No
BURKINA FASO/MALI BDR	1985	Low Level	Yes
CHAD/LIBYA VII	1986	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
SA CROSS BORDER RAID	1986	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
CAPTURE OF AL-FAW	1986	SRSG	No
THREE VILLAGE BDR. II	1987	Low Level	Yes
IRAQ RECAPTURE-AL-FAW	1988	SRSG	No
CAMBODIA PEACE	1989	High Profile SG	Yes

CONF.		Himself	
CONTRAS IV	1989	SRSG	No
GALTAT ZEMMOUR II	1989	SRSG	No
GULF WAR	1990	SRSG	No
NAGORNYY-KABARAKH	1991	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
YUG. I-CROAT./SLOVEN.	1991	SRSG	No
BUBIYAN	1991	SRSG	No
PAPUA/SOLOMON	1992	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
YUG. II-BOSNIA	1992	SRSG	No
IRAQ NO-FLY ZONE	1992	SRSG	No
GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA	1992	SRSG	No
N. KOREA NUCLEAR CR 1	1993	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
OPTN. ACCOUNTABILITY	1993	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
HAITI MIL. REGIME	1994	SRSG	No
RED SEA ISLANDS	1995	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
DESERT STRIKE	1996	Low Level	Yes
ZAIRE CIVIL WAR	1996	SRSG	No
UNSCOM I	1997	High Profile SG Himself	Yes
US EMBASSY BOMBINGS	1998	Low Level	Yes
SYRIA/TURKEY	1998	Low Level	Yes
CYPRUS/TURKEY MISSILE	1998	SRSG	No
ERITREA/ETHIOPIA I	1998	SRSG	No
IND/PAK NUCLEAR TESTS	1998	SRSG	No
DRC CIVIL WAR	1998	SRSG	No
UNSCOM II	1998	SRSG	No
KARGIL	1999	Low Level	Yes
KOSOVO	1999	SRSG	No
EAST TIMOR II	1999	SRSG	No
AFGHANISTAN/US	2001	Low Level	Yes
INDIA PARLMNT ATTACK	2001	Low Level	Yes
KALUCHAK	2002	Low Level	Yes
IRAQ REGIME CHANGE	2002	Low Level	Yes

N KOREA NUCLEAR II	2002	SRSG	Yes
IRAN NUCLEAR I	2003	Low Level	Yes
HAIFA SUICIDE BOMBING	2003	SRSG	No
DRC/RWANDA	2004	SRSG	No
ETHIOPIA/ERITREA II	2005	SRSG	No
CHAD-SUDAN I	2005	SRSG	No
ISRAEL LEBANON WAR I	2006	High Profile SG Himself	No
IRAN NUCLEAR II	2006	Low Level	Yes
N KOREA NUCLEAR III	2006	Low Level	Yes
CHAD-SUDAN II	2006	SRSG	No
ETHIOPIA INT./SOMALIA	2006	SRSG	No
CHAD-SUDAN III	2007	SRSG	No
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA III	2007	SRSG	No
CHAD-SUDAN IV	2007	SRSG	No

Appendix B: List of Civil War Intervention Cases

Country Name	Conflict	Start Year	SG Intervention Type
India-partition	Kashmir	1946	P-5 Mandate
Israel-Palest.	Israel-Paletinian Conflict	1947	P-5 Mandate
Korea	Korea	1950	Autonomous
Indonesia-Mol.	Rep. S. Moluccas	1950	P-5 Mandate
Lebanon	Nasserites v. Chamoun	1958	Autonomous
Laos	Pathet Lao	1960	Autonomous
Congo/Zaire	Katanga, Kasai, Kwilu, Eastern	1960	P-5 Mandate
Yemen-N/Arab Rep	South Yemen	1962	Autonomous
Cyprus	GC-TC civil war	1963	P-5 Mandate
Rwanda	Tutsi uprising	1963	Autonomous
Dominican Rep.	Mil. coup	1965	P-5 Mandate
India-Kashmir	Sikhs	1965	P-5 Mandate
Namibia	SWAPO; SWANU; SWATF	1965	P-5 Mandate
Nigeria-Biafra	Biafra	1967	Autonomous
Pakistan-Bngl.	Bangladesh secession	1971	Autonomous
Jordan	Fedeyeen/Syria v. govt	1971	P-5 Mandate
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia	ZANU, ZAPU	1972	P-5 Mandate
Bangladesh--Hill	Bangladesh-Hill	1973	Autonomous
Cyprus	TCs; GCs; Turkish invasion	1974	P-5 Mandate

Ethiopia-ideol	Ogaden; Somalis	1974	Autonomous
Guatemala	Guatemala	1974	P-5 Mandate
Lebanon	Aoun; militias; PLO; Israel	1975	P-5 Mandate
Indonesia-East Tim.	OPM (West Papua)	1975	P-5 Mandate
Morocco/WestSah	Polisario	1975	P-5 Mandate
South Africa	ANC, PAC, Azapo	1976	P-5 Mandate
Ethiopia-Ogaden	Ideological; Tigrean	1977	Autonomous
Colombia	FARC, ELN, drug cartels, etc	1978	Autonomous
Afghanistan	Mujahideen, PDPA	1978	P-5 Mandate
El Salvador	FMLN	1979	P-5 Mandate
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, etc	1979	Autonomous
Mozambique	RENAMO; FRELIMO	1979	P-5 Mandate
Nicaragua	Contras & Miskitos	1981	P-5 Mandate
Lebanon	Lebanon	1982	P-5 Mandate
Sudan	SPLM, SPLA, NDA, AnyanyaII	1983	Autonomous
Burma	Burma	1983	Autonomous
Israel	Intifada; Palestinian conflict	1987	P-5 Mandate
Iraq-Kurds	KDP, PUK (Kurds)	1988	P-5 Mandate
Papua NG	BRA (Bougainville)	1988	Autonomous
Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh	1988	Autonomous
Somalia	SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs)	1988	Autonomous
Liberia	Doe v. rebels	1989	P-5 Mandate

Rwanda	Hutu vs. Tutsi groups	1990	P-5 Mandate
Iraq-Shiites	Kurds; Anfal	1991	P-5 Mandate
Georgia-Abkhazia	South Ossetia	1991	P-5 Mandate
Burundi	Hutu groups v. govt	1991	Autonomous
Haiti	Haiti	1991	P-5 Mandate
Yugoslavia-Croatia	Croatia/Krajina	1991	P-5 Mandate
Sierra Leone	RUF, AFRC, etc.	1991	Autonomous
Iraq	Shiite uprising	1991	P-5 Mandate
Angola	UNITA	1992	P-5 Mandate
Tajikistan	Popular Democratic Army; UTO	1992	P-5 Mandate
Moldova	Transdniestria	1992	Autonomous
Congo Brazzaville	Lissouba v. Sassou-Nguesso	1992	P-5 Mandate
Yugoslavia-Bosnia	Rep. Srpska/Croats	1992	P-5 Mandate
Somalia	post-Barre war	1992	P-5 Mandate
Afghanistan-Taliban	Taliban v. Burhanuddin Rabbani	1993	Autonomous
Liberia	NPLF; ULIMO; NPF; LPC; LDF	1993	P-5 Mandate
Angola	Cabinda; FLEC	1994	P-5 Mandate
Chad	FARF; FROLINAT	1994	P-5 Mandate
Yemen	Faction of Socialist Party	1994	P-5 Mandate
Yugoslavia-Croatia	Krajina, Medak, Western Slavonia	1995	P-5 Mandate

Uganda	LRA, West Nile, ADF, etc.	1995	P-5 Mandate
Haiti	Haiti	1995	P-5 Mandate
Central African Republic	Factional fighting	1995	P-5 Mandate
Nepal	CPN-M/UPF (Maoists)	1996	P-5 Mandate
Afghanistan-Taliban-UF	United Front v. Taliban	1996	P-5 Mandate
Congo/Zaire	AFDL (Kabila)	1996	P-5 Mandate
Angola	UNITA	1997	P-5 Mandate
Sierra Leone	post-Koroma coup violence	1997	P-5 Mandate
Congo Brazzaville	Cobras v. Ninjas	1998	P-5 Mandate
Congo/Zaire	RCD, etc v. govt	1998	P-5 Mandate
Guinea-Bissau	Vieira v. Mane mutiny	1998	P-5 Mandate
Yugoslavia	Kosovo	1998	P-5 Mandate
Liberia	anti-Taylor resistance	1999	P-5 Mandate
Indonesia	Aceh	1999	P-5 Mandate
Israel	Intifada; Palestinian conflict	2000	P-5 Mandate

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